

SUPREME COURT COPY

Supreme Court Case No. S232946

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SUPREME COURT
FILED

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Deputy

SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER &
HAMPTON, LLP,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J-M MANUFACTURING CO., INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Four
Case No. B256314

Los Angeles Superior Court
Case No. YC067332
Honorable Stuart Rice, Judge

J-M MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON NEW AUTHORITY

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Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520(d)(1), J-M hereby addresses the same recent modifications of the California Rules of Professional Conduct discussed by Sheppard Mullin in, and included in the exhibit to, its supplemental brief filed on May 18, 2018.

A. Rule 1.7 Comment 9 Applies To “Future,” Hypothetical Conflicts—Not Existing Conflicts.

The recently-adopted Rule 1.7, which addresses “Conflicts of Interest,” confirms that rules applicable to advance waivers of hypothetical, future conflicts do not apply to existing conflicts. Thus, Comment 9 explains that its discussion of “advance consent” and client sophistication is applicable to a client’s consent “to a *future* conflict in compliance with applicable case law” and discusses the need for an explanation to the client of “the *types of future representations that might arise.*” (Sheppard Supp. Br., Ex. A at p. 25, italics added.)

The new rules do not alter California’s well-established requirement that attorneys must disclose the existence of and material information about an existing conflict to allow a prospective client to evaluate whether to engage the attorney. For instance, Rule 1.7 requires “informed consent” and “disclosure of the conflicting relationship to the client” when a conflict exists. (*Id.* at pp. 21-22 [Rule 1.7(a), (c)(1)].) Likewise, under the new rules, “informed consent” is defined as requiring that “the lawyer has communicated and explained (i) the relevant circumstances and (ii) the material risks” (*id.* at p. 3 [Rule. 1.0.1(e)])—the opposite of Sheppard Mullin’s approach in this case of

providing a written waiver that says only that a conflict “may” or may not exist, while verbally telling J-M’s general counsel that no conflict exists.

B. Even As To Hypothetical Future Conflicts, The New Rule Is More Circumscribed Than The Out-Of-State Authorities Sheppard Mullin Relies On.

As J-M previously argued, even as to hypothetical future conflicts, California Rule 1.7 “*rejects* the ABA’s decision to recognize generalized, open-ended advance waivers for sophisticated clients.” (J-M’s Answer Brief at p. 34.) Contrary to Sheppard Mullin’s assertions (Sheppard Mullin Supp. Br. p. 3.), that is true of both the recently-adopted version and its immediately-prior draft.

The ABA Model Rule expressly leaves an opening for “general and open-ended” advance waivers, saying that such waivers “*ordinarily* will be ineffective,” but that “such consent is more likely to be effective” in the case of sophisticated clients. (ABA Model Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 1.7, com. 22; *italics* added.) No comparable language appears in California Rule 1.7 comment 9. Had California wanted to incorporate from the ABA Model Rules this normative concept about the potential validity of sophisticated clients’ consent to *general, open-ended waivers*, it easily could and would have done so.

Indeed, the history of the new California rule demonstrates that this departure was deliberate. The Bar began revising the rules in 2000. In 2010, the Board of Governors adopted a version similar to the ABA’s, under which “even a general and open-ended advance consent” is sometimes permissible, depending on client sophistication and other factors. (Proposed Rule of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7, com. 22, adopted by Board of Governors on July 24, 2010 and Sept. 22, 2010, available at p. 24 of

[http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/ethics/CRRPC/RRC%20Final%20Docs/Proposed%20Rules%20of%20Professional%20Conduct%20v.24%20\(7-21-14\).pdf](http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/ethics/CRRPC/RRC%20Final%20Docs/Proposed%20Rules%20of%20Professional%20Conduct%20v.24%20(7-21-14).pdf).)¹ But the Bar stripped this language from subsequent versions of proposed Rule 1.7. In fact, in April 2016, the authors of Rule 1.7 highlighted the deletion of the reference to “general and open-ended” waivers by providing a redline of the proposed California version to the ABA Model Rule. (Exhibit 2 at “Redline Comparison of the Proposed Rule to ABA Model Rule” at p. 8 previously available at [http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/9/documents/2d_RRC/Public%20Comment%20X/RRC2%20-%201.7%20\[3-310\]%20-%20Rule%20-%20DFT3%20\(04-01-16\)%20w-ES.pdf](http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/9/documents/2d_RRC/Public%20Comment%20X/RRC2%20-%201.7%20[3-310]%20-%20Rule%20-%20DFT3%20(04-01-16)%20w-ES.pdf).)²

The version of the comment that California ultimately adopted did *not* reintroduce the ABA’s conditional “blessing” of general, open-ended waivers. Instead, in a far less controversial move, the adopted version merely acknowledged that the validity of an advance waiver turns on the “comprehensive[ness of] the explanation of [a] the types of future representations that might arise and [b] the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences,” and that client sophistication is relevant in determining the second of these considerations. The use of general, open-ended waivers—something that the ABA Model Rule explicitly contemplates—remains a concept considered and rejected in California.

¹ To assist the Court, we attach a copy of the September 22, 2010 proposed California Rule 1.7 and its comments as Exhibit 1.

² The Bar’s document provided as Exhibit 2 includes both a redline comparison of the proposed rule to current rule 3-310 followed by a redline comparison of proposed Rule 1.7 to the ABA Model Rule 1.7. Both of those redlines follow a clean version and executive summary of the rule. This document was located on the Bar’s website at the above web address at the time J-M filed its Answer Brief on the Merits. The web address no longer appears to be working.

C. The Case Is Governed By Existing Law—Not The Newly Adopted Rule, Which Becomes Effective In November 2018.

Even if Sheppard Mullin’s interpretation of California Rule 1.7 were correct, that would not alter the outcome of this case.

To begin with, the rule does not become effective until November 1, 2018. (Sheppard Supp. Br., Ex. A at p. 6.) A rule that is not effective until the future necessarily is not retroactive and cannot possibly control the permissibility of Sheppard Mullin’s actions in 2010. That is consistent with the general rule that a statutory or regulatory amendment is *not* retroactive, especially where it changes the standards governing past conduct. (E.g. *USS-POSCO Industries v. Case* (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 197, 217, citing *Elsner v. Uveges* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 937.) What matters is the Rules of Professional Conduct in effect in 2010, when Sheppard Mullin engaged in the unethical conduct. What’s more, if Rule 1.7 really does introduce the type of dramatic new concepts that Sheppard Mullin asserts, that only underscores that a different result flows from the prior law that is applicable here.

Dated: May 23, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

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/s/ Jefferey E. Raskin

By _____
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(1), I certify that the attached **SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF** is proportionately spaced and has a typeface of 13 points or more. Excluding the caption page, signature block and this certificate, it contains **977 words**.

DATED: May 23, 2018

/s/ Jeffrey E. Raskin

Jeffrey E. Raskin

EXHIBIT 1

PROPOSED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

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connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the protected information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.

[23] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(2) through (b)(5).

Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality

[24] A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1, and 5.3.

[25] When transmitting a communication that includes information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068(e), the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.

Former Client

[26] The duty of confidentiality continues after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9(c)(2). See Rule 1.9(c)(1) for the prohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the former client.

Government Lawyers

[27] This Rule applies to lawyers representing governmental organizations. See Rule 1.13, Comment [15].

Rule 1.7 Conflict Of Interest: Current Clients

- (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
- (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
 - (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
- (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
- (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
 - (2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
 - (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
 - (4) each affected client gives informed written consent.

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Comment

General Principles

[1] Undivided loyalty and independent professional judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests. See Comments [6]-[7], [8], [9], [10]-[12]. This Rule and the other conflict rules (1.8.1 through 1.8.11, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.18) seek to protect a lawyer's ability to carry out the lawyer's basic fiduciary duties to each client. In addition to the duty of undivided loyalty and the duty to exercise independent professional judgment, the conflict rules are also concerned with (1) the duty to maintain confidential client information; (2) the duty to disclose to the client all material information and significant developments; and (3) the duty to represent the client competently and diligently within the bounds of the law. See Rule 1.2(a) regarding the allocation of authority between lawyer and client. For specific rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rules 1.8.1 through 1.8.11. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of "informed consent" and "informed written consent," see Rule 1.0.1(e) and (e-1), and Comments [6] and [7] to that Rule.

[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest under this Rule requires the lawyer to: (1) clearly identify the client or clients; (2) determine the scope of each relevant representation of a client or proposed representation of a client; (3) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; (4) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether lawyer has the ability to obtain the client's consent to the conflict; and (5) if so, consult with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed written consent. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).

[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed written consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a

lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation of this Rule. Whether a lawyer-client relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, is beyond the scope of these Rules.

[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed written consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to a client who becomes a former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also Comment [29].

[5] [RESERVED]

Paragraph (a)(1): Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse

[6] The duty of undivided loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed written consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the lawyer-client relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Thus, a directly adverse conflict arises, for example, when a lawyer accepts representation of a client that is directly adverse to another client the lawyer currently represents in another matter. See *Flatt v. Superior Court* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 537]. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict under

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paragraph (a)(1) occurs when a lawyer, while representing a client, accepts in another matter the representation of a person or organization who, in the first matter, is directly adverse to the lawyer's client. Similarly, direct adversity can arise when a lawyer cross-examines a non-party witness who is the lawyer's client in another matter, if the examination is likely to harm or embarrass the witness. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients. Other instances that ordinarily would not constitute direct adversity include: (1) a representation adverse to a non-client where another client of the lawyer is interested in the financial welfare or the profitability of the non-client, as might occur, for example, if a client is the landlord of, or a lender to, the non-client; (2) working for an outcome in litigation that would establish precedent economically harmful to another current client who is not a party to the litigation; (3) representing two clients who have a dispute with one another if the lawyer's work for each client concerns matters other than the dispute; (4) representing clients having antagonistic positions on the same legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless doing so would interfere with the lawyer's ability to represent either client competently, as might occur, *e.g.*, if the lawyer were advocating inconsistent positions in front of the same tribunal. See Comments [14]-[17A].

[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed written consent of each client. Paragraph (a)(1) applies even if the parties to the transaction have a common interest or contemplate working cooperatively toward a common goal.

[7A] If a lawyer proposes to represent two or more parties on the same side of a negotiation or lawsuit, the situation is analyzed under paragraph (a)(2), not paragraph (a)(1). See Comments [29]-[33].

Paragraph (a)(2): Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation

[7B] Conflicts of interest that create a significant risk that a lawyer's representation of one or more clients will be materially limited as provided in paragraph (a)(2) can arise from: (1) duties owed a former client or a third person (see Comment [9]); (2) a lawyer's personal interests (see Comments [10]-[12]); or (3) a lawyer's joint representation of two or more clients in the same matter (see Comments [29]-[33]).

[8] Even where there is no direct adversity, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent two or more clients in the same matter, such as several individuals seeking to form a joint venture, is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the other clients. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to each of the clients. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and informed written consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests exists or will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of actions that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of each client. See Comments [29]-[33]. Depending on the circumstances, various relationships a lawyer has may likewise create a significant risk that the lawyer's representation will be materially limited, for example, where (1) the lawyer has a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with a party or witness in the same matter; (2) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that: (i) the lawyer previously had a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with a party or witness in the same matter, and (ii) the previous relationship would substantially affect the lawyer's representation; (3) the lawyer has or had a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with another person or entity and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that either the relationship or the person or entity would be affected substantially by resolution of the matter; (4) a lawyer or law firm

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representing a party or witness in the matter has a lawyer-client relationship with the lawyer, the lawyer's law firm, or another lawyer in the lawyer's law firm; and (5) a lawyer representing a party or witness in the matter is a spouse, parent or sibling of the lawyer, or has an intimate personal relationship with the lawyer or with another lawyer in the lawyer's law firm.

Lawyer's Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons

[9] A lawyer's duties of undivided loyalty and independence of professional judgment may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director. See, e.g., *William H. Raley Co, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1042 [197 Cal.Rptr. 232].

Personal Interest Conflicts

[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on the representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give the client detached advice. A lawyer's legal, business, professional or financial interest in the subject matter of the representation might also give rise to a conflict under paragraph (a)(2), where, for example, (1) the lawyer is a party to a contract being litigated; (2) the lawyer represents a client in litigation with a corporation in which the lawyer is a shareholder; or (3) the lawyer represents a landlord in lease negotiations with a professional organization of which the lawyer is a member. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rules 1.8.1 through 1.8.11 for specific rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. See also Rule 3.7 concerning a lawyer as witness and Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).

[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related by blood or marriage, or when there is an intimate personal relationship between the lawyers, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer who is related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, or who is in an intimate personal relationship with another lawyer, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed written consent. The prohibition on representation arising from a close family relationship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.

[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the lawyer-client relationship. See Rule 1.8.10.

Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service

[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client gives informed written consent and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8.6. If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payor who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the lawyer has the ability to obtain the client's consent to the representation and, if so, whether the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation. See Comments [14]-[17A].

Prohibited Representations

[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (b), in some situations a lawyer cannot properly ask for such agreement or

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provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the question of consent must be resolved as to each client.

[15] A lawyer's ability to obtain consent is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed written consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1.

[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts to which a client cannot consent because the representation is prohibited by applicable law. For example, certain representations by a former government lawyer are also prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. See, e.g., Business and Professions Code section 6131.

[17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts for which client consent cannot be obtained because of the interests of the legal system in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. See, e.g., *Woods v. Superior Court* (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 931 [107 Cal.Rptr. 185] (the lawyer of a family-owned business organization should not represent one owner against the other in a marital dissolution action); *Klemm v. Superior Court* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 893, 898 [142 Cal.Rptr. 509] (a lawyer may not represent parties at hearing or trial when those parties' interests in the matter are in actual conflict). Although paragraph (b)(3) does not preclude a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under Rule 1.0.1(m)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).

[17A] Under paragraph (b)(4), a lawyer must obtain the informed written consent of each affected client before accepting or continuing a representation that is prohibited under paragraph (a). If the lawyer cannot make the disclosure requisite to obtaining informed written consent, (see Rules 1.0.1(e) and 1.0.1(e-1)), without violating the

lawyer's duty of confidentiality, then the lawyer may not accept or continue the representation for which the disclosure would be required. See Rule 1.6 and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). A lawyer might also be prevented from making a required disclosure because of a duty of confidentiality to former, current or potential clients, because of other fiduciary relationships such as service on a board of directors, or because of contractual or court-ordered restrictions. In addition, effective client consent cannot be obtained when the person who grants consent lacks capacity or authority. See Civil Code section 38; and see Rule 1.14 regarding clients with diminished capacity.

Disclosure and Informed Written Consent

[18] Informed written consent requires that the lawyer communicate in writing to each affected client the relevant circumstances and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of the conflict on the client's interests and the lawyer's representation and that the client thereafter gives his or her consent in writing. See Rules 1.0.1(e) (informed consent) and 1.0.1(e-1) (informed written consent) and Comments [6] and [7] to that Rule. The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the joint representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the lawyer-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comment [30] (effect of joint representation on confidentiality).

[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. See Comments [14]-[17A].

[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client in writing. See Rule 1.0.1(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). The requirement of a written disclosure, (see Comment [18]), does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked

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to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.

Duration of Consent

[20A] A disclosure and an informed written consent are sufficient for purposes of this Rule only for so long as the relevant facts and circumstances remain unchanged. With any material change, the lawyer may not continue the representation without making a new written disclosure to each affected client and obtaining a new written consent.

Revoking Consent

[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation of that client at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client, whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result, and the lawyer's confidentiality obligations to the client revoking consent.

Consent to Future Conflict

[22] Lawyers may ask clients to give advance consent to conflicts that might arise in the future, but a client's consent must be "informed" to comply with this Rule. A lawyer would have a conflict of interest in accepting or continuing a representation under a consent that does not comply with this Rule. Determining whether a client's advance consent is "informed," and thus complies with this Rule, is a fact-specific inquiry that will depend first on the factors discussed in Comments [18]-[20] (informed written consent). However, an advance consent can comply with this Rule even where the lawyer cannot provide all the information and explanation Comments [18]-[20] ordinarily requires. A lawyer's disclosure to a client must include: (i) a disclosure to the extent known of facts and reasonably foreseeable consequences; and (ii) an explanation that the lawyer is requesting the client to consent to a possible future conflict that would involve future facts and circumstances that to a degree cannot be known when the consent is requested. The lawyer also must disclose to the client whether the consent permits the lawyer to be adverse to the client on any matter in the future, whether the consent permits the

lawyer to be adverse to the client in the current or in future litigation, and whether there will be any limits on the scope of the consent. Whether an advance consent complies with this Rule ordinarily also can depend on factors such as the following: (1) the comprehensiveness of the lawyer's explanation of the types of future conflicts that might arise and of the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences to the client; (2) the client's degree of experience as a user of the legal services, including experience with the type of legal services involved in the current representation; (3) whether the client has consented to the use of an adequate ethics screen and whether the screen was timely and effectively instituted and fully maintained; (4) whether before giving consent the client either was represented by an independent lawyer of the client's choice, or was advised in writing by the lawyer to seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client's choice and was given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice; (5) whether the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation; and (6) the client's ability to understand the nature and extent of the advance consent. A client's ability to understand the nature and extent of the advance consent might depend on factors such as the client's education, language skills, and the client's familiarity with the particular type of conflict that is the subject of the consent. An advance consent normally will not comply with this Rule if it is so general and open-ended that it would be unlikely that the client understood the potential adverse consequences of granting consent. However, depending upon the extent to which the other enumerated factors set forth above are present, even a general and open-ended advance consent can be in compliance when: the consent was given by an experienced user of the type of legal services involved; and the client was independently represented regarding the consent or was advised in writing by the lawyer to seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client's choice and was given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice. In any case, advance consent will not be in compliance in the circumstances described in Comments [14]-[17A] (prohibited representations). See Rule 1.0.1(e) (informed consent) and 1.0.1 (e-1) (informed written consent). A lawyer who obtains from a client an advance consent that complies with this Rule will have all the duties of a lawyer to that client except as expressly limited by the consent. A lawyer cannot obtain an advance consent to incompetent representation. See Rule 1.8.8.

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(Adopted by the Board of Governors on July 24, 2010 and September 22, 2010. Rules of Professional Conduct must be approved by the Supreme Court of California in order to become operative. These rules have not been approved by the Supreme Court.)

Conflicts in Litigation

[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, joint representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is permitted if the requirements of paragraph (b) are satisfied.

[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be informed of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed written consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters to the extent permitted by Rule 1.16.

[24A] If permission from a tribunal to terminate a representation is denied, the lawyer is obligated to continue the representation notwithstanding the provisions of this Rule. See Rule 1.16(c).

[25] This Rule applies to a lawyer's representation of named class representatives in a class action, whether or not the class has been certified. For purposes of this Rule, an unnamed member of a plaintiff or a defendant class is not, by reason of that status, a client of a lawyer who represents or seeks to represent the class. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of an unnamed class member before representing a client who is adverse to that person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter. A lawyer representing a class or proposed class may owe civil duties to unnamed class members, and this Comment is not intended to alter those civil duties in any respect.

Nonlitigation Conflicts

[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters that are prohibited by paragraph (a)(1), see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is significant risk for material limitation as provided in paragraph (a)(2) include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8].

[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present.

[28] [RESERVED]

Special Considerations in Joint Representation

[29] When a lawyer represents multiple clients in a single matter, the lawyer's duties to one of the clients can interfere with the performance of the lawyer's duties to the other clients. In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the joint representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be

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additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the joint representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake joint representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by joint representation is not likely. Other relevant factors include whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.

[29A] Examples of conflicts that arise under paragraph (a)(2) from representing multiple clients in the same matter and that will likely preclude a lawyer from accepting or continuing a joint representation unless the lawyer complies with paragraph (b) include the following situations: (1) the lawyer receives conflicting instructions from the clients and the lawyer cannot follow one client's instructions without violating another client's instruction; (2) the clients have inconsistent interests or objectives so that it becomes impossible for the lawyer to advance one client's interests or objectives without detrimentally affecting another client's interests or objectives; (3) the clients have antagonistic positions and the lawyer is obligated to advise each client about how to advance that client's position relative to the other's position; (4) the clients have inconsistent expectations of confidentiality because one client expects the lawyer to keep secret information that is material to the matter; (5) the lawyer has a preexisting relationship with one client that affects the lawyer's independent professional judgment on behalf of the other client(s); (6) the clients make inconsistent demands for the original file.

[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of joint representation is the effect on lawyer-client confidentiality and the lawyer-client privilege. With regard to the lawyer-client privilege, although each client's communications with the lawyer are protected as to third persons, as between jointly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation results between the joint clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications. See Evidence Code sections 952 and 962. In

addition, because of the lawyer's obligations under Rule 1.4, the lawyer must inform each jointly represented client in writing of that fact and also that the client should normally expect that his or her communications with the lawyer will be shared with other jointly-represented clients. See also Comments [18]-[20].

[31] [RESERVED]

[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the joint representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).

[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the joint representation has the right to the lawyer's undivided loyalty and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.

Organizational Clients

[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.

[35] A lawyer for a corporation who is also a member of its board of directors (or a lawyer for another type of organization who has corresponding fiduciary duties to it) should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in

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matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the lawyer-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.

Insurance Defense

[36] In *State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Federal Insurance Company* (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1422 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 20], the court held that the predecessor to paragraph (a) was violated when a lawyer, retained by an insurer to defend one suit against an insured, filed a direct action against the same insurer in an unrelated action without securing the insurer's consent. Notwithstanding *State Farm*, paragraph (a) does not apply to the relationship between an insurer and a lawyer when, in each matter, the insurer's interest is only as an indemnity provider and not as a direct party to the action.

[37] Paragraph (a)(2) is not intended to modify the tripartite relationship among a lawyer, an insurer, and an insured that is created when the insurer appoints the lawyer to represent the insured under the contract between the insurer and the insured. Although the lawyer's appointment by the insurer makes the insurer and the insured the lawyer's joint clients in the matter, the appointment does not by itself create a significant risk that the representation of the insured, insurer, or both will be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).

Public Service

[38] For special rules governing membership in a legal service organization, see Rule 6.3; for participation in law related activities affecting client interests, see Rule 6.4; and for work in conjunction

with certain limited legal services programs, see Rule 6.5.

Rule 1.8.1 Business Transactions with a Client and Acquiring Interests Adverse to the Client

A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client; or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client, unless each of the following requirements has been satisfied:

- (a) The transaction or acquisition and its terms are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner that reasonably can be understood by the client; and
- (b) The client either is represented in the transaction or acquisition by an independent lawyer of the client's choice or is advised in writing by the lawyer to seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client's choice and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice; and
- (c) The client thereafter consents in writing to the terms of the transaction or the terms of the acquisition and the lawyer's role in the transaction or acquisition, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction or acquisition.

Comment

Scope of Rule

[1] A lawyer's legal training and skill, and the relationship of trust and confidence that arises between a lawyer and client, create the possibility that a lawyer, even unintentionally, will overreach or exploit client information when the lawyer enters into a business transaction with the client or acquires a pecuniary interest adverse to the client. In these situations, the lawyer could influence the client for the lawyer's own benefit, could give advice to protect the lawyer's interest rather than the client's, and could use client information for the lawyer's benefit rather than the client's. This Rule is intended to afford the client the information needed to fully understand the terms and effect of the transaction or acquisition and the importance of having independent legal advice. See, e.g., *Beery v. State*

EXHIBIT 2

Rule 1.7 [3-310] Conflict of Interest: Current Clients
(Commission's Proposed Rule Adopted on March 31 – April 1, 2016
– Clean Version)

- (a) A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent* from each client, represent a client if the representation is directly adverse to another client in the same or a separate matter.
- (b) A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent* from each affected client, represent a client if there is a significant risk the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to or relationships with another client, a former client or a third person,* or the lawyer's own interests, including when:
 - (1) the lawyer has, or knows* that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm* has, a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with or responsibility to a party or witness in the same matter; or
 - (2) the lawyer:
 - (i) knows* the lawyer previously had a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with a party or witness in the same matter; and
 - (ii) knows* or reasonably should know* the previous relationship will materially limit the lawyer's representation; or
 - (3) the lawyer has or had a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with another person* or entity the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* will be affected substantially by resolution of the matter; or
 - (4) the lawyer has or had, or knows* that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm* has or had, a legal, business, financial, or personal interest in the subject matter of the representation that the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* will materially limit the lawyer's representation; or
 - (5) the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* that there is a reasonable* likelihood that the interests of clients being represented by the lawyer in the same matter will conflict.
- (c) A lawyer shall not represent a client in a matter in which another party's lawyer is a spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the lawyer, lives with the lawyer, is a client of the lawyer, or has an intimate personal relationship with the lawyer, unless the lawyer informs the client in writing* of the relationship.
- (d) Representation is permitted under this Rule only if:

- (1) the lawyer reasonably believes* that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
- (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; and
- (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal.

Comment

[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. The duty of undivided loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed written consent.* Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person* the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. See *Flatt v. Superior Court* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 537]. A directly adverse conflict under paragraph (a) occurs when: (i) a lawyer accepts representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; or (ii) a lawyer, while representing a client, accepts in another matter the representation of a person* or organization who, in the first matter, is directly adverse to the lawyer's client. Similarly, direct adversity can arise when a lawyer cross-examines a non-party witness who is the lawyer's client in another matter, if the examination is likely to harm or embarrass the witness. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require informed written consent* of the respective clients.

[2] Paragraph (a) does not prohibit a lawyer from representing multiple clients having antagonistic positions on the same legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless the interests of any of the clients would be adversely affected by the resolution of the legal question. Factors relevant in determining whether the interests of one or more of the clients would be adversely affected, thus requiring that the clients provide informed written consent* under paragraph (a), include: the courts and jurisdictions where the different cases are pending, whether a ruling in one case would have a precedential effect on the other case, whether the legal question is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the legal question to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved, and the clients' reasonable* expectations in retaining the lawyer.

[3] Paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all types of legal representations, including the concurrent representation of multiple parties in litigation or in a single transaction or in some other common enterprise or legal relationship. Examples of the latter include the formation of a partnership for several partners* or a corporation for several shareholders, the preparation of a pre-nuptial agreement, or joint or reciprocal wills for a husband and wife, or the resolution of an "uncontested" marital dissolution. If a lawyer

initially represents multiple clients with the informed written consent* as required under paragraph (b), and circumstances later develop indicating that direct adversity exists between the clients, the lawyer must obtain further informed written consent* of the clients under paragraph (a).

[4] In *State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Federal Insurance Company* (1999) 72 Cal.App. 4th 1422 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 20], the court held that subparagraph (C)(3) of predecessor rule 3-310 was violated when a lawyer, retained by an insurer to defend one suit, and while that suit was still pending, filed a direct action against the same insurer in an unrelated action without securing the insurer's consent. Notwithstanding *State Farm*, paragraph (a) does not apply with respect to the relationship between an insurer and a lawyer when, in each matter, the insurer's interest is only as an indemnity provider and not as a direct party to the action.

[5] Even where there is no direct adversity, a conflict of interest requiring informed written consent* under paragraph (b) exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer's obligations to two or more clients in the same matter, such as several individuals seeking to form a joint venture, may materially limit the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the other clients. The risk is that the lawyer may not be able to offer alternatives that would otherwise be available to each of the clients. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and informed written consent.* The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests exists or will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably* should be pursued on behalf of each client.

[6] Other rules and laws may preclude the disclosures necessary to obtain the informed written consent* or provide the information required to permit representation under this Rule. (See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1) and Rule 1.6.) If such disclosure is precluded, representation subject to paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of this Rule is likewise precluded.

[7] Paragraph (d) imposes conditions that must be satisfied even if informed written consent* is obtained as required by paragraphs (a) or (b) or the lawyer has informed the client in writing* as required by paragraph (c). There are some matters in which the conflicts are such that even informed written consent* may not suffice to permit representation. (See *Woods v. Superior Court* (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 931 [197 Cal.Rptr. 185]; *Klemm v. Superior Court* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 893 [142 Cal.Rptr. 509]; *Ishmael v. Millington* (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 520 [50 Cal.Rptr. 592].)

[8] This Rule does not preclude an informed written consent* to a future conflict in compliance with applicable case law. The effectiveness of an advance consent is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably* understands the material risks that the consent entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the

types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably* foreseeable adverse consequences to the client of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. An advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (d). A lawyer who obtains from a client an advance consent that complies with this Rule will have all the duties of a lawyer to that client except as expressly limited by the consent. A lawyer cannot obtain an advance consent to incompetent representation. See Rule 1.8.8.

[9] A material change in circumstances relevant to application of this Rule may trigger a requirement to make new disclosures and, where applicable, obtain new informed written consents.* In the absence of such consents, depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one or more of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the clients from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).

[10] For special rules governing membership in a legal service organization, see Rule 6.3; and for work in conjunction with certain limited legal services programs, see Rule 6.5.

**PROPOSED RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.7
(Current Rule 3-310(B), (C))
Conflict of Interest: Current Client**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") has evaluated current rule 3-310 (Avoiding the Representation of Adverse Interests) in accordance with the Commission Charter, with a focus on the function of the rule as a disciplinary standard, and with the understanding that the rule comments should be included only when necessary to explain a rule and not for providing aspirational guidance. In addition, the Commission considered the national standard of the American Bar Association ("ABA") counterparts, a series of rules that address conflicts of interest as they might arise in a number of different situations: Model Rules 1.7 (Current Client Conflicts); 1.8(f) (third party payments); 1.8(g) (aggregate settlements); and 1.9 (Duties To Former Clients).

The result of the Commission's evaluation is a two-fold recommendation for implementing:

- (1) the Model Rules' framework of having separate rules that regulate different conflicts interest situations: proposed rules 1.7 (current clients), 1.8.6 (payments from one other than client), 1.8.7 (aggregate settlements) and 1.9 (former clients); and
- (2) proposed Rule 1.7 (conflicts of interest: current clients), which regulates conflicts situations that are currently regulated under rule 3-310(B) and (C). Proposed rule 1.7 represents an approach that is a "hybrid" of the California and ABA approaches to current client conflicts.

Proposed rule 1.7 has been adopted by the Commission for submission to the Board of Trustees for public comment authorization. A final recommended rule will follow the public comment process.

1. **Recommendation of the ABA Model Rule Conflicts Framework.** The rationale underlying the Commission's recommendation of the ABA's multiple-rule approach is its conclusion that such an approach should facilitate compliance with and enforcement of conflicts of interest principles. Among other things, separate rules should reduce confusion and provide out-of-state lawyers, who often practice in California under one of the multijurisdictional practice rules (9.45 to 9.48) with quick access to the rules governing their specific conflicts problem. At the same time, this approach will promote a national standard in how the different conflicts of interest principles are organized within the Rules.¹

¹ Every other jurisdiction in the country has adopted the ABA conflicts rules framework. In addition to the identified provisions, the Model Rules also include Model Rule 1.8, which includes eight provisions in addition to paragraphs (d) and (f) that cover conflicts situations addressed by standalone California Rules (e.g., MR 1.8(a) is covered by California Rule 3-300 [Avoiding Interests Adverse To A Client] and MR 1.8(e) is covered by California Rule 4-210 [Payment of Personal or Business Expenses By Or For A Client]).

Further, the Model Rules also deal with concepts that are addressed by case law in California: Model Rules 1.10 (Imputation of Conflicts and Ethical Screening); 1.11 (Conflicts Involving Government Officers and Employees); and 1.12 (Conflicts Involving Former Judges and Judicial Employees). The Commission is currently studying those rules.

2. **Recommendation of the “hybrid” approach of proposed Rule 1.7.** The recommended “hybrid” approach involves merging the “checklist approach”² of regulating conflicts involving current clients in current rule 3-310(B) and (C) with the ABA Model Rule’s approach, which generally describes two kinds of conflict situations relating to current clients: (1) those involving direct adversity, (MR 1.7(a)(1)), and (2) those involving a significant risk that a lawyer’s representation of current clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or third person, or by the lawyer’s personal interests. (MR 1.7(a)(2)).

There are a number of reasons for the Commission’s recommendation. *First*, a hybrid rule will facilitate compliance with enforcement of the current client conflicts rule provisions by incorporating more clearly-stated general conflicts principles, (see paragraph (a) and introductory clause to paragraph (b)), while providing specific examples (“checklist items”) within the latter category that carry forward the current California Rule requirements. These listed requirements in turn clarify how situations that violate those principles might be recognized in practice. *Second*, the hybrid approach will also increase client protection by including the generally-stated conflicts principles that are subject to regulation under the rule, rather than limiting the rule’s application to several discrete situations as in current rule 3-310(B) and (C). *Third*, by incorporating the generally-stated principles in Model Rule 1.7(a)(1) and (2) into paragraphs (a) and (b), the proposed rule will help promote a national standard in conflicts of interest. *Fourth*, by incorporating the provisions in Model Rule 1.7(b)(1) – (3) concerning unconsentable conflicts into proposed paragraph (d), the proposed rule will move this important concept into the black letter rather than relegate it to two separate Discussion paragraphs in the current rule (see rule 3-310, Discussion paragraphs 2 and 10).

Informed written consent. In addition to the foregoing considerations, the Commission recommends carrying forward California’s more client-protective requirement that a lawyer obtain the client’s “informed written consent,” which requires written disclosure of the potential adverse consequences of the client consenting to a conflicted representation. The Model Rules, on the other hand, employ a less-strict requirement of requiring only “informed consent, confirmed in writing.” That standard permits a lawyer to confirm by email or even text message that the client has consented to a conflict.

Paragraph (a) of proposed Rule 1.7 incorporates the concept of direct adversity of interests of two current clients. This carries forward the concept in current rule 3-310(C)(2) and (3), and Model Rule 1.7(a)(1).

Paragraph (b) incorporates the concept of material limitations on a lawyer’s representation of a client because of duties owed another current or former client, or because a relationship with a client or other person. The paragraph borrows the language of Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) in carrying forward the concepts found in current rule 3-310(B) and (C)(1). Subparagraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) are the provisions that warrant the characterization of the proposed rule as a “hybrid” as these are derived from current rule 3-310 “checklist” of specified conflicts that trigger the current rule. In the proposed rule, these are nonexclusive examples of interests and relationships that result in a material limitation and require that the lawyer obtain informed written consent.

Paragraph (c) carries forward the concept in current rule 3-320. Similar to paragraph (b), this paragraph is concerned with limitations on the lawyer’s ability to represent a client because of

² The “checklist” approach in current rule 3-310(B) and (C) involves the identification of discrete categories of current conflict situations. Unless an alleged conflict fits within one of these discrete categories, the lawyers involved will not be subject to discipline.

the lawyer's relationships with an opposing party's lawyer. The situation is not included in paragraph (b) because the Commission believes that the standard in current rule 3-320 – the lawyer must only “inform” the client of the relationship – should be carried forward, rather than applying paragraph (b)'s “informed written consent” standard.

Paragraph (d) incorporates the provisions in Model Rule 1.7(b)(1) – (3) concerning unconsentable conflicts. The concept is currently found in two separate Discussion paragraphs of current rule 3-310 (paragraphs 2 and 10).

Unlike the Model Rule with 35 comments, there are only 10 comments to proposed Rule 1.7, all of which provide interpretative guidance or clarify how the proposed rule, which is intended to govern a broad array of complex conflicts situations, should be applied. Comment [1] explains “direct adversity” of legal interests and importantly distinguishes clients with economically adverse interests. Comment [2] explains when adverse positions clients have taken on a legal issue may require a lawyer to obtain the clients' informed written consent. Comment [2] carries forward the concept in current rule 3-310, Discussion ¶.7, and explains the rule's application to joint client representations. Comment [4] carries forward current Discussion ¶.9, which the Supreme Court approved in 2002 after extensive debate among various stakeholders in the insurance industry. Comment [5] explains how paragraph (b) should be applied by providing several discrete examples. Comment [6] crucially explains that a lawyer's duty of confidentiality may preclude the lawyer from providing a disclosure sufficient to ensure the client's consent is informed. Comment [7] carries forward the substance of current Discussion ¶¶.2 and 10 concerning unconsentable conflicts and provides citations to several cases that have addressed the issue. Comment [8] is new and provides interpretative guidance regarding paragraphs (a) and (b) regarding the extent to which they might apply to advance consents to future conflicts of interest. Comment [9] notes that a second consent may be required should the circumstances under which a consent was originally obtained change. Comment [10] provides cross-references to proposed Rules 6.3 and 6.5, both of which permit otherwise conflicted representations or provide exceptions for imputation under certain conditions.

**Rule 1.7 [3-310] Avoiding the Representation of Adverse Interests
Conflict of Interest: Current Clients**
(Redline Comparison of the Proposed Rule to Current California Rule)

~~(A) For purposes of this rule:~~

~~(1) "Disclosure" means informing the client or former client of the relevant circumstances and of the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences to the client or former client;~~

~~(2) "Informed written consent" means the client's or former client's written agreement to the representation following written disclosure;~~

~~(3) "Written" means any writing as defined in Evidence Code section 250.~~

(a) A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent* from each client, represent a client if the representation is directly adverse to another client in the same or a separate matter.

(b) A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent* from each affected client, represent a client if there is a significant risk the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to or relationships with another client, a former client or a third person,* or the lawyer's own interests, including when:

~~(B) A member shall not accept or continue representation of a client without providing written disclosure to the client where:~~

~~(1) The member ~~has~~the lawyer has, or knows* that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm* has, a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with or responsibility to a party or witness in the same matter; or~~

~~(2) the lawyer:~~The member knows or reasonably should know that:~~~~

~~(a)(i) knows* the member~~lawyer~~ previously had a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with a party or witness in the same matter; and~~

~~(b)(ii) knows* or reasonably should know* the previous relationship would substantially affect the member's~~will~~ materially limit the lawyer's representation; or~~

~~(3) The member~~the lawyer~~ has or had a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with another person* or entity the member~~lawyer~~ knows* or reasonably should know* ~~would~~will be affected substantially by resolution of the matter; or~~

- (4) The memberthe lawyer has or had, or knows* that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm* has or had, a legal, business, financial, or professionalpersonal interest in the subject matter of the representation- that the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* will materially limit the lawyer's representation; or
- (5) the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* that there is a reasonable* likelihood that the interests of clients being represented by the lawyer in the same matter will conflict.

~~(C) A member shall not, without the informed written consent of each client:~~

~~(c) A lawyer shall not represent a client in a matter in which another party's lawyer is a spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the lawyer, lives with the lawyer, is a client of the lawyer, or has an intimate personal relationship with the lawyer, unless the lawyer informs the client in writing* of the relationship.~~

~~(d) Representation is permitted under this Rule only if:~~

~~(1) the lawyer reasonably believes* that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;~~

~~(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; and~~

~~(1)(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Accept representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients potentially conflict; or~~

~~(2) Accept or continue representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; or~~

~~(3) Represent a client in a matter and at the same time in a separate matter accept as a client a person or entity whose interest in the first matter is adverse to the client in the first matter.~~

~~(D) A member who represents two or more clients shall not enter into an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients without the informed written consent of each client.~~

~~(E) A member shall not, without the informed written consent of the client or former client, accept employment adverse to the client or former client where, by reason of the representation of the client or former client, the member has obtained confidential information material to the employment.~~

~~(F) A member shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:~~

- ~~(1) — There is no interference with the member's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and~~
- ~~(2) — Information relating to representation of the client is protected as required by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e); and~~
- ~~(3) — The member obtains the client's informed written consent, provided that no disclosure or consent is required if:
 - ~~(a) — such nondisclosure is otherwise authorized by law; or~~
 - ~~(b) — the member is rendering legal services on behalf of any public agency which provides legal services to other public agencies or the public.~~~~

DiscussionComment

[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. The duty of undivided loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed written consent.* Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person* the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. See *Flatt v. Superior Court* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 537]. A directly adverse conflict under paragraph (a) occurs when: (i) a lawyer accepts representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; or (ii) a lawyer, while representing a client, accepts in another matter the representation of a person* or organization who, in the first matter, is directly adverse to the lawyer's client. Similarly, direct adversity can arise when a lawyer cross-examines a non-party witness who is the lawyer's client in another matter, if the examination is likely to harm or embarrass the witness. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require informed written consent* of the respective clients.

~~Rule 3-310 is not intended to prohibit a member from representing parties having antagonistic positions on the same legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected.~~

[2] Paragraph (a) does not prohibit a lawyer from representing multiple clients having antagonistic positions on the same legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless the interests of any of the clients would be adversely affected by the resolution of the legal question. Factors relevant in determining whether the interests of one or more of the clients would be adversely affected, thus requiring that the clients provide informed written consent* under paragraph (a), include: the courts and jurisdictions where the different cases are pending, whether a ruling in one case would have a precedential effect on the other case, whether the legal question is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the

legal question to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved, and the clients' reasonable* expectations in retaining the lawyer.

~~Other rules and laws may preclude making adequate disclosure under this rule. If such disclosure is precluded, informed written consent is likewise precluded. (See, e.g., Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e).)~~

~~Paragraph (B) is not intended to apply to the relationship of a member to another party's lawyer. Such relationships are governed by rule 3-320.~~

~~Paragraph (B) is not intended to require either the disclosure of the new engagement to a former client or the consent of the former client to the new engagement. However, both disclosure and consent are required if paragraph (E) applies.~~

~~While paragraph (B) deals with the issues of adequate disclosure to the present client or clients of the member's present or past relationships to other parties or witnesses or present interest in the subject matter of the representation, paragraph (E) is intended to protect the confidences of another present or former client. These two paragraphs are to apply as complementary provisions.~~

~~Paragraph (B) is intended to apply only to a member's own relationships or interests, unless the member knows that a partner or associate in the same firm as the member has or had a relationship with another party or witness or has or had an interest in the subject matter of the representation.~~

~~Subparagraphs (C)(1)^[3] Paragraphs (a) and (C)(2) are intended to~~ apply to all types of legal employment ~~representations~~, including the concurrent representation of multiple parties in litigation or in a single transaction or in some other common enterprise or legal relationship. Examples of the latter include the formation of a partnership for several partners* or a corporation for several shareholders, the preparation of an ~~ante-nuptial~~ pre-nuptial agreement, or joint or reciprocal wills for a husband and wife, or the resolution of an "uncontested" marital dissolution. In such situations, for the sake of convenience or economy, the parties may well prefer to employ a single counsel, but a member must disclose the potential adverse aspects of such multiple representation (e.g., Evid. Code, §962) and must obtain if a lawyer initially represents multiple clients with the informed written consent* of as required under paragraph (b), and circumstances later develop indicating that direct adversity exists between the clients thereto pursuant to subparagraph (C)(1). Moreover, if the potential adversity should become actual, the member, the lawyer must obtain the further informed written consent* of the clients pursuant to subparagraph under paragraph (C)(2a).

~~Subparagraph (C)(3) is intended to apply to representations of clients in both litigation and transactional matters.~~

[4] In *State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Federal Insurance Company* (1999) 72 Cal.App. 4th 1422 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 20], the court held that subparagraph (C)(3) of predecessor rule 3-310 was violated when a member lawyer, retained by an insurer to defend one suit, and while that suit was still pending, filed a

direct action against the same insurer in an unrelated action without securing the insurer's consent. Notwithstanding *State Farm*, subparagraph (C)(3) is not intended to apply with respect to the relationship between an insurer and a member-lawyer when, in each matter, the insurer's interest is only as an indemnity provider and not as a direct party to the action.

[5] Even where there is no direct adversity, a conflict of interest requiring informed written consent* under paragraph (b) exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer's obligations to two or more clients in the same matter, such as several individuals seeking to form a joint venture, may materially limit the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the other clients. The risk is that the lawyer may not be able to offer alternatives that would otherwise be available to each of the clients. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and informed written consent.* The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests exists or will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably* should be pursued on behalf of each client.

[6] Other rules and laws may preclude the disclosures necessary to obtain the informed written consent* or provide the information required to permit representation under this Rule. (See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1) and Rule 1.6.) If such disclosure is precluded, representation subject to paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of this Rule is likewise precluded.

[7] Paragraph (d) imposes conditions that must be satisfied even if informed written consent* is obtained as required by paragraphs (a) or (b) or the lawyer has informed the client in writing* as required by paragraph (c). There are some matters in which the conflicts are such that even informed written consent* may not suffice for non-disciplinary purposes to permit representation. (See *Woods v. Superior Court* (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 931 [197 Cal.Rptr. 185]; *Klemm v. Superior Court* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 893 [142 Cal.Rptr. 509]; *Ishmael v. Millington* (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 520 [50 Cal.Rptr. 592].)

[8] This Rule does not preclude an informed written consent* to a future conflict in compliance with applicable case law. The effectiveness of an advance consent is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably* understands the material risks that the consent entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably* foreseeable adverse consequences to the client of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. An advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (d). A lawyer who obtains from a client an advance consent that complies with this Rule will have all the duties of a lawyer to that client

except as expressly limited by the consent. A lawyer cannot obtain an advance consent to incompetent representation. See Rule 1.8.8.

[9] A material change in circumstances relevant to application of this Rule may trigger a requirement to make new disclosures and, where applicable, obtain new informed written consents.* In the absence of such consents, depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one or more of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the clients from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).

[10] For special rules governing membership in a legal service organization, see Rule 6.3; and for work in conjunction with certain limited legal services programs, see Rule 6.5.

~~Paragraph (D) is not intended to apply to class action settlements subject to court approval.~~

~~Paragraph (F) is not intended to abrogate existing relationships between insurers and insureds whereby the insurer has the contractual right to unilaterally select counsel for the insured, where there is no conflict of interest. (See *San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society* (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358 [208 Cal.Rptr. 494].) (Amended by order of Supreme Court, operative September 14, 1992; operative March 3, 2003.)~~

Rule 1.7 [3-310] Conflict of Interest: Current Clients
(Redline Comparison of the Proposed Rule to ABA Model Rule)

- (a) A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent* from each client, represent a client if the representation is directly adverse to another client in the same or a separate matter.
- (a) ~~Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:~~
- (1) ~~the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client;~~
~~or~~
- (2b) A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent* from each affected client, represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of one or more clients~~the client~~ will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to or relationships with another client, a former client or a third person,* or by a personal interest of the lawyer.the lawyer's own interests, including when:
- (1) the lawyer has, or knows* that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm* has, a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with or responsibility to a party or witness in the same matter; or
- (2) the lawyer:
- (b) ~~Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:~~
- (i) knows* the lawyer previously had a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with a party or witness in the same matter; and
- (ii) knows* or reasonably should know* the previous relationship will materially limit the lawyer's representation; or
- (3) the lawyer has or had a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with another person* or entity the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* will be affected substantially by resolution of the matter; or
- (4) the lawyer has or had, or knows* that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm* has or had, a legal, business, financial, or personal interest in the subject matter of the representation that the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* will materially limit the lawyer's representation; or

- (5) the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* that there is a reasonable* likelihood that the interests of clients being represented by the lawyer in the same matter will conflict.
- (c) A lawyer shall not represent a client in a matter in which another party's lawyer is a spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the lawyer, lives with the lawyer, is a client of the lawyer, or has an intimate personal relationship with the lawyer, unless the lawyer informs the client in writing* of the relationship.
- (d) Representation is permitted under this Rule only if:
- (1) the lawyer reasonably believes* that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
 - (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; and
 - (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and,
 - (4) ~~each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.~~

Comment

General Principles

~~[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of "informed consent" and "confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0(e) and (b).~~

~~[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).~~

~~[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-~~

~~litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.~~

~~[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also Comments [5] and [29].~~

~~[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).~~

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse

~~[6] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. The duty of undivided loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed written consent.* Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom See Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 537]. A directly adverse conflict under paragraph (a) occurs when: (i) a lawyer accepts representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; or (ii) a lawyer, while representing a client, accepts in another matter the representation of a person* or organization who, in the first matter, is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current to the lawyer's client. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may direct adversity can arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit cross-examines a non-party witness who is the lawyer's client in another matter, if the examination is likely to harm or embarrass the witness. On the~~

other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require informed written consent* of the respective clients.

[2] Paragraph (a) does not prohibit a lawyer from representing multiple clients having antagonistic positions on the same legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless the interests of any of the clients would be adversely affected by the resolution of the legal question. Factors relevant in determining whether the interests of one or more of the clients would be adversely affected, thus requiring that the clients provide informed written consent* under paragraph (a), include: the courts and jurisdictions where the different cases are pending, whether a ruling in one case would have a precedential effect on the other case, whether the legal question is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the legal question to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved, and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer.

[3] Paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all types of legal representations, including the concurrent representation of multiple parties in litigation or in a single transaction or in some other common enterprise or legal relationship. Examples of the latter include the formation of a partnership for several partners* or a corporation for several shareholders, the preparation of a pre-nuptial agreement, or joint or reciprocal wills for a husband and wife, or the resolution of an "uncontested" marital dissolution. If a lawyer initially represents multiple clients with the informed written consent* as required under paragraph (b), and circumstances later develop indicating that direct adversity exists between the clients, the lawyer must obtain further informed written consent* of the clients under paragraph (a).

~~[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.~~

[4] In *State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Federal Insurance Company* (1999) 72 Cal.App. 4th 1422 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 20], the court held that subparagraph (C)(3) of predecessor rule 3-310 was violated when a lawyer, retained by an insurer to defend one suit, and while that suit was still pending, filed a direct action against the same insurer in an unrelated action without securing the insurer's consent. Notwithstanding *State Farm*, paragraph (a) does not apply with respect to the relationship between an insurer and a lawyer when, in each matter, the insurer's interest is only as an indemnity provider and not as a direct party to the action.

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation

[85] Even where there is no direct adversenessadversity, a conflict of interest requiring informed written consent* under paragraph (b) exists if there is a significant

risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent lawyer's obligations to two or more clients in the same matter, such as several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be, may materially limited in limit the lawyer's lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses other clients. The risk is that the lawyer may not be able to offer alternatives that would otherwise be available to each of the client clients. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and informed written consent.^{*} The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests exists or will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably^{*} should be pursued on behalf of the each client.

[6] Other rules and laws may preclude the disclosures necessary to obtain the informed written consent^{*} or provide the information required to permit representation under this Rule. (See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1) and Rule 1.6.) If such disclosure is precluded, representation subject to paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of this Rule is likewise precluded.

Lawyer's Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons

[7] Paragraph (d) imposes conditions that must be satisfied even if informed written consent^{*} is obtained as required by paragraphs (a) or (b) or the lawyer has informed the client in writing^{*} as required by paragraph (c). There are some matters in which the conflicts are such that even informed written consent^{*} may not suffice to permit representation. (See *Woods v. Superior Court* (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 931 [197 Cal.Rptr. 185]; *Klemm v. Superior Court* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 893 [142 Cal.Rptr. 509]; *Ishmael v. Millington* (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 520 [50 Cal.Rptr. 592].)

[9] ~~In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.~~

Personal Interest Conflicts

[10] ~~The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules~~

~~pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).~~

~~[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family relationship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.~~

~~[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).~~

~~*Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service*~~

~~[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.~~

~~*Prohibited Representations*~~

~~[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.~~

~~[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence).~~

~~[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable law. For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain representations by a former government lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a governmental client, such as a municipality, to consent to a conflict of interest.~~

~~[17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under Rule 1.0(m)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).~~

Informed Consent

~~[18] Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).~~

~~[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining whether common representation is in the client's interests.~~

Consent Confirmed in Writing

~~[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic~~

transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.

Revoking Consent

[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

Consent to Future Conflict

[228] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b). This Rule does not preclude an informed written consent* to a future conflict in compliance with applicable case law. The effectiveness of such ~~waivers~~ an advance consent is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the ~~waiver~~ consent entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably* foreseeable adverse consequences to the client of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, An advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b)-d). A lawyer who obtains from a client an advance consent that complies with this Rule will have all the duties of a lawyer to that client except as expressly limited by the consent. A lawyer cannot obtain an advance consent to incompetent representation. See Rule 1.8.8.

Conflicts in Litigation

~~[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.~~

~~[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.~~

~~[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.~~

Nonlitigation Conflicts

~~[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with~~

the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8].

[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.

[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.

Special Considerations in Common Representation

[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.

~~[309] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised. material change in circumstances relevant to application of this Rule may trigger a requirement to make new disclosures and, where applicable, obtain new informed written consents.* In the absence of such consents, depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one or more of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the clients from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).~~

~~[10] For special rules governing membership in a legal service organization, see Rule 6.3; and for work in conjunction with certain limited legal services programs, see Rule 6.5.~~

~~[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.~~

~~[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).~~

~~[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning~~

~~the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.~~

~~*Organizational Clients*~~

~~[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.~~

~~[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.~~

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 5900 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90036.

On May 25, 2018, I served the foregoing document described as: **J-M MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON NEW AUTHORITY** on the interested parties in this action by serving:


******* SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST *******

(✓✓) By U.S. Mail: The envelope was deposited in the mail at Los Angeles, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.

I am "readily familiar" with firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with U.S. Postal Service or Federal Express on that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than 1 day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

Executed on May 25, 2018 at Los Angeles, California.

(✓✓) (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.


Pauletta L. Herndon

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc.
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, Case No. B256314
Superior Court of Los Angeles County Case No. YC067332

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