

SUPREME COURT COPY

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)
)
 Plaintiff and Respondent,) Case No. S161781
)
 v.)
) Superior Court No.
 JUSTIN HEATH THOMAS,) RIF086792
)
 Defendant and Appellant.)
)
)
)

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of California

In and For the County of Riverside

Honorable Terrance R. Boren, Judge

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
(Appeal from a Judgment of Death)
(Volume II: Pages 194-336)

**SUPREME COURT
FILED**

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DEATH PENALTY

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