STATE OF CALIFORNIA GAVIN NEWSOM, *Governor*

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
505 VAN NESS AVENUE
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102-3298

September 28, 2021

The Honorable Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye
and Associate Justices
Supreme Court of California
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102

Re: **Respondent's Letter Informing the Court That the Commission Has Issued Its Decision – *Golden State Water Company v. Public Utilities Commission of the State of California,* California Supreme Court, Case No. S269099**

Dear Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of California:

On June 2, 2021, Golden State Water Company (Petitioner) commenced Case No. S269099 by filing a petition for writ of review (writ petition) challenging Decision (D.) 20-08-047, issued by Respondent California Public Utilities Commission (Commission). At that time, Petitioner's and four other parties' applications for rehearing of D.20-08-047 were pending before the Commission.

On June 10, 2021, the Commission asked the Court to hold the writ petition in abeyance until the Commission had acted on the rehearing applications and to grant the Commission an extension of time to file its answer. In a June 15, 2021 Ruling, the Court granted the request and directed the parties to notify the Court when the Commission issued its decision resolving Petitioner's application for rehearing of D.20-08-047. This letter is written to inform the Court that on September 24, 2021, the Commission issued D.21-09-047, in which it modifies D.20-08-047 and denies Petitioner's application for rehearing of D.20-08-047. The Commission has attached a copy of D.21-09-047 to this filing.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. Please contact the undersigned at dnc@cpuc.ca.gov or (415) 703-1650 with any questions regarding this letter.

Respectfully submitted,

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/s/ DARLENE M. CLARK
By: _____
DARLENE M. CLARK

Attorneys for
Respondent California Public Utilities Commission

Decision 21-09-047 September 23, 2021

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Order Instituting Rulemaking Evaluating the Commission's 2010 Water Action Plan Objective of Achieving Consistency between Class A Water Utilities' Low-Income Rate Assistance Programs, Providing Rate Assistance to All Low-Income Customers of Investor-Owned Water Utilities, and Affordability.	Rulemaking 17-06-024

ORDER DENYING REHEARING OF DECISION 20-08-047, AS MODIFIED

I. SUMMARY

This decision addresses the applications for rehearing of Decision (D.) 20-08-047 (or "Decision") filed jointly by Liberty Utilities (Park Water) Corp. and Liberty Utilities (Apple Valley Ranchos Water) Corp. (together, Liberty); and separately by California-American Water Company (Cal-Am); California Water Association (CWA); California Water Service Company (Cal Water); and Golden State Water Company (Golden State) (together referred to as Applicants). In D.20-08-047[1] we evaluated the sales forecasting processes used by water utilities and concluded that the Water Revenue Adjustment Mechanism/Modified Cost Balancing Account (WRAM/MCBA) had proven to be ineffective in achieving its primary goal of conservation. To keep rates just and reasonable, we precluded the continued use of the WRAM/MCBA mechanism in future general rate cases (GRC) but continued to allow use of the Monterey-style WRAM with an Incremental Cost Balancing Account (ICBA). We

[1] Unless otherwise noted, citations to Commission decisions issued since July 1, 2000 are to the official pdf versions, which are available on the Commission's website at: http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/DecisionsSearchForm.aspx.

also adopted other requirements relating to Class A water utilities' low-income rate assistance programs.

In its application for rehearing, Liberty alleges the elimination of the WRAM in D.20-08-047 is unlawful because (1) the Commission did not provide parties with a meaningful opportunity to be heard on this issue; (2) it is not supported by record evidence; (3) the issue was not in the scope of the proceeding; and (4) it is inconsistent with prior Commission decisions. Liberty requests oral argument.

Cal-Am alleges the elimination of the WRAM is unlawful because (1) the Commission violated Public Utilities Code section 1701.1 subdivision (c)[2] and Rule 7.3 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules)[3] by including in the Decision an issue outside the scope of the proceeding; (2) the Commission failed to regularly pursue its authority by failing to fully examine and develop a record on the elimination of the decoupling WRAM and to consider all of the facts and issues; (3) the Decision impedes Cal-Am from having a fair opportunity to earn a reasonable rate of return; (4) the Decision lacks necessary evidentiary support; (5) certain findings of fact and conclusions of law are not supported by record evidence; (6) the Decision lacks necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (7) the Decision departs from Commission precedent without adequate explanation. Cal-Am requests oral argument.

CWA alleges the elimination of the WRAM in D.20-08-047 is unlawful because (1) elimination of the decoupling WRAM was not within the established scope of this proceeding; (2) parties were denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard and respond to the proposed discontinuation of the decoupling WRAM, in violation of statutory requirements and constitutional due process; (3) the eleventh-hour revisions to the Proposed Decision constituted an alternate proposed decision for which additional opportunity for public review and comment was required pursuant to section 311

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[2] Subsequent section references are to the Public Utilities Code unless otherwise noted.

[3] Subsequent rule references are to the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure unless otherwise noted.

subdivision (e); and (4) certain findings of fact are not supported by record evidence. CWA requests oral argument.

Cal Water alleges the elimination of the WRAM is unlawful because (1) the Commission violated section 1701.1 subdivision (c), Rule 7.3, and Cal Water's due process rights by eliminating the WRAM/MCBA decoupling mechanism without including examination of the decoupling WRAM in any of the three scoping memos; (2) the Commission violated section 1708 by modifying prior Commission decisions addressing the decoupling WRAMs without providing Cal Water an opportunity to be heard; (3) the Commission unlawfully mischaracterized the proceeding as quasi-legislative rather than as ratesetting, thereby depriving Cal Water of procedural rights available only in ratesetting proceedings; (4) the Commission violated sections 728 and 729 by eliminating the decoupling WRAM because it effectively fixed water utility rates and rate mechanisms without first holding a hearing; (5) certain findings of fact, conclusions of law, and discussion on the elimination of the decoupling WRAM and/or intergenerational transfer costs are not based on record evidence; (6) the Commission violated section 1705 by failing to hear all evidence that might bear on the exercise of its discretion and to demonstrably weigh that evidence; (7) the Decision unlawfully binds the discretion of future Commission actions by precluding Cal Water from proposing to continue the decoupling WRAM in future GRCs; (8) the preemptive denial precluding a future WRAM violates the Legislative directive under section 727.5 subdivision (c); and (9) the elimination of the decoupling WRAM and preemptive prohibition on rate design changes unlawfully impairs the ability of Cal Water to earn an adequate rate of return in violation of the constitution. Cal Water requests oral argument.

Golden State alleges the elimination of the WRAM is unlawful because: (1) the Commission violated section 1701.1 subdivision (c), Rule 7.3, and Golden State's due process rights by ordering revocation of the WRAM/MCBA without having included this issue in any scoping memo; (2) the Commission violated section 1708 and Golden State's due process rights because it had no meaningful opportunity to analyze or refute the evidence relied upon; (3) the Commission violated section 1708 by failing to have

evidentiary hearings before revoking the WRAM mechanism; (4) the revocation of the WRAM/MCBA and related findings of fact are not supported by the record evidence; (5) the Decision violates section 1705 because it does not contain findings of fact on the effect the elimination of the WRAM/MCBA mechanisms will have on low-income customers; and (6) the Decision violates section 321.1 subdivision (a) by failing to consider the consequences of the Decision on all ratepayers and on low-income customers. Golden State requests oral argument.

The Public Advocates Office at the California Public Utilities Commission (Public Advocates) filed a response opposing the applications for rehearing.

We have carefully considered the arguments raised in the applications for rehearing and do not find grounds for granting rehearing. However, we will modify D.20-08-047 to remove a Finding of Fact that is not based on the evidentiary record and make some clarifying edits. Rehearing of D.20-08-047, as modified, is denied.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The elimination of the WRAM was within the scope of the proceeding.

Applicants contend that the Decision was unlawful because it eliminated the WRAM in violation of section 1701.1, subdivision (c) and Rule 7.3 by addressing an issue that was not within the scope of the proceeding. Specifically, Applicants allege that the elimination of the WRAM/MCBA decoupling mechanism (decoupling WRAM) was not included in any of the scoping memos issued in the proceeding. (Golden State at p. 14-17, CWA at pp. 6-12, Cal-Am at pp. 2-7, Cal Water at pp. 7-20, Liberty at pp. 3-4.) Applicants are not correct. The issue of the decoupling WRAM was included in the original Scoping Memo as part of the water sales forecasting issue. (*Scoping Memo and Ruling of Assigned Commissioner*, January 9, 2018, at pp. 2-3.) We did not violate our own rules or fail to regularly pursue our authority.

Section 1701.1, subdivision (c) provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he assigned commissioner shall prepare and issue by order or ruling a scoping memo that describes the issues to be considered and the applicable timetable for resolution . . . ."

Rule 7.3, in relevant part, provides:

> The assigned Commissioner shall issue the scoping memo for the proceeding, which shall determine the schedule (with projected submission date), issues to be addressed, and need for hearing. . . . In a proceeding initiated by application or order instituting rulemaking, the scoping memo shall also determine the category. . . .

(Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 20, § 7.3.) Section 1701.1(b) and Rule 7.3 require the Scoping Memo to include the issues to be addressed in the proceeding but does not require it to list all possible outcomes to a proceeding.

The Scoping Memo in this proceeding identified water sales forecasting as an issue to be addressed in the proceeding, specifically asking "What guidelines or mechanisms can the Commission put in place to improve or standardize water sales forecasting for Class A water utilities?" (*Scoping Memo and Ruling of Assigned Commissioner*, January 9, 2018, at pp. 2-3.) Water sales forecasting was included in this proceeding because of its effect on WRAM balances and the effect of those balances on customer rates. The decoupling WRAM is inextricably tied to water sales forecasting.[4] One of the main reasons that water sales forecasting is important to the Commission is that when forecast sales are higher than actual sales, the WRAM utilities recover that difference in revenue through surcharges on customer's bills. Therefore, the risk of inaccurate forecasting is borne by the ratepayers. For non-WRAM utilities, if the water sales forecast is higher than actual sales, there is no mechanism to true-up the difference, therefore the risk is borne by the utility. Our concern about water sales forecasting and its effect on rates is, therefore, heightened because of the WRAM. This is illustrated in D.16-12-026, where the Commission found: "[t]he record of substantial WRAM balances or surcharges imposed over months or years on Class A and B water IOUs customers due

[4] CWA points out that D.16-12-026 distinguishes between forecasting and WRAM/MCBA as Section 6.1 is entitled Forecasting and Section 6.2 is entitled WRAM/MCBA. (CWA at p. 11, fn. 32.) However, in Section 6.1. Forecasting, the acronym WRAM is mentioned 42 times.

to mismatches between authorized revenue and sales demands action now to better align forecasted rates to recorded sales." (D.16-12-026 at p. 37.)

Here, the Decision explained that the WRAM issue, as it relates to water sales forecasting, was part of this OIR from the beginning. It discusses the comments made by parties throughout the proceeding that show the linkage between the WRAM and sales forecasting:

> California-American Water Company also identified sales forecasting as an important issue for this rulemaking to explore as the "long-standing problem of forecasting future sales … has been heightened by periods of drought and issues related to very substantial balances in the Water Revenue Mechanism Accounts."

(Decision at p. 18, quoting Cal-Am's comments to the Order Instituting Rulemaking 17-06-024, p. 3.)

> In comments to this Scoping Memo the California Water Association, among other suggestions, called for folding the WRAM/MCBA recovery into base rates instead of surcharges[5] while the Public Advocates Office of the Public Utilities Commission argued that the large variances in forecasted sales are exacerbated by the WRAM/MCBA process.[6] Accordingly, the August 2, 2019, workshop included a panel on drought sales forecasting that identified a number of problems with the WRAM/MCBA mechanism. The September 4, 2019, Ruling specifically sought comment on whether the Commission should convert utilities with a full WRAM/MBCBA mechanism to a Monterey-Style WRAM with an incremental cost balancing account.

(Decision at p. 50, fns. in original.)

> The Public Advocates Office of the Public Utilities Commission recognizes that forecast variance is inevitable in rate-of-return regulation, but that the impact on water utilities has been muted as the result of the WRAM decoupling

[5] CWA Comments dated February 23, 2018 at p. 9.

[6] Public Advocates Office Comments dated February 23, 2018 at p. 8.

> mechanism in California. While the Public Advocates Office of the Public Utilities Commission recognized that large WRAM balances are not solely caused by a large variance in forecasted sales, it argued that by mitigating the consequences of inaccurate sales forecasts, WRAM and other decoupling mechanisms exacerbate the actual size of the variance.

(Decision at p. 30.) These comments illustrate that WRAM issues were an integral part of the discussions on sales forecasting throughout the proceeding.

The above notwithstanding, the Applicants cite *Southern California Edison Company v. Public Utilities Commission* (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1085 (*Edison*) to support their scoping memo arguments. (Golden State at pp. 15-17, CWA at pp. 8-11, Cal-Am at pp. 4-6, Cal Water at p. 8.) However, this reliance on *Edison* is misplaced. In *Edison*, the issue in controversy was unrelated to the issues listed in the scoping memo. (*Edison*, *supra*, 140 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1104-1105.) Here, as explained above, water sales forecasts were included in the list of issues in the Scoping Memo and because the WRAM and water sales forecast are inextricably linked, we did not violate our own rules. *Edison* has no relevance here.

Additionally, Cal Water and CWA cite *City of Huntington Beach v. Public Utilities Commission* (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 566 (*Huntington Beach*) to support their argument. Like *Edison*, this case is not relevant to the instant proceeding. In *Huntington Beach*, the Commission had concluded a construction project preempted local ordinances where "[t]hroughout the PUC proceedings, the parties and the [C]ommission emphasized that a court, not the [C]ommission, would adjudicate the validity of the City's municipal ordinances." (*Huntington Beach*, *supra*, 214 Cal.App.4th 566, 570.) In the present case, there was no stipulation or express language in the Scoping Memo equivalent to that in *Huntington Beach*.

Cal Water cites *Calaveras Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission* (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 972 for the proposition that the Commission may not disregard its own rules. (Cal Water at p. 8.) This case is inapposite. As discussed above, because water forecasting includes WRAM issues, and was identified as an issue in the scoping

memo, we are in compliance with our rules.

Golden State and Cal Water argue if they would have had any notice that the Commission would consider revoking their authority to use their WRAM and MCBA mechanisms they would have advocated for hearings. (Golden State at p. 15, Cal Water at pp. 18-19.) Nothing in the Scoping Memo precluded the WRAM Utilities from requesting hearings. In fact, the Scoping Memo stated that hearings are not required at this time. It further stated that if hearings are required at a later date, an amended scoping memo would be issued. (*Scoping Memo and Ruling of Assigned Commissioner*, January 9, 2018, at p. 4.) The parties at any time could have filed a motion to request hearings. No party did. Even after the September 4, 2019 Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) Ruling specifically asked for comments on whether the WRAM should be replaced with the Monterey-Style WRAM, no party requested hearings. (*Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Inviting Comments on Water Division Staff Report and Responses to Additional Questions*, September 4, 2019, at p. 3 (September 4, 2019 ALJ Ruling.) More than ten months elapsed, after the parties filed their reply comments to that ALJ Ruling, before the Proposed Decision (PD) was issued. The parties had adequate time to file a motion requesting hearings after the ALJ Ruling requested comments on that issue.

Moreover, the parties had notice that, as a pilot program, the continuation of the WRAM and MCBA was regularly under consideration. Since the WRAMs were authorized, the Commission regularly evaluated whether the WRAM and MCBA should be continued. In D.12-04-048 the Commission ordered "a more vigorous review of the [WRAM/MCBA] mechanisms and options to the mechanisms, as well as sales forecasting, be conducted [in] each applicant's pending or next [GRC] proceeding." It further ordered the utilities to address five options in those proceedings, including whether the Commission should adopt a Monterey-Style WRAM rather than the existing full WRAM and whether the Commission should eliminate the WRAM mechanism. (D.12-04-048 at pp. 42-43.) In D.16-12-026 the Commission stated: "We conclude that, **at this time**, the WRAM mechanism should be maintained." (D.16-12-026 at p. 41, emphasis added.) Finally, the Applicants' rehearing applications themselves show the

Commission's ongoing evaluations of the viability of the WRAM in their individual GRC, and other, proceedings. (Golden State at pp. 9-13, CWA at pp. 3, 13.)

B. Applicants were afforded due process.

Applicants contend they were denied due process because they were not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to respond to the discontinuation of the decoupling WRAM in violation of statutory requirements and constitutional due process. Golden State, Cal Water, Liberty, Cal-Am and CWA contend the Decision violated section 1708 by failing to have an evidentiary hearing before discontinuing the WRAM. More specifically, they argue that the Decision's order to refrain from seeking WRAM/MCBAs in their next general rate case proceedings rescinds previous Commission decisions without affording parties a meaningful opportunity to address the relevant issues as required by section 1708. (Golden State at pp. 17-20, Cal Water at pp. 20-32, Liberty at pp. 2-3, 6, Cal-Am at p. 21, fn. 65, and CWA at pp. 13-14.) CWA explains that WRAMs authorized in the utilities' various GRCs and in the balanced rates rulemaking decision, D.16-12-026, affirmed the decoupling WRAM as a ratemaking mechanism for ongoing use. Therefore, CWA argues, the Commission may not rescind, alter, or amend these decisions without providing the parties an opportunity to be heard through hearings. (CWA at p.13-14.)

Section 1708 provides the Commission discretion to rescind, alter, or amend any order or decision made by it:

> The commission may at any time, upon notice to the parties, and with opportunity to be heard as provided in the case of complaints, rescind, alter, or amend any order or decision made by it. Any order rescinding, altering, or amending a prior order or decision shall, when served upon the parties, have the same effect as an original order or decision.

The Applicants are incorrect in their argument that Section 1708 provides the right to evidentiary hearings in this proceeding. The Decision does not rescind, alter, or amend any prior decision. The Decision specifically stated that the policy decision to discontinue the use of the decoupling WRAM would be implemented in the utilities' next

GRCs. (Decision at p. 76.) The Decision does not reopen any prior Commission decisions. Nonetheless, we address the issues raised by the Applicants below.

CWA, Golden State, and Cal Water contend that there was no such opportunity to present evidence or to cross-examine witnesses on the WRAM issues in this proceeding. CWA, Golden State, and Cal Water cite *California Trucking Association v. Public Utilities Commission* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 240, 244 (*California Trucking*) for the proposition that "a party must be permitted to prove the substance of its protest rather than merely being allowed to submit written objections to a proposal." (CWA at p. 14, Golden State at pp. 18-19, Cal Water at p. 25.) However, *California Trucking* does not support Applicants' claim that the Commission denied the parties' due process rights by failing to provide the parties with an opportunity to present evidence or to cross-examine witnesses. In *California Trucking*, the petitioner had requested a hearing on two separate occasions but the Commission refused those requests. (*California Trucking Assn. v. Pub. Util. Com*., *supra*,19 Cal.3d 240, 242-243.) In the instant proceeding, the parties did not request that the Commission schedule hearings. The Court, in *California Trucking* held that "[i]f no party seeks to challenge a proposed order except by merely submitting written comments on its merits, the commission is not required to hold a hearing." (*Id*. at p. 245.) Further, the Court found that "there is nothing remarkable in the concept that one who is entitled to a hearing may waive his right thereto by failing to assert it." (*Id*. at p. 245, fn. 7.) As discussed above, we disagree that Section 1708 provides the right to evidentiary hearings in this proceeding. But even if Applicants had such a right, because no party asked for evidentiary hearings, we did not violate the Applicants' due process rights.

Golden State argues that the Decision's conclusion that WRAMs are no more effective at conservation than Monterey-Style WRAMs is based singularly on Public Advocates' graph and because it had no opportunity to analyze or refute this data, the Commission violated section 1708 and the WRAM utilities' due process rights. (Golden State at p. 17-18.) Golden State cites *Brewer v. Railroad Commission of California* (1922) 190 Cal. 60, 77-78 to support its claim that the Decision's "reliance on

this one-sided perspective" without giving the WRAM utilities the ability to refute the data violates their due process rights. However, *Brewer* does not support Golden State's claim. In *Brewer*, during hearings, the Commission excluded evidence proffered by petitioner because it was duplicative. (*Brewer v. Railroad Com. of Cal., supra,*190 Cal. 60, 76-77.) Here, we sought comments from the parties. The Decision relied on the evidence in the record and the comments received by the parties. It did not rely on a one-sided record, and the WRAM utilities had their own opportunity to provide its own perspective for the record.

Golden State's reliance on *California Association of Nursing Homes, etc. v. Williams* (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 800 is equally unavailing. (Golden State at pp. 18-19.) In that case, the defendant agency, required by statute to create Medi-Cal reimbursement rates for nursing homes, failed to produce an evidentiary record for the court to review and the defendant agency based its decision on off-the-record, private negotiations with select affected businesses, rather than public hearings as required by statute. (*Cal. Assoc. of Nursing Homes, etc. v. Williams, supra*, 4 Cal.App.3d 800, 810-812.) Here, the entire record is available to the parties on the Commission's website, all parties were entitled to attend the workshops and file opening and reply comments, and there are no allegations of private negotiations.

Next, CWA and Cal Water claim it was never incumbent on the parties to seek greater opportunities to weigh in on the WRAM matter because the issue was never reasonably encompassed in any scoping memo. (CWA at p. 15, Cal Water at p. 32.) CWA claims the "deficiency of the evidentiary record is the Commission's failure, as it does not meet the procedural standard mandated for the protection of the parties." (CWA at p. 15.) To support this contention, CWA cites the *Edison* holding that the court "cannot fault the parties for failing to respond to the merits of proposals that were not encompassed in the scoping memo absent an order amending the scope of issues to include the new proposals." (*Edison*, *supra*, 140 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1106.)

As discussed briefly above, the facts in *Edison* can be distinguished from the facts in the instant proceeding. In *Edison*, a party, joining the proceeding late, filed

opening comments 10 months after opening comments were due. The comments included 400 pages of supporting materials and offered new proposals, that were not described in the scoping memo, for the first time in the proceeding. The ALJ ruling gave parties three business days (excluding the weekend and a legal holiday) to file supplemental reply comments. (*Id*. at pp. 1105-1106.) In contrast, in the instant proceeding, as discussed above, WRAM issues were encompassed in the sales forecasting issue included in the original scoping memo. (*Scoping Memo and Ruling of Assigned Commissioner*, January 9, 2018, at p. 1-3.) There were no late-filed comments or voluminous attachments. The parties had twelve days to file opening comments and another seven days to file reply comments. (*Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Inviting Comments on Water Division Staff Report and Responses to Additional Questions*, September 4, 2019, at p. 5.) Once the ALJ's ruling issued, the parties had ample time to submit comments, and parties did file both opening and reply comments.

A recent Court of Appeal decision, *BullsEye Telecom, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission* (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 301 (*BullsEye Telecom*), is more on point. In that decision the court distinguished *Edison* from the facts in *BullsEye Telecom* and found the petitioners had the opportunity to present evidence but had not done so. The Court of Appeal discussed that the petitioners asserted that their "evidentiary showing would have been quite different if the Scoping Memo in 2012 reflected the Commission's current view that only differences in cost-of-service could provide a 'rational basis for different rates.'" (*BullsEye Telecom*, *supra*, 66 Cal.App.5th 301, 327.) The Court held that petitioners failed to show that cost was excluded as an issue by the Scoping Memo, especially in light of the legal position taken by the Real Party in Interest. The Court of Appeal held: "[i]f petitioners had relevant evidence to present on that issue but failed to do so, that was their own strategic decision and they cannot now be heard to complain." (*Ibid*.) Likewise, in the present case, Applicants had the opportunity to provide substantive comments in response to the questions in the September 4, 2019 ALJ Ruling Inviting Comments, but declined to do so. They cannot now complain that the record is devoid of evidence.

Golden State further argues that even if the parties are not entitled to evidentiary hearings, their due process rights have been violated because they "were denied any opportunity to submit any evidence as to the importance of not having their WRAM/MBCA mechanisms revoked and to refute Cal PA's graph." (Golden State at p. 20.) Similarly, CWA takes issue with the graph provided by Public Advocates in its reply comments during the proceeding, claiming it never had the opportunity to respond to the graph until the issuance of the PD. (CWA at p. 16.)

It is well established that due process requires "adequate notice" and an opportunity to be heard. "Due process as to the commission's initial action is provided by the requirement of adequate notice to a party affected and an opportunity to be heard before a valid order can be made." *People v. Western Airlines, Inc*. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 632.

Discontinuation of the WRAM/MBCA was raised throughout the proceeding and the opportunity to file opening and reply comments on this specific issue was provided in the September 4, 2019 ALJ Ruling. The graph at issue was provided in Public Advocates' reply comments in response to CWA's opening comments. (Public Advocates September 23, 2019 Reply Comments at p. 7.) During the proceeding, in the ten months between Public Advocates' introduction of the graph and the issuance of the PD, CWA never sought the opportunity to respond to the graph. CWA and the other parties could have filed a motion to strike the graph or a motion requesting the opportunity to respond to the graph. As discussed above, the parties did not avail themselves of the opportunity to address the graph; they "cannot now be heard to complain." CWA and Golden State have not shown that we failed to proceed in the manner required by law.

C. The Decision is supported by record evidence.

Applicants contend that elimination of the WRAM is not supported by record evidence. For the most part, the allegations are based on differences of opinion and the Applicants have not shown the determinations lack evidentiary support.

1. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are supported by record evidence.

Applicants contend that certain findings of fact and conclusions of law are not supported by record evidence in violation of Section 1757.1(a)(1). (Golden State at pp. 20-28, CWA at pp. 19-22, Cal-Am at pp. 19-27, Cal Water at pp. 40-46, Liberty at pp. 4-5.)

Cal Water identified a typographical error in Finding of Fact #2, which states:

> If actual sales exceed adopted sales, the WRAM/MCBA mechanism will return the over-collected revenues to customers through a balancing account with a surcharge on customer bills. (Emphasis added.)

The underlined surcharge should read sur-credit. Accordingly, we will modify D.20-08-047 to reflect this correction.

CWA argues that the statement in Finding of Fact #8, that subsequent GRC proceedings did not adjudicate the WRAM/MCBA options ordered in D.12-04-048 because those proceedings were resolved by settlement, is incorrect because the Commission approved those settlements. (CWA at p. 20.) This Finding of Fact simply makes the point that the Commission, for the water industry as a whole, did not resolve each issue, but rather, approved the settlements with the knowledge that there is give and take in negotiation and that overall, the settlement was reasonable. Finding of Fact #8 is correct.

Golden State argues that Finding of Fact #11, which states that the WRAM/MCBA has led to substantial under-collections and subsequent increases in quantity rates, is unsupported by current data because the Decision cites to a 2012 Commission decision for that proposition. However, the Decision also cites to two later decisions, D.13-05-011 and D.16-12-026. (Decision at p. 61.) It also discusses comments of the parties regarding high WRAM balances and subsequent rate increases. Cal-Am commented that the "long-standing problem of forecasting future sales. . . has been heightened by periods of drought and issues related to very substantial balances in

the Water Revenue Mechanism Accounts." (Decision at p. 19.) In its comments, "San Gabriel Water Valley Water Company agreed that authorizing Sales Reconciliation Mechanisms during drought periods will help mitigate the regressive nature of rates caused by amortizing high WRAM and Drought Lost Revenue Memorandum Account (DLRMA) balances." (*Id*. at pp. 32-33.) Public Advocates explained that "the main issue is that the WRAM balances are so high." (*Id*. at p. 65.) Finding of Fact #11 is adequately supported by the record.

Golden State alleges that its comments on the PD provided more current data reflecting it had over-collections in two of its service areas in recent years. However, its comments on the PD are not included in the evidentiary record.[7] Additionally, the proffered data addresses Golden States' two service areas, but the Decision considers the WRAM balances of all the service territories of all the WRAM utilities.

Golden State, Cal Water, Cal-Am and CWA contend that a critical determination in the Decision's discontinuation of the WRAM/MCBA is its finding that the mechanisms are no more effective in promoting conservation than the Monterey-Style WRAM/ICBA mechanisms, as stated in Findings of Fact #13 and #14. (Golden State at pp. 21-23, Cal Water at p. 40, Cal-Am at pp. 23-25, CWA at pp. 20-21.)

Findings of Fact #13 and #14 state:

> 13. Average consumption per metered connection for WRAM utilities is less than the consumption per metered connection for non-WRAM utilities as evidenced in water utility annual reports filed from 2008 through 2016.

[7] Under Rule 14.3 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, comments on the Proposed Decision are required to focus on factual, legal or technical errors in the proposed decision, making specific reference to the record or applicable law. Comments which fail to do so will be accorded no weight. Furthermore, comments on Proposed Decisions are filed after the evidentiary record has been closed, and thus, are not considered part of the evidentiary record. (See, e.g., Rules 13.14, 14.2, and 14.3.)

14. Conservation for WRAM utilities measured as a percentage change during the last 5 years is less than conservation achieved by non-WRAM utilities, including Class B utilities as evidenced in water utility annual reports filed from 2008 through 2016.

Golden State alleges Finding of Fact #13 is solely based on the graph submitted in Public Advocates' September 2019 reply comments. Golden State further argues that because the WRAM utilities were not provided "any opportunity to counter CAL PA's graph" no valid record was established on the issue of whether the WRAM/MBCA should be discontinued. (Golden State at pp. 21-23.) To support this claim, it cites *The Utility Reform Network v. Public Utilities Commission* (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 945, 959 (*TURN*) and summarizes the holding as "evidence not subject to cross-examination cannot be the sole support for a finding of fact." (Golden State at p. 23, fn. 93.) Golden State misconstrues this decision. In fact, the Court stated: "Consequently, the issue before us is a narrow one. May the Commission base a finding of fact solely upon hearsay evidence where the truth of the extrarecord statements is disputed? The answer is no." (*TURN*, *supra*, 223 Cal.App.4th 945, 959.)

In *TURN*, PG&E submitted the evidence in dispute, a hearsay declaration from an executive of the California Independent System Operator (the CAISO) and a petition the CAISO had filed with a federal agency. Neither the CAISO executive nor the authors of the petition testified in the Commission's proceedings. Because of their hearsay nature, the presiding ALJ ruled these materials could not be used as evidence of the need for the project in question. Then the Decision overruled the ALJ's ruling and approved the project solely upon that evidence. (*TURN*, *supra*, 223 Cal.App.4th 945, 949.)

TURN is not relevant to this proceeding. The evidence at issue here is based on data provided to the Commission by the utilities in their annual reports. (*Reply Comments of the Public Advocates Office on the Water Division's Staff Report and Response to Additional Questions*, September 23, 2019 at p. 7.) Further, as discussed above, after Public Advocates provided the graph in its reply comments, the parties never

sought permission to respond to the graph they now dispute or to have the graph stricken from the record.

Next, Golden State argues that there are three problems with Public Advocates' graph but the Commission refused to consider the information provided in the WRAM utilities' comments on the PD opposing the data in Public Advocates' graph. It cites *United States Steel Corporation v. Public Utilities Commission* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 603, 608-609 (*U.S. Steel*) to support this contention. However, *U.S. Steel* is not on point. In that case, the Supreme Court annulled the Commission's decision because the Commission refused to consider the economic effect of authorizing different rates for similar services over similar routes. In the instant proceeding, Golden State and Cal Water are arguing that the Commission erred because it refused to consider the utilities' comments on the PD, which were filed after the close of the evidentiary record. However, each of the problems Golden State and Cal Water identified is related to the measurement or interpretation of the data provided in Public Advocates' graph. Neither Golden State nor Cal Water argue that the data are inaccurate. (Golden State at pp. 21-23, Cal Water at p. 41.) Nonetheless, the Decision addresses those concerns and discusses why, in weighing the evidence, it determined that Public Advocates' arguments were credible. (Decision at pp. 62-70.) Golden State and Cal Water simply disagree with the way the Commission weighed the evidence; they have not identified legal error.

CWA argues that Findings of Fact #13 and #14 are unsupported by the record because they contain data that was not placed into evidence in the proceeding or made available to the parties for review. (CWA at p. 20-21.) Finding of Fact #13 addresses the data, from the annual reports that the water companies submit to the Commission, that underlies the graph that Public Advocates filed in its September 2019 reply comments. However, because this data was not included in the evidentiary record and is not necessary, we will delete this finding of fact. In contrast, it is clear from the wording of Finding of Fact #14 that the data are from the aforementioned graph provided in Public Advocates' September 2019 reply comments. In reviewing this finding, it became apparent that the wording is not clear. To clarify, the we will modify Finding of

Fact #14 to indicate that the "last 5 years" refers to the last 5 years of the data provided in the graph contained in Public Advocates' September 2019 reply comments. With this change, Finding of Fact #14 is supported by the record.

Cal-Am relies on *California Manufacturers Assoc. v. Public Utilities Commission* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 251 and *Camp Meeker Water System, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 845 to support its claim that the Commission commits legal error when it issues a decision which is unsupported by evidence before it. (Cal-Am at p. 19.) However, that is not the situation in this proceeding. Cal-Am's rehearing application provides several reasons for its belief that the evidence relied on by the Decision is faulty, however, it fails to provide references to any evidence in the record that contradicts that evidence. (Cal-Am at pp. 23-27.) Cal-Am is merely arguing about the way in which the Commission weighed the evidence. It has not shown legal error.

Next, Cal-Am claims that the Commission did not make any conclusion of law regarding the impact of the decoupling WRAM on conservation. (Cal-Am at p. 23.) It does not provide any reason or analysis as to why this is necessary. In fact, the Commission is not required to make such a conclusion of law. Section 1705 requires conclusions of law "on all issues material to the order or decision." It is within the Commission's discretion to identify the factors that are material to its decision. (*Clean Energy Fuels Corp. v. Pub. Util. Com.* (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 641, 659.) The conclusions of law in the Decision satisfy this requirement.

Cal Water argues that the Commission's conclusion "that continuation of the decoupling WRAM for conservation purposes will not benefit customers" is unsupported by the record. (Cal Water at p. 42.) However, the Decision states "we are not persuaded that continuing the WRAM/MCBA for strictly conservation purposes is beneficial to ratepayers." (Decision at p. 67.) The previous five pages of the Decision discuss the comments of the parties to provide the basis for this conclusion. Part of that discussion addressed the graph provided by Public Advocates, which they argue showed the annual change in average consumption per metered connection is almost the same

during the last eight years for both WRAM and non-WRAM utilities. (*Id*.) The inference is clear; if non-WRAM utilities achieve similar annual change in average consumption as WRAM utilities, other factors must come into play. The Decision identifies some of those factors on page 69. This Finding of Fact is supported by the record.

Golden State contends that Findings of Fact #15 and #16, regarding intergenerational transfers of cost associated with the WRAM, have no factual basis in the record. More specifically, it states: "In reality, the Commission has no basis for conducting any such quantification or analyzing the significance of intergenerational transfers in the short or long term, because there is no data in the record regarding the under-collections that would lead to intergenerational transfers or the intergenerational transfers themselves." (Golden State at pp. 24-25.)

As discussed above, there is evidence in the record regarding under-collections and the resulting surcharges. To the extent that Golden State is arguing that it is improper for the Commission to address its concern about intergenerational transfers because it cannot quantify those costs, it is mistaken. The Decision cites D.16-12-026, which addresses intergenerational transfers associated with WRAM balances collected in surcharges long after the under-collection occurred. (Decision at p. 70.) It is well established that the Commission is concerned with minimizing intergenerational transfers of costs associated with the WRAM balances. (*See* D.18-12-021 at pp. 234-235 and D.12-04-048 at p. 8.)

Cal Water contends that the statement in Finding of Fact #15 could be said of any balancing account, therefore, the fact that there are intergenerational transfers of cost associated with the WRAM, does not support the Commission's decision to eliminate it. (Cal Water at pp. 45-46.) The Decision explains that the WRAM balances have been significant and under-collected and the Commission seeks to minimize such transfers, when possible, to keep rates just and reasonable. (Decision at p. 70.) This is one of various reasons we identified to support our decision to discontinue the WRAM. The balances in other balancing accounts are not relevant to this proceeding. Cal Water's

statement does not identify legal error, it is a disagreement with the way in which we weighed the evidence.

Similarly, Cal Water and CWA argue that Finding of Fact #16 lacks support in the record. Specifically, they allege the Decision does not analyze how the Monterey-Style WRAM mechanism would better minimize intergenerational transfers of cost. (Cal Water at p. 46, CWA at p. 21.) The Decision explains that the option to use the Monterey-Style WRAM mechanism is more limited than the decoupling WRAM and that no other option was put forth by the parties. Based on these two options, the more limited Monterey-Style WRAM mechanism would better minimize intergenerational transfers of cost:

> We therefore find that the WRAM/MCBA mechanism is not the best means to minimize intergenerational transfers of costs when compared to an alternative available to the utilities and the Commission.
>
> **5.2.5. Allowing Water Utilities to [Use] a Monterey-Style WRAM**
>
> In view of the foregoing, we believe that it is an appropriate time to move to eliminate the option for water utilities to use the full WRAM/MCBA mechanism. However, to account for the consequences of inaccurate forecasts, it is reasonable that these former WRAM utilities be provided an opportunity to establish Monterey-Style WRAMs offset by ICBAs. The option to use the Monterey-Style WRAM grants water utilities a rate adjustment mechanism that is more limited and allows water utilities to recover lost revenues constrained to the difference between conservation tiered rates and single, uniform rates.
>
> In comments on the proposed decision, water companies claim that the Monterey-Style WRAM serves a different purpose and does not provide the same benefits as the traditional WRAM/MCBA.[8] However, no water company or

[8] July 27, 2020, Comments of Great Oaks Water Company at 10-11, July 27, 2020, Comments of California Water Service Company at 10-11, July 27, 2020, Comments of Golden State Water Company at 13-14, July 27, 2020, Comments of California-American Water Company at 8-9. July 27, 2020, Comments of California Water Association at 7-9,

> any other party offered any alternative to the WRAM/MCBA process other than allowing companies to use a Monterey-Style WRAM in future GRCs.[9]

(Decision at pp. 70-71, fns. in original.) The Applicants have not established an abuse of discretion with respect to Finding of Fact #16.

CWA argues that Finding of Fact #17 is incorrect in finding that "[t]iered rate design causes customers to use less water at increased costs per unit consumed; thus, use of [tiered] rate design is a reasonable means to stabilizing revenues." (CWA at p. 21, citing Decision at p. 103.) However, CWA makes no citation to the evidentiary record to support its argument. It does cite to Commissioner Randolph's dissent to the Decision, but the dissent is not part of the evidentiary record. Rule 16.1 (c) requires rehearing applicants to make specific references to the record or law. CWA has failed to prove legal error.

Cal-Am alleges Finding of Fact #19 and Conclusion of Law #4 are unsupported by the record. Finding of Fact #19 states:

> Implementation of a Monterey-Style WRAM means that forecasts of sales become more significant in establishing test year revenues.

Conclusion of Law #4 states:

> Elimination of the WRAM/MCBA will provide better incentives to more accurately forecast sales while still providing the utility the ability to earn a reasonable rate of return.

Cal-Am and Cal Water argue that there is no evidence in the record to support the claim that eliminating the WRAM/MCBA will improve forecasting. (Cal-Am at p. 21, Cal Water at p 43.) However, the Decision does not find that eliminating the WRAM/MCBA will improve forecasting. As shown above, Conclusion of Law #4 states that eliminating the WRAM/MCBA will provide *better incentives* to more

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July 27, 2020, Comments of Liberty Utilities at 8-10.

[9] *E.g.,* July 2019 Reply Comments of California Water Association at 13-14.

accurately forecast sales. This Conclusion of Law is based on the language in the Decision on page 18, which reads:

> In addition, parties highlighted the reality that drought is the new normal in California and that forecasts need to be more accurate so that WRAMs can be smaller, and that the Monterey-Style WRAM would provide better incentives for parties to more accurately forecast sales while still providing the utility the ability to earn a reasonable rate of return.

Upon review, it has come to our attention that no citation was provided for that statement. This statement was based on the following record evidence:

Public Advocates' Comments on Phase 1 Issues, February 23, 2018, at pp. 7-8:

> In fact, the risk that a forecast may be inaccurate is the sole economic basis for providing regulated utilities with rates of return greater than a risk-free rate.[fn.] . . . [W]ith revenue decoupling for water utilities,[fn.] the impact on water utilities of forecast variance is muted since nearly all revenue forecast risk has been transferred from utility investors to ratepayers. As a result of the WRAM decoupling mechanism in California, variance in forecasted revenues manifests not as the normal business risk underpinning rate-of-return regulation but as the perceived cause of large WRAM balances and increased customer surcharges.
>
> By mitigating the consequences of inaccurate sales forecasts, WRAM and other decoupling mechanisms can be reasonably assumed to not only reflect variances in sales forecasts but to exacerbate the actual size of the variance.

And Southern California Edison Comments on Staff Report, September 16, 2019, at pp. 3-5:

> In certain situations, implementing a Monterey-Style WRAM with a MCBA may balance the benefits and risks of implementing a conservation rate design more equitably among stakeholders. However, implementing a Monterey-Style WRAM as opposed to a full decoupling WRAM requires shareholders may be required to make up the difference for any shortfalls in authorized revenue not related to the use of a conservation rate design that far exceeds

> normal business risk. [fn.]

Accordingly, we will modify the Decision to insert a footnote with a citation to these comments.

Cal-Am further argues that the limited evidence in the record appears to contradict the Commission's conclusion on this issue. First it cites the staff report on the January 14, 2019 workshop which states that the water utilities claim WRAMs "allow them to institute more accurate and equitable rates." (Cal-Am at p. 21.) However, the report states that mid-year corrections and WRAMs allow them to institute more accurate and equitable rates. Moreover, this claim addresses rates, not accurate sales forecasting. The report also noted that Public Advocates claimed this reduced scrutiny of company expenses and is burdensome to ratepayers. Next Cal-Am cites the workshop report for the second workshop held on August 2, 2019, which observes that CWA and Public Advocates agreed that forecasts have been improving. (*Id*. at p. 21.) However, the report notes that Public Advocates said that "[r]ecent forecasts have improved, but there is still room for further improvements." Finally, it cites Southern California Edison's comments that claimed inaccurate forecasts were not the result of WRAM, but of a general forecast methodology. (Cal-Am at p. 22.) Public Advocates' comments contradict Southern California Edison's assertion. In its reply comments, Public Advocates addressed incentives to develop accurate forecasts:

> [T]he Public Advocates Office strongly supports the development of forecasts that are as accurate as possible for both revenues and expenses. When revenue variances are tracked in decoupling mechanisms (i.e., Water Revenue Adjustment Mechanisms (WRAMs)), and/or expenses are tracked in balancing and memorandum accounts, it reduces the financial repercussions to the utility of inaccurate forecasts. This, in turn, reduces the utility's incentive to develop accurate forecasts. This can result in misguided attempts by Water IOUs to lower rate increases in General Rate Cases (GRCs) with artificial forecasts that are deliberately inaccurate (e.g. higher adopted sales quantities or lower proposed expenses), with the resulting variances recovered through different mechanisms between GRC cycles

that provide for rate increases via a less transparent process.

(*Reply Comments of The Public Advocates Office on Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Inviting Comments on Water Division Staff Report and Modifying Proceeding Schedule*, July 24, 2019, at pp. 2.)

Public Advocates also addressed the manipulation of forecasts:

> Utilities should not propose and the Commission should not adopt sales forecasts with any particular rate outcome in mind. Instead of lowering noticed rate impacts with [higher] than reasonable sales forecasts and allowing new mechanisms to "stagger the impact on customers into smaller increments" as suggested by CWA, the water utilities should propose accurate forecasts openly and transparently in GRCs. Customers should not be required to face the continued uncertainty of stealth rate increases that accompany the operation of existing—much less new—alternative rate mechanisms.

(*Id*. at p. 3.) Additionally, Public Advocates' response to the rehearing applications identifies many other places in the record that contain evidence to support the Decision's determination that elimination of the WRAM will provide better incentives to more accurately forecast sales. (*Response of the Public Advocates Office to California-American Water Company, California Water Service Company, Golden State Water Company, Liberty Utilities Corp., and California Water Association's Rehearing Applications of Decision 20-08-047*, October 20, 2020, at pp. 8-9.) Cal-Am simply disagrees with our weighing of the evidence; it has failed to show legal error.

Similarly, Cal-Am and Cal Water erroneously argue that there is nothing in the record of this proceeding that addresses whether sales forecasts are more significant with the Monterey-Style WRAM. (Cal-Am at p. 22, Cal Water at 44.) The language quoted above that states when revenue variances are tracked in decoupling mechanisms like the WRAM, it reduces the financial repercussions to the utility of inaccurate forecasts, contradicts their arguments. Logic dictates that where there is no revenue protection for inaccurate forecasts, forecasting becomes more significant, both to the utility and the ratepayer. Moreover, Cal-Am provides no citations to the record to

support its allegation, but refers to evidence in its comments to the PD, which were filed after the record in this proceeding was closed and cannot be considered as part of the evidentiary record.

2. The Commission developed a record on the elimination of the WRAM.

Cal-Am contends the Commission failed to pursue its authority by failing to fully examine and develop a record on the elimination of the WRAM and to consider all of the facts and issues. Cal Water contends the Commission violated section 1705 by failing to hear and weigh all of the evidence. Section 1705 provides in pertinent part that a Commission order or decision "shall contain, separately stated, findings of fact and conclusions of law ... on all issues material to the order or decision."

More specifically, Cal-Am and Cal Water contend the Commission failed to adequately weigh the evidence, consistent with relevant case law. (Cal-Am at pp. 7-18, Cal Water at 46-47, citing *United States Steel Corporation v. Public Utilities Commission* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 603, 608 (*U.S. Steel*).) It is well established that an agency's duty is to weigh the relevant evidence provided in a proceeding. Cal-Am and Cal Water offer nothing to show that we failed to consider all the relevant evidence in this proceeding. For example, they assert we failed to consider the potential rate design impacts of eliminating the WRAM. (Cal-Am at pp. 7-18, Cal Water at pp. 48-50.) Next, they argue that in failing to consider rate design, we failed to consider the effect of changed rate design on conservation and low-income customers. (Cal-Am at pp. 13-18, Cal Water at pp. 48-50.) To support their arguments, Cal Water and Cal-Am cite to the parties' comments on the PD, Commissioner Randolph's dissent, and other documents, none of which are in the evidentiary record of this proceeding. An application for rehearing is not a permissible vehicle to merely reargue the issues or to ask the Commission to reweigh the evidence. The Commission has complied with section 1705 by considering the material facts and weighing the relevant evidence provided in this proceeding.

Additionally, Cal Water contends that by discontinuing the WRAM, the

Decision binds the discretion of future Commission actions. (Cal Water at p. 47.) Cal Water argues this violates section 727.5 subdivision (c), which states the Commission "shall consider, and may authorize, a water corporation to establish a balancing account, rate stabilization fund, or other contingency fund, the purpose of which shall be the long-term stabilization of water rates." Cal Water explains that the Decision's precluding the utilities from requesting WRAMs in future GRCs also precludes the Commission from considering whether the water utilities may establish a WRAM balancing account in violation of section 727.5 subdivision (c). However, the Commission has already considered and authorized the water utilities to use WRAM balancing accounts; section 727.5 subdivision (c) does not prohibit the Commission from rescinding that authorization. Moreover, the Decision did not preclude the utilities from requesting any other balancing accounts, in fact, it encouraged utilities to seek Monterey-Style WRAMs. (Decision at pp. 71-72.) The Decision did not violate section 727.5 subdivision (c).

D. The Decision is in compliance with section 321.1 subdivision (a).

Golden State contends that the Decision violates section 321.1 subdivision (a) by failing to consider the consequences of the Decision on all ratepayers and on low-income customers. More specifically, it argues that nothing in the record addresses how elimination of the WRAM will impact low-income customers. (Golden State at pp. 25-28.) As the Commission stated in D.06-12-042, "[t]he plain language of the statute only requires the Commission to 'assess' the economic effects of a decision. It does not require the Commission to perform a cost benefit analysis or consider the economic effect of its decision on specific customer groups or competitors." (D.06-12-042 at pp. 17-18.)

The relevant part of section 321.1 subdivision (a) requires the Commission to assess the economic effects of its decisions:

> It is the intent of the Legislature that the commission assess the consequences of its decisions, including economic effects . . . as part of each ratemaking, rulemaking, or other

> proceeding, and that this be accomplished using existing resources and within existing commission structures.

In the Decision, after discussing the elimination of the WRAM and its effect on ratepayers, the Commission concluded:

> We agree with the Public Advocates Office of the Public Utilities Commission that requiring WRAM utilities to transition to the Monterey-Style WRAM will not decrease conservation incentives for customers. Further, there is no evidence that eliminating the WRAM will raise rates on low-income and low-use customers. However, the impact of the unanticipated WRAM surcharges on low-income and low-use customers is one component of the problems we have encountered with the WRAM. Further, rate design is the ultimate determinant of impacts to low-income and low-use customers, and water utilities can and will propose rate structures in their next GRC application where the Commission will ensure low-income and low-use customers are not adversely impacted.[¶] . . . We continue to believe that other actions by companies, the Legislature, the State Water Resources Control Board, and the Commission have, and continue to do more to achieve conservation requirements and that the flaws and negative customer experience with the WRAM/MCBA outweigh any benefits it does achieve.

(Decision at pp. 68-69, fn. omitted.) We have complied with the requirements of section 321.1 subdivision (a); accordingly, Golden State has not shown legal error.

E. The Decision allows the utilities the opportunity to earn a fair rate of return.

Cal-Am and Cal Water contend that the Decision unlawfully impeded on their ability to earn a reasonable rate of return. Specifically, they suggest that the Commission's efforts to ensure low-income and low-use customers are not adversely impacted by the new rate designs may impact their ability to earn a reasonable rate of return. (Cal-Am at pp. 18-19, Cal Water at pp. 50-52.) To support this claim, Cal-Am and Cal Water cite *Hope Natural Gas, Duquesne Light,* and *Bluefield*, which hold that ratesetting must not lead to confiscatory rates. (*FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.* (1944)

320 U.S. 591; *Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia* (1923) 262 U.S. 679, *Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch (1989)* 488 U.S. 299.) These cases are not relevant here because this is not a ratesetting proceeding and we did not set rates for any utility. This was a quasi-legislative proceeding in which we ended a pilot program that afforded water companies the opportunity to receive balancing account treatment to account for the shortfall between forecast sales and actual sales.

F. The Revised Proposed Decision is not an alternate proposed decision.

CWA contends that the revisions to the PD were substantial and therefore constituted an alternate proposed decision for which additional public review was required pursuant to section 311, subdivision (e). More specifically, CWA alleges that the factual support drawn from workshop discussions and water utility annual reports comprised a substantive revision that materially changed how the PD reached that result. CWA further argues that revisions to the findings of fact, conclusions of law and ordering paragraphs of the PD violate section 311, subdivision (e). (CWA at p. 18.)

While section 311, subdivision (e), does impose a 30-day notice and comment period for "alternate" decisions, the Decision was not an "alternate" within the meaning of section 311, subdivision (e) or the Commission's rules, which implement the statute. Section 311, subdivision (e), defines an "alternate" as:

> [E]ither a substantive revision to a proposed decision that materially changes the resolution of a contested issue, or any substantive addition to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, or ordering paragraphs.

(Pub. Util. Code, § 311, subd. (e).)

Further, section 311, subdivision (e), directs the Commission to adopt rules to implement the statute. Accordingly, the Commission adopted Rule 14.1, which states:

> (d) "Alternate" means a substantive revision by a Commissioner to a recommended decision not proposed by that Commissioner or to the draft resolution which either:
>
> (1) materially changes the resolution of a contested issue,

> or
>
> (2) makes any substantive addition to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, or ordering paragraphs.

(Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 20, § 14.1, subd. (d).)

The revisions in the Revised PD were not substantive revisions by a Commissioner to a recommended decision not proposed by that Commissioner. The Revised PD was a result of revisions made by the assigned ALJ and/or the assigned Commissioner based on comments to the Proposed Decision. Thus, it was not a change constituting an "alternate" under Rule 14.1, subdivision (d).

CWA argues "there is no basis in the unambiguous wording of section 311, subdivision (e), for limiting the definition of an "alternate" to a revision by a Commissioner to a proposed decision not proposed by that Commissioner. Any 'substantive revision' is an alternate and an opportunity to submit comments must be allowed." (CWA at p.18, fn. 54.)

However, the legislative history for section 311, subdivision (e), affirms that Rule 14.1 is lawful. It shows that the Legislature intended "alternates" to be substantive changes made by another Commissioner, not revisions made by the assigned Commissioner or the assigned ALJ. After considering comments of the parties, the Commission specifically addressed this issue in D.00-01-053:

> Specifically, TURN agrees with the Commission's discussion of the history and use of "alternate" (See D.99-11-052 mimeo. at 3-4.)[fn.] and asserts that:
>
> > "Everyone involved in the legislative process that resulted in SB 779 knew the Commission's longstanding definition of 'alternate' and the term was used in that traditional context. If the legislature had meant to change that longstanding definition, it would have done so explicitly, but it did not." (TURN, Comments on Bilas/Neeper Alternate at 4.)

(D.00-01-053 at p. 8.)

In D.99-11-052, the Commission discussed its reasoning for adopting its definition of "alternate" decision:

> At the time that the term 'alternate' was enacted into the Public Utilities Code [§ 311(e), added in 1994 by Assembly Bill 2850 (Escutia), Ch. 1110 of Stats. 1998], and for many years before the enactment, the Commission used that term in distributing agenda materials internally and in publishing its agenda. Under this Commission practice, to which § 311(e) expressly refers, the Commission has applied the term to a revision not prepared or accepted by the presiding officer who originally prepared the decision to be revised. In contrast, a revision that the presiding officer makes or accepts simply replaces the order as originally proposed, since that order no longer has a sponsor and therefore is not before the Commission or on its agenda. In implementing the statutory term 'alternate,' the Commission followed this established practice . . . .

(D.99-11-052 at p. 3, fn. omitted, emphasis in original.)

The Commission explained in D.00-01-053 that "[n]othing in SB 779 indicates that the Legislature intended to expand 'alternate' beyond this historical usage; rather, the Legislature's intent was to expand the kinds of decisions (including alternates to those decisions) that would be issued for comment." (D.00-01-053 at p. 8, fn. 8.) That decision, which adopted the current definition of "alternate" in the Commission's rules, considered parties' comments and is now final and not subject to appeal.

Proposed Decisions present outcomes recommended by the assigned ALJ in a proceeding. They are subject to change and do not become binding unless adopted by the Commission. It is normal practice for decisions to contain changes made by an ALJ following comments on the Proposed Decision. That practice is consistent with section 311, subdivision (d), which allows the Commission to adopt, modify, or set aside all or part of a proposed decision without any additional review or comment.

G. The proceeding was properly categorized.

Cal Water contends that the Commission unlawfully characterized the proceeding as quasi-legislative rather than ratesetting, thus depriving it of certain procedural rights. First, Cal Water claims that eliminating the WRAM is an unlawful ratesetting action, so it was improper for the Commission to categorize the proceeding as

quasi-legislative. Section 1701.1 subsection (d)(1) defines quasi-legislative cases as cases that establish policy, including, but not limited to, rulemakings and investigations that may establish rules affecting an entire industry. This case was an order instituting rulemaking proceeding that established rules for the entire water industry. It is not a ratesetting case because it is not a case in which rates are established for a specific company. (Section 1701.1 subd. (d)(3).) No rates were set in this proceeding. The elimination of the WRAM was a policy decision applied to all water companies. The ordering paragraph identified the utilities that currently employ the WRAM, however, the policy is applicable to all water utilities.

Moreover, Rule 7.1, subdivision (e), provides the Commission discretion to determine which category appears most suitable to the proceeding when a proceeding may fit more than one category. Therefore, there is no legal error in addressing issues from more than one category in a single quasi-legislative proceeding.[10]

Further, once the Commission has categorized a proceeding, Section 1701.1 subsection (a) states "the decision as to the nature of the proceeding shall be subject to a request for rehearing within 10 days of the date of that decision or of any subsequent ruling that expands the scope of the proceeding. Only those parties who have requested a rehearing within that time period shall subsequently have standing for judicial review . . . ." Cal Water claims the parties had no opportunity to appeal the designation of the proceeding because the issue was only raised in the PD. (Cal Water at pp. 35-36.) As discussed above, the issue was explicitly presented in the September 4, 2019 ALJ Ruling Inviting Comments. At that time CWA, on behalf of the water utilities, filed comments regarding that issue but declined to seek rehearing on the categorization within 10 days. The parties may not now challenge the categorization of the proceeding.

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[10] In May of 2021 the rules were modified and Rule 1.3, subdivision (e), which defines quasi-legislative proceedings became Rule 1.3, subdivision (f). The original definition was unchanged, but the Commission added clarifying language that states "even if those proceedings have an incidental effect on ratepayer costs." Thus, the Rules recognize that proceedings may not always fit perfectly into one category.

Finally, Cal Water argues that it was denied procedural protections as a result of the improper categorization. (Cal Water at pp. 36-38.) As discussed above, the proceeding was not miscategorized, therefore no procedural protections were denied.

H. The Decision did not fix water rates.

Cal Water contends that the Commission violated sections 728 and 729 by eliminating the WRAM because it effectively fixed water rates without holding a hearing. (Cal Water at pp. 38-39.) Cal Water's contention is not correct. Section 728 and 729 address the Commission's authority to fix rates. Section 728 orders the Commission, when it finds that rates charged by a public utility are unjust, to fix just and reasonable rates. In this proceeding, we did not hold hearings to evaluate any utility's rates. Cal Water's contention regarding section 729 is equally unavailing. Section 729 permits the Commission to investigate the rates of a public utility and establish new rates. No investigation of rates occurred in this proceeding. Here, we made a policy decision to discontinue a pilot program that protected certain water utilities' revenue when forecast sales were higher than actual sales. No rates were set for any utility.[11] This was not a ratesetting proceeding; it was a quasi-legislative proceeding, making general policy decisions for all water utilities. Cal Water has not shown legal error.

I. Oral argument is not necessary.

Applicants request oral argument pursuant to Commission Rule 16.3 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 20, Rule 16.3). CWA contends that oral argument is appropriate because it will materially assist the Commission in resolving its rehearing application by providing a forum for interested parties to answer the Commissions questions. (CWA at p. 23.) Applicants argue it is appropriate because the Decision departs from precedent (Golden State at p. 28, Cal-Am at pp. 27-28, Liberty at p. 6.) and raises issues of

[11] Cal Water cites caselaw to show that "these statutory provisions have been construed by the California Supreme Court as requirements for the Commission to hold hearings prior to the implementation of new rates." (Cal Water at p. 39.) Because rates were not set in this proceeding, these cases are not on point.

exceptional controversy, complexity, or public importance. (Cal-Am at pp. 28-30, Cal Water at p. 52-53, CWA at p. 23.)

Rule 16.3 provides that requests for oral argument for applications for rehearing shall demonstrate oral argument would materially assist the Commission in resolving the application and that the challenged decision:

(1) adopts new Commission precedent or departs from existing Commission precedent without adequate explanation;

(2) changes or refines existing Commission precedent;

(3) presents legal issues of exceptional controversy, complexity, or public importance; and/or

(4) raises questions of first impression that are likely to have significant precedential impact.

The Commission has complete discretion to determine the appropriateness of oral argument in any particular matter. (Commission Rule 16.3, subdivision (a), Cal. Code Regs., tit. 20, Rule 16.3, subd. (a).) Applicants have had ample opportunity to explain their positions on the Decision's holdings while participating in workshops and in filed comments during the proceeding, in response to the PD, as well as in their applications for rehearing. An oral argument would not materially assist us in resolving those concerns. While the holdings are of public importance, the Decision explains why it is appropriate to depart from precedent to discontinue the WRAM. For these reasons, oral argument would not materially assist in the resolution of the application for rehearing and is therefore not warranted.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we modify D.20-08-047 to remove a Finding of Fact that is not based on the evidentiary record and make some clarifying edits. Rehearing of D.20-08-047, as modified, is denied as no legal error has been shown.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. D.20-08-047 is modified as follows:

   A. On page 18, line 11, after the sentence ending with "ability to earn a reasonable rate of return." the following footnote is inserted:

      Public Advocates' Comments on Phase 1 Issues, February 23, 2018, at pp. 7-8, Southern California Edison Comments on Staff Report, September 16, 2019, at pp. 3-5.

   B. Finding of Fact #2 is modified to replace "surcharge" with "sur-credit" as follows:

      2. If actual sales exceed adopted sales, the WRAM/MCBA mechanism will return the over-collected revenues to customers through a balancing account with a sur-credit on customer bills.

   C. Finding of Fact #13 is deleted.

   D. Finding of Fact #14 is modified to insert "(2012-2016)" to more specifically identify "the last 5 years":

      14. Conservation for WRAM utilities measured as a percentage change during the last 5 years (2012-2016) is less than conservation achieved by non-WRAM utilities, including Class B utilities as evidenced in water utility annual reports filed from 2008 through 2016.

2. With these modifications, rehearing of D.20-08-047 is denied.

3. This proceeding, Rulemaking 17-06-024, remains open.

This order is effective today.

Dated September 23, 2021 at San Francisco, California.

MARYBEL BATJER
President
MARTHA GUZMAN ACEVES
CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN
GENEVIEVE SHIROMA
DARCIE L. HOUCK
Commissioners

Supreme Court of California
Jorge E. Navarrete, Clerk and Executive Officer of the Court
Electronically FILED on 9/28/2021 by Robert Toy, Deputy Clerk

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California

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Case Number: **S269099**
Lower Court Case Number:

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/s/Margarita Lezcano
Signature

Clark, Darlene (172812)
Last Name, First Name (PNum)

California Public Utilities Commission
Law Firm