CITY OF SANTA MONICA, Defendant and Appellant,
V.

PICO NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION; MARIA LOYA, Plaintiffs and Respondents.

## CITY OF SANTA MONICA'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF KAHN A. SCOLNICK; AND [PROPOSED] ORDER

After a Decision by the Court of Appeal Second Appellate District, Division Eight, Case No. B295935

Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. BC616804
The Hon. Yvette M. Palazuelos, Judge Presiding
Gov’t Code, § 6103

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## MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The City of Santa Monica respectfully requests that this Court take judicial notice, under Evidence Code sections 452 and 459 and California Rules of Court, rules $8.520(\mathrm{~g})$ and $8.252(\mathrm{a})$, of the following materials, which are cited in the City's answer brief and are relevant to the question whether the City is liable under the California Voting Rights Act:

## I. Certified transcript of oral argument made before Court of Appeal

On June 30, 2020, the Court of Appeal heard oral argument in this case. The City obtained the official audio recording from the Court of Appeal, which was then transcribed by Veritext Legal Solutions and certified as true and accurate on August 31, 2020.

## II. 2020 City Council election results

The City held an at-large election for five open seats on its City Council on November 3, 2020. The results-the official canvass certificates and official statements of votes cast by precinct-are certified as true and correct by the RegistrarRecorder/County Clerk of the County of Los Angeles.

## III. Candidates' addresses or neighborhoods of residence on their candidate statements for the 2020 Council election

Council candidates have the option to make official statements that are presented by the City on its official elections website, smvote.org. Those statements often contain the candidates' addresses or neighborhoods of residence.

The Court may take judicial notice of the documents listed above under California Rules of Court, rules $8.520(\mathrm{~g})$ and 8.252(a). The documents:
(A) are relevant to the City's argument that there is no vote dilution in City Council elections, and responsive to plaintiffs' arguments that "Latino candidates" almost "universally" lose City Council elections in the at-large system, that the Council does not adequately represent the "Pico Neighborhood," and that the at-large system deters minority candidates from running (e.g., OB at 51, 64-65);
(B) were not presented to the trial court, because they postdate the trial court's judgment;
(C) are subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452 , subdivision (h), because the facts they contain "are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy"; and
(D) relate to an oral argument and an election postdating the trial court's judgment.

DATED: March 22, 2021 Respectfully submitted, GIBSON, DUNN \& CRUTCHER LLP

By: /s/Kahn Scolnick Kahn Scolnick<br>Attorneys for Defendant and<br>Appellant City of Santa Monica

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## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Court should take judicial notice of (1) the certified transcript of the oral argument in this case before the Court of Appeal, (2) the official results of the 2020 Santa Monica City Council elections, and (3) the official statements made by the five candidates who won that election, which list those candidates' addresses or neighborhoods of residence.

All of these items are judicially noticeable under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h), because they are "not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy."

All three items are relevant to the issues before this Court. The certified transcript shows the arguments plaintiffs made below, and it highlights the limitations of the arguments they have made here. The election results and the candidate statements show who is currently sitting on the Council, which bears on plaintiffs' claims that certain groups and neighborhoods are under-represented and that their preferred remedy-the districting scheme approved by the trial court-should be implemented without delay.

Specifically, plaintiffs contend that as a result of its atlarge election system, the City has too few Latino representatives and too few representatives who live in the Pico Neighborhood, and that a district-based election system would fix both of those
issues. But the City currently has three Latino Councilmembers and at least two Councilmembers who reside in the Pico Neighborhood, all of whom won or retained their seats in the most recent at-large election. Switching to a district-based system would mean that the City would lose at least one Latino Councilmember and at least one Councilmember from the Pico Neighborhood, since these Councilmembers would be forced to run against each other in a winner-takes-all district.

## II. ARGUMENT

## A. The Court should take judicial notice of the certified transcript of the oral argument before the Court of Appeal.

On June 30, 2020, the Court of Appeal heard oral argument in this case. The City obtained the official audio recording from the Court of Appeal, which was then transcribed by Veritext Legal Solutions and certified as true and accurate on August 31, 2020. (Scolnick Declaration, IIII 1-3.)

The certified reporter's transcript (Scolnick Decl., Exhibit A) is judicially noticeable because it is "not reasonably subject to dispute" and is "capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy." (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) The accuracy of the transcript can be verified against the official audio recording of the oral argument. Courts also regularly take notice of reporter's transcripts. (E.g., People v. Meloney (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1145, 1152, fn. 3.)

The transcript is relevant to the question whether plaintiffs
have proven dilution, an element of the CVRA, and whether plaintiffs' proposed test for dilution is judicially manageable. In its answer brief, the City cites the portion of the transcript in which the Court of Appeal asked plaintiffs' counsel to draw a principled line between valid and invalid claims that a minority group has been denied the right to influence the outcome of elections; counsel was unable to do so. (Ans. Br. at 17 [citing Ex. A at 28-30].)

## B. The Court should take judicial notice of the certified election results of the 2020 election for Santa Monica's City Council.

The City held an at-large election for five open seats-four 4 -year seats and one 2-year seat-on its City Council on November 3, 2020. The winners were Phil Brock, Gleam Davis, Kristin McCowan, Christine Parra, and Oscar de la Torre. Three of those five winning candidates (Councilmembers Davis, Parra, and de la Torre) are Latino. (OB at 25; Ans. Br. at 56; 25AA11156.)

The 2020 election results (Scolnick Decl., Exhibit B) are judicially noticeable because they are "not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy." (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) The election results are certified as true and correct by the Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk of the County of Los Angeles. The results are also readily accessible on a website, www.smvote.org, maintained by the City Clerk for the City of Santa Monica.

The 2020 election results are relevant because this case is about election outcomes-specifically, whether Santa Monica's atlarge election system dilutes the voting strength of Latino voters in City Council elections. Plaintiffs' theory of vote dilution is that Latino voters in Santa Monica prefer only Latino candidates, that Latino candidates have not been elected to the Council in adequate numbers, and that an immediate switch to districts is necessary so that more Latino candidates would be elected. (E.g., OB at 64; see also id. at 57 [urging the Court not to remand to the Court of Appeal but to reinstate the trial court's order requiring a switch to district-based elections, because "[f]urther delay is unnecessary and unwarranted; Santa Monica's Latino community has already waited far too long for their voting rights."].)

The present composition of the Council is relevant in responding to those arguments. As noted above, three of the five winning candidates in the most recent at-large election are Latino.

In addition, the 2020 election results are also relevant to plaintiffs' argument that "at-large election systems often deter minority candidates, who would be preferred by minority voters, from running," such that a switch to districts would encourage more minority candidates to run. (OB at 51.) But in the November 2020 at-large election for a 4 -year Council seat, roughly one-quarter of the candidates ( 5 of 21) were Latino (Davis, Parra, de la Torre, Jara, Muntaner, and Gomez)—nearly double Latinos' $13.6 \%$ share of Santa Monica's voting population.
(See OB at 25; 25AA11103, RT8798:22-23, 25AA11143, 25AA11156; Ans. Br. at 56.)

Plaintiffs may contend that the results of elections postdating the filing of their complaint or trial are irrelevant. But that is not what the CVRA says. It instead provides that elections predating the filing of an action "are more probative to establish the existence of racially polarized voting than elections conducted after the filing of an action." (Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (a), italics added.) That pre-complaint elections are "more probative" does not mean that post-complaint elections are irrelevant. If it did, plaintiffs would not be able to repeatedly invoke now-Councilmember de la Torre's defeat in the 2016 election, which post-dated the filing of this case. (E.g., OB at 2526, 62-63.)

The CVRA also addresses the evidentiary weight of postfiling elections only with respect to the question of "racially polarized voting." (Elec. Code, § 14028, subd. (a).) But the City is not offering the 2020 election results to support its racially-polarized-voting argument. Nor could it. Because there has been no statistical analysis of those election results, it is not clear which candidates were preferred by Latino voters. (The City does not follow plaintiffs' and the trial court's unconstitutional stereotyping approach of presuming that Latino voters vote only for Latino-surnamed candidates, or that white voters rarely do.) Instead, the City is offering the 2020 election results solely for purposes of the dilution question on which this Court granted review.

Nothing in the CVRA suggests that courts cannot look to post-filing elections when examining dilution. Nor would such a rule make sense where, as here, plaintiffs' entire theory of dilution rests on demonstrably false premises about the ability of Latino candidates, or candidates from the Pico Neighborhood, to be elected in the at-large system-both of which are refutable by reference to judicially noticeable facts. Particularly if the Court accepts plaintiffs' invitation to apply a newly announced "dilution" standard to the facts of this case in the first instance (OB at 56-57), then the Court ought to be able to consider the indisputable effect that district-based elections would have on the current composition of the Council.

In short, this court should take judicial notice of the 2020 election results. Courts regularly take notice of such results. (E.g., Dudum v. Arntz (9th Cir. 2011) 640 F.3d 1098, 1101, fn. 6; Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Court (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1424, fn. 2; Chambers v. Ashley (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 390, 391.) This Court has also granted judicial notice of election results and other election-related materials postdating the trial court's judgment. (E.g., Edelstein v. City \& County of San Francisco (2002) 29 Cal.4th 164, 170-71 \& fn. 3.)

## C. The Court should take judicial notice of candidates' addresses or neighborhoods of residence on their official Council candidate statements.

Council candidates have the option to make official statements that are presented by the City on its official elections website, smvote.org. (Scolnick Decl., II 5.) The candidate
statements frequently disclose the candidates' addresses or neighborhoods of residence. (Ibid.)

The candidates' addresses or neighborhoods of residence listed on their candidate statements (Scolnick Decl., Exhibit C) are judicially noticeable because they are "not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy." (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) The statements are maintained on the City's elections website, www.smvote.org, which is maintained by the City Clerk.

The candidates' addresses or neighborhoods of residence on their candidate statements are relevant because they show that at least two of the candidates who won in the 2020 electionCouncilmembers de la Torre and Parra-live within the boundaries of the Pico Neighborhood. (Scolnick Decl., II 5.) ${ }^{1}$ Plaintiffs contend the Pico Neighborhood has been underrepresented on the Council and should have its own district in a district-based election system. (OB at 65; 25AA11000 [Pico Neighborhood District map proposed by plaintiffs].) But if the City switched to district-based elections, the Pico Neighborhood would have at most one representative-and the City would also necessarily lose one or two of its Latino Councilmembers, because two of those Councilmembers reside in the Pico Neighborhood and would need to run against each other (and both might lose).

[^0]
## CONCLUSION

The City respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion for judicial notice in support of its answer brief.

DATED: March 22, 2021 Respectfully submitted, GIBSON, DUNN \& CRUTCHER LLP

By: $\frac{\text { /s/ Kahn Scolnick }}{\text { Kahn Scolnick }}$
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant City of Santa Monica

## DECLARATION OF KAHN A. SCOLNICK

I, Kahn A. Scolnick, declare as follows:
I am a partner with the law firm Gibson, Dunn \& Crutcher, LLP, counsel for the City of Santa Monica in this case. I am authorized to practice law in the State of California and submit this declaration in support of the City's motion for judicial notice. What I have set out in this declaration is based on my personal knowledge, unless stated on information and belief. If called to testify about the facts set out below, I could and would do so competently.

1. Attached to this declaration as Exhibit A is the certified transcript of the oral argument in this case that was held before the Court of Appeal on June 30, 2020.
2. The City requested a copy of the audio recording of the oral argument from the Court of Appeal on August 5, 2020.
3. After receiving the audio recording from the court, the City commissioned Veritext Legal Solutions to transcribe it. Veritext produced a certified transcript on August 31, 2020.
4. Attached to this Declaration as Exhibit B are true and correct copies of excerpts from the Official Canvass Certificates and Official Statements of Votes Cast by Precinct for the City of Santa Monica election held in November 2020. Those election returns show
that Phil Brock, Gleam Davis, Christine Parra, and Oscar de la Torre won four-year terms on the Council, and that Kristin McCowan won a two-year term on the Council.
5. Attached to this declaration as Exhibit C are true and correct copies of the official statements of the five candidates who won Council seats in 2020—Phil Brock, Gleam Davis, Kristin McCowan, Christine Parra, and Oscar de la Torre. Candidates may submit an official statement to the City's official election website, smvote.gov, which is maintained by the City Clerk. Councilmembers Brock, Davis, McCowan, Parra, and de la Torre all did so.

Councilmembers Parra and de la Torre disclosed in their statement where they live; Councilmember de la Torre listed his home address, and Councilmember Parra listed her neighborhood. Both live within the Pico District proposed by plaintiffs. (25AA11000; see also RT6069:7-9 [Councilmember de la Torre testifying that he "live[s] in the Pico neighborhood in the City of Santa Monica"].) Councilmember McCowan did not list her home address, but I am informed and believe that she also lives in the Pico Neighborhood.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 22, 2021, in La Cañada Flintridge, California.

DATED: March 22, 2021


Kahn A. Scolnick

## EXHIBIT A

| 1 | COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT - DIVISION EIGHT |
| 3 | ------------------- |
| 4 | NO. B295935 |
| 5 | (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC616804) |
| 6 | ---------- |
| 7 | PICO NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, |
| 8 | Plaintiffs and Respondents, |
| 9 | v. |
| 10 | CITY OF SANTA MONICA, |
| 11 | Defendant and Appellant. |
| 12 | ------------------ |
| 13 |  |
| 14 |  |
| 15 | A P P E A R A N C E S: |
| 16 | Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., Gibson, Dunn \& Crutcher |
| 17 | for Defendant and Appellant |
| 18 | Kevin I. Shenkman, Shenkman \& Hughes |
| 19 | for Plaintiffs and Respondents |
| 20 |  |
| 21 |  |
| 22 | B E F OR E: |
| 23 | HON. TRICIA BIGELOW |
| 24 | HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR. |
| 25 | HON. ELIZABETH A. GRIMES |
|  | Page 1 |

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: No. 12 is Pico Neighborhood Association, et al. v. the City of Santa Monica. The panel on this matter is comprised of Justices Wiley, Bigelow, and Grimes, and I see we just need Justice Wiley to reappear, and there he is. Excellent. Okay.

Mr. Boutrous, present, and can we hear you, on behalf of these appellants?

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes, Your Honor. Can you hear me okay?

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Yes. Yes, thank you. And Mr. Shenkman on behalf of Pico Neighborhood Association?

MR. SHENKMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Okay, great. Thank you so much. Let's see, in this case we have issued a tentative decision that we're inclined to reverse the Trial Court's ruling for the reasons that have been outlined in the tentative decision. In light of that, counsel for City of Santa Monica, sir, you may choose to waive your opening argument and solely act on and give your 30 minutes to a reply or, if you wish, you can proceed now and split that up, sir. How would you like to proceed?

MR. BOUTROUS: Your Honor, I would -- I think I'd like to start out and reserve 10 minutes for rebuttal.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Okay. Please proceed.

MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you, Your Honor. We very much appreciate the Court's thorough and -- summary of its tentative opinion. We respectfully submit that the Court should adopt that tentative reasoning in its final opinion and reverse the judgment for the reasons stated. In short, the tentative is entirely correct that the Trial Court's conclusions concerning both dilution and discriminatory intent depend on legal error and are not supported by legally sufficient evidence.

Starting with the dilution point, we believe that the dilution element is required by the California Voting Rights Act and the federal and state constitutions. The tentative correctly concludes that a plaintiff must prove dilution to make out a Voting Rights Act claim. Section 14027 requires the impairment of a protected class' ability to elect a candidate to be as a result of a dilution of the rights of the voters
who are members of a protected class.
And that plain text speaks of the language of harm, dilution, and causation as a result of. As the tentative notes, the -- Pico argued that Section 14028 doesn't mention dilution, but that doesn't resolve the issue because dilution is the injury that is targeted by the California Voting Rights Act and it's the compelling interest that allows the Courts to consider race in decision making under the statute and both --

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: I have a question.

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes.
HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: How should we define dilution?

MR. BOUTROUS: I think, Your Honor, it must be -- if we look to Gingles and I think the tentative talks about it, in the sense that it must be -- the system that's in existence must weaken. One must weaken the right to vote and make it so that there's inequality in terms of the minority group's ability to vote, and we just don't have that here.

As the tentative points out, this 30
percent district that was created would not give Latinos any ability to elect the candidates of their choice that would more favorably compare with what they can do now, and therefore, there's been no dilution.

What the -- Pico's arguing for is not dilution, but a requirement that in drawing districts or creating electoral system, the lawmakers must act to fortify or sort of enhance, is the language that the Trial Court used, and the Supreme Court's decision in Bartlett, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, talked about that very point, that the voting -- Federal Voting Rights Act and, we submit, the California Voting Rights Act, is meant to create equality and to ban systems that dilute the vote, but not create some -- in the words of the Supreme Court, a rule that requires the best possible chance or to change things using racial classification beyond combating dilution.

I think the tentative is absolutely right on the text of the statute, as $I$ mentioned. The 14028 doesn't mention dilution, but the statute requires proof of a violation of both 14027 and 14028 , the latter being the racially
polarized voting requirement, and so it's clear dilution must be proven, and Pico's argument would just flatly contradict the text of the statute and would render the -- as a result of dilution language, and Section 14027 surplusage.

So we believe that it's required by the statute, dilution, but as $I$ mentioned also the federal constitution that there has to be a compelling state interest for courts to order racial classifications or changes in voting systems, and that's provided by the need to combat dilution.

So the second point that the tentative, I think, gets absolutely correct is that there's no valid proof of dilution here. A 30 percent district will not provide a predicate for anything different than was under the current system. The numbers are simply too small and the population of Latino voting group is dispersed through the city, and there's no proof that any alternative system, including districts, would give Latinos greater power to elect the candidates of their choice.

As for Pico's argument number two, as the tentative refers to it, that because the
statute does allow for influence claims, the 30 percent somehow could qualify as an influence claim, but that stretches the word influence beyond any recognition and any meaning, and as the tentative points out, would create absurd results and is thus untenable.

It doesn't change things for -- there'd be 30 percent as opposed to 14 percent in the district. It's too far from a majority, and that would be true under any alternative system, because of the numbers. So -- and again, we agree with the tentative's point that, the fact that the statute in California is broader than the federal statute, it does include influence. It does not require majority/minority district, but that doesn't mean influence. That doesn't mean influence just can mean any small bit of influence.

And as we had pointed out and the tentative mentions, we think that one -- that a plaintiff might be able to make that a claim for influence by showing a 48 percent district, something close to 50 percent, but 30 percent just isn't close.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: So then you would
say influence must be something that changes their ability to win, like it's a vote?

MR. BOUTROUS: Exactly. Exactly, Your Honor.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Going back to dilution, you said that you think dilution should be find -- I want to make sure I have the cite -to weaken a minority so that a minority's voting capability so that there's inequality to achieve electoral success. Let me just preface this by telling you, $I$ feel a little uncomfortable that the legislature didn't define dilution and that we are left to somewhat define it and I'm wondering what -- I mean, how you would help us with that and what you would submit on, in terms of authority for doing so.

MR. BOUTROUS: Yeah, Your Honor, I think the tentative does a nice job of pointing towards just the plain meaning. Dilution means weakening and watering down the rights, and Gingles, the Supreme Court's decision in Gingles looks to compare the current system with an alternative and in effect comparison that allows one to determine whether the current system is diluting the right to vote.

And that's why here, if you look to districts, districts don't provide any greater power because the population is so far below a majority. In passing, the trial judge in the statement of decision and Pico in its brief mentioned alternative at-large systems, but again, the numbers, when we look at the number of turnouts and the population of voters in Santa Monica de-staggering the elections, those sort of things, aren't going give Latinos any better chance to elect the candidates of their choice than they have.

So it's that comparison, Your Honor, and dilution means, under some other system, that group would be able to vote in their choice if they all voted cohesively and there just isn't an alternative here and it really comes down to the numbers. And Santa Monica wants to have -- yes. HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Can $I$ interrupt? Because it seems like both your definition or the definitions proposed of weaken and influence, in order for this to have been a winning argument, your argument would be that they definitely have to reach a point where they can elect a different candidate -- successfully elect a different
candidate, they're strong enough in their voters' rights to be able to do that, right?

MR. BOUTROUS: Correct, Your Honor. HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Because if you look at the word dilution, right, and you say it has a plain meaning, well, you put one drop of water in a glass of milk and you've diluted it. Not a lot, but where on the scale does that go, and $I$ guess that you're saying to a point where it causes a win.

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes, Your Honor. There has to be a demonstrated evidentiary record that a different system would allow that minority group, if they voted cohesively, to enact the person that they wanted, and there just -- with a 30 percent majority in a district or a 14 percent in the city, that's just impossible.

And so the fact that occasionally Latino-preferred candidates do not win is a product of the small numbers -- of the small population and, as $I$ was about to say, Santa Monica is an inclusive, progressive community. It wants to have a diverse community. It wants to ban discrimination, but when the numbers are at hit level, everyone gets their vote and the --

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and so if there's no dilution, it's just a product of the numbers.

And so $I$ think the tentative gets it right the way it has approached things, here, and again, the Bartlett case from the Supreme Court points to the fact that the influence districts, as a federal matter, raise serious constitutional concerns because it puts the Court in the position of having to really speculate and try to predict racial behavior and draw racial lines in a very subjective, unpredictable way, and that creates problems.

It turns the Voting Rights Act on its head. Yes, Justice Wiley.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Only with a plurality right, non-majority?

MR. BOUTROUS: That's correct, Your Honor. Justices Scalia and Thomas would've gone further and really said there were no such claims in terms of Section 2 .

They would've -- they disagreed with Gingles, and so they would've gone farther, but Justice Kennedy's opinion was very careful to ensure that the regime did what the congress intended, combats both dilution, but was very
wary from a constitutional perspective, as the Court knows, but weighed into further efforts for Courts to get in the business of trying to manage voter participation based on racial classification.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: And Bartlett --

MR. BOUTROUS: And -- Yes, Your Honor.
HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: And
Bartlett does not --
MR. BOUTROUS: Yes, Your Honor.
HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Bartlett
is not controling authority one way or the other, right?

MR. BOUTROUS: Well, here in our case, that the statute from interpreting the California Voting Rights Act, it is not because the California legislature did include influence, and so the question is, what type of influence would comport with the federal constitution, and I think the way we've looked at it is there's a way to reconcile the constitutional concerns, the difference in our California statute, by saying that a plaintiff may not be able to show a 50 percent district could be formed, but -- so that
strict standard that the Federal Courts have established, California has departed from it, but you have to be close, so there's a realistic showing. And the Court doesn't have to confront that here, as the tentative notes, because the 30 percent does not even come close.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: I guess you'd agree, apart from being merely persuasive and merely a plurality, as a matter of state law, the meaning of this state statute where we're looking at an undefined term in the statute, influence, do you agree that the most reasonable inference from the fact that the legislature did not define the term influence as it did not define the term dilution, is the legislature wanted courts on a common law basis, the way they always do, to figure it out?

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes, Your Honor, I do, and $I$ think looking at the plain language of the statute, looking at other judicial interpretations, but $I$ do agree, Your Honor. I think that as to racially polarized voting, there was a specific reference to federal standards, but as to dilution under California law, I think that's correct, that this Court is to interpret
that term in a way that comports with its plaining meaning and with other considerations.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: When the
United States Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, outlawing the act of monopolizing, Congress didn't define the term monopoly or monopolize. The Federal Courts have been wrestling with the meaning of that term on their own since 1890. This is the same thing, right?

MR. BOUTROUS: I think so, Your Honor, that here we have the fundamental -- the Court would look to the purpose of the statute, which is to ensure equality, the meaning of the word dilution.

I think the Court can draw on principles from other -- from the federal standards, as $I$ mentioned, in Gingles, and determine what dilution means for these purposes, and $I$ think it means it's your right to vote, your right to equality has been diminished, it's been diluted, in such a way that under a different system, that minority group would be able to vote in candidates, when they can't under this system. And $I$ think the tentative does a
nice job of parsing through that, based on those principles, and so that's why we believe the Court should adopt that reasoning.

And just briefly on the equal
protection claim, the tentative is right that the Trial Court erred from a legal perspective, both on the standard for intent and the standard for evaluating the evidence as the Supreme Court in Feeney made clear, your awareness or knowledge regarding a potential disparate impact is not intentional discrimination under equal protection clause.

It has to be proof of purposeful discrimination, like the purpose -- creating an electoral system for the purpose of discriminating on race in order to dilute the power of the minority group. The ALI Model Penal Code does, indeed, do a very nice job of distinguishing between purpose and knowledge. The Trial Court, however, ignored that distinction and the statement of decision repeatedly talks about awareness, knowledge, understanding, and that is pure legal error, as the tentative, I think, recognizes.
And then the tentative also recognized
correctly that this court is in the same position as the Trial Court. These were documents, news clippings, a report, a videotape. This Court's in the same position in analyzing those materials as the Trial Court. There's no need to defer to the Trial Court. There's also no need to defer to expert testimony.

I think this is a little bit like the chase video in the Scott case, because the video itself just totally contradicts what the Trial Court found --

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: -saying, it's a little like?

MR. BOUTROUS: Totally like. Excuse me. I -- it's exactly like.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: So in the Scott case, the eight justices looked at the videotape without any deference at all to figure out what did the tape show. You're saying we should do the same?

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes, Your Honor, and in fact, Justice Breyer, $I$ think in his current -even urged readers of the opinion to look at the video because any person who looked -- who viewed that video would see that the video depicted
something vastly different, totally contrary to what had been assumed to be the facts in the lower Court, and that's what we have here. Mr. Zane, his comments -- again, and the tentative just hits the nail on the head. What you saw in that videotape and with the commission report were officials doing what we want them to do.

They were conscientiously grappling with the issues and debating the issues, without a hint of racial discrimination, without -- they were trying to do the right thing.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Mr.
Boutrous, you were on the trial team in this case, right?

MR. BOUTROUS: Yes.
HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Now, was
there any eyewitness testimony from 1992 about how people at the meeting perceived Councilman Dennis Zane's -- Councilmember Dennis Zane's one sentence? There's a disputed sentence that you're familiar with, as is Mr. Shenkman. Was there any eyewitness testimony about what -- how to interpret what Zane said?

MR. BOUTROUS: No, Your Honor. There was no eyewitness testimony. It was all -- came
down to Dr. Kousser, the expert, giving his interpretation and that -- appears to get no weight. That's -- and again, his interpretation contradicts what everyone can see. If Mr. Zane--

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: But -MR. BOUTROUS: Yes.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: SO what should we make of the fact that Pico did not try to introduce testimony from, say, Antonio Vazquez or, say, Richard Fajardo or, say, Doug Willis about what the meaning of the Zane sentence was? What should flow from that failure to produce eyewitness testimony on this -- what the plaintiffs say is the crucial evidence?

MR. BOUTROUS: I respectfully expect the Court can infer that they didn't do that because they knew it would verify what the videotape shows and terribly harm their case. That was one of the big frustrations here, Your Honor. We had articles and news articles and as the tentative points out, in 1946 , the minority community all supporting the charter.

Articles that said race -- the charter will help racial minorities and they managed to twist that through the vehicle of Dr. Kousser
opining -- and $I$ think it was like political advocacy -- that that somehow met the opposite of what it actually showed, unanimous support, no opposition. And so it just does not come close to meeting the standards for proving intentional discrimination.

And I think it's really important because the Supreme Court, other Courts have said it's divisive when you have litigation accusing government officials of being engaged in racist behavior and so it's a very, very high standard. This does not come close and $I$ think the tentative takes the right approach to evaluating those historical documents, the videotape, the report from the commission, and the Court should reverse the judgment based on the analysis in the tentative.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Okay, thank you. You are at 20 minutes, so we'll stop there. I also do just want to make it clear for the record that all of the justices assigned to this case -that being Wiley, Bigelow and Grimes -- viewed the relevant portions of the video of the hearing ourselves. So with that, Mr. Shenkman, you may proceed.

MR. SHENKMAN: Thank you, Justice Bigelow, and I'd like to focus particularly on the California Voting Rights Act, if $I$ may.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Sure.
MR. SHENKMAN: In 2004 , respondent Maria Loya ran for a seat on appellant's city council. Only one Latino had ever been elected to the city council in its then 58-year history, and he immediately lost his bid for reelection. Ms. Loya wanted to change that.

Agreed that Ms. Loya received the votes of essentially 100 percent Latino voters, far more than any other candidate in that election, but she received much less support from nonLatino voters, about 21 percent. She lost, coming in seventh, in a race for four seats, the epitome of racially polarized voting.

When she reviewed the election results of each precinct, something jumped out to her.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Mr.
Shenkman, you probably noticed that the tentative does not address racially polarized voting at all.

MR. SHENKMAN: Understood, Your Honor, and --

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: In other words, the tentative assumes that there's racially polarized voting and decides on other grounds. So the argument you're making now is not addressing the tentative.

MR. SHENKMAN: Sure. So what I'm getting to here is when she looked at the election results by each precinct, she noticed that Bobby Shriver, who -- a member of the Kennedy family and really the closest thing this country has to royalty, I suppose, beat every candidate in their own neighborhood, except for Ms. Loya.

Maria Loya beat Bobby Shriver and every other candidate in the precincts that make up the Latino concentrated Pico neighborhood where she lived and still lives with her husband and two sons. In a seven-district system, corresponding to appellant's seven-member city council, Maria Loya, who both sides agree was the lone Latinopreferred candidate, almost certainly would have won and specifically, she would have won in the seven-district map adopted by the Trial Court.

In the at-large system, she lost and Latinos were denied their chosen representative.

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There can be no doubt that the at-large system in that instance, diluted the Latino vote. If that's not dilution under the California Voting Rights Act, then nothing could be.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: You say there cannot be any doubt, but let's assume that voting in Santa Monica is absolutely racially polarized. So 30 percent of Latinos vote for the Latino candidate and everybody else doesn't. That introduces doubt.

MR. SHENKMAN: So I think that's actually a key point, and $I$ think that's really where the tentative goes awry, is that initial assumption that there is absolutely no white cross-over voting. At Page 5, the tentative says, "If one assumes groups vote only for candidates from their own group, as is Pico's premise for this suit and the Act's application." Actually, we have never suggested that there is zero white cross-over voting, and in fact, to show racial polarized voting, we don't need to show that there is zero white cross-over vote.

We merely need to show that the white cross-over vote is insufficient -- I'm sorry, that the white cross-over vote is insufficient to
allow the minority preferred candidate to prevail, usually. And in the case of Maria Loya, getting back to a reality situation in this case --

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: So Mr. --

MR. SHENKMAN: -- Latino -- I'm sorry. HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: So Mr. Shenkman, it seems to me that you are willing to embrace racially polarized voting when it helps and to abandon it when it hurts. In other words, your test is perfectly flexible and it boils down to plaintiff always wins. That is to say, we're going to assume that there's race-based voting, but 30 percent is enough to win because, well, there's not all race-based voting. We'll get 21 percent from somewhere else. Do you see my problem with that?

MR. SHENKMAN: I don't. I think there is a test for racially polarized voting and I think there is a separate test for dilution in any sense that could possibly be consistent with the California Voting Rights Act. What $I$ mean by that is that if, in fact, we start with the assumption that the tentative does at Page 5,
that 100 percent of the minority votes for minority candidate; 100 percent of the majority votes for the majority candidate, then absolutely.

The only way that a district is going to elect the minority preferred candidate in that instance is if it is a majority/minority district, but that is contrary to the text of the California Voting Rights Act, the legislative history, and the holdings of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and Division 5 of the Second District Court of Appeals. $14028(c)$ addresses this key difference between the federal Voting Rights Act and the California Voting Rights Act.
"The fact that members of protected class are not geographically compact or concentrated, may not preclude a finding of racially polarized voting or a violation of Section 14027 and this section..."

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: YOu agree, Mr. Shenkman, in our 21-page tentative opinion, we never talk about those terms, about compactness.

MR. SHENKMAN: I'll take your word for it, Justice Wiley. I think, though, that that's
a key failing of the tentative and that is that it doesn't address this particular statutory text that says, as the legislative history dictates, what this language says and the Sanchez $v$. Modesto Court, the Jauregui v. Palmdale Court have said this means, and that is that a majority/minority district is not required.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Well, let me understand what your argument is. I'm a little confused. Do you think that the dilution element exists?

MR. SHENKMAN: Yes, although I think that dilution means something different in the context of the California Voting Rights Act than it does in the federal version.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: SO I take it, you are now abandoning your argument made in one sentence of your brief that the dilution element is satisfied merely by showing racially polarized voting? You're abandoning that argument, right?

MR. SHENKMAN: Well, I don't think that we need to rely on that, because the Trial Court in this case --

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Yes or
no on this, logically.
MR. SHENKMAN: For purposes of this argument, I will abandon that. Yes, Justice Wiley.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Well, this is the argument in the case. So you've abandoned that argument. Thank you.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: And how would you define dilution?

MR. SHENKMAN: So dilution, I actually don't think that there's a problem with one of the references in the tentative about adding water to milk, if the election system weakens the minority's voting power. And in fact, as a factual matter, that is what the Trial Court found in this case.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: How do we --
MR. SHENKMAN: And the --
HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: -- (sound drops) to dilute it? Does it have to be one that would result in the minority being able to win? That diluted? How much is dilution? Dilution can be, again, one drop of water in a glass of milk or it could be 51 percent of it.

MR. SHENKMAN: Sure. Well, I don't
know that that is a question that needs to be answered in this case, because in this case, the Trial Court found and is correct that the particular remedy that it did adopt would allow Latinos to elect their preferred candidate in the Pico neighborhood district. And it didn't just say, well, here's 30 percent and end the analysis there.

I think that would be inappropriate.
What the Superior Court looked at is past elections, like the 2004 election in which Ms. Loya got the most votes in the Pico neighborhood district but lost, and why, and the same thing is true for Tony Vazquez in 1994. He was Latinos' top choice. Received the most votes in the Pico neighborhood but lost citywide.

The Superior Court doesn't just end its analysis based on the 30 percent and the election history, either. The Superior Court properly looked to the cost of citywide campaigns for Santa Monica city council, over $\$ 1$ million in 2012, for example, and the extreme disparity in income and wealth in Santa Monica, both between Latinos and non-Hispanic whites, and also between the Pico neighborhood and other areas of the
city. Yes, Justice Wiley.
HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: So Mr. Shenkman, if you've abandoned your argument that dilution is satisfied by racially polarized voting and therefore is not a separate element, I take it that you are now claiming that an influence theory is your main ground of argument and you say 30 percent -- going from 14 to 30 percent is enough, right?

MR. SHENKMAN: In this particular case, 30 percent is sufficient to elect Latino preferred candidates in that Pico neighborhood district. Yes.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Would going from 14 to 15 percent be enough?

MR. SHENKMAN: Doubtful.
HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Why?
MR. SHENKMAN: Because that's -- having done these cases quite a bit --

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: No, no, I --

MR. SHENKMAN: -- election --
HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Sorry.
I need a legal rule, not your personal litigation experience.

MR. SHENKMAN: Yeah, I think that there is no bright line legal rule.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: There -MR. SHENKMAN: I think that --

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: There
must be. There -- you say 14 to 30 is enough but 14 to 15 isn't, and yet there's no bright line? That's logically incoherent.

MR. SHENKMAN: No, Your Honor. And to be clear, $I$ am not saying that 14 to 15 could never conceivably be enough; although, it's doubtful, because if there is enough to satisfy a significant enough difference between the majority and minority voting behavior to make out a claim for racially polarized voting, then it's extremely unlikely that --

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Okay --
MR. SHENKMAN: -- 14 to 15 would make a difference.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: Mr. Shenkman, you know where I'm going. If 14 to 15 might do it, how about 14 to 14.1?

MR. SHENKMAN: Again, extremely, extremely unlikely that would ever make a difference. I cannot conceive of a situation
where it would.
HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: But Mr. Shenkman, what did the legislature intend, here? MR. SHENKMAN: Sure. So if we -HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: What -MR. SHENKMAN: I've we don't use exact posture, we can look at the legislative history...

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: (sound drops). This statute is drawing lines between liability and no liability, and the consequences are enormous. Where does liability begin? You've got to define a line. The statute demands a line. Where's the line?

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Define the rule you want us (sound drops).

MR. SHENKMAN: So I think if, in fact, the Superior Court makes the factual finding that a district election system would make a difference, then that satisfies dilution, and in this case, the district -- the Superior Court found not only that it would make a difference, but looked at past election and showed that it would make a difference. The result would have been different.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: If I have understood you correctly, if the District Court finds that a change from 14 percent to 14.1 percent is enough, then the Court of Appeal must affirm, correct? That's your rule?

MR. SHENKMAN: No. I think that would probably be a ridiculous rule, and --

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: I guess I agree.

MR. SHENKMAN: Okay. So this sort of hypothetical of well, what if there's only one person, that's --

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: You're breaking new ground here. You've got to propose an administrable, a predictable rule, something that's cogent. What's your proposal?

MR. SHENKMAN: I think to set a particular number, because no one -- not in the tentative -- I suppose the tentative is suggesting the number of 50 , which would be the same as the federal Voting Rights Act. I heard appellants' counsel say 48. No one has proposed a particular number, and $I$ don't think that it is appropriate to propose a particular number.

I actually think that that's a fairly -

- that was actually a really cynical view of the judiciary that a judge cannot take all of the facts about whether a switch to a district system or, for that matter, one of the available atlarge remedies would make a difference, and the Superior Court in this case went through that proper analysis looking at the percentage difference, looking at the past election history, looking at the cost of citywide campaigns and the disparity in income and wealth between the Latinos and non-Latinos, the Pico neighborhood and the other part of the city.

The Court looked at the performance of other similar influence districts in other cities.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: But just up to -I guess, a follow-up to Justice Wiley's last question and my kind of follow-up to his question was, if you promulgate a rule for what is influence or perhaps what is dilution. You did say if the Superior Court decides it would make a difference and the result would be different, so is that the rule you're saying, the result has to be different and does result different mean winning? And then doesn't it follow along lines
with the federal analysis?
MR. SHENKMAN: So under federal -under the federal Voting Rights Act, it does not include the language or the ability to influence. It just focuses on the ability to elect, and that's why the Court in Bartlett said that means you've got to show a majority/minority district. The California Voting Rights Act, I think to interpret it to require a majority/minority district would turn it on its head, would ignore $14028(c)$, would ignore 14027 , would ignore the legislative history, would be contradictory to the Sanchez v. Modesto and Jauregui v. Palmdale decisions.

But if the Court is looking for a particular number, the U.S. Supreme Court, Georgia v. Ashcroft, actually did define what an influence district is in term of numbers, and it said 25 to 50 percent. And that -- 30 percent falls squarely in that range and that's a recognition that the Supreme Court actually recognized in its opinion that those type of influence districts have been effective and may be the best way to promote minority voting power. Justice Wiley, I see your hand's up.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: I note in the tentative that Georgia v. Ashcroft is distinguished three different ways. I'm sure you read that. Would you care to attack any of those distinctions?

MR. SHENKMAN: So the one that I recall is that the tentative makes the point that Georgia v. Ashcroft was decided as a Section 5 case, not a Section 2 case, and Section 5 focuses on retrogression, but to retrogress, you need to be taking away voting power and that is also a recognition that by eliminating an influence district, you are taking away voting power.

So I don't see why that would -- that Georgia v. Ashcroft was decided as a Section 5 case would have any impact in our analysis under the California Voting Rights Act, that explicitly does not require the potential for a majority/minority district.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: But you agree --

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: I -- go ahead, Justice Wiley.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: No, no. Certainly, $I$ defer to our presiding justice.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: I just - I still feel frustrated that $I$ 'm not getting a straight answer on what rule you would promulgate for a definition of dilution or influence, and $I$ guess...

MR. SHENKMAN: So I would implore the Court to say that the Court's need to take a fact intensive approach to determining whether there is a remedy that will do any good, because at some point in a case, the Court is going to need to decide on a remedy and the court should be satisfied that that remedy is going to do something to solve the problem.

In this particular case, the Court did that analysis and the Court was satisfied that it would make a difference, and it's not just some pie in the sky, gee, $I$ think it will. It's -- I think the strongest evidence here is that if you look at past elections, it would have made a difference, not just the ability to influence, but the ability to elect, that Maria Loya would have been elected, the Latino preferred candidate, that Tony Vazquez got the most votes there.
And so the -- simply looking at the
percentage without that searching practical reality of the political situation on the ground, I think it can be misleading. In fact, there are some situations there a 30 percent district will work. There are some where it is unlikely to work. There are places where a much higher percentage than even 50 might be necessary to change the results and allow a minority group to elect the candidate of choice.

But all of those factors, those demographic factors, the wealth disparities, the particular politics in that city is what the Courts ought to look at, and it's what this court did look at to make that determination.

And in fact, all of those factual findings are entitled to deference here, as is the Superior Court's reasoned determination based on those factual findings that the votes of Latinos, the largest minority group in Santa Monica, are diluted by the at-large system.

The tentative -- I think I've mentioned this a little bit, but the tentative also disregards the availability of non-district remedies, cumulative voting, limited voting, and ranked choice voting. The undisputed evidence at
trial showed that these remedies would also give Latinos not just the ability to influence, but the ability to elect representatives of their choice.

As Professor Levitt explained at trial, these systems have been effective at electing minority preferred candidates even when the minority proportion of the electorate is less than the threshold of exclusion. Here, the Latino proportion in Santa Monica is greater than the threshold of exclusion for a seven-seat race, meaning that when an entity of Latinos would have the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, so in this particular instance, if the Court were looking for a bright line in terms of the effectiveness of these alternative at-large remedies, the bright line that the federal Courts have used, for example, in U.S. v. Village of Port Chester, is the threshold of exclusion.

The threshold of exclusion for a sevenseat race is 12.5 percent. The Latino eligible voters in Santa Monica comprised 13.64 percent, greater than the threshold of exclusion, and that would indicate these alternative at-large remedies would also be effective at giving them
an opportunity to elect their candidate. Not a guarantee, but a fair opportunity, and that's really all that we're asking for. That's all that we can ask for.

And I would close with this. This Court should follow the California legislature's lead, specifically its recognition that a majority/minority district is not necessary for the voting rights of the minority to be diluted, and thus affirm the Superior Court's reasoned judgment that the remedy it selected will be effective.

This is certainly no time (sound drops) backwards from what the legislature did in enacting the CVRA. If the court has no further questions, I'll rest. Thank you.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Does the panel have any other questions? Okay.

HON. JOHN SHEPARD WILEY, JR.: I want to praise Mr. Shenkman. An excellent argument.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Okay. We'll go back to -- if there's a reply by Mr. Boutrous.

MR. BOUTROUS: Your Honor, this is Mr. Boutrous. I had a power outage here at home so I switched to the phone. You won't be able to see
me and $I$ can't see you, but it makes it exciting. So let me just address a few points.

Let me start with the alternative atlarge systems that Mr. Shenkman points -- the evidence is absolutely not undisputed that those systems would've given Latino voters the ability to -- a greater ability to elect the candidates of their choice than the current system, and in fact, the -- as we point out in our brief, the analysis is completely flawed.

And again, it comes down to low
numbers: 12.5 percent, the threshold of exclusion, i.e., the minimum population a group would need to guarantee it could elect a candidate, and it is guaranteed, is the word that's used in this context, is 12.5 percent.

Their analysis assumes total voter
cohesion and total turnout of the Latino population to get to above that, and of course, no voting population, white voters, any -there's no population in the world will have 100 percent turnout, and so they just didn't do the analysis and the trial judge didn't do any analysis. Plaintiff Pico does not do any analysis in its brief whatsoever on those issues.

Mr. Shenkman was not able to provide any standard for dilution. It's standardless and it would create exactly what the -- Justice Kennedy said in Bartlett, where the Courts would have to ask all these questions and speculate and that's not what the Voting Rights Act is intended to do. It's intended to combat voter -- vote dilution and to ensure equality. It's not meant to embroil or, in this analysis that based on all these racial components and other issues.

Justice wiley was asking about the legislature's intent and Mr. Shenkman didn't really have an answer as to the influence point, but we briefed it and one of the amicus briefs briefed it. The legislative history actually shows that the legislature was specifically concerned or thinking of the situation we teed up and that's mentioned in the tentative, 49 percent in a district as opposed to 50 and that that could qualify if other factors were shown.

So our position is completely
consistent with the legislature's view and legislative intent. And I would also add that at this point, Mr. Shenkman was -- is conflating racially polarized voting with dilution. He's

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combining it all together and that's improper. They're two different things.

The statute clearly distinguishes between them, and he's put all those eggs in one basket, crossover voting, but the entire premise of Pico's case from the beginning has been that white voters, African American voters, Asian American voters do not cross over enough to help Latino voters elect a candidate of their choice, so it makes no sense, and they are -- sometimes they embrace racially polarized voting, when they think it helps, and then they reject it, so that doesn't fly either.

And with respect to the Pico district, the evidence actually from Pico's own expert showed that candidates basically who would win in the Pico district would've won city wide. It really made absolutely no difference. And I would also just add that the -- with respect to Ashcroft, again, Mr. Shenkman had no response to this Court's tentative.

The multiple reasons why Ashcroft doesn't apply, and I would just go back to Bartlett there Bartlett, discussing Ashcroft, explains at the end of the plurality opinion from

Justice Kennedy, that it's much different to talk about Section 5 cases and what legislatures can and should consider and enhancing voter power, ensuring equality, as opposed to Courts issuing remedies compelling districts and other actions based on racial classifications and the Bartlett Court said that Section 2 , and $I$ would say our Voting Rights Act is the same thing, does not -is not intended to maximize voter strength.

It's meant to ensure equality. Maybe I'll pause, since $I$ can't tell if you have any questions, but $I$-- with that, I'll just pause and see if there are any questions.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Does the panel have any questions? They are shaking their heads no, they do not. You have five more minutes left if you wish to use it.

MR. BOUTROUS: I'll just finish with one point, since Mr. Shenkman did make various claims about how Latino preferred voters fared. They count -- the word gerrymandering, I think, applies best here when we look at how the Pico has always dealt with the data. They count Tony Vazquez, the one time he lost an election. They don't count the three times he won.

They don't count Gleam Davis, who's a Latina, because she wasn't Latina surnamed and then because she's not recognized as a Latina. They don't count Latino surnamed candidates who lost with very little Latino support. They deem them not serious, so it's basically a selffulfilling prophecy and we demonstrated through the data that Latino preferred candidates of all races and all need to be considered, overwhelmingly prevailed.

And so I think as Mr. Shenkman raised the data, there's need for the Court to delve into it because of the way the tentative has resolved the issue on dilution, but $I$ just wanted to make that point for the record. Would ask the Court to affirm -- sorry, reverse, based on the rationale in the tentative and greatly appreciate the Court holding the argument today and on this schedule, too. We know we asked for a speedy argument.

HON. TRICIA BIGELOW: Okay, thank you both very much. As Justice Wiley said, you both did a great job, so thank you. This is the last matter on calendar today, Division 8's oral argument for this month will be concluded. We
are in recess. Thank you.
MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you.

Veritext Legal Solutions

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[present - retrogression]

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[straight - understood]


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[undisputed - zero]


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## EXHIBIT B

DEAN C. LOGAN
Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk

November 30, 2020

Ms. Denise Anderson-Warren, City Clerk
City of Santa Monica
1685 Main Street, Room 102
Santa Monica, California 90401
Dear Ms. Anderson-Warren:
Enclosed are the Official Canvass Certificate and the Official Statement of Votes Cast by precinct for the City of Santa Monica General Municipal, Unified School District, and Community College District Elections consolidated with the General Election held on November 3, 2020.

Please call the Election Planning Section at (562) 462-2317, if you have any questions.
Sincerely,

DEAN C. LOGAN
Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk


LATICIA MCCORKLE, Assistant Division Manager
Election Information and Preparation Division

Enclosures<br>Official Canvass Certificate<br>Official Statement of Votes Cast

## Los crbngeles Bounty

## Clegistrax-Clecoxdex/Gounty Blexk Certificate of the Canvass of the Election Returns

I, DEAN C. LOGAN, Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk of the County of Los Angeles, of the State of California, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that pursuant to the provisions of Section 15300 et seq. of the California Elections Code, I did canvass the returns of the votes cast for each elective office and/or measures) for

at the General Election, held on the 3rd day of November, 2020.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that the Statement of Votes Cast, to which this certificate is attached, shows the total number of ballots cast in said jurisdiction, and that the whole number of votes cast for each candidate and/or measures) in said jurisdiction in each of the respective precincts therein, and the totals of the respective columns and the totals as shown for each candidate and/or measures) are full, true and correct.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal this 30th day of November, 2020.







| COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - | GENERAL ELECTION |  |  |  |  |  | 11/03/20 |  |  |  |  |  | 64.6 | - PAGE - | 176 of 6086 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FINAL OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF VOTES CAST BY PRECINCT |  |  |  | SANTA MONICA CITY GEN MUNI COUNCILMEMBER |  |  |  |  |  | $\frac{\sqrt[2]{2}}{\frac{2}{4}}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOCATION |  | REGISTRATION | BALLOTS CAST |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\frac{5}{5}$ |  |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250060A |  |  | 272 | 49 | 72 | 44 | 15 | 16 | 39 | 45 | 6 | 15 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1237 |  | 1296 | 400 | 441 | 249 | 95 | 70 | 310 | 361 | 13 | 32 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2029 | 1568 | 449 | 513 | 293 | 110 | 86 | 349 | 406 | 19 | 47 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250061B |  |  | 273 | 51 | 114 | 44 | 11 | 8 | 38 | 67 | 3 | 3 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1238 |  | 1108 | 358 | 493 | 164 | 53 | 58 | 258 | 410 | 15 | 44 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 1907 | 1381 | 409 | 607 | 208 | 64 | 66 | 296 | 477 | 18 | 47 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250067A |  |  | 342 | 72 | 115 | 78 | 29 | 14 | 76 | 82 | 6 | 15 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1239 |  | 1295 | 457 | 394 | 311 | 114 | 45 | 415 | 388 | 13 | 24 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2100 | 1637 | 529 | 509 | 389 | 143 | 59 | 491 | 470 | 19 | 39 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250069A |  |  | 413 | 108 | 127 | 109 | 23 | 12 | 103 | 94 | 10 | 5 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1240 |  | 1692 | 614 | 569 | 418 | 143 | 66 | 544 | 527 | 9 | 28 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2609 | 2105 | 722 | 696 | 527 | 166 | 78 | 647 | 621 | 19 | 33 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250071A |  |  | 298 | 59 | 113 | 54 | 19 | 12 | 59 | 76 | 1 | 8 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1241 |  | 1433 | 541 | 539 | 211 | 66 | 69 | 458 | 541 | 16 | 56 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2239 | 1731 | 600 | 652 | 265 | 85 | 81 | 517 | 617 | 17 | 64 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250072A |  |  | 346 | 105 | 117 | 84 | 23 | 11 | 86 | 94 | 8 | 12 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1242 |  | 1756 | 610 | 604 | 355 | 140 | 77 | 549 | 550 | 20 | 46 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2501 | 2102 | 715 | 721 | 439 | 163 | 88 | 635 | 644 | 28 | 58 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250078A |  |  | 318 | 85 | 102 | 70 | 17 | 13 | 87 | 88 | 2 | 4 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1243 |  | 1462 | 499 | 501 | 354 | 97 | 53 | 431 | 443 | 19 | 24 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2175 | 1780 | 584 | 603 | 424 | 114 | 66 | 518 | 531 | 21 | 28 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250083B |  |  | 315 | 89 | 95 | 79 | 21 | 14 | 94 | 71 | 8 | 2 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1244 |  | 1759 | 632 | 615 | 429 | 93 | 58 | 590 | 573 | 17 | 24 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2521 | 2074 | 721 | 710 | 508 | 114 | 72 | 684 | 644 | 25 | 26 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250087A |  |  | 288 | 60 | 107 | 104 | 17 | 13 | 62 | 52 | 6 | 8 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1245 |  | 1648 | 579 | 580 | 399 | 80 | 69 | 575 | 496 | 27 | 29 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2344 | 1936 | 639 | 687 | 503 | 97 | 82 | 637 | 548 | 33 | 37 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250093A |  |  | 351 | 70 | 76 | 74 | 31 | 12 | 89 | 66 | 8 | 6 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1246 |  | 1586 | 607 | 389 | 266 | 139 | 73 | 546 | 492 | 24 | 29 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2410 | 1937 | 677 | 465 | 340 | 170 | 85 | 635 | 558 | 32 | 35 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250094A |  |  | 346 | 56 | 78 | 56 | 18 | 13 | 56 | 52 | 16 | 11 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1247 |  | 1533 | 528 | 424 | 327 | 137 | 83 | 464 | 409 | 20 | 32 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2339 | 1879 | 584 | 502 | 383 | 155 | 96 | 520 | 461 | 36 | 43 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250098A |  |  | 268 | 55 | 60 | 52 | 20 | 14 | 68 | 55 | 10 | 5 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1248 |  | 1514 | 525 | 377 | 340 | 152 | 71 | 502 | 439 | 15 | 31 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2284 | 1782 | 580 | 437 | 392 | 172 | 85 | 570 | 494 | 25 | 36 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250109A |  |  | 215 | 40 | 63 | 46 | 11 | 11 | 42 | 39 | 3 | 8 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1249 |  | 1655 | 589 | 497 | 385 | 132 | 80 | 521 | 468 | 15 | 20 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2264 | 1870 | 629 | 560 | 431 | 143 | 91 | 563 | 507 | 18 | 28 |  |  |  |
| SANTA MONICA - 6250113B |  |  | 309 | 50 | 88 | 81 | 26 | 12 | 43 | 47 | 5 | 4 |  |  |  |
| VOTE BY MAIL | SERIAL 1250 |  | 1355 | 439 | 377 | 258 | 146 | 64 | 380 | 353 | 23 | 31 |  |  |  |
| TOTAL |  | 2153 | 1664 | 489 | 465 | 339 | 172 | 76 | 423 | 400 | 28 | 35 |  |  |  |








## EXHIBIT C

## VOTE

## MENU

## Phil Brock



Occupation: Businessman
1328 12th Street
Santa Monica, CA 90401
Phone (310) 393-8004
brock4santamonica@gmail.com
https://www.brockthevote.org

## Español (Spanish)

## Candidate Statement

## Native Santa Monica!

- SMMUSD: Madison, Lincoln, Samohi, SMC, UCLA, LMU
- Played in our parks, body-surfed our waves, taught in our schools, community activist
- Renter, Homeowner, Teacher, Entrepreneur


## Santa Monica Commissioner since 2003

- Past President, CalParksBoard
- 2013 Commissioner of the Year, Chair, Recreation \& Parks Commission

Working for Residents

- Host, Brock on Your Block; Columnist, SM Mirror
- Co-Chair, Historic San Vicente Coalition
- SMart Group
- Samohi Alumni President
- Kiwanis Lieutenant-Governor
- SM Elks Trustee/Citizen of the Year
- Salvation Army Advisory Board/Volunteer of the Year
- Civic Auditorium Working Group
- Boys \& Girls Club Council


## I Will Fight for You! Residents First!

- Restore Public Safety/Reduce Crime NOW!
- Common Sense City Government!
- STOP Overdevelopment! STOP wasting our tax dollars! STOP overtaxing!
- STOP Traffic gridlock! ENFORCE e-scooter laws!
- ENACT building height/density limits. Palm trees must be our only high rises!
- Intelligent change that preserves character! Sustainably adapt buildings!
- Value YOUTH and SENIORS!
- Champion RENT CONTROL/Affordable FAMILY housing
- Find REAL homelessness solutions!
- Transparent government/LISTEN to residents
- Racial Justice Now!
- Free public transportation for residents! Free citywide high-speed internet!
- Parks are paramount. Create SAFE open space!
- Envision the future by honoring our past!

I will take action where incumbents have failed! Restore the Soul of Our City!

## Other Candidates: City Council 4-Yr



Andrew Browning


Merv Andika


Dominic Gomez



Marcus Owens


Chip Martin


Oscar De La Torre


Ted Winterer


Mario Fonda-Bonardi


Ana Maria Jara


Anne-Marie Slack


Zoë Muntaner


John Patrick Jewell III


Jon Mann


Gleam Olivia Davis


## Election Calendar

## 2020 Election Resources

Taxpayer Protection/Oaks Initiative Log (Excel)

Top 5 FAQs on November 2020 Election

Presentation on Voting Options for November 2020 Election

Regulations Relating to Election Campaigns

## Election Links

## Select Language $\mid \boldsymbol{\nabla}$

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## VOTE

## Gleam Olivia Davis



Occupation: Santa Monica Councilmember
1158 26th Street, \#139
Santa Monica, CA 90403
Phone (213) 324-0666
gleam.davis@gmail.com
https://www.gleamdavis2020.com

## Español (Spanish)

## Candidate Statement

As your Councilmember, I have worked to preserve and create affordable housing, and to provide a safe and stable community for all residents.

If re-elected, I will focus on:

- Promoting a just Santa Monica that offers equitable opportunity for all residents;
- Addressing the public health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic;
- Reimagining public safety organizations to make them more just and more effective;
- Restoring our local economy so that it provides good jobs and good wages;
- Fighting for a safer and sustainable transportation system that includes innovative solutions to traffic and parking and that is pedestrian and bike friendly;
- Expanding educational opportunities for everyone;
- Increasing public open space and recreational facilities including the conversion of Santa

Monica Airport to a great park;

- Working for the wellbeing of seniors and youth;
- Reducing the number of people experiencing homelessness; and
- Helping all residents reach their full potential.

I am endorsed by:

- U.S. Representative Ted Lieu
- Los Angeles County Supervisor Sheila J. Kuehl
- State Senator Ben Allen
- Assemblymember Richard Bloom
- Former Santa Monica Mayors Nat Trives, Michael Feinstein, and Judy Abdo

I am pleased to have such a broad base of support and would be honored to have your vote on November 3.

## Other Candidates: City Council 4-Yr




Andrew Browning



Merv Andika


Marcus Owens


Anne-Marie Slack


Jon Mann


Oscar De La Torre


Ted Winterer


Todd Mentch


Nathaniel Jones

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Complete Election Calendar

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## VOTE

## MENU

## Oscar De La Torre



2039 1/2 Stewart St.
Santa Monica, CA 90404
Phone (310) 922-5122
odelatorre16@yahoo.com
http://www.vote4oscar.com

## Español (Spanish)

## Candidate Statement

The City of Santa Monica needs a champion on City Council who cares about local businesses, homeowners and renters alike.

As a lifelong resident of Santa Monica, I am running for City Council to restore public trust in our government by restoring public safety to our streets!

I have devoted my career to public service. I have a MA in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION and am the FOUNDER of a youth center, CHAIR of Santa Monica's Pico Neighborhood Association, and 18-year MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION for the Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District.

As the father of two children, I have a personal commitment to advancing public safety and the well-being of ALL Santa Monicans.

I am a PROVEN LEADER who will:
-ENFORCE OUR LAWS with "Compassionate Accountability" to protect our public spaces while supporting those in need,
-STOP IRRESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT and gentrification and protect renters and small businesses from displacement,
-CHALLENGE the culture of corruption at City Hall that promotes profit over people,
-ENSURE that resident needs and concerns are given priority over tourists,
-DEFEND workers from lay-offs caused by fiscal mismanagement, -FIGHT for social, economic, environmental \& racial justice.

Santa Monica needs a champion for residents to hold our government accountable. Elect OSCAR DE LA TORRE to bring needed CHANGE to Santa Monica.

## WWW.VOTE4OSCAR.COM

## Other Candidates: City Council 4-Yr



Andrew Browning


Merv Andika



Christine Parra


Jon Mann


Gleam Olivia Davis


Ted Winterer


Marcus Owens


Todd Mentch
Chip Martin


Mario Fonda-Bonardi


Ana Maria Jara


Anne-Marie Slack


Zoë Muntaner


Andrew Kamm


Nathaniel Jones

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## VOTE 20

MENU

## Christine Parra



Occupation: Emergency Management
Phone (310) 678-7442
info@christineparra.com
https://www.christineparra.com

## Español (Spanish)

## Candidate Statement

It's time for CHANGE in Santa Monica.
Living in the Gandara Park neighborhood within the Pico District for the last 20 years, I've experienced firsthand the inequities that have fallen upon forgotten pockets of our city. We need fresh perspectives and effective solutions to current issues facing our Santa Monica family. I'm committed to building a safe and healthy community where all our residents will thrive.

Through my education and as a career public servant working in fire safety and emergency preparedness, I am familiar with the complexities of city planning and know how to balance a budget. City development and revitalization are necessary but should never come at the expense of our tax-paying residents. As a mother of three and an engaged community member, I know what it takes to help create a livable city.
As your representative, I come with an open heart and willingness to listen and learn, while recognizing my own biases. I am dedicated to protecting residents' quality of life and ensuring
that decisions are equitable and fair for all. I vow, as your councilwoman, to uphold the highest standards of integrity, character and ethics. Let's all love Santa Monica again!!
www.christineparra.com

## Other Candidates: City Council 4-Yr



Andrew Browning

Todd Mentch


Dominic Gomez


Anne-Marie Slack


Jon Mann


Zoë Muntaner


Gleam Olivia Davis



Ted Winterer


Ana Maria Jara


John Patrick Jewell III


## Election Calendar

Complete Election Calendar

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## VOTE

## MENU

## Kristin McCowan



Occupation: Executive Director
1158 26th Street, \#294
Santa Monica, CA 90404
Phone (424) 341-4083
info@kristinmccowan.com
https://www.kristinmccowan.com

## Español (Spanish)

## Candidate Statement

I'm a second-generation Santa Monican. My family's been part of our City's history since 1938. I've lived through less inclusive years and rejoiced as we became a progressive model for the nation.

This past year has shaken our hope. It is clear we still have a lot of work to do.

Now, as we ask ourselves tough questions, listen and learn, I'll help guide our City to become more genuinely equitable, inclusive and forward-thinking. My professional experience and lived historical context give me the unique ability to achieve these goals. I worked for FEMA, the Obama Administration, and Mayor Garcetti. I served as a Pier Commissioner and volunteered in the St. Monica community. As a Black parent of young children, I know the challenges facing Santa Monica families.

Critical days lie ahead as we fight COVID-19 and address the outcry for systemic change. My priorities on City Council are: economic recovery; rebuilding our exceptional city services; increasing access to affordable housing; reimagining public safety; and greater social/racial/economic justice.

I'm endorsed by: Senator Ben Allen, Assemblymember Richard Bloom, Board of Equalization, Tony Vazquez, Los Angeles County Supervisor Sheila Kuehl, and a broad coalition of community leaders, renters, homeowners and working families.

As you learn more about me, I hope to earn your support too.

## Other Candidates: City Council 2-Yr

## Election Calendar

Complete Election Calendar

## 2020 Election Resources

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Regulations Relating to Election Campaigns

Election Links

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Select Language
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CITY OF SANTA MONICA, Defendant and Appellant, V. PICO NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION; MARIA LOYA, Plaintiffs and Respondents.

## [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CITY OF SANTA MONICA'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

After a Decision by the Court of Appeal<br>Second Appellate District, Division Eight, Case No. B295935<br>Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. BC616804<br>The Hon. Yvette M. Palazuelos, Judge Presiding

The Court grants the City's motion and takes judicial notice of:
(A) the certified transcript of the oral argument presented to the Court of Appeal in this case;
(B) excerpts from the Official Canvass Certificates and

Official Statements of Votes Cast by Precinct for the
City of Santa Monica election held in November 2020;
and
(C) the official statements of the candidates who won

Council seats in 2020.

## IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: $\qquad$
The Honorable Tani Cantil-Sakauye
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California

## PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Daniel Adler, declare as follows:
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen years, and I am not a party to this action. My business address is 333 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90071-3197. On March 22, 2021, I served:

> CITY OF SANTA MONICA'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF KAHN A. SCOLNICK; AND [PRO-POSED] ORDER
on the parties stated below, by the following means of service:
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
$\checkmark$ BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: A true and correct copy of the above-titled document was electronically served on the persons listed on the attached service list.
$\nabla$ (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 22, 2021.


Daniel R. Adler

## Respondents' Counsel

Morris J. Baller (48928)
Laura L. Ho (173179)
Anne P. Bellows (293722)
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RUBIN
237 Princeton Avenue
Mill Valley, CA 94941-4133
Tel: 415-298-4857

## Method of service

Electronic service

Electronic service

Electronic service

Electronic service

Electronic service

## Trial court

Hon. Yvette M. Palazuelos Mail service
Judge Presiding
Los Angeles County Superior
Court
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Tel: 213-310-7009

Case Name: PICO NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF SANTA MONICA Case Number: S263972
Lower Court Case Number: B295935

1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.
2. My email address used to e-serve: dadler@gibsondunn.com
3. I served by email a copy of the following document(s) indicated below:

Title(s) of papers e-served:



This proof of service was automatically created, submitted and signed on my behalf through my agreements with TrueFiling and its contents are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
/s/Daniel R. Adler
Signature

Adler, Daniel R. (306924)
Last Name, First Name (PNum)

Gibson, Dunn \& Crutcher LLP
Law Firm


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Councilmember McCowan also lives there, but she does not list her address or neighborhood on her candidate statement.

