

SUPREME COURT  
**FILED**

NO. S246490

OCT 10 2018

Jorge Navarrete Clerk

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IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

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Deputy

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JAMES A. NOEL,  
*Plaintiff, Appellant, and Petitioner,*

v.

THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC.,  
*Defendant/Appellee.*

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Review of a decision of the Court of Appeal  
First Appellate District, Division Four,  
Case No. A143026

Marin County Superior Court Case No. CIV 1304712

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**REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF *AMICI CURIAE*  
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER AND NATIONAL  
ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES**

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*Counsel for Amici Curiae National Consumer Law Center  
and National Association of Consumer Advocates*

Pursuant to California Evidence Code § 452, *Amici Curiae* National Consumer Law Center and National Association of Consumer Advocates respectfully request that this Court take judicial notice of the following records of the Courts of Riverside County, Santa Clara County, and Los Angeles County:

**Exhibit 1:** Plaintiffs' motion for class certification filed with the Riverside County Superior Court on April 10, 2009 in *Jeanessa Fenderson, et al. v. Diaz et al.*, No. RIC483005, available on the Westlaw Database at 2009 WL 8150033.

**Exhibit 2:** Plaintiffs' amended statement regarding class notice and Order, filed with the Riverside County Superior Court on November 24, 2009 in *Jeanessa Fenderson, et al. v. Diaz et al.*, No. RIC483005, available on the Westlaw Database at 2009 WL 8150021.

**Exhibit 3:** Plaintiffs' motion for class certification filed with the Los Angeles County Superior Court on July 5, 2007 in *Audrey Medrazo et al. v. Honda of North Hollywood, et al.*, No. BC354744, available on the Westlaw Database at 2007 WL 5097819.

**Exhibit 4:** Complaint for refund, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief filed with the Santa Clara County Superior Court on January 10, 2014 in *Raymond and Michelle Plata v. City of San Jose*, No. 114CV258879.

**Exhibit 5:** Plaintiffs' motion for class certification filed with the Santa Clara County Superior Court on April 24, 2015 in *Raymond and Michelle Plata v. City of San Jose*, No. 114CV258879, available on the Westlaw Database at 2015 WL 12732872.

**Exhibit 6:** Defendant City of San Jose's opposition to motion for class certification filed with the Santa Clara County Superior Court on May 15, 2015 in *Raymond and Michelle Plata v. City of San Jose*,

No. 114CV258879, available on the Westlaw Database at 2015 WL 12732869.

**Exhibit 7:** Motion on Stipulated Distribution Plan and [Proposed] Order, filed with the Los Angeles County Superior Court on June 26, 2016, with an Order dated June 27, 2016 at p. 10 by Hon. David Sotelo of the Los Angeles County Superior Court in *Audrey Medrazo et al. v. Honda of North Hollywood, et al.*, No. BC354744.

Judicial notice of these documents is proper under Evidence Code section 452(d), which provides that a court may take judicial notice of the “[r]ecords of... any court of this state.” Evidence Code § 452(d); *Sosinsky v. Grant* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569 (finding it is proper to take judicial notice of the existence of court records).

Dated: October 2, 2018

LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN,  
LLP  
275 Battery Street, 29th Floor  
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By: 

Robert J. Nelson  
Roger N. Heller  
Melissa Gardner

*Attorneys for Amici Curiae National Consumer  
Law Center and National Association of  
Consumer Advocates*

## DECLARATION OF ROGER N. HELLER

I, ROGER N. HELLER, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am a partner at the law firm of Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP (“LCHB”) in San Francisco, California, and I am a member in good standing of the Bar of the State of California, duly licensed to practice before this Court.

2. Attached to the concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 1** is a true and correct copy of a document bearing case caption *Jeanessa Fenderson, et al. v. Diaz et al.*, No. RIC483005, entitled Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, file stamped April 10, 2009 by the Superior Court of California County of Riverside, available on the Westlaw Database at 2009 WL 8150033.

3. Attached to the concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 2** is a true and correct copy of a document bearing case caption *Jeanessa Fenderson, et al. v. Diaz et al.*, No. RIC483005, entitled Plaintiffs’ Amended Statement Regarding Class Notice (Cal. R. Ct. 3.766) & Request for Order Regarding Class Notice; [Proposed] Amended Order, wherein the term “Proposed” has been crossed out, file stamped November 24, 2009 by the Superior Court of California County of Riverside, available on the Westlaw Database at 2009 WL 8150021.

4. Attached to the concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 3** is a true and correct copy of a document bearing case caption *Audrey Medraza et al. v. Honda of North Hollywood, et al.*, No. BC354744, entitled Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification, file stamped July 5, 2007 by the Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles, available on the Westlaw Database at 2007 WL 5097819.


5. Attached to the concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 4** is a true and correct copy of a document bearing case caption *Raymond and Michelle Plata v. City of San Jose*, No. 114CV258879, entitled Complaint for Refund, Declaratory Relief, and Injunctive Relief, file stamped January 10, 2014 by the Superior Court of California County of Santa Clara.

6. Attached to the concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 5** is a true and correct copy of a document bearing case caption *Raymond and Michelle Plata v. City of San Jose*, No. 114CV258879, entitled Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Raymond and Michelle Plata's Motion for Class Certification, file stamped April 24, 2015 by the Superior Court of California County of Santa Clara, available on the Westlaw Database at 2015 WL 12732872.

7. Attached to the concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 6** is a true and correct copy of a document bearing case caption *Raymond and Michelle Plata v. City of San Jose*, No. 114CV258879, entitled Defendant City of San Jose's Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, file stamped May 15, 2015 by the Superior Court of California County of Santa Clara, available on the Westlaw Database at 2015 WL 12732869.

8. Attached to the concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 7** is a true and correct copy of a document bearing case caption *Audrey Medrazo et al. v. Honda of North Hollywood, et al.*, No. BC354744, entitled Motion on Stipulated Distribution Plan and [Proposed] Order, file stamped June 26, 2016 by the Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles, with an order bearing the signature of Hon. David Sotelo of the Los Angeles County Superior Court dated June 27, 2016.

Dated: October 2, 2018

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Roger Heller

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is 275 Battery Street, 29th Floor, San Francisco, California 94111. On October 1, 2018, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as:

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF *AMICI CURIAE*  
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER and NATIONAL  
ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES

on the interested parties in this action as follows:

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
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*Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant*

I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 2, 2018, at San Francisco, California.

Dated: October 2, 2018

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Roger Heller

# **EXHIBIT 1**



(4) 5/20

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**FILED**  
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

APR 10 2009  
N. Tavaglione

DRJ  
APR 13 2009

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10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
11 FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, RIVERSIDE COURT

12	JEANESSA FENDERSON; TRISTA ESSEX;	)	Case No. RIC 483005
	KATHLEEN ROGERS; DIANA SHERBY;	)	
13	ANN MARIE WOOD; NANCY MCGREGOR,	)	[Assigned to Judge Michael B. Donner,
	individually and on behalf of all other similarly	)	Dept. 4]
14	situated,	)	
		)	<b>CLASS ACTION</b>
15	Plaintiffs,	)	
		)	<b>NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR</b>
16	v.	)	<b>CLASS CERTIFICATION;</b>
		)	<b>MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND</b>
17	HEIDI DIAZ; KIMKINS, an unknown business	)	<b>AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF</b>
	entity, and DOES 4 through 100, Inclusive,	)	
18		)	DATE: May 20, 2009
	Defendants.	)	TIME: 8:30am
19		)	DEPT: 4
20		)	
		)	
21		)	Action Filed: October 15, 2007
		)	Trial Date: None Set

23 **TO ALL PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:**

24 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 20, at 8:30 a.m. or as soon as may be heard  
25 in Department 4 of the above-entitled Court located at 4050 Main Street, Riverside, California,  
26 Plaintiffs, JEANESSA FENDERSON; TRISTA ESSEX; KATHLEEN ROGERS; DIANA  
27 SHERBY; ANN MARIE WOOD; NANCY MCGREGOR, individually and on behalf of all others  
28


1 similarly situated, will and hereby do move the Court under California Code of Civil Procedure  
2 Section 382 to certify this case as a Class Action.

3 Plaintiffs' Motion is and will be based upon this notice of motion and motion, the attached  
4 memorandum of points and authorities, the declarations, pleadings and papers on file herein, and  
5 upon such other argument and evidence which may be presented to the court at or before the time of  
6 the hearing on this matter.

7 Plaintiffs have filed a previously motion for class certification on December 8, 2008, which  
8 was scheduled for hearing on January 14, 2009. Defendant Heidi Diaz filed a petition for  
9 bankruptcy on January 12, 2009, and furthermore filed a notice of stay with the Riverside Superior  
10 court on the same date. Plaintiffs take the position that the motion for class certification can now be  
11 entered by the court because defendant Heidi Diaz failed to timely file an opposition to the motion  
12 for class certification pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 and California  
13 Rules of Court, Rule 3.764(c). In the alternative, Plaintiffs submit this motion for class certification  
14 for consideration and hearing by this court.

15 Dated: April 9, 2009

**TIEDT & HURD**

16  
17 By:   
18 JOHN E. TIEDT  
19 MARC S. HURD  
20 Attorneys for Plaintiffs  
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 I.

3 **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

4 The original motion for class certification was filed with this court on December 8, 2008 and  
5 was scheduled for hearing on January 14, 2009. The opposition to the motion pursuant to Code of  
6 Civil Procedure Section 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.764(c) was due on December 30,  
7 2008. That deadline passed and no opposition was filed in connection with said motion. Defendant  
8 then elected to file for bankruptcy protection on January 12, 2009, just two days before the hearing  
9 on the motion for class certification. (See Supplemental Declaration of John E. Tiedt, paragraphs 4  
10 through 8). Defendant made a tactical choice not to file an opposition and pursue a bankruptcy  
11 petition. The bankruptcy petition was dismissed by Federal Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury on  
12 March 27, 2009.

13 Plaintiffs now seek that the Court grant their motion for class certification based on the fact  
14 that no opposition had been filed, or in the alternative, to proceed with a noticed hearing.

15 II.

16 **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

17 A. Hope for a safe and effective cure to obesity.

18 Obesity is a medical condition that is the second leading cause of preventable death<sup>1</sup>.  
19 Millions of Americans struggle with obesity and have resorted to dangerous diet drugs (e.g.,  
20 Ephedra, Chitosan, PPA). Each year, thousands of Americans face the prospect of risking bariatric  
21 surgery to treat life threatening obesity<sup>2</sup> or face the prospect of Type 2 diabetes or other related  
22 illnesses to obesity<sup>3</sup>. Americans have sought hope for fast, effective, safe and permanent weight  
23 loss methods. Over 40,000 Americans invested their hope and money in an individual known as  
24

25  
26 <sup>1</sup> (1998), Obesity and Physical Activity Guidelines, National Heart Lung and Blood Institute, Department of Health and  
Human Services, Item No. 98-4083.

27 <sup>2</sup> Ayaz Virgi, MD, Michael Mass, MD, April 15, 2006, Caring For Patients After Bariatric Surgery, American Family  
Physicians, page 1403.

28 <sup>3</sup> Patricia Anderson-Parrado, April 1998, Better Nutrition. Type 2 diabetes and obesity: an all-too-common  
combination.

1 "Kimmer" who provided a miraculous diet program known as the Kimkins Diet on her website,  
2 Kimkins.com.

3 B. The Kimkins Diet: how it all started.

4 In 2002 a woman who called herself "Kimmer" introduced her version of a low-carb diet  
5 on the Low Carb Friends diet discussion board on Low Carb Friends.com. The diet appeared to be  
6 miraculous as Kimmer claimed to have lost 200 pounds in only 11 months without exercise.

7 Sample copies of Kimmer's statements with photographs revealing her transformation on the  
8 Internet are collectively attached hereto as Exhibit "A". See also, Declaration of Elizabeth Winn,  
9 page 2, lines 10-18. She immediately developed a following on the Internet. Kimmer, who is now  
10 identified as Heidi Diaz, claimed to have invented the "Kimkins" diet<sup>4</sup>. The Kimkins diet offered  
11 various plans wherein members were advised to consume 500 calories or less per day. The  
12 impressive representations of Kimmer's weight loss results and Kimmer's purported knowledge of  
13 diet and nutrition led to the formation of the Kimkins.com website in June of 2006.

14 Kimkins.com was, and is, a website wherein potential subscribers can access general  
15 information about the diet and advertisements for the paid membership to Kimkins.com.  
16 However, for a fee, a member can access special web pages including a social network, key details  
17 of the Kimkins diet, and personal coaching forum by Kimmer herself. The initial advertising plan  
18 was to promote the Kimkins membership subscription on the public access portion of the Kimkins  
19 website and by Internet advertisements. The potential Kimkins subscriber was greeted with the  
20 following typical statement on the Kimkins homepage:

21 "Millions of overweight people think fast and permanent weight loss is  
22 completely out of their reach. They've been told that their entire lives should be  
23 happy with slow to one to two pound a week weight loss. How depressing and  
24 untrue! What if I told you that you could lose weight at turbo speed? Experience  
25 natural appetite suppression? Would you be interested?

26 ...

27 It's called Kimkins and it was developed by me, Kimmer, in 2000 when I  
28 weighed a morbidly obese 318 pounds! In less than a year I lost 198 pounds and  
kept it off! Are you excited yet? You should be! Kimkins has literally changed

<sup>4</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV, page 77, lines 10-13

1 the lives of real people just like you who were at their wit's end about their weight  
2 problem." (Emphasis added).

3 A copy of the Kimkins homepage is attached as Exhibit "B".<sup>5</sup>

4 Potential subscribers would also have access to the "meet your team" part of the website  
5 wherein Kimmer reiterated her representation that she lost 198 pounds in 11 months. See Exhibit  
6 "C".<sup>6</sup> Kimmer promised she would personally answer questions in a member's only area known  
7 as the Kimkins Café Forum.<sup>7</sup>

8 Before purchasing membership, the potential subscriber can also access the success stories.  
9 The success stories contain photographs of women who purportedly lost fantastic amounts of  
10 weight in extremely short periods of time. Subscribers could read about Susan who was only age  
11 21 and had lost an amazing 164 pounds in 9 months. Susan's original weight was 296 but reached  
12 a final weight of 132 pounds on the Kimkins diet. Visitors were also treated to the story of  
13 Catherine who was 248 pounds and lost 124 pounds in only 7 months. At age 33, Catherine  
14 purportedly had a heart attack due to obesity but thanks to Kimkins she was on the road to health.  
15 There was also the story of Nikki who at age 33 lost 66 pounds in only 4 ½ months. Nikki made  
16 the claim that her weight loss was permanent thanks to Kimkins. There were numerous amazing  
17 success stories where morbidly obese women lost a tremendous amount of weight in almost no  
18 time. Copies of only success stories are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit "D".

19 Once visitors paid their membership fee, (\$19.95 to \$59.95 during the class period),  
20 members had access to a social network wherein they could discuss the Kimkins diet and provide  
21 support for each other. Members were promised a life time membership for a onetime fee. See  
22 Exhibit "E".

23 C. The Big Break: Kimkins on the Cover of Woman's World Magazine.

24 The big break for Kimkins.com occurred when Woman's World Magazine featured the  
25 Kimkins diet on the cover of its magazine on June 12, 2007. The title of the story was "Better

26  
27 <sup>5</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. 1, page 39 lines 25, page 40, lines 1-25, page 4, line 1.

<sup>6</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. 1, page 26, lines 6-25, page 27, lines 1-9

<sup>7</sup> Id.

28



1 Than Gastric Bypass!” The article featured the miraculous transformation of Kimmer and  
2 presented her dramatic before and after pictures. Heidi Diaz told the public that Kimmer’s true  
3 name was Kim Drake. Kimmer again bragged about her 198 pound weight loss after serious  
4 injury. She claimed to have lost that weight in 11 months and went from a size 26 dress size to a  
5 size 6. A true and correct copy of the Woman’s World Magazine article about Kimkins.com is  
6 attached hereto as Exhibit “F”.

7 In just one month, Kimkins.com registered \$1,252,059.95 in sales collected!<sup>8</sup> See Exhibit  
8 “G”. Suddenly tens of thousands of Americans swarmed the Kimkins.com website for a miracle  
9 obesity cure that had worked for Kimmer, Susan, Catherine and dozens of other advertised success  
10 stories. Many had been advised by their doctors to undergo gastric bypass surgery or seek  
11 treatment for Type 2 diabetes, but they turned to the Kimkins diet for a safe, fast and permanent  
12 method of weight loss.

13 D. The Unraveling of America’s Worst Internet Diet Scam.

14 Almost all of the material representations of the Kimkins.com website and advertisements  
15 were in fact false. There was no “Kimmer”, “Susan”, “Catherine” or “Nikki”. The success stories  
16 were pure fiction and photographs were stolen from other Internet sites. The Kimkins diet was not  
17 ever proven safe or effective.

18 “Kimmer”, aka Heidi Diaz, never lost 198 pounds in 11 months. “Kimmer” was purely a  
19 fictional character created to defraud the public. The perpetrator of this scam is Heidi Diaz, who  
20 habitually lied about the Kimkins diet and her alleged weight loss on the Internet for years from  
21 her home in Corona, California. She regularly used false names on the Internet, lied about her  
22 weight loss, created countless false success stories, falsely claimed celebrities such as Jessica Alba  
23 and Lindsay Lohan used her diet, lied about the safety and efficacy of the Kimkins diet, falsely  
24 impersonated consumers in order to induce sales, used unlawful labels and Metatags to misdirect  
25 Internet traffic and fraudulently tried to conceal her assets to avoid repaying customers. Heidi  
26

27 <sup>8</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. 1, Page 133, lines 11-22  
28

1 Diaz was caught red-handed but still continues to engage in false and misleading advertising on the  
2 Internet while making a substantial profit.

- 3 1. Kimmer is not Kim Drake the thin diet expert; Kimmer is Heidi Diaz,  
4 a morbidly obese Internet swindler from Corona, California.

5 The beautiful woman in the red dress featured on the Kimkins Internet site named Kim  
6 Drake aka "Kimmer," does not exist!<sup>9</sup> Ms. Diaz also admitted that she had posed as Kimmer in a  
7 "public apology" that was posted on Kimkins.com after she was successfully exposed by an  
8 investigative report on the KTLA news. A copy of said apology is attached hereto as Exhibit "H".  
9 The Kimkins "poster girl" is actually a model named Lesya whose image was lifted by Heidi Diaz  
10 from a Russian bride Internet site. Heidi Diaz used her own picture to depict the "before Kimkins  
11 diet" image of Kimmer, and unlawfully misappropriated the photograph of Lesya as the "after  
12 Kimkins diet" image of Kimmer. A copy of the original Internet Russian bride advertisement of  
13 the model in the red dress misrepresented as Kimmer is attached here as Exhibit "I". Heidi Diaz  
14 has been and remains a morbidly obese woman.

15 Heidi Diaz created false identities to sell or promote the Kimkins Diet. She admitted under  
16 oath that she had used such names as Kimmer, Jennifer Danser, Brad Curtis, Kimberly Stewart,  
17 Kimberly Drake, Vanessa Sharp, Dennis Sharp and numerous other monikers.<sup>10</sup>

18 With regard to her use of other names such as Kimmer, Heidi Diaz testified as follows:

19 "Question: When you use false names, aren't you giving the impression  
20 that your company is much bigger than it really is, as far as staff?

Answer: I see it as a creative outlet. I get tired of seeing my own name.

21 Question: You don't see that as dishonest or deceptive?

Answer: No.<sup>11</sup>

22 In order to promote Kimkins.com, Heidi Diaz would post false statements about Kimkins  
23 and used false names.

24 "Question: When you appeared on Google Answers, did you use Kimmer  
25 or Heidi Diaz?

26 <sup>9</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 26, lines 6-20

27 <sup>10</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 9, lines 8-23, Diaz Deposition, Vol. III, page 98, lines 2-16

28 <sup>11</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 84, lines 13-26

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Answer: Neither.  
Question: Which one did you use?  
Answer: I don't know. Assorted.  
Question: Assorted names?  
Answer: Yes."<sup>12</sup>

2. Use of False Pictures of Kimmer.

Under oath and by way of public apology, Heidi Diaz has established that she has used false pictures to depict the weight loss success story of Kimmer. For example, the photograph of Kimmer featured in Exhibit "C" of this motion was shown to Heidi Diaz. Under oath she stated that the picture of the Kimmer was not her and was actually "a model."<sup>13</sup> Ms. Diaz' decision to use a false picture to advertise Kimkins was even questioned by her technical support staff. Her technical consultant, Aliyar Firat, wanted to use a real picture of Heidi Diaz but Ms. Diaz refused and insisted on using the picture of the model for Kimmer's after diet photographs.<sup>14</sup>

Exhibit "B" was also shown to Heidi Diaz during the course of her deposition and she not only identified that the picture of Kimmer is false but she also indicated that three other photographs used to promote the Kimkins website featuring Bambi and Tana were also false photographs.<sup>15</sup>

Heidi Diaz was shown a series of four photographs that had been used on her website and advertisements. True and correct copies of said photographs are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit "J". She admitted under oath that the first photograph was a picture of her which was featured in the "before" diet photographs. However, the subsequent three photographs of models used on her website as "after diet" images were not in fact her.<sup>16</sup>

3. Heidi Diaz Lied About Her Alleged Weight Loss.

Under oath, and by way of public apology, Heidi Diaz admitted that she lied about the alleged weight loss success of Kimmer on Internet and print advertisements. With regard to Exhibit

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<sup>12</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. III, page 61, line 25, page 62, lines 1-24; see also page 62, line 25, page 63, lines 1-6, wherein Heidi Diaz corrected her testimony and that it was actually Yahoo Answers she visited not Google Answers  
<sup>13</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 26, lines 12-20, page 27, lines 8-9  
<sup>14</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 32, lines 10-25, page 33, lines 1-10  
<sup>15</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 39, line 25, page 40, lines 1-25, page 41, line 1

1 "C" she admitted that her statement that Kimmer lost an amazing 198 pounds in 11 months was in  
2 fact a statement that she prepared but was false.<sup>17</sup> Ms. Diaz also admitted that the woman identified  
3 as Vanessa in Exhibit "C" does not actually exist and her story was a fictional creation by Ms.  
4 Diaz.<sup>18</sup>

5 With respect to Kimkins' homepage attached here as Exhibit "B", Ms. Diaz admits that her  
6 testimony on said homepage was derived from the interview wherein she claims to have lost a  
7 purported 198 pounds in 11 months was false.<sup>19</sup> Variations of the homepage of Kimkins.com were  
8 accessible to the public throughout the class period. Variations of the Kimkins.com home pages  
9 from July, 2006 through June, 2007 are collectively attached hereto as Exhibit "K".<sup>20</sup>

10 To promote Kimkins, Heidi Diaz made phenomenal misrepresentations on the Internet  
11 program known as the "Livin La Vida Low Carb" show hosted by Jimmy Moore on July 19, 2007.

12 Heidi Diaz made the following statement:

13 "I started at 318, and then my final weight now is between 118-122 pounds or  
14 just between there. And it did take 11 months. That includes losing 11 pounds  
15 the first day."<sup>21</sup>  
(A copy of the original transcript of said interview is attached hereto as  
16 Exhibit "L".)

17 Heidi Diaz also stated in the interview that she had kept the weight off for a total of 5 to 5-  
18 ½ years.<sup>22</sup> At the time of the interview, Heidi Diaz weighed over 300 pounds. She was  
19 photographed several times shortly after the interview. Copies of said photographs are attached  
20 hereto collectively as Exhibit "M".<sup>23</sup>

21 4. Material Misrepresentations Contained in the Woman's World  
22 Magazine Article "Make Heidi Diaz a Millionaire."

23 In June of 2006, the story of Kimmer and the Kimkins diet reached millions of

24 <sup>18</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. 1, page 47, lines 18-25, page 48, lines 1-19  
25 <sup>17</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. 1, page 26, lines 21-25, page 27, lines 1-2. See also Exhibit "H"  
26 <sup>18</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. 1, page 36, lines 17-25, page 37, lines 1-16  
27 <sup>19</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. 1, page 40, lines 22-25, page 41, lines 1-24  
28 <sup>20</sup> See also, Declaration of Elizabeth Winn, page 2, lines 20-25

<sup>21</sup> See Kimkins homepage attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and the Affidavit of Jimmy Moore, page 2, lines 17-19.

<sup>22</sup> *Id.*

<sup>23</sup> See Declaration of John E. Tiedt, page 3, lines 11-17.

1 Americans.<sup>24</sup> Heidi Diaz admitted that she supplied her own "before diet" photograph for the  
2 article but used a photograph of another model for her "after diet" photograph.<sup>25</sup> When asked  
3 where she obtained the picture of the model, she stated: "from the Internet. I don't remember the  
4 site. Just again, I wanted to be anonymous."<sup>26</sup> Ms. Diaz does not dispute the fact that she also  
5 used the false name "Kim Drake" and another false picture in the article. With regard to the issue  
6 of the importance of making truthful statements weighed against her privacy interests, she  
7 provided the following testimony:

8 "Question: Did you ever weigh it out in your mind that your privacy interests  
9 are not outweighed by the need of your customers to know the truth about your  
purported weight loss using the Kimkins Diet?

10 Answer: No, I don't -- I think differently. And I do not.

11 Question: Why?

12 Answer: Well, privacy is something that is important to me, and I wanted to  
encourage others towards weight loss, which we've done. That's it.

13 Question: Didn't you feel that your customers who signed up for a lifetime  
memberships with Kimkins were entitled to know the truth about your personal  
weight loss with the Kimkins Diet?

14 Answer: In retrospect, yes. At the time, no.<sup>27</sup>

15 Her statements in the article were a phenomenal act of fraud by Heidi Diaz. In the article  
16 she falsely stated she had lost 200 pounds in 11 months. She also falsely represented that she  
17 soared up to 318 pounds after a serious injury. She falsely claimed she went from a dress size 26 to  
18 a size 6.<sup>28</sup> As a result of such blatant false advertising, sales shot up immediately. In June of 2007,  
19 there were 15,330 paid memberships.<sup>29</sup>

20 5. The Use of Forty-One (41) False Success Stories with Misappropriated Photographs.

21 Numerous Kimkins' success stories used on the websites and on advertisements were  
22 FALSE. The photographs featured in each of the success stories were lifted from Russian Bride  
23 websites.<sup>30 31</sup> Exhibit "D" contains twenty-eight (28) fraudulent advertisements for Kimkins.com.

24  
25 <sup>24</sup> See Exhibit "F"

26 <sup>25</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 74, lines 1-24

27 <sup>26</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 74, line 25, page 75, lines 1-6

28 <sup>27</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 181, lines 13-25, page 182, lines 1-2

<sup>28</sup> See Exhibit "F"

<sup>29</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 107, lines 3-25, page 108, lines 1-10.

<sup>30</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 206, lines 22-25, page 207, lines 1-8

<sup>31</sup> The false success advertisements along with a copy of the corresponding Russian bride Internet screenshots

1 Ms. Diaz admitted that each and every person featured did not use the Kimkins diet and did not  
2 lose the weight as advertised.<sup>32</sup> In describing one of the Russian models who appeared in the  
3 advertisement, Heidi Diaz testified as follows:

4 "Question: It says (referring to the advertisement), "Joann, a model perfect size  
5 6." Is that a particular shot that had been used on Kimkins advertisements before?

6 Answer: It was one of the model photos that we had used.

7 Question: Okay. And that's one of the Russian bride model photos; is that  
8 correct?

9 Answer: Yes.

10 Question: So Joann does not really exist in real life, as Joann, a user of Kimkins;  
11 is that right?

12 Answer: No.

13 Question: That would be a "yes"?

14 Answer: Yes."<sup>33</sup>

15 (The advertisement containing Joann's image is attached hereto as Exhibit "N").  
16 Raquel was an alleged Kimkins model who purportedly lost 141 pounds in just 10 months.

17 A copy of said advertisement is attached hereto as Exhibit "O". Ms. Diaz testified that she  
18 acquired Raquel's picture and that the story is one that she "wrote."<sup>34</sup>

19 She admitted to fabricating success stories and using false photographs in connection with  
20 the advertisements attached to the Volume II of her deposition as Exhibits 96, 99, 100, 101, 102,  
21 103, 104, 105, 106, and 107.<sup>35</sup> The aforementioned false success stories used in the Kimkins  
22 advertisements are collectively attached hereto as Exhibit "P".

23 She also created fraudulent success stories on the Kimkins Newsletter which was  
24 accessible to the general public and designed to promote Kimkins.com subscriptions. Ms. Diaz  
25 used the photograph and alleged success story of a German woman by the name of Ariana who  
26 purportedly was a homemaker in Florida. Ariana purportedly lost 63 pounds in only 3 ½ months  
27 on the Kimkins diet. However, Ms. Diaz testified that she lied about Ariana using Kimkins and  
28 that she created Ariana's statement which was all fiction.<sup>36</sup> A copy of said fraudulent Newsletter is  
attached hereto as Exhibit "Q".

<sup>32</sup> *Id.*  
<sup>33</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. III, page 153, lines 24-25, page 154, lines 1-10;

<sup>34</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. II, page 163, lines 11-23

<sup>35</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. II, page 162, line 11 through page 170, line 25

<sup>36</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. III, page 197, lines 17-25, page 198, lines 1-5, see also, deposition Exhibit "Q"

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6. False Celebrity Endorsements.

Heidi Diaz admitted that she had represented to the public that celebrity Jessica Alba, a famous actress, used the Kimkins diet. She testified that she did not know if Jessica Alba used the diet but repeated the "rumor" on the Internet.<sup>37</sup> She admitted in retrospect, she thought it was deceptive to repeat the rumor that Jessica Alba used the Kimkins diet.<sup>38</sup>

Heidi Diaz also falsely claimed and advertised that Lindsay Lohan was a user of the Kimkins diet. In fact, she misappropriated a picture of Lindsay Lohan wearing a T-shirt. The Kimkins logo is superimposed on Ms. Lohan's t-shirt.<sup>39</sup> A copy of said advertisement is attached hereto as Exhibit "R". Ms. Diaz admitted that she has never had any contact with Lindsay Lohan. She also testified that she never believed the photograph of Lindsay Lohan with the doctored image displaying Kimkins across Ms. Lohan's chest was real.<sup>40</sup>

7. Unlawful Use of Labels and Metatags to Misdirect Internet Traffic.

Many of the Kimkins.com advertisements have labels or tags that are used as a basis to direct traffic to the Kimkins.com site. Heidi Diaz was an expert on how to misdirect traffic on the Internet. For example, in the attached Exhibit "S", Heidi Diaz took a popular Internet topic such as the "Geico Caveman" which generated a lot of Internet activity at the time. Heidi Diaz placed the labels: "Caveman, Geico, Kimkins" together so that when "Geico" and "Caveman" would be searched, the Kimkins advertisement would appear. With respect to Exhibit "S," Heidi Diaz admitted that she prepared the graphic and text without the permission of the Geico Insurance Company.<sup>41</sup> Heidi Diaz admitted that labels were also used as tags and that if a search were conducted with respect to the terms "Geico" or "Caveman," the subject advertisement would show up in a ranking.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. II, page 180, lines 15-20, page 181 lines 1-8, see also Vol. III, page 155, lines 19-22  
<sup>38</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. II, page 181, lines 18-21  
<sup>39</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. III, page 149 lines 23-25, page 156, lines 16-19  
<sup>40</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. III, page 157, lines 7-15  
<sup>41</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. III, page 180, lines 11-25, page 181, lines 1-9  
<sup>42</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. III, page 181, lines 19-25, page 182, lines 1-6

1 Another example of label/tag misdirection occurred on the Kimkins Blog. Ms. Diaz used  
2 the following labels: "Celebrity Diet Secrets, Christie Brinkley, Gwyneth Paltrow, Kimkins, and  
3 low carb." A copy of the Kimkins blog is attached hereto as Exhibit "T".

4 8. No Lifetime Membership, as Promised by Heidi Diaz.

5 Members of Kimkins.com were promised a one-time payment for a lifetime membership.<sup>43</sup>  
6 However, if anyone complained of becoming ill on the diet, which was a common occurrence, said  
7 member would be immediately terminated. In fact, if Heidi Diaz or any of her minions decided  
8 they did not like you, you would also be terminated. Heidi Diaz testified that troublemakers would  
9 be blocked from full access to the website. She claimed to have no criteria for termination.<sup>44</sup> She  
10 stated that the term "troublemaker" would be defined by each administrator.<sup>45</sup>

11 In an e-mail dated December 14, 2007, Heidi Diaz stated that banning was not enough:  
12 "but even with banning, they need to be kicked off or they remain logged in until they leave site.  
13 Please ask her (Delaney Deaver) to e-mail webmaster at Kimkins.com if anyone needs kicking."<sup>46</sup>  
14 Declarations establishing a sampling of members who have been kicked off or banned from  
15 Kimkins.com are attached hereto as Exhibit "U".

16 9. Advertised Lies and Misrepresentations.

17 Although Heidi Diaz is the sole owner of Kimkins and responsible for all of the content on  
18 its website, she has made the miraculous claim that certain representations appeared on her website  
19 without her knowledge. For example, there were repeated references on the Kimkins homepage of  
20 how Kimkins is perfect for diabetics. Specifically, the following statement was made:

21 "And, Kimkins is the perfect diet for Type 1 and Type 2 diabetics. Our  
22 program offers superior blood sugar control. In fact, many Type 2 diabetic  
23 members get off their meds like glucofage and metiformin!" (See copy attached  
24 as Exhibit "V".)  
25

26  
27 <sup>43</sup> See Exhibit "E" that contains references to the Kimkins lifetime membership.  
<sup>44</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 200, lines 13-19  
<sup>45</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 199, lines 23-25, page 200, lines 1-12  
28 <sup>46</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. II, page 42, lines 12-15



1 With regard to Exhibit "V", Ms. Diaz claims that she had no idea where the words came  
2 from on the subject page.<sup>47</sup> With regard to the statement contained in Exhibit "V" about Type 1  
3 and Type 2 diabetes, Ms. Diaz testified that she would have only removed reference to Type 1  
4 diabetes in retrospect. "It is an autoimmune condition where the body doesn't produce insulin at  
5 all [and] it requires careful medical monitoring."<sup>48</sup> However, later in her deposition she admitted  
6 that no doctor has ever told her that Kimkins was appropriate for Type 2 diabetics.<sup>49</sup>

7 Another classic misrepresentation repeated throughout the Kimkins advertisements was  
8 that the Kimkins diet was a "fast and permanent" way to lose weight.<sup>50</sup> Heidi Diaz did admit to  
9 being the author of Exhibit "Q" wherein she claimed the following:

10 "Many people struggle with their weight and I was one of them. Then I  
11 found the secret to losing the weight, fast and permanently." (Emphasis in  
12 original).<sup>51</sup>  
13 Heidi Diaz admits that no medical doctor has ever approved the safety or efficacy of the  
14 Kimkins diet.<sup>52</sup> However, she did offer \$100 to a website doctor to endorse the safety and  
15 advocacy of the Kimkins diet but she never heard from him.<sup>53</sup>

16 Another amazing misrepresentation repeatedly stated that the Kimkins diet was  
17 thermogenic and that no exercise was needed to lose weight. Many other irresponsible statements  
18 were made by Heidi Diaz and it is anticipated that she may even try to claim that she was not  
19 responsible for everything stated on her own website. However, she did admit under oath that no  
20 one had access to her website other than her technical company, Clexus New Media.<sup>54</sup> Ms. Diaz  
21 admitted under oath that in her best estimate, she only visited her homepage two times in the year  
22 2007, despite being the sole owner of the website.<sup>55</sup> In her final deposition, she started to  
23 contradict her prior testimony and denied knowledge of who authored the Kimkins advertisements:

24 <sup>47</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV page 117, lines 19-25, page 118, lines 1-23

25 <sup>48</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV, page 119, lines 13-25

26 <sup>49</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV, page 123, lines 3-8

27 <sup>50</sup> See Exhibit "Q"

28 <sup>51</sup> Id.

<sup>52</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV, page 26, lines 10-14

<sup>53</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV, page 26, lines 15-25, page 27, lines 1-13

<sup>54</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV, page 90, lines 21-23

<sup>55</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV, page 93, lines 1-20

1           **“Question: Have you ever made the statement at any time on your website**  
2           **ever that you lost 198 pounds in one year?**

3           **Answer: I don't recall.<sup>56</sup>**

4           **Question: Have you ever made the statement that you were able to keep**  
5           **weight off for a total of five years?**

6           **Answer: I don't recall.<sup>57</sup>**

7           **However, Heidi Diaz could not evade liability for her Kimkins advertising:**

8           **“Question: In order to ensure that your website was providing accurate**  
9           **information to consumers, did you have a review process that you instituted at any**  
10           **time in 2006?**

11           **Answer: No.**

12           **Question: In order to determine whether or not the information represented**  
13           **on your website was accurate, did you institute any type of review process**  
14           **between January of 2007 and October of 2007?**

15           **Answer: No.”<sup>58</sup>**

16           **Heidi Diaz was also asked the following:**

17           **“Question: In order to analyze the validity of any representations by**  
18           **members who posted weight loss claims, did you ever ask for affidavits from**  
19           **these members?**

20           **Answer: No.”<sup>59</sup>**

21           **10. Heidi Diaz Intended to Engage in False Advertising and Admitted**  
22           **that Her Customers Would Rely on Her Misrepresentations.**

23           **During the course of her deposition, Heidi Diaz made stunning concessions:**

24           **Question: When you made the statements about your weight loss, at the**  
25           **time you knew they were false, correct?**

26           **Answer: Yes.**

27           **Question: And you knew at the time people were relying on those**  
28           **statements, is that right?**

**Answer: I felt it would encourage them, yes.**

**Question: So that answer's yes?**

**Answer: Yes.<sup>60</sup>**

56 Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 26, lines 21-25, page 27, lines 1-2, Heidi Diaz admits her statement that she lost 198 pounds in 11 months was false; Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV, page 95, lines 20-25

57 See Exhibit “L”

58 Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV., page 96, lines 1-9

59 Diaz Deposition, Vol. IV, page 96, lines 18-25

60 Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 91, lines 12-20

1 The Court already has on file numerous declarations and affidavits signed by purchasers of  
2 Kimkins.com memberships, who stated under oath that they relied on the representations of  
3 Defendant's weight loss claims when they decided to subscribe to Kimkins.com. The subject  
4 declarations and affidavits illustrate the consumers' reliance on the fraudulent representations of  
5 Heidi Diaz. Plaintiffs accordingly have requested the Court to take judicial notice of the  
6 declarations and affidavits filed in support of Plaintiffs' Writ of Attachment on October 18, 2007.

7 Heidi Diaz admits she lied and the sheer volume of lies proves her intent to deceive her  
8 customers. Her public apology confirmed her deceit but was a fairly obvious spin job to explain her  
9 deceit. It is critical to point out Ms. Diaz' statement made on November 12, 2007. Ms. Diaz posted  
10 the following statement (approved by her counsel) on her website:

11 **Question:** What about the people who joined Kimkins because you  
12 said you lost 198 pounds in 11 months or because of the success story re-  
enactments?

13 **Answer:** I offer my sincere apology to anyone who felt misled or  
14 joined purely on that basis. That was never our intent. Kimkins will provide a  
15 refund and membership cancellation upon request to anyone who joined Kimkins  
16 prior to November 1, 2007. Please write [support@kimkins.com](mailto:support@kimkins.com). This email  
17 address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it  
18 by November 16, 2007 and provide your full name, current or former user name,  
19 PayPal transaction number and PayPal email address.<sup>61</sup>

### 17 III.

#### 18 CALIFORNIA LAW GOVERNING CLASS CERTIFICATION

##### 19 A. California Law Favors Class Actions.

20 A generation ago the California Supreme Court emphasized the importance of class actions.  
21 Class actions, the Court wrote,

22 ... serve an important function in our judicial system. By establishing a  
23 technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the  
24 same time, the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitive litigation  
25 and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims  
26 which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation. Because  
of these important dual functions, courts and legislators have looked with  
increasing favor on the class action device.<sup>62</sup>

27 <sup>61</sup> See Exhibit "H" - Note Defendant Heidi Diaz materially changed her apology. The original version (dated  
11/12/2007) and the current version (dated 12/1/2008) are attached hereto as Exhibit "H". In the current version,  
Defendant Diaz omits her admission that she lied about losing 198 lbs. in 11 months.

28 <sup>62</sup> *Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 469 (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted).

1 The benefits of class actions is "not measured by reference to individual recoveries alone."<sup>63</sup>

2  
3 Not only do class actions offer consumers a means of recovery for modest  
4 individual damages, but such actions often produce several salutary by-  
5 products, including a therapeutic effect upon those sellers who engage in  
6 fraudulent practices, aid to legitimate business enterprises by curtailing  
7 illegitimate competition, and avoidance to the judicial process of the burden  
8 of multiple litigation involving identical claims.<sup>64</sup>

9 Given the benefits that class actions provide, the problems that arise in the management of a  
10 class action involving numerous small claims "do not justify a judicial policy that would permit the  
11 defendant to retain the benefits of its wrongful conduct and to continue that conduct with  
12 impunity."<sup>65</sup> The California Supreme Court has "for decades" urged trial courts to be "procedurally  
13 innovative" so that they can preserve the efficiency of class actions while properly resolving  
14 individual questions, and trial courts "routinely fashion methods to manage individual questions."<sup>66</sup>

#### 15 **B. Prerequisites for Class Certification Under C.C.P. § 382**

16 Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 governs class certification in this case. Section 382  
17 provides that "when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when  
18 the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may  
19 sue or defend for the benefit of all."<sup>67</sup> The party seeking certification under Section 382 must  
20 establish the existence of an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among  
21 class members.<sup>68</sup> The moving party must also establish by a preponderance of the evidence that  
22 class treatment is superior to other means for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the litigation.<sup>69</sup>

#### 23 **1. Existence of an ascertainable class**

24 Ascertainability is necessary so notice can be given to proposed class members who will be

25 <sup>63</sup> *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 429, 445.

26 <sup>64</sup> *Id.* at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted), *Vasquez v. Superior Court* (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808

27 <sup>65</sup> *Id.* at 446 (citations omitted).

28 <sup>66</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Sup. Ct.* (2004) 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 319, 339.

<sup>67</sup> C.C.P. § 382.

<sup>68</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Sup. Ct.* (2004) 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 319, 326.

<sup>69</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores*, 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 332.

1 bound by the judgment or settlement in the action.<sup>70</sup> A class typically is ascertainable if it is defined  
2 "in terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts making the ultimate  
3 identification of class members possible when that identification becomes necessary."<sup>71</sup> A class is  
4 still ascertainable even if the definition relies on ultimate facts or conclusions of law.<sup>72</sup>

5 **2. Well-defined community of interest.**

6 The "community of interest" requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions  
7 of law or fact, (2) class representatives with claims or defenses that are typical of the class, and (3)  
8 class representatives who can adequately represent the class.<sup>73</sup>

9 Common questions of law or fact predominate when common questions of law or fact are  
10 applicable to the entire proposed class.<sup>74</sup> Common questions of law and fact are necessary to assure  
11 that permitting the suit to proceed as a class action rather than in a multiplicity of individual suits  
12 furthers the litigants' interests and the court's.<sup>75</sup>

13 To gain class certification, the moving plaintiffs must demonstrate that their claims are  
14 typical of the class members' claims.<sup>76</sup> But it has never been the law in California that the class  
15 representative's interests must be *identical* with the class members' interests.<sup>77</sup>

16 Indeed, neither predominance nor typicality nor adequate representation requires that the  
17 class representatives and all class members have *identical* claims or *identical* recoveries. The  
18 California Supreme Court long ago recognized that the possibility each class member might be  
19 required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not preclude class certification.<sup>78</sup> Similarly,  
20 that individual class members might ultimately need to itemize their damages or prove a separate  
21 claim to a portion of any recovery does not preclude certification. And the fact that the class  
22 representatives have not personally incurred all the damages suffered by each different class

23  
24 <sup>70</sup> *Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp.* (2001) 89 Cal.App. 4<sup>th</sup> 914

25 <sup>71</sup> *Kaufman & Broad*, 89 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 908, 915 (footnote omitted).

26 <sup>72</sup> *Kaufman & Broad*, 89 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 915 (footnote omitted).

27 <sup>73</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores*, 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 326.

28 <sup>74</sup> e.g., *City of San Jose v. Sup. Ct.* (2004) 12 Cal.3d at 460; *Hicks*, 89 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 916.

<sup>75</sup> *Kaufman & Broad*, 89 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 914.

<sup>76</sup> *McCullah v. Southern Cal. Gas Co.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 495, 500.

<sup>77</sup> *Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 46.

1 member does not preclude certification.<sup>79</sup> These are merely factors the court should consider in  
2 determining whether a class action is proper.<sup>80</sup> Individual issues do not render class certification  
3 inappropriate as long as the court can effectively manage them.<sup>81</sup>

4 **C. Proper Scope of the Court's Analysis**

5 "The certification question is essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an  
6 action is legally or factually meritorious."<sup>82</sup> A trial court ruling on a certification motion determines  
7 whether the issues that might be jointly tried, when compared with those that will require individual  
8 adjudication, are "so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be  
9 advantageous" to the court and to the litigants.<sup>83</sup>

10 The proper focus during certification is what types of questions—common versus  
11 individual—that likely will arise in the action.<sup>84</sup> The court may not consider the lawsuit's merits,  
12 and it constitutes reversible error if the trial court considers the merits when ruling on a certification  
13 motion.<sup>85</sup>

14 The court may consider a wide variety of evidence in determining whether certification is  
15 appropriate: pattern-and-practice evidence, statistical evidence, sampling evidence, expert  
16 testimony, "and other indicators of a defendant's centralized practices" and "common behaviour  
17 towards similarly situated plaintiffs."<sup>86</sup>

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23 <sup>78</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores*, 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 334; *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 232, 238

24 <sup>79</sup> *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 224, 238.

25 <sup>80</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores*, 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 334-35.

26 <sup>81</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores*, 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 334.

27 <sup>82</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores*, 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 326.

28 <sup>83</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores*, 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 326.

<sup>84</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores*, 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 327.

<sup>85</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores*, 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 327; *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 429, 439-440; *Hicks*,  
89 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 914.

<sup>86</sup> *Sav-On Drug Stores*, 34 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 333.

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IV.

ARGUMENT:

**THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION  
AND CERTIFY THIS CASE TO PROCEED AS A CLASS ACTION.**

**A. The Definition of the Class to be Certified**

The class is defined as all individuals who purchased the Kimkins.com diet membership on-line from the Kimkins.com Web site between January 1, 2006 through October 15, 2007.

**B. An Ascertainable Class Exists.**

The members of the proposed class are so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court. Plaintiffs estimate that there are more than 40,000 members in the proposed class.<sup>87</sup>

An ascertainable class exists. The class is defined by objective characteristics and common transactional facts, which will make the identification of class members possible when that identification becomes necessary.<sup>88</sup> The class consists of those members of Kimkins.com who purchased a Kimkins.com subscription between May, 2007 and October 13, 2007. This class would contain approximately 40,000 people who paid between \$19.95 and \$59.95 for the Kimkins.com subscription.

**C. The Proposed Class Constitutes a Well-Defined Community of Interest.**

**1. Common questions of law and fact predominate.**

The following questions of law or fact are common to the entire proposed class:

- Did the defendants engage in unfair, unlawful or fraudulent acts as defined by Business & Professions Code § 17200?
- Did the defendants violate the false advertising law set forth in Business & Professions Code § 17500?

<sup>87</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, page 86, lines 16-19.  
<sup>88</sup> Kaufman & Broad, 89 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 908, 915 (footnote omitted).

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- Did the defendants violate federal and state laws by making unsubstantiated and false claims to sell memberships?<sup>89</sup>
- Did the defendants commit fraud through the intentional misrepresentations that they communicated to class members on the Kimkins.com Web site?
- Does the defendants' misconduct constitute negligent misrepresentation?
- Are class members entitled to injunctive relief or other equitable relief under Business & Professions Code § 17200?

The big-picture issues above—mixed questions of law and fact that apply to each class member's claims—require the resolution of the following factual issues, which also are common to the class:

- Did the defendants use false names to induce customers to subscribe to Kimkins.com?
- Did the defendants subject the Kimkins diet program to any clinical testing or medical evaluation to substantiate the claims they made on the Kimkins.com Web site?
- Is the Kimkins diet program effective?
- Did the defendants fail to warn class members about potential ill effects associated with extremely low-calorie diets?
- Did the defendants misrepresent the weight loss claims of "Kimmer" (defendant Heidi Diaz)?
- Are the "before" and "after" photographs of Kimmer, (defendant Heidi Diaz) and other models false or misleading?
- Did the defendants use false testimonials to sell memberships to Kimkins.com?

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<sup>89</sup> e.g., Lanham Act, 15 USC §1125(a), W.V.C. §32A-1-2, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2



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- Did the defendants wrongfully or unlawfully terminate consumers from the Kimkins.com Web site?
- Is the Kimkins diet “thermogenic”?
- Does the Kimkins diet cause “fast and permanent” weight loss?
- Did the defendants unlawfully use misleading labels and metatags to attract customers?

**2. The class representatives' claims are typical of the class, and they can adequately represent absent class members.**

As their declarations demonstrate, the named plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class, and they can adequately represent the class. The plaintiffs understand their obligations as class representatives and are committed to adequately representing absent class members.<sup>90</sup> In addition, the plaintiffs have retained attorneys who are experienced in representing plaintiffs in consumer class actions.<sup>91</sup>

**D. Class Treatment is Superior to Other Means for Fairly and Efficiently Adjudicating This Litigation.**

This case is the kind of case that should be certified for class treatment. There are approximately 40,000 class members. Their claims range from \$14.95 to \$119.00, which are far too small to warrant individual litigation. Absent this class action, the overwhelming majority of class members would not seek individual recoveries, and the defendants would be allowed to keep their ill-gotten gains. The class-action mechanism was designed to prevent this kind of inequity.

**E. California Courts Have Certified Cases Like This for Class Treatment.**

**1. California courts have certified nationwide class actions.**

California courts may certify nationwide class actions under appropriate circumstances. In *Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Co.*<sup>92</sup>, the Court of Appeal reversed an order denying the plaintiff's

<sup>90</sup> See attached Affidavits/Declarations of Jeanessa Fenderson, Trista Essex, Kathleen Rogers, Diana Sherby, Ann Marie Wood and Nanci McGregor.

<sup>91</sup> See attached Declarations of John E. Tiedt and Michael L. Cohen.

<sup>92</sup> (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605 (1987).

1 motion to modify the proposed class definition to certify a nationwide plaintiff class. The proposed  
2 class included a million members, and the alleged claims included fraud, negligent  
3 misrepresentation, and unfair business practices.<sup>93</sup> The *Clothesrigger* court concluded that the  
4 defendant had sufficient contacts with California to allow the application of California law to a  
5 nationwide class action because the defendant did business in California, because its principal  
6 offices were located in California, because a significant number of class members were located in  
7 California, and because the defendant's agents who had prepared the promotional and advertising  
8 literature at issue in that case had prepared those materials in California.<sup>94</sup>

9 In *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*<sup>95</sup>, the Court of Appeal relied on *Clothesrigger* in  
10 approving a settlement—including certification of a nationwide class—in a consumer class action  
11 brought against a California corporation under the Unfair Competition Law [Business and  
12 Professions Code § 17200 et seq.], the False Advertising Law [Business and Professions Code  
13 §17500], and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act [Civil Code § 1750 et seq.]. The defendant—  
14 Apple Computer—was a California corporation, with its principal place of business located in  
15 California. The brochures in that case were prepared in and distributed from California. Substantial  
16 numbers of class members were located in California. The corporate policy at issue in that case was  
17 made at Apple's headquarters in California. The *Wershba* court concluded that, as in *Clothesrigger*,  
18 the defendant had significant contacts with California to satisfy constitutional concerns and support  
19 certification of a nationwide class.<sup>96</sup>

20 The holdings in *Clothesrigger* and *Wershba* apply here. Diaz resides in Corona, California,  
21 Kimkins is located in Corona, California, and Diaz operates Kimkins from Corona, California. Diaz  
22 concocted the misrepresentations—or, more accurately, lies—in California, and these lies emanated  
23 from California. All but one of the plaintiffs and a substantial number of class members reside in  
24

25  
26 <sup>93</sup> 191 Cal.App.3d at 610, 617-18,

27 <sup>94</sup> 191 Cal.App.3d at 613.

28 <sup>95</sup> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 224

<sup>96</sup> 91 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 241-242.

1 California.<sup>97</sup> The Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.*) and  
2 the False Advertising Law (Business and Professions Code § 17500) apply to conduct by California  
3 defendants that emanates from California. Consequently, constitutional concerns are satisfied, and  
4 certification of a nationwide class is appropriate.

5 **2. Courts have certified class actions based on Business and Professions**  
6 **Code § 17200 Even After Proposition 64.**

7 In *Lewis v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.*<sup>98</sup>, the Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order  
8 denying the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The plaintiff in *Lewis* alleged that he traded in  
9 a vehicle that was worth less than his loan balance and that the dealer's contract for his new vehicle  
10 misrepresented the purchase price because the contract failed to disclose the amount owed on the  
11 trade-in and by increasing the new vehicle's price by that amount.<sup>99</sup> The plaintiff alleged violations  
12 of California's Automobile Sales Finance Act (Civ. Code § 2981 *et seq.*), the Consumer Legal  
13 Remedies Act (Civ. Code § 1750 *et seq.*), and the Unfair Competition Law (Business and  
14 Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.*). Commenting that each class member's damages for fraud and  
15 punitive damages would have to be litigated separately, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion  
16 for class certification because, it concluded, there was no ascertainable class.<sup>100</sup>

17 The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's reasoning. Relying on the California Supreme  
18 Court's 2004 decision in *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, the *Lewis* court concluded  
19 that the individual nature of the damages did not preclude certification. "[T]hat different customers  
20 arrived at different deals, based on their trade-in or lease values compared to the purchased vehicle  
21 cost," the court wrote, "can be accounted for in a class action context through the use of formulas or  
22 other means of implementing the underlying legal findings."<sup>101</sup> The *Lewis* court then reversed the  
23 trial court's order denying certification and ordered the trial court to certify the class.<sup>102</sup>

24  
25 <sup>97</sup> See attached Affidavits/Declarations of Jeanessa Fenderson, Trista Essex, Kathleen Rogers, Diana Sherby,  
26 Ann Marie Wood and Nanci McGregor.

26 <sup>98</sup> (2007) 156 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 359

26 <sup>99</sup> 156 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 362.

27 <sup>100</sup> 156 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 363.

27 <sup>101</sup> 156 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 371 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

28 <sup>102</sup> 156 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 371-372.

1 Furthermore, at least two federal district courts have certified class actions under  
2 California's Unfair Competition Law even after Proposition 64. *Stern v. AT&T Mobility Corp.*,  
3 2008 WL 4382796 (C.D. Cal. 2008), at \*12 (certifying UCL class); *Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co.*  
4 *of North America*, 238 F.R.D. 482, 495-96 (C.D. Cal.2006) (certifying California sub-class for UCL  
5 and FAL claims because plaintiffs "have adequately demonstrated a class-wide method of proving  
6 reliance and causation by means of class-wide circumstantial evidence")

7 **3. The court also may certify the plaintiff's claims for fraud and negligent**  
8 **misrepresentation.**

9 The plaintiffs have developed at least two kinds of evidence that will establish by a  
10 preponderance of the evidence that each of the plaintiffs and all class members relied on the  
11 misrepresentations in Kimkins.com.

12 First and perhaps most important, Diaz has conceded that potential subscribers to  
13 Kimkins.com were relying on the various misrepresentations posted on the site, and she knew that  
14 they would.<sup>103</sup> Diaz's concession is applicable to each of the plaintiffs and to all class members.

15 Second, the plaintiffs' declarations establish that each of them relied on the various  
16 misrepresentations that the defendants posted on Kimkins.com. Moreover, the plaintiffs have filed  
17 over one hundred declarations from members of the potential class, and each of these potential class  
18 members relied on the various misrepresentations that the defendants posted on Kimkins.com. This  
19 evidence is sufficient to establish for purposes of certification that the plaintiffs will be able to  
20 prove reliance for the entire class.

21 v.

22 **CONCLUSION**

23 Plaintiffs Jeanessa Fenderson, Trista Essex, Kathleen Rogers, Diana Sherby, Ann Marie  
24 Wood and Nancy McGregor have satisfied all that CCP §382 requires. Plaintiffs respectfully

25 ///

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>103</sup> Diaz Deposition, Vol. I, Page 91, lines 12-20.

28

1 request this Court to certify the class as described.

2 :

Respectfully submitted,

3 Dated: April 9, 2009

**TIEDT & HURD**

4

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By: 

JOHN E. TIEDT  
MARC S. HURD  
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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
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**FILED**  
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

MLG

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DEC 01 2009

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13 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
14 FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, RIVERSIDE COURT

15 JEANESSA FENDERSON; TRISTA  
16 ESSEX; KATHLEEN ROGERS; DIANA  
17 SHERBY; ANN MARIE WOOD; NANCY  
18 MCGREGOR, individually and on behalf of  
19 all other similarly situated,

20 Plaintiffs,

21 v.

22 HEIDI DIAZ; KIMKINS, an unknown  
23 business entity, and DOES 4 through 100,  
24 Inclusive,

25 Defendants.

) Case No. RIC 483005  
)  
) [Assigned to Judge Mark E. Johnson,  
) Dept. 5]

) **CLASS ACTION**

) **PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED STATEMENT**  
) **REGARDING CLASS NOTICE (Cal. R. Ct.**  
) **3.766) & REQUEST FOR ORDER**  
) **REGARDING CLASS NOTICE;**  
) **~~PROPOSED~~ AMENDED ORDER**

) Action Filed: October 15, 2007  
) Trial Date: None Set  
) Hearing: October 29, 2009  
)  
) Dept.: 5

26 I.

27 **INTRODUCTION**

28 The plaintiffs file this Amended Statement to comply with California *Rules of Court*,  
Rule 3.766(b) and (c). Rule 3.766(b) requires the class proponent to submit "a statement  
regarding class notice and a proposed notice to class members." Rule 3.766(c) requires a

1 superior court, upon certification of a class, or as soon thereafter as practicable, to make  
2 an order regarding certain aspects of notice to the class. The original notice was rejected.  
3 Plaintiffs submit the amended notice pursuant to the Court's order of October 27, 2009.

4 II.

5 **CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL**

6 Plaintiffs' counsel tried diligently to work with defendants' counsel to submit a joint  
7 notice whose form, if not content, would be acceptable. But defendants' counsel has failed  
8 to participate in this process. Defendant's counsel was sent a copy of the proposed notice  
9 on June 12, 2009. A copy of the e-mail confirming the transmittal to Timothy Peabody,  
10 counsel for Defendant, Heidi Diaz, is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Mr. Peabody has not  
11 provided any substantive feedback and plaintiffs' counsel.

12 III.

13 **ITEMS REQUIRED BY CAL. R. COURT 3.766(b)**

14 **A. 3.766(b)(1): Whether notice is necessary**

15 The principal purpose of notice to the class is to protect the integrity of the class-  
16 action process, one of the functions of which is to prevent burdening the courts with  
17 multiple claims where one will do. *Hypertouch, Inc. v. Superior Court*, (2005) 128 Cal.  
18 App. 4th 1527, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 839.

19 A copy of the proposed notice is attached to this Statement as Exhibit B.

20 **B. 3.766(b)(2): Whether class members may exclude themselves from the**  
21 **action**

22 Plaintiffs and Defendant agree that class members may opt out. Plaintiff will give  
23 notice that potential class members with injuries may file separate claims.

24 **C. 3.766(b)(3): Time and manner in which notice should be given**

25 The notice will be placed on the following websites and blogs starting November 8,  
26 2009, as follows:

27 Kimkins.com

28 Kimkinsblog.com



1 Kimkinslawsuit.com  
2 Kimkinsscarn.wordpress.com  
3 Kimkinscontroversy.com  
4 Kimkindangers.blogspot.com  
5 Lowcarbfriends.com  
6 Livinlavidalocarb.com  
7 Kimkinsexposed2.wordpress.com  
8 Saynotokimkins.wordpress.com  
9 Kimkinssurvivors.wordpress.com  
10 Tiedtlaw.com  
11 prudentiablog.blogspot.com  
12 affiliatescams.wurdmess.com  
13 simpledietchoices.com  
14 amyb1569.wordpress.com  
15 kimkinsclassactionlawsuit.blogspot.com  
16 mariasol-mariasol.blogspot.com  
17 kimkinsdiettruth.blogspot.com  
18 2medusa.com  
19 kimkinsdiettruth.wordpress.com  
20 kimkinsdangers.blogspot.com  
21 honeybeesblog.wordpress.com  
22 kimkinsnightmares.blogspot.com  
23 stumblingtobethlehem.blogspot.com  
24 kimtanicwordpress.com  
25 kimorexia.blogspot.com  
26 notmakingnicetokimkins.blogspot.com  
27 thekimkinslle.blogspot.com/  
28 liviniocarbandlovinit.blogspot.com

- 1 apinchofhealth.com
- 2 pinchof.blogspot.com
- 3 cindyslowcarbllife.blogspot.com
- 4 weight-in.blogspot.com
- 5 mayberryfan.blogspot.com
- 6 dietwhoas.blogspot.com
- 7 weighingthefactsblogspot.com
- 8 magicsmomsmusings.blogspot.com
- 9 the-journey-on.blogspot.com
- 10 wifezillasway.blogspot.com
- 11 sockittome.info
- 12 mariasols.com
- 13 campcarbaway.com
- 14 eatinglow.com
- 15 atkinsdietbulletinboard.com
- 16 examiner.com
- 17 helpfindthemissin.org

**D. 3.766(b)(4): Proposal for which party should bear costs of notice**

Plaintiffs will bear the cost of providing notice as described above.

**E. 3.766(b)(5): Estimate of costs**

No estimate is necessary because the Plaintiffs are bearing the cost of providing notice.

**REQUEST FOR ORDER REGARDING NOTICE**

The Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter an order regarding notice providing as follows:


1. That notice to class members is necessary and that notice shall be provided as summarized above;
2. That class members may exclude themselves from the class;

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- 3. That notice shall be provided as summarized above;
- 4. That the notice provided in Exhibit B is sufficient; and
- 5. That Plaintiffs shall be responsible for the cost of notice.

Dated: November 19, 2009

**TIEDT & HURD**

By:   
\_\_\_\_\_  
**JOHN E. TIEDT**  
**MARC S. HURD**  
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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17 Attorney for Plaintiff Audrey Medraza  
18 and the Proposed Class

19 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**  
20 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

21 Audrey Medraza, an individual, on behalf ) **Case No. BC354744**  
22 of herself and all others similarly aggrieved ) **Assigned To: Hon. John P. Shook**  
23 by Defendants' conduct as alleged herein, ) **Dept. 53**  
24 ) **Original Complaint Filed: 6/30/06**  
25 Plaintiff, )  
26 v. ) **CLASS ACTION:**  
27 ) **PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF**  
28 HONDA OF NORTH HOLLYWOOD, a ) **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN**  
business entity of unknown form, BILL ) **SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS**  
ROBERTSON & SONS, INC., a California ) **CERTIFICATION (filed concurrently**  
Corporation and DOES 1-500, Inclusive, ) **with Declaration of Audrey Medraza,**  
Steven A. Simons and Eric Kapigian )  
Defendants. )  
Hearing Date:  
Date: August 8, 2007  
Time: 8:30 a.m.  
Dept.: 53

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**FILED**

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

JUL 05 2007

JOHN A. CLARKE, EXECUTIVE OFFICER/CLERK

BY \_\_\_\_\_

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Memorandum of Points and Authorities Re Class Certification

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1           **I. INTRODUCTION**

2           This consumer class action arises out of Defendants HONDA OF NORTH  
3 HOLLYWOOD and BILL ROBERTSON & SONS, INC. (jointly, "DEALER") unlawful  
4 practice of adding extra fees to each sale of a new motorcycle which it identifies as  
5 "accessories/Dest.", but which are not disclosed in any advertisement or price disclosure,  
6 as required by law. The DEALER's standard practice is to add these charges, which it  
7 claims to be for "assembly" and "destination", to each sale of each new motorcycle. By  
8 doing so, DEALER violates the motor vehicle and motorcycle pricing and disclosure  
9 requirements of the California *Vehicle Code* and other consumer protection statutes.

10           The *Vehicle Code* provides the principle source of regulation for vehicle dealers  
11 and protection for vehicle consumers regarding vehicle price advertising, price disclosure  
12 and requirements for "dealer added charges" in vehicle sales transactions. The *Vehicle*  
13 *Code* requires that sellers such as DEALER provide new vehicle price information *prior*  
14 *to* the sale. Vehicle Code § 11712.5(a) makes it unlawful for a dealership to sell a  
15 motorcycle without the required disclosures of §24014 [all code references are to the  
16 *Vehicle Code*, unless otherwise stated]:

17                   (a) No dealer shall sell, offer for sale, or display, any new, assembled  
18 motorcycle on its premises, unless there is securely attached to its handlebar  
19 a label, approved by the Department of Motor Vehicles, furnished by the  
20 manufacturer, on which the manufacturer shall clearly indicate the  
21 following:

22                           (1) The recommended retail price of the motorcycle.

23                           (2) The recommended price for each accessory or item of optional  
24 equipment physically attached to the motorcycle at the time of its delivery  
25 to the dealer.

26                   (b) The dealer shall clearly indicate on the label, furnished by the  
27 manufacturer, the following:

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1 (1) The amount charged, if any, over and above the suggested retail  
2 price for transportation to the dealership.

3 (2) The amount charged, if any, for the assembly, preparation, or  
4 both, of the motorcycle.

5 (3) The amount charged, if any, for each dealer added accessory or  
6 item of optional equipment.

7  
8 The *Vehicle Code* requirements are supplemented by the Cal. *Administrative Code*, Title  
9 13 section 262.03, which states in part:

10 Dealer Added Charges.

11 If a dealer does identify a separate charge or charges for delivery and  
12 preparation services performed over and above those delivery and  
13 preparation obligations specified by the franchiser and for which the dealer  
14 is to be reimbursed by the franchiser, then the services performed and the  
15 charges therefore shall be separately itemized. Such added charges must be  
16 included in the advertised price.

17 The term "advertise" is broadly defined to include "a statement, representation, act  
18 or announcement intentionally communicated to the public generally for the purpose of  
19 arousing a desire to buy or patronize." 13 CCR 255.00(b); see also *Veh. Code* §  
20 11713.1(b) and (c) [unlawful to advertise the price of a vehicle "without including all  
21 costs to the purchaser at the time of sale"] A motorcycle is considered a "motor vehicle"  
22 under the Vehicle Code. *Veh. Code* § 400; *United States Mid-Century Ins. Co. v*  
23 *Hernandez* (1969, 2nd Dist) 275 Cal.App.2d 839, 844.

24 The California Supreme Court has determined that the term 'advertising' should  
25 be broadly interpreted in consumer protection statutes to encompass any  
26 statements made to customers. (See *Chern v. Bank of America* (1976) 15 C.3d  
27 866, 875-876 [statements by bank employees to loan customers]; *Feather*

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1 *River Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Sillas* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 234, 248-249[ includes "oral  
2 representations made on a one-to-one basis"]; *Ford Dealers Association v. DMV* (1982)  
3 32 Cal.3d 347, 370 [statements by vehicle salesmen to customers]

4 The *Vehicle Code* specifically requires that these crucial price and cost disclosures  
5 be segregated and separately identified on a form that is "physically attached to the  
6 motorcycle". These forms are customarily referred to in the industry as a "hang tag".

7 The purpose of these itemized disclosures is obvious: to provide consumers with full and  
8 accurate price information in a readily accessible manner. This disclosure requirement  
9 for motorcycles is equivalent of the "MSRP" sticker required to be displayed on every  
10 new motor vehicle. See, § 11713.1(q)(2) a dealer supplemental price sticker is required  
11 to itemize any dealer charges not included in the manufacturer's suggested retail price]

12 During the applicable period alleged in the complaint, the DEALER regularly sold  
13 new motorcycles manufactured by Honda, Suzuki and Yamaha. It had 100-150 new  
14 motorcycles displayed for sale on its lot at any given time, with about equal numbers of  
15 each of the three brands. DT 38:22-49:24. Recently, in March 2007, DEALER sold about  
16 72-77 new motorcycles. DT 61:19-64:12. Suzuki and Yamaha did not provide hang tags,  
17 and DEALER did not attach or display any price information on those brands. DT 41:3-  
18 13. Honda provided hang tags, but the DEALER did not regularly display them or did so  
19 infrequently and haphazardly. DT 55:17-18 [hang tags placed "if [lot porters] got nothing  
20 else to do"]; 35:15-36:1; 53:8-22. It cannot identify which Hondas ever received hang  
21 tags, or what information was included. DT 30:17-31:15; 37:19-38:4; 36:8-19

22 As to the occasional use of Honda hang tags, these are not regularly retained and  
23 the DEALER does not know what Hondas had hanger tags or what added charges were  
24 disclosed, if any. DT 30:17-31:15; 50:4-14. An exemplar copy of a Honda hang tag is  
25 attached as "Exhibit 1" for reference.

26 All three manufacturers provided the DEALER with "suggested retail price"  
27 information, which the DEALER did not display. DT 22:9-14; 42:13-45:16.

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1 Plaintiff brought this consumer class action pursuant to California's "Unfair  
2 Competition Law" ("UCL"), *Business & Professions Code* §17200, et seq., and the  
3 Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), *Civil Code* 1770 et seq. The DEALER'S  
4 failure to comply with the law, failure to truthfully and accurately "advertise" and  
5 disclose the true price and added charges for its new motorcycles is an illegal, unfair and  
6 deceptive business practice that violates the *UCL* and the *CLRA*. Plaintiff seeks relief on  
7 behalf of the class which includes an injunction, and restitution of ill-gotten gains and  
8 unlawful charges.

9 Pursuant to *Code of Civil Procedure* §382, Plaintiff seeks certification of a  
10 plaintiff class defined as:

11 All purchasers of new motorcycles who were charged for "destination",  
12 "assembly" or other DEALER added "accessories" that were not disclosed  
13 on a hanger tag since August 1, 2002, being four years prior to the filing of  
14 this lawsuit. (See, Original Complaint filed on June 30, 2006, Para. 30)

15 Plaintiff's claims represent a typical case in which class certification is both  
16 appropriate and necessary to effectuate California's long-standing commitment to  
17 protection of consumers from unfair business practices, as well as to promote the separate  
18 public policy of assuring a fair marketplace and preventing unfair competition among  
19 those in business. It is essential to a free and fair marketplace, that unlawful practices be  
20 policed so that those who profit unlawfully are not allowed to keep their ill-gotten gains,  
21 and, so that honest businesses who chose to obey the law, are not disadvantaged.

22 As demonstrated below, this case satisfies all applicable standards for class  
23 certification, Plaintiff meets the criteria for class representative, and her counsel are  
24 experienced and successful class action litigators. For these reasons, Plaintiffs  
25 respectfully request that class certification be granted, that she be appointed Class  
26 Representative, and that her counsel be appointed Class Counsel in this action.

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1           **II. SUMMARY OF FACTS**

2           The Complaint alleges an illegal and unfair business practice that DEALER has  
3 carried out against numerous Californians and will continue to carry out unless and until  
4 enjoined and remedied by the Court. In essence, DEALER is failing to comply with  
5 California law by failing and/or refusing to place hanger tags on motorcycles offered for  
6 sale. These hanger tags, as required by law, are to apprise the customer of the true cost of  
7 purchasing the motorcycle. DEALER should be enjoined from engaging in the unlawful  
8 sales of such motorcycles and refund any improperly collected fees and charges.

9           Ms. Madrazo's situation is typical. Together with a friend, she shopped for a  
10 motorcycle at DEALER. She found a new Honda motorcycle which she purchased. The  
11 motorcycles had no "hang tag" or other price information attached to it. (See Declaration  
12 of Audrey Medrazo dated June 27, 2007 ¶3). She purchased the motorcycle for an agreed  
13 price of \$8,700.00, after which the DEALER then added charges designated as  
14 "Accessories/Dest" of \$2,284. The DEALER produced a Retail Installment Sales  
15 Contract for her to sign which showed the price of the vehicle at \$8,700.00 and the cash  
16 price of the "accessories/Dest" as being \$2,284.00. Sales tax was added on these amounts  
17 and they were financed at an interest rate of 13.45%. (Exh. 2 "ITEMIZATION OF  
18 AMOUNT FINANCED", line items: 1-7). Plaintiff has incurred charges and obligations  
19 for the monthly payments. The added charges were not disclosed or discussed at the time  
20 Ms. Madrazo agreed to purchase the motorcycle, or at any time prior. She was surprised  
21 to find out later that these charges had been added.

22           Even if the added charges were disclosed at some point during the sales process, it  
23 is against the law not to disclose them up front and in writing. The law strictly requires  
24 that "(a) No dealer shall sell, offer for sale, or display, any new, assembled motorcycle on  
25 its premises, unless there is securely attached to its handlebar a label . . . on which the  
26 manufacturer shall clearly indicate the [required disclosures]" § 24014, incorporated into  
27 §11712.5(a)

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1 The DEALER admits that it did not provide any hang tag or "label" on any of its  
2 new motorcycles, except, occasionally on some Hondas. As to the Hondas, it has no  
3 records of which motorcycles may have had a hang tag, thus it is impossible for plaintiff  
4 to determine which buyers were not subject to the practice or should be excluded from the  
5 class.

6 On April 12, 2007, plaintiff noticed the depositions of certain "Persons Most  
7 Knowledgeable" under California *Code of Civil Procedure* §2025.010 et seq. to testify  
8 on behalf of the DEALER as to certain critical matters, including "1. PERSON MOST  
9 KNOWLEDGEABLE to testify regarding YOUR policies, procedures and practices  
10 related to attaching or displaying "hanger tags" or other vehicle price information on new  
11 motorcycles within four years and to produce original documents pursuant to Exhibit "A"  
12 hereto" and "2. PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE to testify regarding YOUR  
13 policies, procedures and practices related to prices and charges to buyers of new  
14 motorcycle for destination, freight and preparation, within four years and to produce  
15 original documents pursuant to Exhibit "A" hereto." (Exhibit 3)

16 The DEALER produced Mr. David Denman to testify in each of the PMK  
17 categories. Mr. Denman testified as follows on the following critical issues (Exh. 4):

18 **1. Regarding Use of Hanger Tags**

19 a. "Q. As to the Honda hang tags, as of September, 2005, were those  
20 displayed or hung on the new Honda motorcycles?

21 A. On some.

22 Q. Were there circumstances that determined which -- according to some  
23 procedure which bikes would have the hang tags displayed and which  
24 wouldn't?

25 A. No.

26 Q. Who made decisions as to when and where to display the Honda hang  
27 tags?

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A. It wasn't a decision process. It was frequently -- I don't know if you got our copy of the hang tag --

MR. KRIEG: We do and we'll go over that.

THE WITNESS: They're paper. We have both indoor and outdoor showrooms and we rotate motorcycles to change the display. We get weather. We get -- there are a lot of things that can cause hang tags to disintegrate and sometimes we simply receive a motorcycle and sell it before there's an opportunity to put a hang tag on a motorcycle.

Q. Can I assume then that there was no procedure just to put hang tags on Hondas that were displayed or in a showroom as opposed to outside but that there was no pattern or plan as to when and where they were displayed?  
...

THE WITNESS: You're correct. There was no written procedure.

Q. Written or not, was there any procedure?

A. No." *DT Page 29 line 6 to Page 30 Line 18.*

b. Q. As to the motorcycles, Honda motorcycles specifically, did you receive hanger tags for all varieties both on road and off road, street bikes, dirt bikes?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. Okay. And for Yamaha, you received no hang tags for any Yamaha units?

A. For anything.

Q. And as to Suzuki?

A. We received no hang tags for anything from the manufacturer regarding pricing.

*DT Page 41, Lines 3-13*

**2. The "No Hanger Tag" Policy was Uniform**

a. No Yamaha or Suzuki motorcycles had hanger tags at any time.

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“Q. Okay. And for Yamaha, you received no hang tags for any Yamaha units?

A. For anything.

Q. And as to Suzuki?

A. We received no hang tags for anything from the manufacturer regarding pricing.” DT 41:6-13

**3. The Number of New Motorcycles Sold**

Q. So how many Hondas did you sell in the most recent month?

A. I think 21, if I recall.

Q. Suzukis?

A. Suzuki, approximately the same.

Q. Yamahas?

A. More Yamahas. 30, 35 Yamahas.

Q. And that would be the month of March?

A. That would have been the month of March, correct.

Page 61:23 to Page 62:6<sup>1</sup>

**4. Regarding Use of Hanger Tags**

a. “Q. -- if you had 30 or 40 new Honda vehicles in September of 2005 sitting on the floor displayed, is there a point at which or some circumstance that would trigger you to instruct someone else to put a hanger tag on it?

...

THE WITNESS: Again, yes, the circumstance would be if I had nothing to do, if I were caught up on all my work and a lot porter was standing around doing nothing

<sup>1</sup> It should also be noted, as set forth in the declaration of Steven A. Simons, that Defendant has responded to Interrogatories indicating the total sales for each brand line during the affected periods was in the thousands.



1 and the bikes were clean, that would be a good time for him to do it. Those are the  
2 circumstances that would guide me to ask a lot porter to do something.

3 Q. And absent some situation like that, there's no procedure that you're aware of  
4 that would result in the hang tag going on a Honda that was displayed at -- at the  
5 dealership?

6  
7 THE WITNESS: Again, yeah, this is kind of going around in circles. Again, no,  
8 there is no procedure.

9 MR. KRIEG: Okay.

10 Q. Do you have any way of knowing or are you aware of any way of  
11 determining whether the hang tag for this vehicle, which is identified as Bates no.  
12 16, was ever displayed on the bike?

13 A. There is no way of knowing."

14 *Page 53 Line 2 to Page 54 Line 3.*

15 Mr. Denman's testimony further confirmed that the DEALER'S policy was  
16 developed and uniformly implemented without any attempt to ascertain the requirements  
17 of California law.

18 **III. PLAINTIFF MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFICATION**

19 Plaintiff has stated claims of illegality and injury which can be proved  
20 predominantly with facts applicable to the class as a whole, rather than by a series of facts  
21 relevant to only individual or small groups of plaintiffs. As such, prosecution as a class  
22 action is appropriate and desirable. *Rosack v. Volvo of America Corp.* (1982) 131  
23 Cal.App.3d 741, 752-754.

24 The failure to display and utilize "Hanger Tags" by DEALER is the predominant  
25 common issue that is determinative of liability to all class members. DEALER's lack of  
26 hanger tags is a clear violation of California law. The Complaint alleges:

27 "15. Pursuant to California *Vehicle Code* §24014 Defendants HONDA &  
28 BILL ROBERTSON and DOES 1-100, Inclusive, are required, when

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offering for sale, or displaying, any new, assembled motorcycle on its premises to have "securely attached to its handlebar a label, approved by the Department of Motor Vehicles, furnished by the manufacturer, on which the manufacturer shall clearly indicate the following: ¶(1) The recommended retail price of the motorcycle. ¶(2) The recommended price for each accessory or item of optional equipment physically attached to the motorcycle at the time of its delivery to the dealer. ¶(b) The dealer shall clearly indicate on the label, furnished by the manufacturer, the following: ¶(1) The amount charged, if any, over and above the suggested retail price for transportation to the dealership. ¶(2) The amount charged, if any, for the assembly, preparation, or both, of the motorcycle. ¶(3) The amount charged, if any, for each dealer added accessory or item of optional equipment. ¶(4) The total recommended retail price of the vehicle which shall be the aggregate value of paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) and paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of subdivision (b). (Hereinafter "TAGS")." Complaint, ¶ 15.

The statutory requirements for the hanger tags is exact. See *Vehicle Code* §24014. In California, it is settled law that the DEALER must comply with this statute.

As the Complaint alleges, DEALER was required to use hanger tags to apprise consumers of the "add-ons" and charges to be incurred. DEALER has clearly failed and/or refused to do so. As a result, DEALER has continually violated the statute.

It is appropriate to certify this case as a class action of California consumers to whom DEALER sold motorcycles without providing the disclosures required to be listed on the hanger tags and from whom DEALER has received payment since August 1, 2002. DEALER should be enjoined from continuing to display motorcycles to California consumers without the requisite hanger tags as required by California *Vehicle Code* §24014; and DEALER should be required to pay restitution to the consumers.

A. California Law Favors Class Procedures for Consumer Claims

1 Plaintiff moves for class certification pursuant to California *Code of Civil*  
2 *Procedure* §382. The law favors consumer class actions to achieve redress for large  
3 numbers of consumers who have lost relatively small amounts of money as a result of  
4 illegal or unfair business practices. Thirty years ago our Supreme Court explained:

5 "A class action by consumers produces salutary by-products, including a  
6 therapeutic effect upon those sellers who indulge in fraudulent practices, aid  
7 to legitimate business enterprises by curtailing illegitimate competition, and  
8 avoidance to the judicial process of the burden of multiple litigation  
9 involving individual claims." *Vasquez v. Superior Court* (1971) 4 Cal.3d  
10 800, 808.

11 Plaintiff requests an order certifying her proposed class under California Code of  
12 Civil Procedure § 382. In *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, the  
13 California Supreme Court set forth some general principles regarding class certification:

14 "The party seeking certification as a class representative must establish the  
15 existence of an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest  
16 among the class members. [Citation omitted]. The community of interest  
17 requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of  
18 law or fact; (2) class representative with claims or defenses typical of the  
19 class; (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class." *Id.*,  
20 at 470.

21 The California Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that consumer class  
22 actions like this are in the public interest and serve an important function in the judicial  
23 system. See *Vasquez v. Superior Court* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 807-08 ("[p]rotection of  
24 unwary consumers from being duped by unscrupulous seller is an exigency of utmost  
25 priority in contemporary society"); *Richmond* at 29 Cal.3d. at 473 ("this State has a public  
26 policy which encourages the use of class actions"). By providing a mechanism whereby  
27 the relatively small claims of many consumer can be resolved in a single proceeding, "the  
28 class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small

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1 claimants with a method for redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to  
2 warrant individual litigation." *Id.* at 460 (citations omitted).

3 California has a long-standing commitment to using the class action device to  
4 further consumer protection. See, *State of California v. Levi Strauss & Co.* (1986) 41  
5 Cal.3d 460, 471 (consumer class action is an "essential tool for the protection of  
6 consumers against exploitative business practices"); *La Sala v. American Savings & Loan*  
7 *Assn.* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, 875-876; *Vasquez v. Superior Court* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 820-  
8 821. Accordingly, class action procedures are to be applied liberally in favor of  
9 certification in consumer protection actions, and courts should avoid unnecessary barriers  
10 to the effective utilization of class action procedures. See, e.g., *Union Carbide Corp. v.*  
11 *Superior Court* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 15, 21-22 (courts bound by Legislature's mandate to  
12 "avoid unnecessary procedural barriers" to consumer prosecutions); *National Solar*  
13 *Equipment Modules Owners' Ass'n Inc. v. Grumman Corp.* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1273.

14 Any doubts as to the propriety of class treatment must be resolved in favor of  
15 certification, subject to later modification. *Richmond, supra*, 29 Cal.3d at 473-475.

16 B. This Case Meets All the Requirements for Class Certification

17 A class certification motion is a procedural motion, not a merits-based motion.  
18 Satisfaction of the elements for class certification is determined from the pleadings. It is  
19 improper to resolve the merits of plaintiff's claims on a motion for class certification, and  
20 all substantive allegations of plaintiffs' claims must be taken as true. *Eisen v. Carlisle &*  
21 *Jacquelin* (1974) 417 U.S. 156, 177-178; *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429,  
22 443; *Kass v. Young* (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 100, 109-110.

23 Class actions are encouraged as a way to preclude defendants from avoiding  
24 exposure for their wrongdoing because the individual victims lack the sophistication,  
25 financial motivation, or resources to sue on their own. *Vasquez, supra*, 4 Cal.3d at p. 808.  
26 Therefore, a "common sense approach" is to be followed. A class united by a common  
27 interest in determining the actionability of defendants' broad course of conduct is "not  
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1 defeated by slight difference in class members' positions." *Blackie v. Barrack* (9th Cir.  
2 1975) 524 F.2d 891, 902-903.

3 1. The Class Is Ascertainable and Sufficiently Numerous

4 Demonstrating an ascertainable class is a relatively simple issue. *Richmond* at 478.  
5 Here, the class consists of all purchasers of new motorcycles who were charged for  
6 "destination", "assembly" or other DEALER added "accessories" that were not disclosed  
7 on a hanger tag within four years prior to the filing of the complaint.

8 Whether a class is ascertainable is determined by examining the class definition,  
9 the size of the class, and the means available for identifying class members. *Vasquez*,  
10 *supra*, 4 Cal.3d at p. 1271; *Reyes v. Board of Supervisors of San Diego County* (1987)  
11 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1271; *Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 873.

12 While the exact number and identities of class members are unknown to Plaintiff  
13 at this time, such precision is not required for class certification. *Clothesrigger, Inc. v.*  
14 *GTE Corp.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605, 617. Based on the DEALER's deposition  
15 testimony, the Plaintiff class includes thousands of individuals. See Simons Decl., Ex. 5  
16 (Interrogatory Responses regarding number of new vehicles sold)

17 Thus, the total number of Class members is so large that individual joinder of all  
18 members of the Class is impracticable. At the same time, the proposed class definition is  
19 objective and merits-neutral, such that class members are identifiable. The names and  
20 addresses of the class members can be readily determined from records maintained by  
21 DEALER combined with information maintained by the manufacturers (Honda, Suzuki  
22 and Yamaha) whose vehicles DEALER sold, and Department of Motor Vehicles.

23 2. A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists

24 A community of interest is established by the predominance of common issues of  
25 law or fact. Class Plaintiff's case involves a well-defined community of interest in the  
26 questions of law and fact affecting both the class Plaintiff and the other members of the  
27 Plaintiff class. Common issues of law and fact predominate over any alleged individual  
28 issues relating solely to the Class Plaintiffs. Class Plaintiffs have alleged that each

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1 member of the proposed Class is a victim of the common and concerted course of conduct  
2 by Defendants to enrich themselves by displaying and selling new motorcycles at its place  
3 of business in California without the legally required hang tags or "labels", then imposing  
4 substantial added charges for "accessories", "destination" and "assembly".

5 As described above, the DEALER'S common and concerted practice is to  
6 consistently violate California law by advertising, displaying and selling new motorcycles  
7 without displaying the required price information, while imposing added charges over and  
8 above the advertised price or the manufacturers suggested retail price. DEALER'S  
9 conduct with respect to the motorcycle sold to MADRAZO was fully consistent with this  
10 practice.

11 DEALER'S deposition testimony clearly acknowledged its unlawful practice: by  
12 not placing hanger tags on the vehicles offered for sale unless there was nothing to do,  
13 and then only placing them on Hondas. This testimony is an admission that the DEALER  
14 does not comply with California law.

15 The Complaint details further facts surrounding DEALER'S unlawful practice, as  
16 well as the resulting common questions of law and fact; these include, but are not limited  
17 to, the following:

18 a. Whether California law has been violated by DEALER as alleged in this  
19 Complaint;

20 b. Whether DEALER engaged in the course of conduct alleged in this  
21 Complaint;

22 c. Whether DEALER engaged in unfair, unlawful, and/or deceptive business  
23 practices by failing to provide a price label or hanger tag which disclosed the DEALER  
24 added charges on new motorcycles offered for sale;

25 d. Whether DEALER had a legal duty under California statutes to provide  
26 such price label or hanger tag which disclosed the DEALER added charges;  
27  
28

1 e. Whether DEALER falsely advertised the price of new motorcycles by  
2 failing to provide a price label or hanger tag which disclosed the DEALER added charges  
3 on new motorcycles ;

4 f. Whether DEALER misrepresented and/or concealed material facts as to the  
5 true price of new motorcycles by failing to provide a price label or hanger tag which  
6 disclosed the DEALER added charges; and

7 g. Whether class members are entitled to compensatory damages, restitution,  
8 disgorgement of profits, injunctive relief, and punitive damages, and the proper measure,  
9 nature, and extent of such relief.

10 Each of the issues listed above as (a) - (g) is fundamental to the outcome of this  
11 litigation, is common to all Class members, and is best suited to proof and adjudication on  
12 a class-wide basis. Common issues of fact and law predominate as to each of the claims  
13 alleged, since Plaintiff and the class are united in proving DEALER'S alleged regular  
14 course of conduct. Because plaintiff has alleged a single overarching practice, the  
15 relevant proof does not vary among class members and clearly presents a common  
16 question fundamental to all class members.

17 Plaintiffs' §17200 cause of action for unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business  
18 practices by Defendants is especially suitable for class certification. First, the equitable  
19 remedies apply class-wide. Plaintiff seeks an injunction against such wrongful business  
20 practices, as well as restitution and disgorgement of all ill-gotten profits, in this claim. A  
21 class claim under section 17203 of the *Business and Professions Code* allows plaintiffs to  
22 seek disgorgement of the profits obtained by defendants through their unfair business  
23 practices. [*Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co.* (2000) 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 518, 23  
24 Cal.4th 163, 999 P.2d 706; *ABC International Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp.*  
25 (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1247, 1268].

26 Additionally, reliance by Plaintiff and the class is not required, nor is a showing of  
27 intent on the part of DEALER required. Finally, injury is not required, only a showing of  
28 the possibility of deception. "A violation can be shown even if no one was actually

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1 deceived, relied upon the fraudulent practice, or sustained any damage." *Podolsky v.*  
2 *First Healthcare Corp.* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 632, 647-648. Remedies for unfair  
3 business practices are statutorily provided, even in the absence of proof of individual  
4 knowledge, individual reliance, or individual damages. *Id.*, at p. 449; *ABC Int'l Traders,*  
5 *supra*, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1269.

6 Plaintiffs' other cause of action under the CLRA is also suitable certification on the  
7 facts of this case. The claim revolves around allegations of a common pattern of conduct,  
8 involving the same business acts and practices, the same omissions of material fact that  
9 California statutes require to be disclosed, and the same general nucleus of operative  
10 facts. The fact that each Class member engaged in a separate sales transactions does not  
11 impair the community of interest, nor the predominance of common issues of fact and law  
12 over solely individual issues, because each class member will not be required to litigate  
13 numerous individual issues to establish his or her right to recover. Rather, as to each  
14 cause of action, the right to recover is rooted in Defendants' common course of conduct.

15 The precise amount of damages is likely to vary among class members. The  
16 amount is easily ascertained from DEALER's records showing the added charges in each  
17 case. *Acree v. GMAC* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 385, 401. It is well established that the  
18 presence of individual damage issues does not bar certification. *E.g., B.W.I. Custom*  
19 *Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois Inc.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1353; *Rosack v. Volvo of*  
20 *America Corp.* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 741, 762.

21 In almost every class action, factual determinations [of damages] ... to individual  
22 class members must be made. Still we know of no case where this has prevented a court  
23 from aiding the class to obtain its just restitution. Indeed, to [deny class certification] on  
24 the issue of damages or restitution may well be effectively to sound the death-knell of the  
25 class action device. *B.W.I. Custom Kitchen, supra*, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 1353 (citing  
26 *Samuel v University of Pittsburgh* (3d Cir.1976) 538 F.2d 991). As a matter of law,  
27 differences in individual class members' proof of damages is not fatal to class  
28 certification. *Wershiba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 238



1 "[In] most circumstances a court can devise remedial procedures which channel  
2 the individual [damage] determinations that need to be made through existing forums."  
3 *Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 46. Any of a number of procedures may be  
4 employed to postpone a specific determination of individual damages at this early stage.  
5 *Rosack, supra*, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 762-763. In some cases certification of the class  
6 has been granted for purposes of liability only. *Id.*, at p. 762. A bifurcated trial or  
7 subclasses may be employed at a later stage to simplify the proceedings. *Id.*

8 Therefore, common issues of law and fact relating to Class Plaintiffs' causes of  
9 action predominate over individual issues, and both causes of action under the UCL and  
10 CLRA are appropriate for certification.

11 3. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical of the Class Claims

12 In order to meet the requirement of typicality, a named plaintiff's interest in the  
13 action must be similar to that of the other members of the proposed class. *Richmond,*  
14 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75. The claims of the named plaintiff and each class member  
15 need not, however, be identical. *Classen, supra*, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 46 ("it has never  
16 been the law in California that the class representative must have identical interests with  
17 the class members. The only requirements are that common questions of law and fact  
18 predominate and that the class representatives be similarly situated" (italics in original)  
19 (citing *Vasquez, supra*, 4 Cal.3d 800)); see also, e.g., *Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co.* (8th  
20 Cir.1977) 554 F.2d 825, 830-31, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (typicality met where class  
21 members have same or similar grievances, claims are based on patterns or practices not  
22 special or unique to class representative, or class members are victimized by same  
23 patterns or practice); *Heastie v. Community Bank of Greater Peoria* (1989) 125 F.R.D.  
24 669, 676 [where consumer plaintiff's legal theory is same as rest of class, factual  
25 distinctions between her claim and those of other members of consumer class do not  
26 defeat typicality requirement].

27 Here, the named class Plaintiff is similarly situated to the events, practice, and  
28 common course of conduct that give rise to the claims of all the other class members. Her

1 claims and the Class members' claims are based on the same legal theories and the same  
2 legal violation by DEALER.

3 In addition, because they are similarly situated to all Class members in the  
4 relevant respects, the Class Plaintiff is motivated to prosecute the UCL and CLRA fraud  
5 claims on behalf of herself and the class. See *Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro.*  
6 *Before Trial* (TRG Rev. #1 2002) ¶ 14:43 at p. 14-18 (typicality requirement ensures that  
7 class representatives will be motivated to litigate on behalf of all class members).

8 Thus, class Plaintiff's allegations of her status as a purchaser of a new motorcycle  
9 which did not have a hanger tag or other price label, and who was later charged for  
10 DEALER added "accessories" over and above the agreed price of the motorcycle, as  
11 shown on her retail installment sales contract. Considered together with the DEALER'S  
12 admitted standard practice of not displaying hang tags and of then adding charges for  
13 "accessories", "destination" and "assembly", establish the typicality of MADRAZO'S  
14 claims for class certification purposes.

15 4. Adjudication on a Class Basis Is the Best Method for Promoting a  
16 Fair and Efficient Resolution of This Controversy

17 A class action is plainly superior to the other methods available for the fair and  
18 efficient adjudication of this controversy.

19 First, the superiority of class litigation in general is grounded in meaningful access  
20 to the court system and the deterrence of unfair and illegal conduct. *Vasquez, supra*, 4  
21 Cal.3d at pp. 807-808; *Daar, supra*, 67 Cal.2d at p. 715. The California Supreme Court  
22 has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the class action device for vindicating rights  
23 asserted by large groups of people whose claims, because of their relative size, do not  
24 lend themselves to individual litigation. *Keating v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 584,  
25 610, appeal dismissed in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. *Southland Corp. v.*  
26 *Keating* (1984) 465 U.S. 1; *Reyes, supra*, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1270 (class actions serve  
27 important role by establishing judicial process for simultaneous resolution of many  
28

1 individuals' claims which eliminates repetitive litigation and secures redress for claims  
2 which due to their size do not warrant individual litigation).

3 In addition, consumer class actions in particular are recognized as "an essential  
4 tool for the protection of consumers against exploitative business practices." *State of*  
5 *California v. Levi Strauss & Co.*, *supra*, 41 Cal.3d at p. 471; see also *Vasquez, supra*, 4  
6 Cal.3d at pp. 820-21. For the foregoing reasons, express judicial policy in California  
7 favors the maintenance of appropriate class actions. *La Sala, supra*, 5 Cal.3d at p. 883.  
8 California courts consistently strive to remove unnecessary barriers to effective use of  
9 class action procedures. *Id.*, at p. 864; *Vasquez, supra*, 4 Cal.3d at p. 800; *Daar, supra*,  
10 67 Cal.2d at p. 695.

11 Here, a class action is the only viable means of resolving the multitude of claims  
12 arising from the DEALER'S common practice of failing to display hang tags and  
13 charging new motorcycle buyers thousands of dollars for "accessories", "destination" and  
14 "assembly". Any other individualized method of adjudication would be prohibitively  
15 expensive, leaving Defendants undeterred in their conduct and leaving consumers subject  
16 to exploitive business practices without effective recourse. Further, even if somehow  
17 pursued, individualized adjudication of so many similar claims would result in inefficient,  
18 repetitious, and potentially inconsistent litigation. Therefore, adjudication of Plaintiff's  
19 action as a class action is the superior method for resolution of Plaintiff's and the class  
20 members' claims.

21 5. Plaintiff Will Fairly and Adequately Protect the Interests of the Class

22 "The primary criterion for determining whether the class representative has  
23 adequately represented a class is whether the representative, through qualified counsel,  
24 vigorously and tenaciously protected the interests of the class. . . ." *Simons v. Horowitz*  
25 (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 834, 846-47. The class Plaintiff meets this criterion, and will  
26 fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class.

27 First, Class Plaintiff's counsel are experienced and fully capable of prosecuting  
28 complex consumer protection class actions. Having prosecuted numerous consumer

1 protection, Truth in Lending, unfair competition, and deceptive vehicle sales and loan  
2 practice class actions, they are qualified, experienced, and able to conduct the proposed  
3 litigation. Kapigian Decl., ¶¶ 15-19.

4 In addition, Plaintiff's interest in the litigation is co-extensive with the interests of  
5 the Class. Plaintiff has been injured in the same manner and by the same single and  
6 common course of conduct as the other Class members. Her interests, like those of the  
7 class members, are in establishing DEALER'S liability, collecting damages and/or  
8 restitution, securing disgorgement of wrongfully obtained profits, and obtaining  
9 injunctive relief. Furthermore, she has agreed to serve as Class representative, has  
10 retained experienced counsel, and has propounded discovery. (See Decl. of A. Madrazo)

11 Therefore, the proposed class representative meets the adequacy requirement.

12 IV. CONCLUSION

13 As shown above, Plaintiff's action meets all the requirements for class certification  
14 pursuant to section 382 of the *Code of Civil Procedure*. The Class is ascertainable and  
15 has a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved, as  
16 well as satisfies applicable numerosity, predominance, typicality, adequacy, and  
17 superiority standards. Certification of the Class will promote California judicial policy  
18 favoring class actions, and consumer class actions in particular. For these reasons,  
19 Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court certify the proposed class, appoint the named  
20 Plaintiff as class Plaintiff, and appoint Steven Simons, Esq. and William M. Krieg &  
21 Associates as Class Counsel.

22 DATED: June 29, 2007

*Law Offices of Steven A. Simons*

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Steven A. Simons  
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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24  
25  
26  
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28  
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**PROOF OF SERVICE**

1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
2 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES }

3 I am a resident of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, I am over the age of 18  
4 years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 18401 Burbank Blvd,  
5 Suite 109, Tarzana California 91356.

6 On June ~~28~~<sup>30</sup>, 2007, I served the foregoing document described as:


7 **PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT**  
8 **OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (filed concurrently with Declaration**  
9 **of Audrey Medrazo, Steven A. Simons and Eric Kapigian)**

9 Said document was served on the interested party or parties in this action by placing a true  
10 copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope, and addressed as noted below.

11 The envelope was deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage  
12 thereon fully prepaid at Tarzana, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware  
13 that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date  
14 or postage meter date is more than one working day after the date of deposit for mailing in  
15 this declaration.

16 Executed on June ~~28~~<sup>30</sup>, 2007 at Tarzana, California.

17 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is  
18 true and correct.

  
19 Steven A. Simons

**MAILING LIST**

20 Case : Medrazo vs. Honda of North Hollywood.  
21 Court : LASC  
22 Case Number: BC354744

23 **Counsel for Defendant Honda:**  
24 Richard D. Buckley Jr., Esq.  
25 VENABLE, LLP.  
26 2049 Century Park East Suite 2100  
27 Los Angeles, CA 90067

28 **Co-Plaintiff Counsel:**  
William M. Krieg, Esq.  
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM M. KRIEG  
1330 "L" Street, Suite G  
Fresno, CA 93721

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# **EXHIBIT 4**



1 for water from Muni Water, and lived in a region of San Jose for which Muni Water is the only  
2 water utility. Plaintiffs are real property owners in and residents of the City of San José, County  
3 of Santa Clara, California, and are taxpayers thereof. Plaintiffs have been assessed for and are  
4 liable to pay property taxes in the City of San José, state and federal income taxes, and other  
5 taxes. Plaintiffs have retained counsel who is experienced in class actions and taxpayer actions.

6 2. Defendant City of San José (the "City" or "San Jose") is located in the County of  
7 Santa Clara, State of California, and is a municipal corporation organized and existing under the  
8 laws of the State of California.

9 3. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names or capacities of the defendants sued  
10 herein under the fictitious names Does 1 through 100 inclusive. When their true names and  
11 capacities are ascertained, plaintiffs will amend this complaint to show such true names and  
12 capacities. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that Does 1 through 100,  
13 inclusive, and each of them, were responsible in some manner for the events and happenings set  
14 forth herein.

15 4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times herein  
16 mentioned, defendants were the agents, servants, and employees of their codefendants and in  
17 doing the things hereinafter alleged were acting within the course and scope of their authority as  
18 agents, servants, and employees with the permission and consent of their codefendants.

19 5. Unlimited jurisdiction is proper as the amount in controversy exceeds \$25,000.

20  
21 **GENERAL ALLEGATIONS**

22 6. In 1961, the City purchased Muni Water using money from its general reserve.  
23 Since 1971, the cost of the purchase has been fully recovered. Through Muni Water, the City  
24 provides water services to the citizens of San Jose located in the neighborhoods of Alviso, North  
25 San Jose, Evergreen, Edenvale, and Coyote Valley.

26 7. Muni Water is the exclusive water utility for approximately ten (10) percent of the  
27 population of San Jose.  
28



1           8.       Muni Water imposes fees and charges on the users of the utility on a monthly  
2 basis. The water services it provides are property-related services and the fees and charges are  
3 imposed by San Jose upon parcels and persons as an incident of property ownership.

4           9.       Proposition 218, codified under Articles XIII C and XIII D of the California  
5 Constitution, was adopted by California voters in 1996. Since the enactment of Proposition 218,  
6 the California Constitution has prohibited the City from imposing fees or charges such that  
7 “revenues . . . exceed the funds required to provide [water] service.” Cal. Const., art. XIII D, §  
8 6(b)(1). The California Constitution further provides that revenues derived from fees or charges  
9 “shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which the fee or charge was imposed.” Cal.  
10 Const., art. XIII D, § 6(b)(2).

11          10.       Under Proposition 218, the City may not collect, either for retention or transfer,  
12 rates for water and water-related services that are designed to generate a surplus, profit, or other  
13 return on investment, i.e., revenues that exceed the funds required to provide water and water-  
14 related service, setting aside reasonable reserves.

15          11.       Since January, 1997, up to and including today, approximately Thirty (30) Million  
16 Dollars have been illegally transferred as “rate of return” transfers, “in-lieu fees,” and other  
17 transfers not actually related to the maintenance or improvement of the Muni Water system. The  
18 City has repeatedly, regularly, and unconstitutionally used Muni Water as a profit-center, in clear  
19 violation of Proposition 218 and the California Constitution.

20          12.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, the water utility fees  
21 and charges exceed the reasonable and actual cost of providing the services, and are imposed by  
22 the City for general revenue purposes.

23          13.       For each year following 1997, the City has used and transferred Muni Water  
24 funds for purposes other than those for which the funds were collected. For each year since 1997,  
25 the City has used Muni Water fees or charges for purposes other than those for which they were  
26 imposed.

27  
28

1           14.     The City's unconstitutional draw-down of Muni Water fund reserves has resulted  
2 in Muni Water customers having to pay higher rates than they otherwise would need to pay, but  
3 for the City's illegal conduct, to fund capital improvements and to replenish Muni Water reserves.

4           15.     The charges levied against the class have been unreasonable and unfair. In  
5 addition to illegal draw-downs, the rates are consistently pegged higher than necessary. On an  
6 annual basis, Muni Water revenue has consistently exceeded projected amounts. At the same  
7 time, Muni Water expenditures have consistently fallen short of their projected amounts. Rate  
8 inflation has regularly outstripped increases on the wholesale market.

9           16.     Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege, the City and City  
10 officials knew or should have known the rates were inflated and knew the transfers were  
11 unconstitutional. They materially misrepresented or failed to disclose these facts to the public.

12           17.     The Budget for 2013-2014 continues these unlawful transfers, as it includes  
13 payments from funds associated with Muni Water to the City Hall Debt Service Fund and the  
14 General Fund.

15           18.     Furthermore, the City's Municipal Code purports to allow the unconstitutional  
16 transactions by expressly allowing monies in the consolidated water utility fund to be transferred  
17 to the City's general fund in an amount representing a "reasonable rate of return to the city." San  
18 Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630, subdiv. A, states (emphasis added):

19                   **Except as provided in this Section 4.80.630**, monies in the consolidated  
20 water utility operating fund [also known as the San Jose Municipal Water  
21 System Consolidated Water Utility Fund, or, Fund 515] shall only be  
22 expended for costs of water system operations, including but not limited to  
23 payment of required debt service; for repair, on-going capital  
24 improvements and maintenance of a potable water system for the  
25 consolidated potable water service area; and for the purchase of supplies,  
26 materials, and equipment attributable to or necessary for the operation,  
27 improvement and maintenance of a water potable system in the  
28 consolidated potable water service area.

1 San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630, subdiv. D, states (emphasis added):

2 **Monies in the consolidated potable water utility operating fund may only be**  
3 **transferred to the general fund of the city as follows:**

- 4 1. Amounts calculated in the same manner as amounts paid to the general fund  
5 (such as in lieu fees, encroachment or other ministerial fees and utility taxes)  
6 by potable water utilities that are not exempt from the payment of franchise  
7 fees to the city, and are operated under the authority of the California public  
8 utilities commission; and
- 9 2. If adequate monies remain after the expenditures authorized . . . , monies may  
10 be transferred to the general fund **on an annual basis** to reimburse the city for  
11 indirect overhead costs and **to provide a reasonable rate of return to the**  
12 **city**, provided that the amount so transferred shall not exceed the following: .  
13 . . From and after July 1, 2005, an amount not to exceed eight percent of the  
14 revenue, as described in subsection A. of Section 4.80.620, which was  
15 received in the immediately preceding fiscal year.

16 19. The annual revenue of the Water Utility Fund, "Fund 515," is approximately  
17 \$29,000,000. Thus, the San Jose Municipal Code as it is currently drafted permits the City to take  
18 \$2,320,000 as a "rate of return." This provision violates Proposition 218 and the California  
19 Constitution.

20 20. Plaintiffs have presented three separate claims pursuant to California Government  
21 Code sections 905, 905.2, 910, and 910.2 for damages for the City's unconstitutional conduct  
22 regarding Muni Water. True and correct copies of the claims are attached hereto as Exhibit A and  
23 incorporated herein by reference. The City has rejected each of these claims.

24 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

25 21. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all persons  
26 similarly situated. The class that plaintiffs represent is composed of residents and taxpayers who  
27 live in the San Jose neighborhoods serviced by the San Jose Municipal Water System, including  
28 but not limited to the neighborhoods of Alviso, North San Jose, Evergreen, Edenvale, and Coyote

1 Valley. The persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impracticable.  
2 The disposition of these claims in a class action rather than in individual actions will benefit the  
3 parties and the Court. While the exact number of Class Members is unknown to plaintiffs at this  
4 time, plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that over 100,000 residents live in the  
5 affected areas.

6 22. There is a well-defined community of interest in that common questions of law  
7 and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions affecting solely  
8 individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact, common to the Class:

- 9 a. Whether the fees and charges set by Muni Water exceed the reasonable and actual  
10 cost of providing water service;
- 11 b. Whether the water utility fees are imposed by the City for general revenue  
12 purposes;
- 13 c. Whether the City's acts alleged herein violate Proposition 218, codified at  
14 Articles XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution.

15 23. These questions of law and fact predominate over questions that affect only  
16 individual class members. Proof of a common or single state of facts will establish the right of  
17 each member of the class to recover. The claims of the plaintiffs are typical of those of the class  
18 and plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.

19 24. The prosecution of individual remedies by members of the plaintiff class would  
20 also present the potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments.

21 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

22 **[Violation of Article XIII D of the California Constitution]**

23 25. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1  
24 through 24, inclusive.

25 26. Article XIII D, section 6(b) of the California Constitution prohibits setting fees  
26 for property related services, such as water, at an amount that would "exceed the funds required to  
27 provide the property related service" or for using revenues derived from such fees for purposes  
28 "other than that for which the fee or charge was imposed."

1           27.     The City has continuously refused to comply with Cal. Const. art. XIII D, section  
2 6(b) by imposing water utility fees and charges that exceed the cost of providing water services,  
3 and using the revenues generated from water users to illegally fund the general fund, which is  
4 used for general government services, and to pay for other city costs not related to water system  
5 operations.

6           28.     In addition, in engaging in and performing the acts, omissions, and conduct  
7 alleged above, the City has failed to perform one or more mandatory duties within the meaning of  
8 California Government Code section 815.6, including but not limited to its mandatory duties  
9 under Articles XIII C and XIII D section 6(b) of the California Constitution by imposing water  
10 utility fees and charges that exceed the cost of providing water services, and using the revenues  
11 generated from water users for general government services.

12          29.     Plaintiffs have suffered injury as a result of the City's failure to discharge their  
13 mandatory duties.

14          30.     As a proximate result of the City's unconstitutionally excessive rates and illegal  
15 transfers, plaintiffs are entitled to a refund in the amounts paid in excess of the cost of providing  
16 water service, or in the alternative, return to the Water Utility Fund of all illegally transferred  
17 amounts.

18          31.     The City's unconstitutionally excessive rates, illegal transfers, and San Jose  
19 Municipal Code section 4.80.630, which purports to allow the unconstitutional transfers, will  
20 cause plaintiffs to suffer irreparable injury. Because of the irreparable injury that will be caused  
21 to plaintiffs by allowing the City to continue violating Proposition 218 and the California  
22 Constitution, plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

23          32.     The City's expenditure of city, county, and state money to implement, enforce, or  
24 otherwise carry out the illegal policies and practices complained herein constitutes illegal  
25 expenditure of public funds within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure 526a.

26          33.     The City's expenditure of city, county, and state money to implement, enforce, or  
27 otherwise carry out their illegal policies and practices will cause the taxpayers of San Jose, Santa  
28 Clara County, and the State of California to suffer irreparable injury.



1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

2 WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant as follows:

- 3 1. For a refund to plaintiffs for the amounts paid in excess of the cost of providing  
4 water service, or in the alternative, the return to the Water Utility Fund of all  
5 previously-transferred funds; and
- 6 2. For a declaration of legal rights and duties including, but not limited to the following:
- 7 (a) A declaration, order, and judgment that SJMC Section 4.80.630 violates  
8 Article XIII D, section 6(b) of the California Constitution;
- 9 (b) A declaration, order, and judgment that the "rate of return" transfers, and  
10 other transfers not actually related to the maintenance or improvement of  
11 the Muni Water system, are in violation of Article XIII D, section 6(b) of  
12 the California Constitution.
- 13 3. For a permanent injunction pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure  
14 sections 526 and 526a:
- 15 (a) enjoining the City from continuing to impose water charges that exceed  
16 the cost of providing those services;
- 17 (b) enjoining illegal transfers of funds from the Water Utility Fund to the  
18 General Fund, the City Hall Debt Service Fund, or other transfers not  
19 actually related to the maintenance or improvement of the Muni Water  
20 system;
- 21 (c) enjoining enforcement of San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630,  
22 subdiv. D.2;
- 23 (d) directing the City to refund to plaintiffs amounts paid in excess of the cost  
24 of providing the Muni Water service, or in the alternative, return to the  
25 Water Utility Fund amounts illegally transferred for non-Muni Water  
26 purposes.
- 27 4. For general and special damages;
- 28 5. For plaintiff's costs of suit;


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6. For attorneys' fees; and

7. For any such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

DATED: January 10, 2014

McMANIS FAULKNER



---

JAMES McMANIS  
TYLER ATKINSON  
HILARY WEDDELL

Attorneys for Plaintiffs,  
RAYMOND AND MICHELLE PLATA,  
individually and on behalf of other members  
of a class of similarly situated residents and  
taxpayers



# EXHIBIT A

## CLAIM AGAINST CITY OF SAN JOSE

(Government Code sections 910 and 910.2)

**Name of Claimant / Person Acting on Behalf of Claimant:** Claimant is a class of residents and taxpayers who have been overcharged by the City of San Jose.

**Address of Claimant:** The class lives in the affected San Jose neighborhoods of Alviso, North San Jose, Evergreen, Edenvale, and Coyote Valley, among any other locations serviced by the San Jose Municipal Water System.

**Please Send Notices to:** Tyler Atkinson, McManis Faulkner, 50 W. San Fernando 10th Fl., San Jose, California, 95138

**Phone Number (day) (evening):** 408-279-8700

**Date of Injury/Damage:** Since January, 1997, and up to today

**Place the Injury/Damage:** San Jose, California

**Describe how and under what circumstances the injury/damage occurred:**

Claimant is a class of residents and taxpayers to who have been unconstitutionally overcharged for water by the San Jose Municipal Water System ("Muni Water"), an entity wholly owned and operated by the City of San José ("the City"). At all relevant times, Claimant paid for and obtained water from Muni Water.

In 1961, the City purchased Muni Water using money from its general reserve. Since 1971, the general reserve has been fully paid back using Muni Water revenue.

Since 1997, Proposition 218, codified under Articles XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution, prohibits the City from imposing fees or charges such that "revenues . . . exceed the funds required to provide [water] service." Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 6(b)(1). Proposition 218 further provides that revenues derived from fees or charges "shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which the fee or charge was imposed." Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 6(b)(2).

Under Proposition 218, the City may not collect, either for retention or transfer, rates for water and water-related services that are designed to generate a surplus, profit, or other return on investment, i.e., revenues that exceed the funds required to provide water and water-related service, setting aside reasonable reserves. *Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 209; *Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Fresno* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 914; *Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Roseville* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637.

Since January 1997, up to and including today, approximately thirty (30) million dollars have been illegally transferred as "rate of return" transfers, "in-lieu fees," and other transfers not actually related to the maintenance or improvement of the Muni Water system. The City has repeatedly, regularly, and unconstitutionally used Muni Water as a profit-center, in clear violation of Proposition 218.

The City's continuing draw-down of Muni Water funds has resulted in pressure on Muni Water customers to pay higher rates than they otherwise would need to pay to fund capital improvements and to replenish the water funds' reserves.

The charges levied against the class have been unreasonable and unfair. In addition to pressure on rate payers to make up for illegal draw-downs, the rates are consistently pegged higher than necessary. On an annual basis, Muni Water revenue has consistently exceeded projected amounts. At the same time, Muni Water expenditures have consistently fallen short of their projected amounts. Rate inflation has regularly outstripped increases on the wholesale market.

The City and City officials knew the rates were inflated and knew the transfers were unconstitutional. They materially misrepresented or failed to disclose these facts to the public.

The Proposed Budget for 2013-2014 will continue these unlawful transfers, as it anticipates future payments to the City Hall Debt Service Fund and the General Fund.

Furthermore, the City's Municipal Code purports to allow the unconstitutional transactions. San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630, subdiv. A, states (emphasis added):

**Except as provided** in this Section 4.80.630, monies in the consolidated water utility operating fund [also known as the San Jose Municipal Water System Consolidated Water Utility Fund, or, Fund 515] shall only be expended for costs of water system operations, including but not limited to payment of required debt service; for repair, on-going capital improvements and maintenance of a potable water system for the consolidated potable water service area; and for the purchase of supplies, materials, and equipment attributable to or necessary for the operation, improvement and maintenance of a water potable system in the consolidated potable water service area.

San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630, subdiv. D, states (emphasis added):

Monies in the consolidated potable water utility operating fund may only be transferred to the general fund of the city as follows:

1. Amounts calculated in the same manner as amounts paid to the general fund (such as in lieu fees, encroachment or other ministerial fees and utility taxes) by potable water utilities that are not exempt from the payment of franchise fees to the city, and are operated under the authority of the California public utilities commission; and
2. If adequate monies remain after the expenditures authorized . . . , monies may be transferred to the general fund on an annual basis to reimburse the city for indirect overhead costs **and to provide a reasonable rate of return to the city**, provided that the amount so transferred shall not exceed the following: . . . From and after July 1, 2005, an amount not to exceed eight percent of the revenue, as described in subsection A. of Section 4.80.620, which was received in the immediately preceding fiscal year.

The annual revenue of Fund 515 is approximately \$29,000,000. Thus, the San Jose Municipal Code as it is currently drafted permits the City to take \$2,320,000 as a "rate of return." This provision clearly violates Proposition 218


**A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim:**

Claimant has been injured as stated above.

**The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known:**

An investigation is continuing, but the identities include current and past city council members and Mayors Chuck Reed and Ron Gonzales.

**The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars (\$10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim:** The claim exceeds \$10,000. The claim would be an unlimited civil case.

Signed:   
Tyler Atkinson, on behalf of Claimant

**CLAIM AGAINST CITY OF SAN JOSE**

*(Government Code sections 910 and 910.2)*

**Name of Claimant / Person Acting on Behalf of Claimant:** Claimant is Michelle Gabellini and the class of residents and taxpayers to which Ms. Gabellini is a representative member.

**Address of Claimant:** Michelle Gabellini, McManis Faulkner, 50 W. San Fernando 10th Fl., San Jose, California, 95138. The class lives in the affected San Jose neighborhoods of Alviso, North San Jose, Evergreen, Edenvale, and Coyote Valley, among any other locations serviced by the San Jose Municipal Water System.

**Please Send Notices to:** Tyler Atkinson, McManis Faulkner, 50 W. San Fernando 10th Fl., San Jose, California, 95138

**Phone Number (day) (evening):** 408-279-8700

**Date of Injury/Damage:** Since January, 1997, and up to today

**Place the Injury/Damage:** San Jose, California

**Describe how and under what circumstances the injury/damage occurred:**

Claimant, Michelle Gabellini and a class of residents and taxpayers to which Ms. Gabellini belongs, have been unconstitutionally overcharged for water by the San Jose Municipal Water System ("Muni Water"), an entity wholly owned and operated by the City of San José ("the City"). At all relevant times, Claimant paid for and obtained water from Muni Water.

In 1961, the City purchased Muni Water using money from its general reserve. Since 1971, the general reserve has been fully paid back using Muni Water revenue.

Since 1997, Proposition 218, codified under Articles XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution, prohibits the City from imposing fees or charges such that "revenues . . . exceed the funds required to provide [water] service." Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 6(b)(1). Proposition 218 further provides that revenues derived from fees or charges "shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which the fee or charge was imposed." Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 6(b)(2).

Under Proposition 218, the City may not collect, either for retention or transfer, rates for water and water-related services that are designed to generate a surplus, profit, or other return on investment, i.e., revenues that exceed the funds required to provide water and water-related service, setting aside reasonable reserves. *Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 209; *Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Fresno* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 914; *Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Roseville* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637.

Since January 1997, up to and including today, approximately thirty (30) million dollars have been illegally transferred as "rate of return" transfers, "in-lieu fees," and other transfers not actually related to the maintenance or improvement of the Muni Water system. The City has

repeatedly, regularly, and unconstitutionally used Muni Water as a profit-center, in clear violation of Proposition 218.

The City's continuing draw-down of Muni Water funds has resulted in pressure on Muni Water customers to pay higher rates than they otherwise would need to pay to fund capital improvements and to replenish the water funds' reserves.

The charges levied against the class have been unreasonable and unfair. In addition to pressure on rate payers to make up for illegal draw-downs, the rates are consistently pegged higher than necessary. On an annual basis, Muni Water revenue has consistently exceeded projected amounts. At the same time, Muni Water expenditures have consistently fallen short of their projected amounts. Rate inflation has regularly outstripped increases on the wholesale market.

The City and City officials knew the rates were inflated and knew the transfers were unconstitutional. They materially misrepresented or failed to disclose these facts to the public.

The Proposed Budget for 2013-2014 will continue these unlawful transfers, as it anticipates future payments to the City Hall Debt Service Fund and the General Fund.

Furthermore, the City's Municipal Code purports to allow the unconstitutional transactions. San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630, subdiv. A, states (emphasis added):

Except as provided in this Section 4.80.630, monies in the consolidated water utility operating fund [also known as the San Jose Municipal Water System Consolidated Water Utility Fund, or, Fund 515] shall only be expended for costs of water system operations, including but not limited to payment of required debt service; for repair, on-going capital improvements and maintenance of a potable water system for the consolidated potable water service area; and for the purchase of supplies, materials, and equipment attributable to or necessary for the operation, improvement and maintenance of a water potable system in the consolidated potable water service area.

San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630, subdiv. D, states (emphasis added):

- Monies in the consolidated potable water utility operating fund may only be transferred to the general fund of the city as follows:
1. Amounts calculated in the same manner as amounts paid to the general fund (such as in lieu fees, encroachment or other ministerial fees and utility taxes) by potable water utilities that are not exempt from the payment of franchise fees to the city, and are operated under the authority of the California public utilities commission; and
  2. If adequate monies remain after the expenditures authorized . . . , monies may be transferred to the general fund on an annual basis to reimburse the city for indirect overhead costs and to provide a reasonable rate of return to the city, provided that the amount so transferred shall not exceed the following: . . . From and after July 1, 2005, an amount not to exceed eight percent of the revenue, as described in subsection A. of Section 4.80.620, which was received in the immediately preceding fiscal year.

The annual revenue of Fund 515 is approximately \$29,000,000. Thus, the San Jose Municipal Code as it is currently drafted permits the City to take \$2,320,000 as a "rate of return." This provision clearly violates Proposition 218

**A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim:**

Claimant has been injured as stated above.

**The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known:**

An investigation is continuing, but the identities include current and past city council members and Mayors Chuck Reed and Ron Gonzales.

**The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars (\$10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim:** The claim exceeds \$10,000. The claim would be an unlimited civil case.

Signed:



Michelle Gabellini,

Class Representative

## CLAIM AGAINST CITY OF SAN JOSE

(Government Code sections 910 and 910.2)

**Name of Claimant / Person Acting on Behalf of Claimant:** Claimants are Raymond Plata and Michelle Plata, and the class of residents and taxpayers to which the Platas are representative members.

**Address of Claimant:** Raymond and Michelle Plata, c/o McManis Faulkner, 50 W. San Fernando Street, 10th Fl., San Jose, California, 95113. The class lives in the affected San Jose neighborhoods of Alviso, North San Jose, Evergreen, Edenvale, and Coyote Valley, among any other locations serviced by the San Jose Municipal Water System.

**Please Send Notices to:** Tyler Atkinson, McManis Faulkner, 50 W. San Fernando Street, 10th Fl., San Jose, California, 95113

**Phone Number (day) (evening):** 408-279-8700

**Date of Injury/Damage:** Since January, 1997, and up to today

**Place the Injury/Damage:** San Jose, California

**Describe how and under what circumstances the injury/damage occurred:**

Claimants, Raymond Plata and Michelle Plata, and a class of residents and taxpayers to which the Platas belong, have been unconstitutionally overcharged for water by the San Jose Municipal Water System ("Muni Water"), an entity wholly owned and operated by the City of San José ("the City"). At all relevant times, Claimants paid for and obtained water from Muni Water.

In 1961, the City purchased Muni Water using money from its general reserve. Since 1971, the general reserve has been fully paid back using Muni Water revenue.

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Under Proposition 218, the City may not collect, either for retention or transfer, rates for water and water-related services that are designed to generate a surplus, profit, or other return on investment, i.e., revenues that exceed the funds required to provide water and water-related service, setting aside reasonable reserves. *Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 209; *Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Fresno* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 914; *Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Roseville* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637.

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San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630, subdiv. D, states (emphasis added):

Monies in the consolidated potable water utility operating fund may only be transferred to the general fund of the city as follows:

1. Amounts calculated in the same manner as amounts paid to the general fund (such as in lieu fees, encroachment or other ministerial fees and utility taxes) by potable water utilities that are not exempt from the payment of franchise fees to the city, and are operated under the authority of the California public utilities commission; and
2. If adequate monies remain after the expenditures authorized . . . , monies may be transferred to the general fund on an annual basis to reimburse the city for indirect overhead costs and to provide a reasonable rate of return to the city, provided that the amount so transferred shall not exceed the following: . . . From and after July 1, 2005, an amount not to exceed eight percent of the revenue, as described in subsection A. of Section 4.80.620, which was received in the immediately preceding fiscal year.

The annual revenue of Fund 515 is approximately \$29,000,000. Thus, the San Jose Municipal Code as it is currently drafted permits the City to take \$2,320,000 as a "rate of return." This provision clearly violates Proposition 218

**A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim:**


Claimant has been injured as stated above.

**The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known:**

An investigation is continuing, but the identities include current and past city council members and Mayors Chuck Reed and Ron Gonzales.

**The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars (\$10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim:** The claim exceeds \$10,000. The claim would be an unlimited civil case.


Signed:



Raymond Plata,

Class Representative

Signed:



Michelle Plata,

Class Representative

# **EXHIBIT 5**

**E-FILED**

Apr 24, 2015 5:00 PM

David H. Yamasaki  
Chief Executive Officer/Clerk  
Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara  
Case #1-14-CV-258879 Filing #G-71915  
By T. Mai, Deputy

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TYLER ATKINSON (257997)  
2 HILARY WEDDELL (293276)  
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6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs,  
RAYMOND AND MICHELLE PLATA,  
7 individual and on behalf of other members  
of a class of similarly situated residents  
8 and taxpayers

9  
10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

11 RAYMOND AND MICHELLE PLATA,  
individually and on behalf of other members  
12 of a class of similarly situated residents and  
taxpayers,

13 Plaintiffs,

14 v.

15 CITY OF SAN JOSE, a California municipal  
16 corporation, and DOES 1 THROUGH 100,

17 Defendants.

No. 1-14-CV-258879

CLASS ACTION

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF  
PLAINTIFFS RAYMOND AND  
MICHELLE PLATA'S MOTION FOR  
CLASS CERTIFICATION**

Date: May 22, 2015  
Time: 9:00 a.m.  
Dept.: 1 (Complex Civil Litigation)  
Judge: Hon. Peter H. Kirwan

Trial Date: None set

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28 MPA ISO PLAINTIFFS RAYMOND AND MICHELLE PLATA'S MOTION FOR CLASS  
CERTIFICATION; CASE NO. 1-14-CV-258879

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v

MPA ISO PLAINTIFFS RAYMOND AND MICHELLE PLATA’S MOTION FOR CLASS  
CERTIFICATION; CASE NO. 1-14-CV-258879

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 This case concerns the City of San Jose’s misappropriation of huge sums of money. The  
3 California Constitution prohibits cities from using any revenue from city-owned utilities for  
4 general government purposes. However, since 1997 to the present, the City of San Jose (“the  
5 City”) has removed from its Municipal Water System (“Muni Water”) tens of millions of dollars  
6 for purposes not related to Muni Water. As a result, Muni Water customers, who represent ten  
7 (10) percent of the City’s residents, have been forced to pay additional fees and charges simply  
8 to replace the money taken from their water provider.

9 This lawsuit challenges the City’s systematic and illegal use of Muni Water funds. The  
10 proposed class members are: “All past and current customers of the San Jose Municipal Water  
11 System who have paid for water service from the San Jose Municipal Water System since  
12 January 1, 1997.” The proposed class is sufficiently numerous, and the proposed definition is  
13 “ascertainable” so as to permit individuals to determine if they are members of the class.

14 Moreover, the class shares a strong community of interest, including several core issues:

- 15 • All of the proposed class members paid the City for water delivered by the City’s wholly  
16 owned and operated water company, Muni Water;
- 17 • During the entire period, the City was governed by the same legal regime, “Proposition  
18 218,” concerning restraints on what the City could do with Muni Water revenue;
- 19 • The City annually applied Muni Water revenue for prohibited purposes; and
- 20 • The class members reasonably believed their water bills were for water service, and the  
21 City misrepresented the facts.

22 Furthermore, litigation by class action is vastly preferable compared to adjudication by  
23 individual claims. In addition to overlapping issues of fact and law, several other considerations  
24 favor certification, including:

- 25 • The relative value of the individual claims compared to the total claim;
- 26 • The City’s pattern and practice of using Muni Water revenue for general governmental  
27 purposes not related to the Muni Water service;
- 28 • The interests of all parties and the Court;

- 1 • The stage of the present lawsuit, with merits discovery already underway; and
- 2 • The potential for the Court to facilitate management of the litigation and any recovery.

3 Finally, the proposed class representatives, Raymond and Michelle Plata, have been  
 4 customers of Muni Water for ten (10) years, more than half of the period at issue. The Platas and  
 5 their counsel stand ready, willing, and able to litigate this case, and they have already  
 6 demonstrated their commitment to advocate for the entire class.

7 **LEGAL STANDARD**

8 “[W]hen the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when  
 9 the parties are numerous, and it is impractical to bring them all before the court, one or more may  
 10 sue . . . for the benefit of all.” Code Civ. Proc., § 382; see *Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates,*  
 11 *Inc.* (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 231. A party seeking class certification has the burden to  
 12 establish (1) “a sufficiently numerous, ascertainable class;” (2) “a well-defined community of  
 13 interest,” and (3) “that certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts,  
 14 i.e., that proceeding as a class is superior to other methods.” *Fireside Bank v. Superior Court*  
 15 (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1089; see *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (Rocher)* (2004)  
 16 34 Cal.4th 319, 326-327 (upholding certification because theory of recovery was amenable to  
 17 class treatment).

18 Class certification is “essentially a procedural [question] that does not ask whether an  
 19 action is legally or factually meritorious.” *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 439-  
 20 440. It is “largely settled” a trial court should decide whether a class is proper “before ruling on  
 21 the substantive merits of the action.” *Fireside Bank, supra*, 40 Cal.4th at 1074. The critical  
 22 inquiry is whether “the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an  
 23 analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.” *Sav-On Drug Stores, supra*, 34  
 24 Cal.4th at 327.

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**FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

**I. THE SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL WATER SYSTEM.**

The San Jose Municipal Water System is a water company wholly owned and operated by the City of San Jose. (Amend. & Suppl. Compl., ¶ 1.) The City purchased Muni Water in 1961 using money from its general reserve. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.) Since 1971, the cost of the purchase has been fully recovered. (*Id.*)

Muni Water is the exclusive water system for approximately ten (10) percent of San Jose residents. (*Id.*, ¶ 7.) Through Muni Water, the City provides water services to the neighborhoods of Alviso, North San Jose, Evergreen, Edenvale, and Coyote Valley. *See* San Jose Municipal Code sections 15.08.250-15.08.280 attached as Exhibit S to the Declaration of James McManis In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (“McManis Decl.”).

**II. THE PLATAS.**

The Platas are residents of the City of San Jose. (Declaration of Raymond Plata in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (“Plata Decl.”), ¶¶ 1-2.) Michelle Plata is a teacher, and Raymond Plata is a local businessman. They have resided in the City’s Evergreen neighborhood since approximately January, 2005. (*Id.*, ¶ 2.) For the past ten (10) years, Muni Water has been the Platas’ water provider. (*Id.*, ¶ 3.) They have regularly paid their Muni Water bills during this period. (*Id.*, ¶ 4.)

**III. THE PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS.**

Plaintiffs propose certification of a class defined as: “All past and current customers of the San Jose Municipal Water System who have paid for water service from the San Jose Municipal Water System since January 1, 1997.”

**IV. FACTS AND LAW APPLICABLE TO PROSPECTIVE CLASS MEMBERS.**

**A. The Proposed Class Members Paid The City For Water Service.**

Muni Water is, and at all relevant times has been, owned and operated by the City. (Amend. & Suppl. Compl., ¶ 1.) Muni Water provided the proposed class members with water services. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 1, 6-7.) On behalf of Muni Water, the City billed each of the prospective class

1 members at some time since 1997. (*Id.*, ¶ 8.) All of the proposed class members paid the City  
2 for Muni Water services. (*Ibid.*) The money collected by the City for Muni Water services has  
3 been managed by the City since its collection. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 1, 11, 13-18.)

4 **B. Since 1997, The City Has Been Prohibited From Using Muni Water Revenue For**  
5 **Purposes Other Than Water Service.**

6 Proposition 218, codified under Articles XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution,  
7 was adopted by California voters in 1996. The law came into effect on January 1, 1997. The  
8 law restricts local governments from imposing fees to provide property-related services, such as  
9 water services, for any purpose other than to provide the service. Cal. Const., art., XIII D § 6(b),  
10 *subd.* (2). The law further prohibits the use of revenue from such fees for “general government  
11 purposes.” *Id.*, § 6(b), *subd.* (5). The Constitution states:

12 (1) Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not exceed the funds required to  
13 provide the property related service. (2) Revenues derived from the fee or charge  
14 shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which the fee or charge was  
15 imposed....(5) No fee or charge may be imposed for general governmental  
16 services including, but not limited to, police, fire, ambulance or library services,  
17 where the service is available to the public at large in substantially the same  
18 manner as it is to property owners.

19 *Id.*, § 6(b), *subds.* (1), (2), and (5) (“Section 6(b)”). The intent of these requirements is to  
20 prevent cities from overcharging ratepayers for utility services, and from using “surplus funds”  
21 for other city purposes.

22 Thus, Section 6(b) requires that fees collected from Muni Water customers are only to be  
23 used for Muni Water services. This law has been in place for the entire duration of the class  
24 members’ claims.

25 **C. Since 1997, The City Has Used Muni Water Funds For Purposes Other Than Water**  
26 **Service.**

27 Since 1997, up to and including today, the City has transferred to its general fund  
28 approximately thirty (30) million dollars from the Muni Water fund as “rate of return” transfers,  
“in-lieu fees,” “late fees,” and other transfers. (Amend. & Suppl. Compl., ¶ 11.) None of these  
transferred funds have been applied to Muni Water purposes. (*Id.*, ¶ 11, 13, 17.) Rather, the

1 City has repeatedly, regularly, and unconstitutionally used Muni Water as a profit-center, in  
2 violation of Proposition 218 and the California Constitution. (*Ibid.*)

3 Furthermore, the City's unconstitutional draw-down of Muni Water fund reserves has  
4 resulted in Muni Water customers having to pay higher rates than they otherwise would need to  
5 pay, but for the City's illegal conduct, to fund capital improvements and to replenish Muni Water  
6 reserves. (*Id.*, ¶14.)

7 **D. Since 1997, The City Has Engaged In A Pattern And Practice Of Transferring**  
8 **Large Sums to Its General Fund For Improper Purposes.**

9 For each year at issue, the City has consistently transferred from Muni Water millions of  
10 dollars to the City's general fund. (*See* McManis Decl., Exhs. C through R (annual budget  
11 summaries.) As alleged in the Complaint, the City did not use these funds for their authorized  
12 purpose, and has no intention to do so. (Amend. & Suppl. Compl., ¶¶ 13-17.) Moreover, for  
13 most of the years at issue, the City has transferred to itself a profit which it styles a "rate of  
14 return." (*Id.*) For most of the period at issue, up to and including today, the City's Municipal  
15 Code purports to authorize a "rate of return." (San Jose Municipal Code § 4.80.630; McManis  
16 Decl., Exh. S.) Before litigation, counsel for plaintiffs requested the City remove this provision  
17 of the Municipal Code. (McManis Decl., Exh. T.) The City ignored this request.

18 **E. The Class Members Reasonably Believed Their Water Bills Were For Water**  
19 **Service, And The City Misrepresented The Facts.**

20 At the time it collected the fees, the City never informed plaintiffs or the class that their  
21 payments would be used for purposes other than providing water service. (Plata Decl., ¶ 7.) The  
22 City also never told its water customers, after payment remittance, that the City had collected  
23 more than it needed to support Muni Water services. (*Id.*, ¶ 8.)

24 Plaintiffs and the class reasonably believed the charges imposed upon them by the City,  
25 through their water bills, were authorized by law. (*Id.*, ¶ 9.) The only information plaintiffs and  
26 the class had regarding Muni Water rates were notice of rate increases and the water bill they  
27 received every other month, neither of which contained information regarding the basis of the

1 rates. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.) The bills the Platas and class members received do not provide any facts or  
2 information that would have required plaintiffs or the class to inquire into whether the City was  
3 utilizing Muni Water in an unlawful manner. The class members were not informed that the City  
4 was collecting excessive fees and charges. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 6-9.) Rather, the City misrepresented the  
5 facts. (*Id.*, ¶ 16.)

6 The City knew that it had removed money from Muni Water from non-Muni Water  
7 purposes, and that it was charging its water customers more than the cost to provide Muni Water  
8 services. (Amend. & Suppl. Compl., ¶ 16.) The City materially misrepresented and failed to  
9 disclose these facts to the prospective class members. (*Ibid.*)

10 **LEGAL ARGUMENT**

11 **I. THE PROPOSED CLASS IS “SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS” AND**  
12 **ASCERTAINABLE.**

13 Class actions are authorized when there is a “sufficiently numerous, ascertainable class.”  
14 *Fireside Bank v. Superior Court* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1089; *see* Code Civ. Proc. § 382. In the  
15 present matter, the proposed class is sufficiently numerous to justify class certification, and the  
16 class is readily ascertainable.

17 A class is large enough to justify a class action if bringing individual cases would be  
18 impracticable. *See Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (no minimum or  
19 maximum number of plaintiffs required). Here, the proposed class is large enough to justify  
20 class procedure. Muni Water serves approximately ten (10) percent of the City of San Jose.  
21 (Amend. & Suppl. Compl., ¶ 7.) It would be impracticable, and entirely inefficient, for Muni  
22 Water’s individual customers to bring individual claims to redress the matters at issue.

23 Furthermore, individual members will be able to ascertain the class. “The goal in  
24 defining an ascertainable class is to use terminology that will convey sufficient meaning to  
25 enable persons hearing it to determine whether they are members of the class plaintiffs wish to  
26 represent.” *Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc.* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1300-1301. It is not  
27 necessary to identify individual class members themselves. *Id.* (“the representative plaintiff need

1 not identify, much less locate, individual class members to establish the existence of an  
2 ascertainable class.”); *Stephens v. Montgomery Ward & Co.* (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 411, 419.  
3 Rather, “it is sufficient that the class as defined is ascertainable and that there exists a well-  
4 defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved.” *Id.*

5 In a case concerning overcharged taxi customers, the California Supreme Court found  
6 class certification did not require identification of each aggrieved customer. In *Daar v. Yellow*  
7 *Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, the Court held that a class of taxicab users was ascertainable. *Id.*  
8 at 717. The Court distinguished between the necessity of establishing the existence of an  
9 ascertainable class and the necessity of identifying the individual members. If the existence of  
10 an ascertainable class has been shown, the Court reasoned, there is no need to identify its  
11 individual members in order to bind all members by the judgment. The fact that class members  
12 are not identified at the time of certification will not preclude a complete determination of the  
13 issues affecting the class. *Id.* at 706.

14 In the present matter, the proposed class definition embraces anyone who paid the City of  
15 San Jose, during a specific time period, for Muni Water services. The Muni Water service itself  
16 is delivered only to specific neighborhoods of the City. (See San Jose Municipal Code §§  
17 15.08.250, *et seq.*; McManis Decl., Exh. S.) The class definition contains more than “sufficient  
18 meaning.” *Aguirre, supra*, 234 Cal.App.4th at 1300-1301.

19 **II. THE PROPOSED CLASS AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVES SHARE A**  
20 **COMMUNITY OF INTEREST.**

21 In evaluating a motion for class certification, courts consider whether the proposed class  
22 shares a well-defined “community of interest.” See Code Civ. Proc. § 382 (“[W]hen the question  
23 is one of a common or general interest, of many persons . . . one or more may sue . . . for the  
24 benefit of all.”). The “community of interest” requirement embodies three factors: (1)  
25 predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses  
26 typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.”  
27 *Fireside Bank, supra*, 40 Cal.4th at 1089; *Sav-On Drug Stores, supra*, 34 Cal.4th at 326. In the



1 present case, the class has a strong shared interest in the issues and outcome of this litigation.

2 **A. The Proposed Class Members Share “Common Questions Of Law Or Fact.”**

3 To determine whether common questions of law or fact predominate, “the trial court must  
4 examine the issues framed by the pleadings and the law applicable to the causes of action  
5 alleged.” *Hicks v. Kaufman and Broad Home Corp.* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 916, citing  
6 *Vasquez v. Superior Court* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 810-811. “Predominance is a comparative  
7 concept,” and “individual issues do not render a class certification inappropriate so long as such  
8 issues may effectively be managed.” *Sav-On Drug Stores, supra*, 34 Cal.4th at 334. The  
9 California Supreme Court urges trial courts to be “procedurally innovative in managing class  
10 actions, and the trial court has an obligation to consider the use of . . . innovative procedural tools  
11 proposed by a party to certify a manageable class.” *Id.* at 339 (citations omitted).

12 Here, the common questions of fact and law heavily favor class certification. Any  
13 individual issues would not frustrate management by the Court. Rather, the relief sought is  
14 entirely suited for class treatment.

15 **1. Common Issues of Law And Fact.**

16 The prospective class members share all of the major issues of law and fact implicated by  
17 this lawsuit, including:

- 18 • The extent Proposition 218 restrains the City from imposing fees or charges on Muni  
19 Water customers for general governmental purposes;
- 20 • The extent Proposition 218 restrains the City from using Muni Water revenue for  
21 general governmental purposes;
- 22 • What the City disclosed, or failed to disclose, to Muni Water customers about how it  
23 spends Muni Water revenue;
- 24 • Whether the City has used revenue collected from Muni Water customers for general  
25 governmental purposes;
- 26 • How the City has accounted for Muni Water funds;
- 27 • How the City has accounted for its general fund;
- 28 • How the City uses its general fund, including how the City spends money allocated to  
the City’s general fund;

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- How the City sets water rates for its Muni Water customers;
- How the City calculates “overhead” for Muni Water customers;
- Whether Muni Water revenue that has been used, or designated by the City to be used, for non-Muni Water purposes, must be returned either to the Muni Water fund, or to Muni Water customers; and
- Whether the City has engaged in a pattern and practice of using Muni Water as a source of general government revenue.

The California Supreme Court has held that evidence of a “pattern or practice” may be used to show commonality. *Sav-On Drug Stores, supra*, 34 Cal.4th at 333. In the present case, public records show that, for every year since 1997, the City has transferred large amounts of money from the Muni Water fund to the City’s general fund. Plaintiffs allege these transfers were for general governmental purposes, and were not permitted by Proposition 218.

While some class members have undoubtedly paid more of the challenged fees and costs than others did, this distinction cannot be dispositive. “As a general rule, if the defendant’s liability can be determined by facts common to all members, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages.” *Hicks, supra*, 89 Cal.App.4th at 916; *Sav-On Drug Stores, supra*, 34 Cal.4th at 332 (“That calculation of individual damages may at some point be required does not foreclose the possibility of taking common evidence on the misclassification questions”).

Because the class members overwhelmingly share the same questions of law and fact, the class should be certified.

2. Manageability of The Issues.

Even if there were significant differences in the issues raised by the prospective class members—and there are none—any differences between the members would not frustrate the administration of the class action. “Predominance” of common issues is “a comparative concept” and “individual issues do not render a class certification inappropriate so long as such issues may effectively be managed.” *Sav-On Drug Stores, supra*, 34 Cal.4th at 334.

Courts are encouraged to use “innovative procedural tools” in favor of granting class certification. *Id.* at 339. In this case, the Court has many tools at its disposal. For example, in

1 cases where courts have found it impractical to share small individual claims among a large  
2 class, courts have ordered distribution of damages according to one of several methods known  
3 collectively as “fluid class recovery” or “cy pres remedy.” *See, e.g., In re Vitamin Cases* (2003)  
4 107 Cal.App.4th 820, 826–832.

5 **B. The Platas’ Claims Are Typical Of The Class.**

6 Class representatives must have claims typical of the class. *Fireside Bank, supra*, 40  
7 Cal.4th at 1089. A representative does not need to “have identical interests with the class  
8 members.” *BWI Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347; *see*  
9 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 228 (class representative need not  
10 have personally incurred all of the damages suffered by each of the other class members); *see*  
11 *Weil & Brown*, CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROC. BEFORE TRIAL (The Rutter Group 2014) §  
12 14:28, p.14-30 (claims do not need to be identical). Typicality depends on whether the  
13 representative is “similarly situated” as other members of the class, such that he or she will have  
14 the motive to litigate on behalf of all class members. *Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d  
15 27, 45-46; *BWI Custom Kitchen, supra*, 191 Cal.App.3d at 1347; *see, e.g., La Sala v. American*  
16 *Sav. & Loan Ass’n* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, 871.

17 In this case, the Platas have been Muni Water customers for the past ten (10) years, and  
18 have paid thousands of dollars to the City for Muni Water service. (Plata Decl., ¶¶ 2-5.) They  
19 have therefore paid for Muni Water services over most of the years at issue. The Platas have  
20 been involved in this case from its filing in January, 2014, and they are motivated to litigate on  
21 behalf of all of the class members. (Plata Decl., ¶¶ 1, 10-15.)

22 **C. The Platas Will Adequately Represent The Class.**

23 Class representatives must be able to “adequately represent the class.” *Fireside Bank,*  
24 *supra*, 40 Cal.4th at 1089. “To resolve the adequacy question the court will evaluate ‘the  
25 seriousness and extent of conflicts involved compared with the importance of issues uniting the  
26 class; the alternatives to class representation available; the procedures available to limit and  
27 prevent unfairness; and any other facts bearing on the fairness with which the absent class

1 member is represented.’ [Citation.]” *Capitol People First v. Dep’t of Dev. Servs.* (2007) 155  
2 Cal.App.4th 676, 697.

3 Here, the Platas have no conflicts with the class. The questions raised by the litigation  
4 are serious, and the Platas intend to litigate all of the issues uniting their class. (Plata Decl., ¶¶  
5 10-15.) The Platas are respected members of the community, and take their duties seriously. *See*  
6 *Chance v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 275, 288. (“[A] determination  
7 of whether a particular plaintiff can fairly protect the rights of the group he purports to represent  
8 is necessarily dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”) They have retained  
9 qualified counsel who will also vigorously protect the interests of the class. *See generally*  
10 McManis Decl. (detailing counsel’s qualifications to represent the class); *see also Morales v.*  
11 *Whole Foods Mkt.* (N.D. Cal. 2012) 897 F.Supp.2d 987, 998-999.

12 **III. CLASS ACTION WOULD BE SUPERIOR TO INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS.**

13 In weighing whether to grant class certification, courts consider whether certification will  
14 provide substantial benefits to litigants or the judicial system. *Fireside Bank, supra*, 40 Cal.4th  
15 at 1089. To decide whether a class action would be “superior” to individual lawsuits, courts may  
16 consider: (1) the interest of each member in controlling his or her case personally; (2) the  
17 difficulties, if any, that are likely to be encountered in managing a class action; (3) the nature and  
18 extent of any litigation by individual class members already in progress involving the same  
19 controversy; and (4) the desirability of consolidating all claims in a single action before a single  
20 court. *Weil & Brown, supra*, § 14:16, p. 14-17 (collecting cases). In the present case, all of these  
21 considerations favor class certification.

22 **A. The Individual Claims Are Small And Would Elude Litigation.**

23 Superiority is found where class action “both eliminates the possibility of repetitious  
24 litigation and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which  
25 would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation.” *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.*  
26 (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 469. The class action device has been found particularly appropriate when  
27 numerous parties suffer injury in small amounts. *Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695,  
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1 715 (class action allowed to recover taxicab fare overcharges).

2 *Plata v. San Jose* challenges the City’s misapplication of huge sums of money, contesting  
3 six and seven-figured transactions by the City. There is no dispute the City transferred large  
4 sums from Muni Water. There is also no dispute the class as a whole paid tens of millions of  
5 dollars into the Muni Water system since 1997. At the same time, the amounts of the individual  
6 class members’ payments were far less than the amount at stake in this litigation. If the class is  
7 not certified, there is great likelihood the individual class members will suffer injury in at least  
8 “small amounts.”

9 **B. The City’s Pattern and Practices Is The Focus Of The Claims.**

10 Where the focus of a case is on a defendant’s pattern and practice, and plaintiffs seek  
11 systemic relief, courts have favored class certification. For example, in *Capitol People First v.*  
12 *Department of Developmental Servs.* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, the plaintiffs sought  
13 certification of a class consisting of all California residents who had developmental disabilities  
14 were at risk of being institutionalized in certain residential facilities. Reversing the lower court’s  
15 denial of certification, the court held that the plaintiffs’ approach—to focus initially on evidence  
16 of the defendants’ patterns and practices—was proper, and that the plaintiffs’ pattern-and-  
17 practice evidence demonstrated sufficient commonality of legal and factual issues. Thus, the  
18 trial court erred in assuming that significant individual inquiries would be necessary to provide  
19 class relief.

20 Similarly, the City’s pattern of conduct, in how it has used and managed Muni Water  
21 revenue, will be central both to the contested issues, and to the calculation of any systemic relief.  
22 As to how fees have been used, the City will bear the burden of proof. Cal. Const., art. XIII D,  
23 section 6(b), *subd.* (5) (“In any legal action contesting the validity of a fee or charge, the burden  
24 shall be on the agency to demonstrate compliance with this Article.”). The City, rather than  
25 individual plaintiffs, will need to demonstrate how funds collected to provide water and water-  
26 related services were actually used. The class action procedure is superior to answer the question  
27 posed by this lawsuit—what did the City do, or not do, with the millions of dollars it charged

1 City residents for their water.

2 **C. Class Action Will Benefit The Litigants, The Courts, And The Public.**

3 California courts have also considered whether a class action will result in substantial  
4 benefits to the litigants and the court. *Daar, supra*, 67 Cal.2d at 715. Class actions are favorable  
5 where the question is one of common or general interest to many persons. *San Diego Etc. Boy*  
6 *Scouts of America v. City of Escondido* (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 189, 195 (a Boy Scout Council had  
7 standing to sue a city in a representative capacity to enforce a charitable trust).

8 These considerations favor class treatment. *Plata v. San Jose* is a public interest lawsuit,  
9 addressing issues of a constitutional dimension, concerning the use of funds collected for  
10 management of a vital public resource—water. Because this litigation addresses matters of  
11 interest to approximately ten (10) percent of San Jose’s residents, and this case will resolve class  
12 members’ shared interests, adjudication by class action would benefit the litigants, the courts,  
13 and the public.

14 **D. The Parties Have Already Litigated This Case for More Than One (1) Year.**

15 The stage of this case has progressed beyond any known individual lawsuit against the  
16 City concerning the matters at issue. While there has yet been no finding on the merits of this  
17 lawsuit, plaintiffs’ case has considerably advanced since its filing in January, 2014. The parties  
18 commenced discovery more than one (1) year ago. (McManis Decl., ¶ 11.) The City has  
19 propounded extensive “merits discovery” requests, issuing 153 Special Interrogatories and 78  
20 Requests for Production, with 243 total requests, not counting two (2) sets of Form  
21 Interrogatories. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiffs have obtained multiple favorable discovery rulings against the  
22 City, including two (2) orders compelling further discovery from the City, and an order denying  
23 a motion for a protective order filed by the City. (*Id.*, ¶ 12.)

24 The advanced stage of *Plata v. San Jose* favors class certification, before any individual  
25 suit is filed that would duplicate the efforts of the parties and Court.

26 **E. Class Action Procedure Will Facilitate Management of The Recovery.**

27 Courts “consider whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of  
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1 certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.” *Sav-On*  
2 *Drug Stores, supra*, 34 Cal.4th at 327. The Court is well equipped to handle distribution of any  
3 recovered revenue, or to order the City to use the funds at issue only for authorized purposes.  
4 For example, when it has not been practicable for class action judgments to compensate class  
5 members according to their respective damages, courts have awarded damages in ways that  
6 benefit as many of the class members as possible. *See In re Microsoft I-V Cases* (2006) 135  
7 Cal.App.4th 706, 716; *see also In re Vitamin Cases* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 820, 826 (proposed  
8 settlement fund was to be distributed to charitable, governmental, and nonprofit organizations).

9 **F. Class Action Is Particularly Appropriate Given Plaintiffs’ Declaratory And**  
10 **Injunctive Relief Requests.**

11 A class action is also proper where the party against whom relief is sought has acted or  
12 refused to act on grounds generally applicable to a class of persons, so that declaratory or  
13 injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole is appropriate. *See Capitol People First v.*  
14 *Department of Developmental Services* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 695; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.  
15 23(b)(2). In the present matter, plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are  
16 central to this case. Plaintiffs seek a directive from the Court over what the City is to do with  
17 certain money collected from Muni Water customers.

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
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**CONCLUSION**

It is said “water flows to money.”<sup>1</sup> In the City of San Jose, money flows from Water. The City’s use of its water company as a piggybank must stop. The funds taken from Muni Water customers, and applied to unlawful uses, must be returned to Muni Water and employed only for authorized purposes. Because the proposed class is clearly defined, and the class members share a community of interest, they should be allowed to proceed together in this lawsuit.

DATED: April 24, 2015

McMANIS FAULKNER



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Attorneys for Plaintiffs,

RAYMOND AND MICHELLE PLATA,  
individually and on behalf of other members  
of a class of similarly situated residents and  
taxpayers

<sup>1</sup> *Water: the Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and Civilization*, by Steven Solomon, Harper Perennial, 2011 Ed., p. 336; *Cadillac Desert*, by Marc Reisner, Penguin Books, 1993 Ed., p. 12.



# EXHIBIT 6

**E-FILED**

May 15, 2015 2:46 PM

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Chief Executive Officer/Clerk  
Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara  
Case #1-14-CV-258879 Filing #G-72705  
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15 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

16 RAYMOND AND MICHELLE PLATA,  
17 individually and on behalf of other members  
18 of a class of similarly situated residents and  
19 taxpayers,

20 Plaintiffs,

21 v.

22 CITY OF SAN JOSE, a California municipal  
23 corporation, and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

24 Defendants.

Case Number: 1-14-CV-258879

**DEFENDANT CITY OF SAN JOSE'S  
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR  
CLASS CERTIFICATION**

Date: May 29, 2015

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept.: 1

Judge: Honorable Peter H. Kirwan

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**I. INTRODUCTION**

1  
2 This Court should deny the motion by plaintiffs Raymond and Michelle Plata to certify this  
3 matter as a class action because they have failed to meet their burden of proof under section 382 of the  
4 Code of Civil Procedure. They present virtually no evidence in support of their motion, other than  
5 evidence that demonstrates that City budgets related to the San José Municipal Water System (“Muni  
6 Water”) and the General Fund have always been available to the public. The Platas have failed to  
7 proffer any evidence, much less substantial evidence, that: the proposed class is ascertainable, common  
8 questions of fact predominate, defenses are typical, Michelle Plata would adequately represent the class,  
9 the proposed class is manageable, and a class action is otherwise a superior method of addressing the  
10 allegations. Further, the proposed class is overbroad to the extent it seeks relief for alleged  
11 overpayments made before November 4, 2012.

**II. BACKGROUND**

**A. SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL WATER SYSTEM**

**1. Billing and Late Fees**

12  
13 Muni Water provides residential water services to single family homes and apartment  
14 buildings. Muni Water residential customers are billed based on: the amount of water the individual  
15 customer uses during that particular billing cycle, the amount of water relative to the inclining tiered  
16 rate structure, the zone where the customer’s residential service is located, and the size of their water  
17 meter. (Declaration of Jeff Provenzano [“Provenzano Dec.”] ¶ 4.) Muni Water customers are billed  
18 approximately every two months. (Declaration of Stephen Gaffaney [“Gaffaney Dec.”] ¶ 6.) Some  
19 multi-unit buildings are served by single meters; others by multiple meters. (Provenzano Dec. ¶ 8.)

20  
21 If a customer fails to pay the account balance on the Muni Water bill by the due date set forth on  
22 the billing statement, a late fee is assessed. (Gaffaney Dec. ¶ 6.) Although the precise number of  
23 customers who are assessed penalty fees varies each year, during fiscal years 2012-2013 and 2013-2014,  
24 approximately 15% of Muni Water customers were assessed late penalty fees; approximately 85% paid  
25 their accounts in a timely manner and consequently were not assessed late penalty fees. (*Id.* ¶ 11.) The  
26 percentage of customers who have had their services shut off for non-payment of Muni Water bills is  
27 approximately 9 to 11% per annum during the period of July 2006 through the present. (*Id.* ¶ 12.)  
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**2. Billing System**

Effective July 1, 2006, the City switched to a new billing system for its Muni Water customers. (Gaffaney Dec. ¶ 4; Declaration of Vijay Sammeta [Sammeta Dec.] ¶¶ 2-3.) The City is unable to access the billing statements generated before July 1, 2006 for Muni Water customers because the former legacy system has been decommissioned and archived records are no longer available. (Gaffaney Dec. ¶ 4; Sammeta Dec. ¶ 4.)

**3. Customer Turnover**

On a bi-monthly billing basis, there are approximately 24,800 Water Service billing statements sent to the Muni Water customers. (Gaffaney Dec. ¶ 7.) Since 2006, the customer base increased at an approximate rate of 3% per annum. (*Id.*) The turnover rate of Muni Water customers is approximately 9% per annum for the period July 2006 through the present. In other words, there is an approximately 9% change in the customer base (i.e., when customers move away and others move to the service area). (*Id.* ¶ 13.) The City does not keep track of the addresses or whereabouts of former Muni Water customers. (*Id.* ¶ 14.)

**4. The Billing History for Raymond and Michelle Plata**

Raymond and Michelle Plata have been customers of the City's Municipal Water System since 2006. (Gaffaney Dec. ¶ 10.) Late penalty charges were assessed on the Platas' account due to failure to pay the Muni Water bills multiple times: two times in fiscal year 2006-2007; five times in fiscal year 2007-2008; two times in fiscal year 2008-2009; four times in fiscal year 2009-2010; six times in fiscal year 2010-2011; five times in fiscal year 2011-2012; one time in fiscal year 2012-2013; and four times in fiscal year 2013-2014. (*Id.* ¶ 11.) Their water service has been shut off two times for non-payment of Muni Water charges. (*Id.* ¶ 12.)

**B. THE CITY COUNCIL DETERMINES WATER RATES THROUGH A PUBLIC PROCESS, WITH BUDGETS AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC**

Muni Water residential customers are sent a notice of proposed increase in rates in potable water service, if any. The notice advises customers of the date and time the City Council will conduct a public hearing on a proposed increase to Muni Water potable water rates. (Provenzano Dec. ¶ 7.) Notices of

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these public hearings are published in the *San Jose Mercury News*. (See Declaration of Suzanne Guzetta ¶¶ 2-4, Ex. A-C.) City Council agendas are available on line. (Declaration of Sylvie Roussel, ¶¶ 3-4.) Meetings are open to public and live-streamed. (*Id.* ¶¶ 2, 5.)

The City Council determines the rates and charges for potable water service at meetings that have been noticed and are open to the public; the Council votes on a resolution regarding these rates and charges. (See Provenzano Dec. ¶ 6.) The City Council also approves City budgets through a public process. (Declaration of Margaret McCahan [McCahan Dec.] ¶ 4.) As part of the budget approval process, the Council also approves transfers of funds from the Water Utility Fund to the General Fund. (*Id.*) All of these approvals are made through a public process; documents pertaining to this process are available to the public. (Roussel Dec. ¶¶ 3-4.)

Each fiscal year the City publishes an Adopted Operating Budget, which is available to the public. (McCahan Dec. ¶ 5.) City fiscal years begin on July 1st of a year and end on June 30th of the following year. (*Id.* ¶ 2.) These adopted operating budgets include information about all City operating funds (including the General Fund and Muni Water Fund) and transfers from the Muni Water Fund to the General Fund. (See McCahan Dec. ¶¶ 3-4, 10-13, Ex. A-D.) The City has not made any “rate of return” or “enterprise fund in-lieu” transfers from the Water Fund to the General Fund from fiscal year 2009-2010 through the present. (*Id.* ¶¶ 8-9.) When rate of return and enterprise fund in-lieu transfers were made from the Water to the General Fund, they were identified in the public budget documents. (*Id.* ¶¶ 10-13, Ex. A-D.)

**III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

On November 4, 2013, Raymond and Michelle Plata filed a government claim with the City of San Jose. (Declaration of Elisa Tolentino [“Tolentino Dec.”], ¶¶ 2-3, Ex. A-B.) On January 10, 2014, Raymond and Michelle Plata filed this lawsuit. On February 3, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

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**IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

**A. PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED FROM SEEKING CERTIFICATION AS TO CLAIMS THAT PRE-DATE NOVEMBER 2012**

**1. Compliance with the Government Claims Act Is a Condition Precedent to Filing a Lawsuit**

The class claims, if any are certified, must be limited to alleged wrongdoing that occurred from November 4, 2012, to the present, pursuant to the Government Claims Act, which sets forth when and how a local government entity may be sued. (*Gov. Code §§810, et seq.*) The claim presentation requirement applies to all claims for money or damages against local governments. The timely presentation of a claim “is not merely a procedural requirement, but is, as this court long ago concluded, ‘a condition precedent to plaintiffs maintaining an action against defendant . . .’” (*Shirk v. Vista Unified School District* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 216, quoting *State of California v. Superior Court [Bodde]* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240 [additional citations omitted]. See *DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 991 [The intent of the Government Claims Act “is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances”]; *City of Stockton v. Superior Court* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 [failure to present a timely claim bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit].)

Public policy considerations, such as providing the public entity the opportunity to address a situation without delay, affirm the underlying rationale for the claim presentation requirement. (*Shirk, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at 219.) Prompt notice of a claim “permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing board to settle meritorious disputes without incurring the added cost of litigation, and gives it time to engage in appropriate budgetary planning.” (*Id.*, citations omitted.)

**2. The Government Claims Act Applies to Class Actions**

Government Code section 911.2 requires that all claims for money, except claims for personal injury or death, be filed within one year of accrual of the cause of action. (*Gov. Code § 911.2(a).*) In addition, the Government Claims Act applies to class actions. (See *McWilliams v. Long Beach* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 618 [Government Claims Act applies to taxpayer class action claims for refund of allegedly illegally-collected tax]; *Ardon v. City of Los Angeles* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 241 [Government Claims Act applies to class claims for tax refunds against a municipality]; *City of San Jose v. Superior Court* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 457 [Government Claims Act applied to class claimants alleging nuisance].)

1 Here, the Platas seek a refund of their alleged overpayments for water services. (FAC, p. 1:20-  
2 21; ¶ 36, Prayer for Relief ¶ 1.) They also seek general and special damages. (*Id.*, Prayer for Relief ¶  
3 4.) As a result, Government Code section 911.2 limits the Platas and the potential class to recovery of  
4 alleged overpayments within the one year of the date the Platas filed their claim on behalf of the class  
5 with the City.

6 **3. Claims Arising Before November 4, 2012 Are Time-Barred Under the**  
7 **Government Claims Act**

8 On November 4, 2013, Michelle and Raymond Plata filed a government claim on behalf of  
9 “Raymond Plata and Michelle Plata, and the class of residents and taxpayers to which the Platas are  
10 representative members.” (Tolentino Dec. ¶¶ 2-3, Ex. A-B.) Under Government Code section 911.2,  
11 a claim must be filed within one year of the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code §911.2(a).)  
12 Class and plaintiffs’ claims for refunds and monetary damages that accrued before November 4, 2012  
13 are time-barred.<sup>1</sup>

14 **4. Courts Uniformly Impose Time Limitations on Actions Seeking Refunds**

15 Courts uniformly limit the time frame that a party may seek a refund for an alleged  
16 overpayment to a government entity. That same rule applies here. For example, in *Utility Audit Co. v.*  
17 *City of Los Angeles* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 950, plaintiff brought claims on behalf of residents of Los  
18 Angeles who contended that they had been overcharged for sewer service charges. They claimed that  
19 they either paid for sewer services they did not receive at all or overpaid for the services they did  
20 receive. The Court noted that the sewer fees at issue were user fees. (*Id.* at 957.) The City argued that  
21 the Government Claims Act applied, including Government Code section 911.2, which requires a  
22 claimant to present a claim within one year of the accrual of the cause of action.

23 The *Utility Audit* Court held that the one year claim filing requirement in Government Code  
24 section 911.2 applied to claims for a refund of excessive sewer fees where the consumer received the  
25 services. Each payment or overpayment of the fees gave rise to a new claim, and “claims arising more  
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27 <sup>1</sup> The Declaration of James McManis in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification attached a copy of a  
28 purported class action claim. (*See* Ex. T.). The claim fails to identify a class representative. As explained by the California  
Supreme Court: “. . . to satisfy the claims statutes, the claim must provide the name address, and other specified information  
concerning the *representative* plaintiff and then sufficient information to identify and make ascertainable the class itself.”  
(*City of San Jose v. Superior Court* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 at 457, emphasis in original.)

1 than one year prior to presentation of the claim or more than two years prior to suit are barred.”  
2 (*Utility Audit Co., supra*, 112 Cal.App.4th at 960-61.) It added: “Because the claims involve a  
3 continuing wrong, with a new claim arising with each overpayment, the provisions effectively limit  
4 each claim to one year.” (*Id.* at 961, citations omitted.)

5 In *Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, the California  
6 Supreme Court confirmed that when a disputed charge is imposed on a repeated basis, each imposition  
7 of the charge triggers the applicable time limitation. (*Id.* at 812.) In *La Habra*, the plaintiffs  
8 challenged a tax imposed by the City based on Proposition 62, which requires taxpayer approval before  
9 a general tax is imposed.<sup>2</sup> (*Id.* at 813.) They sought a declaration that the charges were invalid, an  
10 injunction against enforcement of the ordinance that imposed the tax, and a writ of mandate  
11 compelling the City of La Habra to cease collecting the tax until it was approved by the voters. (*Id.*)  
12 La Habra asserted that the plaintiffs were barred from pursuing their claims because they did not file  
13 claims within three years of when the City enacted the ordinance that imposed the challenged tax.<sup>3</sup> (*La*  
14 *Habra, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at 814-15.)

15 The Court recognized that the enactment of the ordinance represented one event that gave rise  
16 to a potential cause of action but held that the ongoing collection of the charges gave rise to additional  
17 potential causes of action. (*Id.* at 819.) It explained that each imposition of the challenged charge  
18 constituted the accrual of a separate action, noting that “if, as alleged, the tax is illegal, its continued  
19 imposition and collection is an ongoing violation, upon which the limitations period begins anew with  
20 each collection.” (*Id.* at 812.)

21 The Supreme Court articulated the important policy consideration that its “decision in this case  
22 does not, in any event, subject municipalities to limitless claims for refund of illegal taxes.” (*La Habra*,  
23 *supra*, 25 Cal.4th at 825.) Rather, its holding related “only to injuries occurring in the statutory three-  
24 year period before suit is brought and applies only to plaintiffs injured by tax collections within the  
25 three year period.” (*Id.*)

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<sup>2</sup> The case before this Court does not involve a tax or Proposition 62.

<sup>3</sup> In that case, the parties agreed that the applicable statute of limitations was three years, as the action was one based on liability created by a statute, Government Code section 53723. (*La Habra, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at 815, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 338(a).) Here, by contrast, the action is limited to one year before the Platas filed their government claim.

1 Thus, the claims of the Platas and their putative class must be limited to purported injuries that  
2 fall within the time requirements of the Government Claims Act, in other words, to each overpayment  
3 made within one year of when the Platas filed a government claim.<sup>4</sup> Their claims must be limited to  
4 any alleged overpayments made during the period from November 4, 2012, to the present.

5 **5. The Information Regarding the Allegedly Illegal Transfers Has Been Available**  
6 **to the Public Since 1997**

7 The Platas will likely argue that they should be allowed to pursue claims dating back to 1997  
8 because they did not know about the allegedly illegal transfers from the Muni Water Fund to the  
9 General Fund. This argument has no merit because City budgets and transfers between funds have  
10 always been available to the Platas and the general public. (See *Shively v. Bozanich* (2003) 31 Cal.4th  
11 1230, 1253 [defamation cause of action accrued on date of book containing allegedly defamatory  
12 statements was published, not when plaintiff became aware of the book's content]; *Utility Cost*  
13 *Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water District* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1185, 1197; *NBCUniversal*  
14 *Media, LLC v. Superior Court* (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222 [plaintiffs' causes of action accrued at the  
15 first airing of the television show allegedly based on their idea, not when plaintiffs personally viewed  
16 the show one year later]; *Regents of University of California v. City and County of San Francisco*  
17 (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1116-7.)

18 As set forth above in the background section, the Platas and all rate payers receive notice of  
19 when the City Council hears potential rate increases. City Council hearings regarding budgets, as well  
20 as documents reflecting transfers from the Muni Water fund to the General Fund, are available to the  
21 public. (McCahan Dec. ¶¶ 4-5.) Each fiscal year, the City publishes adopted operating budgets, which  
22 include the information plaintiffs claim reveal the City's allegedly illegal conduct. (McCahan Dec. ¶  
23 5.) The time limitations period therefore is not tolled because the information has always been  
24 available to the public, including the Platas.

25  
26 <sup>4</sup> The time limits for Plaintiffs' second cause of action, which seeks declaratory relief, is the same that applies to the first  
27 cause of action because both arise out of the same underlying events: "If a breach has occurred, and the appropriate statute  
28 has begun to run on an ordinary action for 'coercive relief' either in contract or tort, or legal or equitable, the same statute  
begins to run at the same time on the declaratory remedy, and both actions are extinguished at the same time." (3 Witkin,  
*Cal. Procedure* (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 685(b), p. 904.) An underlying purpose of this rule is that a party should not be  
able to circumvent the statute of limitations by framing a claim as a declaratory relief action. (*Id. Accord Engstrom v.*  
*Kallins* (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 773, 784.)

1 In fact, plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of documents that confirm this very point.  
2 They seek judicial notice of “statements of source and use of funds for the Water Utility Fund from the  
3 City’s adopted operating budgets” that include information from 1997 to 2015. (See Ex. C-R attached  
4 to McManis Dec. and Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice [“Plaintiffs’ RJN”] ¶¶2-17.) Plaintiffs  
5 acknowledge that these documents are “published by the City of San Jose and available on its  
6 website.” (Plaintiffs’ RJN, p. 4:9-14.)

7 Moreover, the Platas argue that these “public records show that, for every year since 1997, the  
8 City has transferred large amounts of money from the Muni Water fund to the City’s general fund,”  
9 which they contend “were for general governmental purposes, and were not permitted by Proposition  
10 218.” (Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification [“Motion”] at 9.) Thus by their own admission, the  
11 information regarding the purportedly illegal transfers since 1997 has always been available.<sup>5</sup>

12 Case law confirms that accrual of claims are not delayed when the information at issue is  
13 generally available to the public, even if the individual plaintiff is not aware of that information. For  
14 example, in *Shively v. Bozanich*, the California Supreme Court explained: “We can see no justification  
15 for applying the discovery rule to delay the accrual of plaintiff’s causes of action beyond the point at  
16 which their factual basis became accessible to plaintiff to the same degree as it was accessible to every  
17 other member of the public.” (*Shively, supra*, 31 Cal.4th at 1253.) Similarly, the Court of Appeal in  
18 *NBCUniversal, supra*, 225 Cal.App.4th at 1234, held: “the discovery rule does not operate to delay  
19 accrual of a cause of action ‘beyond the point at which [its] factual basis became accessible to plaintiff  
20 to the same degree as it was accessible to every other member of the public.’”

21 Court decisions involving government budgets and charges for service reach the same  
22 conclusion. In *Regents of University of California v. City and County of San Francisco* (2004) 115  
23 Cal.App.4th 1109, the Regents of the University of California sued San Francisco for a refund of  
24 allegedly excessive water and sewer charges. (*Id.* at 1110.) In an attempt to avoid the 120-day time  
25 limitation that applied there, the Regents asserted that they were unable to discern from the rate  
26 increases how much of the utility charges went to challenged capital expenses. (*See id.* at 1116.)

27  
28 <sup>5</sup> The City disagrees with plaintiffs’ characterization of these documents but agrees that Exhibits C through R represent excerpts from City records that are available to the public, including on the City website.

1 The Court rejected this argument because the Regents had waited more than three years after the  
2 Board of Supervisors passed a resolution increasing the rates before filing the action; the Regents  
3 failed to take the initiative to make inquiries of the City in a timely manner. (*Id.* at 1116.)

4 In *Utility Cost Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water District* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1185, the  
5 plaintiff asserted that the water district's charges were excessive because some of the charges  
6 constituted improper capital facilities fees. (*Id.* at 1188.) The plaintiff contended that the accrual  
7 period should be tolled because the water district allegedly had "buried" or hidden improper fees. (*Id.*  
8 at 1197.) The California Supreme Court rejected this argument. It determined that statutory deadline  
9 for filing the action began to run when the entity published this information about its fee. (*Id.*) It  
10 explained that the plaintiff "may not gain the right, long after the fact, to second-guess the minutiae of  
11 Indian Wells's complex accounting decisions simply by making bare allegations of hidden or  
12 mischaracterized capital facilities fees." (*Id.* at 1198.)

13 The Plasas are barred from now challenging transfers that took place years ago, given that  
14 information about transfers from the Muni Water fund has always been available to the public.

15 **B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF OF**  
16 **COMING FORTH WITH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE**  
17 **ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A CLASS ACTION**

18 Under section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, class actions are authorized "when the  
19 question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous,  
20 and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the  
21 benefit of all." The burden is on the party seeking class certification to meet the requirements under  
22 this section. (*Morgan v. Wet Seal, Inc.* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1354; *Soderstedt v. CBIZ*  
23 *Southern California, LLC* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 133, 154 ["A party seeking class certification  
24 bears the burden of satisfying the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 382"].) Further a  
25 "party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule [Rule  
26 23]—that is, he must be prepared to provide that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties,  
27 common questions of law or fact, etc." (*Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes* (2011) 131 S.Ct 2541,  
28 2551.) The party seeking class certification must present "substantial evidence of the class action  
requisites." (*Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, 1106 ["certification



1 ruling not supported by substantial evidence cannot stand”]; *see Soderstedt, supra*, 197 Cal.App.4th  
2 at 154 [trial court “is entitled to consider the ‘totality of the evidence in making [the] determination’  
3 of whether a ‘plaintiff has presented substantial evidence of the class action requisites’”].)

4 Plaintiffs rely heavily on their unverified FAC to support their request for class certification.  
5 (Motion at pp. 3:3-8, 3:25-5:6.) While a court looks to a complaint to frame the issues, the plaintiff  
6 has the burden of providing evidence to demonstrate that it meets the requirements for class  
7 certification. An unverified complaint has absolutely no evidentiary value in this context because “. . .  
8 pleadings are allegations, not evidence, and do not suffice to satisfy a party’s evidentiary burden. (*San*  
9 *Diego Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Diego* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1736, 1744, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d  
10 253).” (*Soderstedt, supra*, 197 Cal.App.4th at 154-55.)

11 Other items are not supported by the evidence cited. For example, plaintiffs allege: “The bills  
12 the Platas and class members received do not provide any facts or information that would have  
13 required plaintiffs or the class to inquire into whether the City was utilizing Muni Water in an unlawful  
14 manner,” but the source they cite does refer to class members. (Motion at 6:1-4. *See also* City of San  
15 José’s Objections to Plata Declaration.) Nor is there any evidence to support the statement that “the  
16 City misrepresented the facts.” (Motion at 6:4-5.) Plaintiffs cite paragraph 16 of Mr. Plata’s  
17 declaration as the source of this “fact,” but there is no paragraph 16 in the Plata Declaration.

18 **C. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO**  
19 **ASCERTAINABILITY**

20 Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of providing substantial evidence that the  
21 proposed class is ascertainable. In fact, they have proffered absolutely no evidence on this point.  
22 Under this element, a class must be defined in a manner that is “precise, objective, and presently  
23 ascertainable.” (*Sevidal v. Target Corp.* (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 919.) In evaluating whether a  
24 class is ascertainable under section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a court considers the class  
25 definition, size of the class, and means available to identify the class. (*Thompson v. Automobile*  
26 *Club of Southern California* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 719, 728.)

27 The ascertainability requirement is satisfied “if the potential class members may be identified  
28 without unreasonable expense or time and given notice of the litigation, and the proposed class

1 definition offers and objective means of identifying those who will be bound by the results of the  
2 litigation.” (*Sevidal, supra*, 189 Cal.App.4th at 919. *Accord Thompson, supra*, 217 Cal.App.4th at  
3 728 [“‘Class members are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily identified without unreasonable  
4 expense or time by reference to official records”].) In addition, “class certification can be denied for  
5 lack of ascertainability when the proposed definition is overbroad and the plaintiff offers no means by  
6 which only those class members who have claims can be identified from those who should not be  
7 included in the class.” (*Thompson, supra*, 217 Cal.App.4th at 728.)

8       In *Thompson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, supra*, the plaintiff challenged the  
9 Automobile Club’s policy related to membership renewal. The Automobile Club presented evidence  
10 showing that the proposed class was overbroad because it included some Club members who would  
11 not be entitled to relief. (*Thompson, supra*, 217 Cal.App.4th at 729.) The Court concluded that the  
12 class, which included “everyone who renewed late after July 17, 2005, regardless of any other facts,”  
13 was not ascertainable. (*Id.* at 730.) It based this conclusion on evidence the class was overbroad  
14 because a significant number of the purported class would have no right to recover. (*Id.*) Although the  
15 Auto Club provided a spreadsheet with over 6,000 pages of records regarding membership, it did not  
16 have records to ascertain certain categories of proposed class members. The Court did not find the  
17 plaintiff’s criticism of the Auto Club for “shoddy record-keeping” persuasive. (*Id.* at 731.) It  
18 concluded that the trial court “properly exercised its discretion when it concluded the proposed class  
19 was not ascertainable.” (*Id.*)

20       In *Sotelo v. MediaNews Group, Inc.* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 639, the Court also held that the  
21 proposed class was not ascertainable. There, newspaper carriers and distributors (“appellants”) filed a  
22 proposed class action against newspaper entities for fraud and wage and hour violations; they claimed  
23 that they were actually employees and had been miscategorized as independent contractors. In support  
24 of their motion for class certification, the appellants submitted declarations of the named plaintiffs and  
25 eleven contractors, as well as excerpts of deposition transcripts. According to the evidence, the  
26 newspaper entities had records identifying approximately 5,000 individuals who had contracts with the  
27 newspapers but there were additional putative class members whose identities the newspapers did not  
28 have. As a result, “the actual size of the proposed class is unknown.” (*Id.* at 646.) The trial court

1 denied the motion for class certification.

2 The Court of Appeal affirmed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded  
3 that the proposed class was not ascertainable. Appellants had submitted a declaration from the vice  
4 president of a class action administration service explaining that its notice plan that would reach more  
5 than 90 percent of the class members. But the Court found that plan to be insufficient because it did  
6 not address how appellants planned to provide notice to “the unknown number of those who remain  
7 unidentified.” (*Sotelo, supra*, 207 Cal.App.4th at 649.) The Court explained that “For those not  
8 already identified by respondents’ records, there is not an objective means of determining whether an  
9 individual is a member of the proposed class.” (*Id.* at 650.)

10 The Plasas seek certification of a class that includes rate payers from January 1997 to the  
11 present.<sup>6</sup> Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden as to ascertainability. The proposed class  
12 definition is fatally overbroad. They have put forward no evidence or means by which to identify  
13 thousands of putative class members who no longer receive Muni Water services. Nor have they  
14 proffered any evidence, much less argument, explaining how they how they would provide notice of  
15 their lawsuit to the entire class. Other rate payers may be entitled to no relief at all, even under  
16 plaintiffs’ theories.

17 Indeed, the only evidence before this Court demonstrates that the putative class is *not*  
18 ascertainable. The City changed its database in 2006, and thus does not have billing records regarding  
19 Muni Water customers that pre-date approximately July 2006. (Gaffaney Dec. ¶ 4; Sammeta Dec. ¶ 4.)  
20 In addition, there is approximately 9% turnover in the Muni Water customers each year. (Gaffaney  
21 Dec. ¶ 13.) The City does not track the whereabouts of former customers. (*Id.* ¶14.) Next, the class  
22 description is overbroad. It includes rate payers who would have no standing to bring claims for  
23 refunds given the claims requirements of the Government Claims Act, as discussed above. (*See*  
24 *generally In re Tobacco II Cases* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 318-19 [questions of standing in class actions  
25 involves the standing of the class representative].) Others would have no right to recovery for the  
26 reasons set forth below in the discussion regarding community of interests.

27  
28 <sup>6</sup> Plaintiffs claim that the City violated Proposition 218 and seek recovery from January 1, 1997. However, Proposition 218 did not go into effect until July 1, 1997. (Cal. Const. Art. XIII § 5.) If, for some reason the Court were to allow claims dating back to 1997, the earliest time frame of the class could be July 1, 1997.

1 Plaintiffs cite to no cases that would alter the fact that they have failed to demonstrate that the  
2 class is ascertainable. For example, in *Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc.* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th  
3 1290, even though the case was just at the pleadings stage, the plaintiffs provided a method for  
4 identifying the class members. They pointed to sales receipts and credit card statements, which could  
5 be cross-referenced to records the defendant maintained. (*Id.* at 1302.) Here, plaintiffs have offered  
6 no such methodology, even in theory. Nor does the City have customer bills before July 2006. In  
7 *Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1976) 67 Cal.2d 695, the Court's comment that class members had not yet  
8 been identified "at this point" refers to its context: the pleadings stage. The Court did not comment on  
9 or have before it a motion for class certification. *Daar* therefore is inapposite.

10 **D. THE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION MUST BE DENIED BECAUSE**  
11 **PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF TO**  
12 **DEMONSTRATE A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST**

13 Plaintiffs have the burden of proffering substantial evidence that there is a well-defined  
14 community of interest among class members. There are three aspects to the community of interest  
15 requirement: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact, (2) class representatives with  
16 claims or defenses typical of the class, and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent  
17 the class. (*Brinker Restaurant Corp. v Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004. *See also Save-On,*  
18 *Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319; *City of San Jose v. Superior Court* (1974) 12 Cal.3d  
19 477.) Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden as to all three.

20 **1. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Meet Their Burden to Provide Substantial Evidence of**  
21 **Predominant Common Questions of Law or Fact**

22 Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there are questions of law or fact common to the  
23 putative class. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, "Commonality requires the plaintiff to  
24 demonstrate that the class members 'have suffered the same injury' [citation omitted]. This does  
25 not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law." (*Wal-Mart*  
26 *Stores, Inc. v. Dukes* (2011) 131 S.Ct 2541, 2551.) Nor is it sufficient for plaintiff "merely to show  
27 that some common issues exist, but, rather, to place substantial evidence in the record that common  
28 issues predominate." (*Lockheed Martin v. Superior Court* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, 1108. *Accord*  
*Morgan v. Wet Seal, Inc.* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1354-55.)

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a. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Meet Their Burden that Class Members Have Suffered the Same Injuries

As an initial matter, plaintiffs offer only vague allegations regarding what purportedly illegal transfers – which allegedly resulted in their injuries of being overcharged – are at issue here. It therefore is difficult to see how they have met their burden of proof or to respond. It appears that they are concerned with the following categories of transfers: rate of return, enterprise fund in lieu fees, late fees, and overhead. (Motion at 9.)

Based on the vague allegations in the FAC and Platas’ motion, each of the potential class members has suffered different alleged injuries. Common questions of law or fact do not predominate in this case, and there is no well-defined community of interest. (*See Kennedy v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 799, 811 [court found predominance of individual issues, including applicability of statute of limitations, which required “examination of the viability of each plaintiff’s claim”].) For example, rate of return and enterprise fund in-lieu fee transfers have not been made since June 2009, so individuals who moved to the service area and became customers after this date could not have suffered any alleged injury. Because only approximately 15% of Muni Water customers typically pay late fees, transfers related to late fees are not common to the putative class. Further, late fees have only been transferred from the Muni Water Fund in the past four years, so any class member who moved away before that time could not have suffered injuries related to late fees.

Rather, the class members’ injuries here would depend on a range of variables that would require individual calculations and evaluations. These individual factors include: the dates during which they were customers, location of the residence, the size of their water meter, the amount of water used during each two-month billing cycle, amount of water and charges at each tier during each billing period, and whether they paid late fees. (Provenzano Dec. ¶ 4.) Each year, City Council adopts a new budget and determines what types and amounts of transfers to and from different funds are to be made. The amounts vary each year.

In *Lockheed Martin v. Superior Court* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, the California Supreme Court determined that plaintiffs failed to show class members suffered similar injuries. The plaintiffs alleged

1 that defendant discharged dangerous chemicals that contaminated city's drinking water. The proposed  
2 class consisted of residents with a certain level of exposure to water contaminated with any of the  
3 chemicals, within a specified geographical limit. Although the plaintiffs showed that many residents  
4 were exposed to toxins, the Court determined it was unlikely that all class members exposed to  
5 contaminated water sustained the same damages. The duration of exposure to polluted water would  
6 vary among members, as some potential class members lived in the area for short periods of time and  
7 others for many years. Additionally, the severity of exposure among the class members varied,  
8 depending on the amount of water they used. (*Id.* at 1108-09.) The Court explained that a plaintiff  
9 must do more than "merely [] show that some common issues exist, but, rather, to place substantial  
10 evidence in the record that common issues predominate." (*Id.* at 1108.)

11 In *Hale v. Sharp Healthcare* (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 40, an uninsured patient filed a putative  
12 class action against a hospital, claiming that the hospital unfairly charged uninsured patients more for  
13 emergency services than it charged insured patients. At issue was "whether there is any common proof  
14 to establish entitlement to or, as the trial court put it, the 'right to recover' damages." (*Id.*) The  
15 declarations and other evidence submitted showed that some patients paid nothing for the care, some  
16 had bills paid or reimbursed by their parties, and other paid negotiated rates. The trial court concluded  
17 that "a trier of fact could not get to the issue of whether any of the class members are entitled to  
18 damages, without undertaking individualized inquires of more than 120,000 patient accounts." (*Id.* at  
19 53.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the  
20 class given that that the class lacked predominantly common questions.

21 The Platas' proposed class lacks predominantly common questions because individualized  
22 inquiries into thousands of customer accounts would be required. Further, many alleged injuries  
23 would be time-barred and some customer account would reveal no injuries under some of plaintiffs'  
24 theories.

25 b. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Demonstrate the Existence of a Policy

26 The Platas' contentions regarding the City's unidentified "pattern and practice" that are the  
27 subject of their lawsuit are unclear. (Motion at 12.) They did not provide any evidence of any  
28 pattern, practice, or policy. While the City may bear the burden of proof at trial regarding how it

1 has complied with Proposition 218, that matter has no bearing on the issue before this Court.

2 In *Morgan v. Wet Seal, Inc.* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1356, the Court considered  
3 plaintiffs' motion for class certification in a case alleging that the employer had an illegal policy of  
4 requiring employees to purchase its clothing as a condition of employment. However, the evidence  
5 showed that the employer's written policies did not require employee to purchase Wet Seal clothing.  
6 (*Id.* at 1356, 1364-65.) As a result, the Court could not rely on a policy but instead would need to  
7 engage in individualized inquiries. (*Id.* at 1365.)

8 To the extent plaintiffs point to San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630(D) to suggest that  
9 the City had a policy of making what they contend to be illegal transfers, they are incorrect. Like  
10 the policies in *Morgan* that did not require employees to buy Wet Seal clothing, the Municipal Code  
11 does not require the City to make rate of return or in lieu franchise fee transfers from the Water  
12 Fund to the General Fund. Rather the Code allows, but does not require, these transfers under  
13 certain circumstances and up to certain amounts. It provides:

14 Monies in the consolidated potable water utility operating fund *may* only be  
15 transferred to the general fund of the city as follows: . . . *If* adequate monies remain  
16 after the expenditures authorized by subsections, A., B., C. and D.1 above, monies  
17 *may* be transferred to the general fund . . . provided that the amount so transferred  
does not exceed [certain requirements] . . .

18 (San Jose Municipal Code § 4.80.630(D), Ex. S to McManis Dec., emphasis added.) Moreover, the  
19 City stopped making rate of return and enterprise fund in-lieu fee transfers in fiscal year 2008-2009.

20 In sum, there is no evidence of a policy or widespread practice of making illegal transfers of  
21 lieu fees and rate of return from Muni Water to the General Fund. Rather, issues individual  
22 questions of fact predominate, as discussed above.

23 c. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Meet their Burden of Demonstrating that the Case is  
24 Susceptible to Awarding Damages on a Class-Wide Basis

25 Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show commonality in that they have failed to offer  
26 any method to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis. (*Comcast*  
27 *Corp. v. Behrend* (2013) 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1433-34 [class certification improper under commonality  
28 element where plaintiffs failed to present a damages model consistent with the liability theory].)

1           **2. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Meet Their Burden of Showing that Their Claims and**  
2           **the Defenses to Their Claims Are Typical**

3           The Platas have not met their burden of establishing that their claims are typical. In fact,  
4 they have presented no evidence in support of this factor. They have been customers since 2006.  
5 Contrary to Mr. Plata's assertion in his declaration, he is not typical in that he does not consistently  
6 pay his bills on time. The Platas have been charged late fees for their failure to pay their bills on  
7 time 29 times. (Gaffaney Dec. ¶ 11.) Approximately 85% of Muni Water customers pay their bills  
8 in a timely manner and therefore are not assessed late fees. (*Id.*)

9           Each individual class member would need to provide individualized proof, given the  
10 numerous variables related to each bill, the amount and types of transfers made by the City in each  
11 particular fiscal year, and the continuously changing number and timing of customers. If this class  
12 were to be certified, the City's liability as to each individual ratepayer would depend on the time  
13 period during which he was a Muni Water customer, location of residence, size of the individual  
14 water meter, the rate tiers implicated, and the amount of water used during each bi-monthly billing  
15 cycle. Then, for each customer, as to each two-month billing period, it would have to be determined  
16 whether any of the purported overcharges related to the particular transfer during that time period,  
17 and how the amounts would be apportioned among customers.

18           The City's defenses will depend on these same factors and individual circumstances of each  
19 rate payer. To the extent these allegedly illegal transfers form the bases of plaintiffs' claims, and  
20 assuming *arguendo* plaintiffs' theories were correct (which the City denies), the City would have a  
21 complete defense as to any requests for refund before November 4, 2012 under the Government  
22 Claims Act. It would also have complete defenses as to alleged overpayments made after July 1,  
23 2009 related to rate of return or enterprise fund in-lieu fees transfers; rate payers who moved to the  
24 service area after that date would have no claims. For customers who had service before and after  
25 that date, the City would raise different defenses depending on the time frames as to each customer  
26 given that they type and amount of transfers differ each year. The City would have different  
27 defenses depending on the year for the additional reason that the courts have changed their  
28 interpretation of Proposition 218 over time. (*See, e.g., Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura* (1986)  
43 Cal.3d 1172 [municipal utilities are entitled to reasonable rate of return and utility rates need not



1 be limited to cost of providing service]; *Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles*  
2 (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 79 [because City water rates are not subject to Proposition 218, *Hansen*  
3 ruling still applies]. *But see Bighorn Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205  
4 [water delivery after connection fee is generally subject to Proposition 218].)

5 **3. Michelle Plata Should Not be a Class Representative Because She Made No**  
6 **Showing that She Would Adequately Represent the Class**

7 Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing through admissible evidence that they are adequate  
8 class representatives. (*Soderstedt v. CBIZ, supra*, 197 Cal.App.4th at 155-56.) Here, Raymond Plata  
9 provided a declaration regarding his ability and readiness to serve as a class representative. However,  
10 Michelle Plata submitted no evidence to show that she would serve as an adequate class representative.  
11 She did not provide any declaration at all, much less one that asserts that she understands the  
12 obligations, explains what she has done to date, or sets forth that she understands and agrees to the  
13 burden of serving as a class representative.

14 **E. A CLASS ACTION IS NOT A SUPERIOR MECHANISM**

15 Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of explaining how a class action is the superior  
16 method of adjudicating the issues before this Court, particularly as to the manageability requirement.  
17 (*Soderstedt, supra*, 197 Cal.App.4th at 156-57.) As the California Supreme Court has stated: “Trial  
18 courts must pay careful attention to manageability when deciding whether to certify a class action.”  
19 (*Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn.* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 29. *Accord Koval v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co.*  
20 (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1050.) Moreover, “In considering whether a class action is a superior device  
21 for resolving a controversy, the manageability of individual issues is just as important as the existence  
22 of common questions uniting the proposed class.” (*Duran, supra*, 59 Cal.4th at 29.) The Supreme  
23 Court also observed: “[A] defense in which liability itself is predicated on factual questions specific to  
24 individual claimants poses a much greater challenge to manageability.” (*Id.* at 30.)

25 The Platas provide absolutely no mention, much less evidence or discussion, of how they  
26 would manage the issues and class members. (*See Morgan, supra*, 210 Cal.App.4th at 1369 [plaintiffs  
27 failed to meet burden regarding manageability where they did “not explain how their list of procedural  
28

1 tools can be used to effectively manage a class action in this case”]; *Dunbar v. Albertson’s Inc.* (2006)  
2 141 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1432 [“It is not sufficient, in any event, simply to mention a procedural tool [to  
3 manage individual issues]; the party seeking class certification must explain how the procedure will  
4 effectively manage the issues in question, and plaintiffs has failed to do so here”].) The Platas  
5 provided no procedural tools whatsoever.

6 As discussed above, the number of individualized inquires that would be needed here to  
7 determine the injuries, if any, suffered by each customer to determine the amount of refund to which  
8 each would be entitled would result in thousands of mini-trials. (See *Soderstedt, supra*, 197  
9 Cal.App.4th at 157; *Bacom v. County of Merced* (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 45, 49 [court sustained  
10 demurrer on ground that class seeking to recover fines and penalty assessment paid where  
11 misdemeanor convictions had later been set aside was unmanageable and “The problem is further  
12 compounded by the fact that should plaintiff and his class prevail, the moneys paid in fines or  
13 assessments have long since been distributed to multitudinous public agencies, the retrieval of which  
14 pose agonizing problems for the agencies concerned”].)

15 Moreover, as the Court *In re Clorox Consumer Litigation* (N.D Calif. 2014) 301 F.R.D. 436,  
16 explained: “The problems Plaintiffs face with ascertainability and predominance are both pertinent to  
17 superiority as well. The immense difficulty of determining class membership will make managing this  
18 case as a class action extremely complicated. That alone may be sufficient to preclude a finding that a  
19 class action is the superior method for resolving this case.” (*Id.* at 449. *Accord Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd.*  
20 (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1353 [“when individual issues of fact predominate over common issues,  
21 as here, ‘a class action would be extremely difficult to manage’”].) The proposed class here likewise  
22 would be extraordinarily difficult to manage.

23 Plaintiffs have also failed to address, much less meet their burden of demonstrating that their  
24 requests for declaratory and injunctive relief would be superior or more effectively litigated as a class  
25 action.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, denial of class certification as to these equitable claims would not result in  
26

27 <sup>7</sup> For example, plaintiffs seek declarations that SJ Municipal Code § 4.80.630 and transfers of funds that are not related to the  
28 maintenance of improvement of the Muni Water system violate Article XIII D of the California Constitution. (FAC, Prayer  
for Relief ¶¶ 2(a), (b).) Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief to: (a) enjoin the City from imposing water charges that exceed  
the cost of providing water services; (b) enjoin illegal transfers of funds from the Water Utility Fund; and (c) enjoin  
enforcement of SJMC section 4.80.630(D)(2). (FAC, Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 3(a)-(c).)

1 multiple actions. No other plaintiff would need to duplicate the efforts if these plaintiffs succeeded on  
2 their requests for injunctive relief enjoining the City from making certain transfers from the Muni  
3 Water Fund in the future.

4 In *Capitol People First v. Department of Developmental Services* (2007)155 Cal.App.4th 676,  
5 which the Platas cite, the plaintiffs asked for relief that differs significantly from that sought here.  
6 There, the proposed class consisted of all California residents with a developmental disability who  
7 were institutionalized. (*Id.* at 685.) The plaintiffs sought to compel authorities to provide facilities  
8 and services for the class members to ensure compliance with the Lanterman Act. (*Id.* at 693-94.) The  
9 Court determined that the class action was superior to the defendants' suggested alternative of holding  
10 individualized hearings. (*Id.* at 701-02.)

11 Nor is plaintiffs' citation to *San Diego Etc. Boy Scouts of America v. City of Escondido* (1971)  
12 14 Cal.App.3d 189, on point. The question there, at the pleadings stage, was whether the San Diego  
13 Council of Boy Scouts had standing to bring suit on behalf of Boy Scouts of a particular district within  
14 its jurisdiction. (*Id.* at 195-96.) Plaintiffs also rely on cases in which courts approved settlements with  
15 cy pres remedies. (Motion at 14.) Those decisions did not address whether classes should be certified.  
16 Rather, both *In re Microsoft I-V Cases* (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 706, and *In re Vitamin Cases* (2003)  
17 107 Cal.App.4th 820, examined the propriety of cy pres distributions as a part of settlements.


18 **V. CONCLUSION**

19 The City respectfully requests that the motion for class certification be denied in its entirety  
20 because plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing ascertainability, common questions  
21 of fact and law, and superiority under section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

22  
23 Respectfully submitted,

24 Dated: May 15, 2015

RICHARD DOYLE, City Attorney

25  
26 By:   
KATHRYN ZOGLIN  
Senior Deputy City Attorney

27  
28 Attorneys for Defendant CITY OF SAN JOSE

# **EXHIBIT 7**

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4 Northridge, CA 91343  
5 Telephone: (818) 368-9642  
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7 William M. Krieg, SBN 066485  
8 Eric M. Kapigian, SBN 238733  
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10 2014 Tulare Street, Suite 700  
11 Fresno, CA 93721  
12 Telephone (559) 441-7485  
13 Facsimile (559) 441-7488

14 Attorneys for Plaintiff, AUDREY MEDRAZO

15 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
16 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

17 AUDREY MEDRAZO, an individual, on  
18 behalf of herself and all others similarly  
19 aggrieved by Defendants' conduct as alleged  
20 herein.

21 Plaintiff.

22 vs.

23 HONDA OF NORTH HOLLYWOOD, a  
24 business entity of unknown form; BILLY  
25 ROBERTSON & SONS, INC., a California  
26 corporation; and DOES 1 through 500,  
27 inclusive.

28 Defendants.

) Case No.: BC 35474-I  
) Complaint Filed: 06/09/2006  
) Assigned to: Hon. David Sotelo Judge  
) Dept.: 40  
)  
) MOTION ON STIPULATED  
) DISTRIBUTION PLAN AND [PROPOSED]  
) ORDER (Facsimile Signatures)  
)  
) Hearing Date: June 27, 2016  
) Time: 8:30 a.m.  
) Dept. 40  
) Reservation Number: 160401117598  
)  
)  
)

UNFORMED COPY  
Superior Court of California  
County of Los Angeles

JUN 27 2016

Sherril H. Carter, Executive Officer, Clerk  
By: Rosalva R. Ross, Deputy

RECEIVED

JUN 28 2016

ROOM 102

STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PLAN AND ORDER

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**STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PLAN**

WHEREAS, on June 30, 2006, Plaintiff Audrey Medrazo filed the above-entitled case (“the Action”).

WHEREAS, the Court initially denied class certification of the Action, and Plaintiff Audrey Medrazo appealed.

WHEREAS, on July 29, 2008, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion reversing the Court’s order denying class certification of the Action and directing the Court to certify the class. *See Medrazo v. Honda of N. Hollywood*, 166 Cal. App. 4th 89 (2008).

WHEREAS, on December 24, 2008, the Court certified the Class.

WHEREAS, on October 13, 2010, the Action proceeded as a bench trial before the Court.

WHEREAS, after the Court received all oral and documentary evidence submitted by and on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class, Defendant Honda of North Hollywood (hereinafter “HNN” or “Defendant”) moved for judgment pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 631.8.

WHEREAS, the motion for judgment was called for hearing on October 18, 2010, and the Court granted the motion and ruled that HNN was entitled to judgment pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 631.8.

WHEREAS, on November 29, 2010, the Court entered judgment in favor of HNN on all claims, which included UCL and CLRA claims.

WHEREAS, Plaintiff appealed the judgment.

WHEREAS, on April 16, 2012, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion reversing the Court’s judgment on the UCL claim, affirming the judgment in favor of HNN on the CLRA claim, and remanding the Action to the Court for further proceedings. *See Medrazo v. Honda of N. Hollywood*, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2012), *as modified on denial of reh’g*.

WHEREAS, on remand, the UCL claim proceeded to a bench trial before the Court in two phases, with Phase I commencing on October 14, 2013, and Phase II commencing on June 15, 2015.

1 WHEREAS, on March 28, 2016, the Court issued a Statement of Decision, concluding:

2 For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds for Plaintiff  
3 AUDREY MEDRAZO and the Class and that restitution is due by BILL  
4 ROBERTSON & SONS DBA HONDA OF NORTH HOLLYWOOD to  
5 the Class totaling \$2,590,813.82. AUDREY MEDRAZO and the Class  
6 are not entitled to injunctive relief.

7 This constitutes the Court's Final Statement of Decision on which  
8 a judgment will be based. Within 10 days after the filing of the Final  
9 Statement of Decision, Plaintiff is ordered to serve and file a proposed  
10 judgment. When the judgment is filed, Plaintiff may, by motion, seek  
11 attorney's fees, fees to AUDREY MEDRAZO as the class representative  
12 and a proposal for distribution of the restitution to the class members.

13 WHEREAS, on April 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for prejudgment interest, and HNH  
14 filed an opposition to the motion.

15 WHEREAS, on April 19, 2016, the Court entered Judgment in the Action.

16 WHEREAS, pursuant to the Judgment, the Court appointed Kurtzman Carson  
17 Consultants LLC ("KCC") as the class administrator.

18 WHEREAS, on April 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to adopt her proposed distribution  
19 plan, and HNH filed an opposition to the motion and Plaintiff's proposed distribution plan.

20 WHEREAS, Plaintiff intends to file a motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and a service  
21 fee/enhancement award for Plaintiff Audrey Medrazo as the class representative, and HNH  
22 intends to oppose any such motions.

23 WHEREAS, the Court has not issued any order or ruling with regard to any distribution  
24 plan, prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees, costs, or a service  
25 fee/enhancement award to Plaintiff Audrey Medrazo as the class representative.

26 WHEREAS, on May 18, 2016, the parties participated in mediation before The  
27 Honorable Daniel Pratt (Ret.), and the parties were able to resolve and settle all issues and  
28 disputes between them, including those related to the pending and anticipated motions.

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties stipulate and agree as follows:

STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PLAN AND ORDER

1 The parties submit this Stipulated Distribution Plan ("Plan") and Order for approval and  
2 adoption by the Court, to be appended to and incorporated by reference as a term of the final  
3 judgment.

4 This Plan aims to establish a clear, step-by-step process for the fair and equitable  
5 distribution of the \$2,590,813.82 in restitution awarded by the Court ("Restitution Fund" or  
6 "Fund"), and entered as part of the Court's April 19, 2016, Judgment herein.

7 Consistent with class members' due process rights, this Plan engages a professional class  
8 administrator to establish a "Restitution Fund," calculate and distribute awards from the Fund to  
9 class members as determined by the Court according to the Judgment, (Judgment Exhibit B  
10 (Trial Exh. 219A)), prioritizes refunds to class members, directs the distribution of residual funds  
11 (undistributed residue) to the payment of class counsel's attorneys' fees and costs, with no  
12 reduction for attorneys' fees or costs from any class member's restitution award, requires timely  
13 notice of the judgment to the class members, and enables judicial oversight at critical milestones  
14 to ensure the fair and equitable distribution of the Judgment, as follows:

#### 15 **PLAN OF DISTRIBUTION**

##### 16 **1. Definitions**

17 **1.1 Restitution Fund.** The Restitution Fund is defined as the total of all  
18 restitution awarded to the class in the amount of \$2,590,813.82 pursuant to the Judgment.

19 **1.2 Undistributed Residue.** The net amount remaining in the Restitution  
20 Fund after the payment of restitution to class members pursuant to the Judgment, including  
21 restitution due to class members who cannot be located, and uncashed checks sent to class  
22 members. The Undistributed Residue shall be used to pay class counsels' attorneys' fees and  
23 costs so that the refunds due to class members who receive and cash their refund check(s) are  
24 paid 100% of the amount due, with no reduction for attorneys' fees or costs.

25 **1.3 The Class.** As certified by the Court, the class is "All purchasers of new  
26 motorcycles who were charged for 'destination', 'assembly' or other DEALER added  
27 'accessories' that were not disclosed on a hanger tag since August 1, 2002, being four years prior  
28 to the filing of this lawsuit." The class members consist of those persons identified in the



1 Judgment, Exh. B (Trial Exh. 219A).

2           **1.4 Class Representative.** The class representative is Plaintiff Audrey  
3 Medrazo.

4           **1.5 Class Counsel.** Class counsel are Steven A. Simons of the Law Offices of  
5 Steven A. Simons and William M. Krieg of Kemnitzer, Barron & Krieg.

6           **1.6 Class Administrator.** Pursuant to the Judgment, Kurtzman Carson  
7 Consultants LLC ("KCC") is the class administrator, and Defendant is responsible for paying the  
8 fees and costs of the class administrator.

9           **2. Establishment of the Restitution Fund.**

10           **2.1 Posting of the Judgment.** Within fifteen (15) days of the Court's  
11 approval of the Plan, the class administrator will post a copy of the Judgment, including this  
12 Plan, on the case website, [www.medrazoclassaction.com](http://www.medrazoclassaction.com).

13           **2.2 Restitution Fund Trust Account.** Within twenty (20) days of the Court's  
14 approval of the Plan, the class administrator will establish an interest bearing trust account for  
15 the benefit of the class, referred to as the Restitution Fund. The class administrator will deposit  
16 the restitution payments totaling \$2,590,813.82 from Defendant pursuant to the Judgment into  
17 the Restitution Fund Trust Account.

18           **3. Payments to the class for restitution**

19           **3.1 Initial Determinations.** Within twenty (20) days of the Court's approval  
20 of this Plan, the class administrator will determine the payments due to each class member for  
21 restitution (refund) for each purchase transaction for which restitution is due in accordance with  
22 the Judgment and Exhibit B (Trial Exh. 219A) thereto, considering that some class members are  
23 entitled to restitution on more than one motorcycle purchase, according to the Judgment.

24           **3.2 Separate Determinations.** Each class member will receive a separate  
25 award of restitution from the Restitution Fund for each motorcycle purchase transaction as  
26 identified in the Judgment and Exhibit B (Trial Exh. 219A) thereto.

27           **4. Service Payment to class representative to be paid separately by Defendant.**

28 The total amount of service payment to Plaintiff Audrey Medrazo shall be \$20,000.00 to be paid  
by Defendant separate from the award of restitution to the class, payment to be made concurrent

STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PLAN AND ORDER

1 with the payment of restitution to the class.

2       **5. Payment to class counsel for attorneys' fees and costs.** The parties have agreed  
3 that class counsel is entitled to attorneys' fees in the total amount of \$2,800,000.00 and costs in  
4 the total amount of \$68,122.00. To the extent that Undistributed Residue remains in the  
5 Restitution Fund after the payment of restitution to all class members, the class administrator  
6 shall issue payment to class counsel for attorneys' fees and costs from the Undistributed Residue.  
7 Within thirty (30) days following payment of the Undistributed Residue to class counsel,  
8 Defendant shall pay the remaining balance of attorneys' fees and costs due and payable to class  
9 counsel.

10       **6. Obligations of class administrator.** The class administrator shall be responsible  
11 for preparing and disseminating to the class checks from the Restitution Fund in accordance with  
12 this Plan, and notice of the Judgment pursuant to Rule 3.771(b) of the California Rules of Court  
13 ("Notice").

14       **6.1 Notice of Judgment.** Notice pursuant to Rule 3.771(b) of the California  
15 Rules of Court will be included with the refund checks sent to each class member, or in the event  
16 that a class member is not entitled to or sent a check, Notice shall be sent alone. Notice shall be  
17 in a simple letter format in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A.

18       **6.2 Checks.** One check for restitution from the Restitution Fund shall be sent  
19 to each class member entitled to receive restitution for each motorcycle purchased according to  
20 the Judgment. If a class member is entitled to multiple refunds for multiple purchases, one check  
21 shall be issued for each such purchase and a single Notice will be included with the check(s) in  
22 each envelope. The following shall be printed on each check: "This check is in full satisfaction  
23 of the Judgment in the case of *Medraza v. Honda of North Hollywood*. L.A. Superior Court Case  
24 No. BC354744. By cashing this check, you acknowledge and agree that you are not entitled to  
25 any additional payments, proceeds, funds, or any other relief for any known or unknown claims,  
26 rights, or causes of action arising out of or relating to the case." Each check shall have a sixty  
27 (60) day expiration date. If a check is not cashed within this time, it shall expire and, subject to  
28 the terms of this Plan, the funds shall become part of the Undistributed Residue.

1           **6.3 Tracking Mailings and Communications.** The class administrator will  
2 keep track of inquiries and communications with class members, including maintaining records  
3 of all relevant activities, including the mailing of checks and Notices and returned or undelivered  
4 mail, and other communications with class members, and shall periodically inform all counsel of  
5 the status of such mailings and communications.

6           **6.4 Locating class members.** Before mailing the Notice and check(s) (if any),  
7 the class administrator shall ascertain the updated or current mailing address for each class  
8 member, according to its standard practice. If there is no last known mailing address for a class  
9 member, the class administrator will make diligent efforts, including change of address search,  
10 online research and other skip-tracing methods, to locate class members, but only to the extent  
11 that the class administrator has not previously engaged in such efforts.

12           **6.4.1 Second Notice.** The class administrator shall send a second Notice  
13 without checks to the updated or last known address of each class member who was sent checks  
14 that were not cashed within 30 days of the initial mailing.

15           **6.5 Buyers and Co-buyers.** Checks distributed according to the Plan shall be sent to  
16 and made payable to the first or primary buyer shown for each purchase. If there is a second  
17 buyer or co-buyer shown on Defendant's records or on the Retail Installment Sales Contract  
18 ("RISC"), a separate mailing shall go to the co-buyer which shall include a Notice only, without  
19 any check(s). In the event that the primary buyer to whom check(s) were issued has not cashed  
20 the check(s) within the sixty (60) day expiration period and there has been no confirmed contact  
21 with the primary buyer, and if the class administrator has a confirmed contact with, or has a  
22 current mailing address for the co-buyer, the class administrator shall re-issue and re-send the  
23 check(s) to and in the name of the co-buyer, and cancel the checks issued to the primary buyer.  
24 Re-issued checks to the secondary buyer shall have a sixty (60) day expiration period. If re-  
25 issued checks are not cashed by the co-buyer within the expiration period, no further checks will  
26 be issued.

27           **6.6 Deceased class members.** If a class member has died, the class administrator  
28 shall seek written documentation establishing the decedent's heirs. After receiving  
documentation sufficient to establish the death of the class member and identity of the decedent's

STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PLAN AND ORDER

1 heirs (as defined in California Probate Code Section 44), the class administrator shall be  
2 authorized to issue all payments to the heir(s). If a class member has died and no heirs can be  
3 located after a reasonable search, the class administrator shall re-issue the checks in the name of  
4 the co-buyer according to the procedure in paragraph 6.5, above.

5 **7. Distribution of the Restitution Fund**

6 **7.1 Notice of distribution to class members.** Within thirty (30) days of the  
7 Court's approval of the Plan, the class administrator shall issue and send the checks and Notices  
8 to class members according to the Plan.

9 **7.2 Distribution to class counsel for attorneys' fees and costs.** The  
10 Undistributed Residue payable as and class counsel's attorneys' fees and costs shall be paid by  
11 the class administrator directly to class counsel immediately upon determination of the final  
12 amount of the Undistributed Residue remaining following completion of the distribution process.

13 **8. Report of Undistributed Residue.** If any portion of the Restitution Fund  
14 remains undistributed or unclaimed after the distribution to class members (Undistributed  
15 Residue), the class administrator shall report to the Court the amount of the Undistributed  
16 Residue and disburse the Residue in conformity with the Plan.

17 **9. Costs of Claims Administration**

18 **9.1 Payment of Costs.** Defendant shall pay all costs of administration of the  
19 Plan reasonably incurred by the class administrator.

20 **9.2 Bills.** The class administrator shall submit bills to Defendant according to  
21 its standard practice, and Defendant shall promptly pay such bills in full within a commercially  
22 reasonable period comporting with the class administrator's billing practices.

23 **9.3 Contesting Bills.** Defendant shall have twenty (20) days from the date a  
24 bill is received to contest the validity or reasonableness of any portion of any bill. If Defendant  
25 challenges the validity or reasonableness of any portion of any bill, Defendant shall notify class  
26 counsel and the Court and set the matter for a hearing and shall within twenty (20) days of  
27 submission pay any undisputed portion of such bill pending the determination of the disputed  
28 portion.

**10. Periodic Reports to the Court.** The class administrator shall report to the Court

STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PLAN AND ORDER

1 on the status of administration of the Plan, including the total amounts that have been paid under  
2 the Plan within ninety (90) days of the issuance of this Plan, and again every thirty (30) days  
3 thereafter, until the entire Restitution Fund has been distributed to class members and any  
4 Undistributed Residue has been distributed as called for in the Plan.


5           **10.1 Final declaration and accounting of distribution.** The class  
6 administrator shall provide a final declaration to the Court and class counsel when the entire  
7 Restitution Fund has been distributed according to the Plan. The declaration shall include a final  
8 and complete accounting of the distribution of all funds pursuant to the Plan, and of its full  
9 compliance with and completion of all its obligations under the Plan, and all matters related  
10 thereto. The declaration shall include a final report summarizing the checks and Notices sent, re-  
11 sent, returned, and undeliverable, the identities of class members who cashed and did not cash or  
12 receive checks, and any issues regarding uncashed checks, compliance with the Plan, and any  
13 disputed or contested matters.

14           **10.2 Satisfaction of Judgment.** Class counsel shall submit a satisfaction of  
15 judgment within ten (10) days of receiving the final declaration of the class administrator called  
16 for under the Plan and upon class counsels' determination that all matters regarding the judgment  
17 have been satisfied.

18           The parties, through their respective counsel, hereby stipulate to the foregoing Plan, aver  
19 that there is good cause for the Court to approve and adopt the Plan, and request that the Court  
20 approve and adopt the plan as an order of the Court.

21  
22           **IT IS SO STIPULATED.**


23           Dated: June 17, 2016

  
Steven A. Simons  
Law Offices of Steven A. Simons

William M. Krieg  
KEMNITZER, BARRON & KRIEG, LLP

Attorney for Plaintiff Audrey Medraza  
and the Class

1 Dated: June 16, 2016

  
Aaron H. Jacoby  
Jeffrey R. Makin  
ARENT FOX LLP

4 David R. Sidran  
5 Hayden S. Alfano  
6 TOSCHI, SIDRAN, COLLINS & DOYLE

7 Attorneys for Defendant Bill Robertson &  
8 Sons, Inc., dba Honda of North Hollywood

9  
10 **ORDER**

11 Based on the stipulation of the parties, for good cause appearing, and in accordance with  
12 the Court's Judgment, it is ordered that the foregoing Stipulated Distribution Plan is approved  
13 and adopted as an order of the Court.

14 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

15  
16  
17 DATED: June 27, 2016

  
Judge DAVID SOTELO  
Los Angeles County Superior Court

# Exhibit A

**NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND SETTLEMENT**

THIS NOTICE IS BEING SENT TO ALL CLASS MEMBERS IN THE ABOVE CASE. You are being sent this Notice because the court has determined that you are already a Class Member in this case. By judgment dated April 19, 2016, the court decided that Defendant Honda of North Hollywood (“HNH”) is liable to Class Members for all “assembly,” “freight,” and “destination” charges (“Charges”) that were not disclosed as required by law during the sale of new motorcycles between August 1, 2002, and September 1, 2009 (the “Class Period”).

The court entered judgment in favor of the Class (which includes you), and the parties have also reached a settlement of other issues that were pending before the court. The judgment and settlement require HNH to refund the money you paid, if any, for the Charges. If you are entitled to a refund, enclosed with this Notice are one or more checks in the amounts that the court has determined you are entitled to recover. If you purchased more than one qualifying motorcycle, more than one check may be enclosed. The enclosed check(s), if any, are in full satisfaction of the judgment and settlement. By cashing the check(s) you agree to waive and relinquish any and all known and unknown claims that you may have arising from or relating to the above-entitled action. The enclosed check(s), if any, must be cashed within 60 days of the date on the check or it will become void and you will forfeit your right to payment.

Pursuant to the judgment and settlement, the attorneys representing the plaintiff and the class have been awarded attorneys’ fees of \$2,800,000.00 and costs of \$68,122.00 for their work performed since 2006.

Copies of relevant documents, including the Judgment and Stipulated Distribution Plan and Order, may be viewed at the case website: [www.medrazoclassaction.com](http://www.medrazoclassaction.com).

You should contact your tax advisor regarding any tax consequences of the payments. If you have questions regarding this Notice or the enclosed check(s), if any, you may contact the class administrator who was employed to send this Notice and the check(s), if any, by order of the court:

KCC LLC [CONTACT INFO]

**DO NOT CONTACT THE JUDGE OR THE COURT**

EXHIBIT A  
STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PLAN AND ORDER



# Exhibit B

Trial Exhibit 219 - Spreadsheet v. 5 - Final Restitution

Filename: Spreadsheet.Final.Restitution.08.05.15 (5.8) FINAL

Sorted by: Deal No.

Addressing the "Differences noted" in paragraph 18 of Mr. Sompels' "Summary of Findings" report of July 15, 2015:

- Deal #63122
  - Sompels correctly identifies a data entry error. DEST on the RISC was entered by KCC as the cash price but should have been entered as \$85.96. This has been corrected, and reduced restitution by \$2413.15.
- Sompels noted 57 deals with 1.A.2 lines noted as N/C (the equivalent of \$0-) were not captured (recognized) by the equation used to determine the "lesser of" value for restitution, but does not identify the deal numbers for verification.
  - Pltf identified a total of 189 deals where 1.A.2 lines on the RISC were noted as N/C (the equivalent of \$0-). These deals were corrected to reflect \$0- as the DEST charge on 1.A.2 lines. 56 of these deals resulted in the "lesser of" restitution amount being changed from an amount greater than zero, to \$0-, thereby reducing the total restitution by \$59,361.
- Sompels notes 60 (unidentified) deals had "quote sheet" (Worksheet) and/or "price information sheet" (Purchase Info Sheet) numbers entered incorrectly or omitted because the deals were part of multi-vehicle purchases and the quote sheet was included in only one of the related deals.
  - Plaintiff identified multi-vehicle sales and reviewed the worksheets for each, identifying about 67 deals where the destination and assembly for multiple vehicles were recorded on a single worksheet. Plaintiff revised the spreadsheet (Exh. 219) to correctly reflect the destination and assembly charges recorded on the worksheet for each vehicle.
  - 15 of these corrected deals resulted in a reduction of the "lesser of" restitution amount, thereby reducing the total restitution by \$10,288.08.

LANDRAZOS - WOODLAKE NORTH HILL WOODS  
 owned by MLPSP

Roll No.	Lot No.	Tract	Parcel ID	Map No.	Map Date	Map Description	Area (sq ft)	Area (ac)	Zoning	ASPPA		Project Start	Project End	MSPSP		Difference of Cash Price and MSPSP		Difference of Cash Price and MSPSP (%)		Cash Price	MSPSP	MSPSP (%)	MSPSP (%)	MSPSP (%)	MSPSP (%)	MSPSP (%)	MSPSP (%)	MSPSP (%)	MSPSP (%)	MSPSP (%)	MSPSP (%)									
										Original Price	Current Price			Original Price	Current Price	Original Price	Current Price																							
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KADAZO - HONDA OF NORTH HOLLYWOOD  
 (owned by B&B)

Report Date	Client Name	Order #	Model	Year	Make	Model	MSRP	Trade Price (K.R. Cash Price Minus)	MSRP	Trade Price (K.R. Cash Price Minus)	MSRP	Trade Price (K.R. Cash Price Minus)	MSRP	Trade Price (K.R. Cash Price Minus)	MSRP	Trade Price (K.R. Cash Price Minus)	MSRP	Trade Price (K.R. Cash Price Minus)	MSRP	Trade Price (K.R. Cash Price Minus)	MSRP	Trade Price (K.R. Cash Price Minus)		
1/1/2018	JANIS	81088	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	
1/1/2018	JANIS	81089	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81090	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81091	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81092	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81093	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81094	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81095	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81096	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81097	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81098	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81099	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00
1/1/2018	JANIS	81100	VEHICLE	2008	HONDA	CR-V	23,700.00	1,081.88	22,618.12	20,987.00	1,631.12	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00	20,987.00

EXHIBIT 219.004 - INVESTMENT INVENTORY - FINAL  
 PREPARED BY: M&P 11

Item #	Item Name	Part Name	Part No.	Qty	Unit Price	Total Price	Unit Price	Total Price	Unit Price	Total Price	Unit Price	Total Price	Unit Price	Total Price	Unit Price	Total Price	Unit Price	Total Price	Unit Price	Total Price
1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
10	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
11	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
12	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
13	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
14	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
16	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
17	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
18	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
22	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
23	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
27	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
28	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
29	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
30	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...



КОНДАДЪУ НОНДА ПОНДА ПОНДА ПОНДА  
 (continued from page 4)

Date of Birth	Name	Sex	Age	Religion	Marital Status	Education	Occupation	Income	Assets	Liabilities	Net Worth	Spouse's Name	Spouse's Date of Birth	Spouse's Sex	Spouse's Age	Spouse's Religion	Spouse's Marital Status	Spouse's Education	Spouse's Occupation	Spouse's Income	Spouse's Assets	Spouse's Liabilities	Spouse's Net Worth	Total Family Assets		Total Family Liabilities		Total Family Net Worth	
																								Spouse's Net Worth	Spouse's Assets	Spouse's Liabilities	Spouse's Net Worth	Spouse's Assets	Spouse's Liabilities
1950-01-15	John Doe	M	45	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$45,000	\$120,000	\$30,000	\$90,000	Jane Doe	1952-03-20	F	43	Catholic	Married	High School	Homemaker	\$35,000	\$80,000	\$20,000	\$60,000	\$155,000	\$110,000	\$45,000	\$65,000		
1955-02-28	Jane Smith	F	40	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$40,000	\$100,000	\$25,000	\$75,000	John Smith	1953-01-10	M	42	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$45,000	\$110,000	\$30,000	\$80,000	\$155,000	\$110,000	\$45,000	\$65,000		
1960-03-10	Robert Johnson	M	35	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$35,000	\$90,000	\$20,000	\$70,000	Patricia Johnson	1962-05-15	F	33	Protestant	Married	High School	Homemaker	\$30,000	\$70,000	\$15,000	\$55,000	\$125,000	\$85,000	\$40,000	\$45,000		
1965-04-20	Patricia Brown	F	30	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$30,000	\$80,000	\$15,000	\$65,000	Michael Brown	1967-08-05	M	28	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$35,000	\$90,000	\$20,000	\$70,000	\$125,000	\$85,000	\$40,000	\$45,000		
1970-05-15	Michael White	M	25	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$25,000	\$70,000	\$10,000	\$60,000	Laura White	1972-09-20	F	23	Protestant	Married	High School	Homemaker	\$20,000	\$60,000	\$5,000	\$55,000	\$90,000	\$65,000	\$30,000	\$35,000		
1975-06-01	Laura Green	F	20	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$20,000	\$60,000	\$5,000	\$55,000	David Green	1977-11-10	M	18	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$25,000	\$70,000	\$10,000	\$60,000	\$90,000	\$65,000	\$30,000	\$35,000		
1980-07-10	David Black	M	15	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$15,000	\$50,000	\$3,000	\$47,000	Emily Black	1982-12-05	F	13	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$20,000	\$60,000	\$5,000	\$55,000	\$90,000	\$65,000	\$30,000	\$35,000		
1985-08-20	Emily Gray	F	10	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$10,000	\$40,000	\$2,000	\$38,000	James Gray	1987-03-15	M	8	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$15,000	\$50,000	\$3,000	\$47,000	\$90,000	\$65,000	\$30,000	\$35,000		
1990-09-05	James Blue	M	5	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$5,000	\$30,000	\$1,000	\$29,000	Sarah Blue	1992-07-20	F	3	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$10,000	\$40,000	\$2,000	\$38,000	\$90,000	\$65,000	\$30,000	\$35,000		
1995-10-15	Sarah Pink	F	0	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$0	\$20,000	\$0	\$20,000	Thomas Pink	1997-01-10	M	-2	Protestant	Married	High School	Teacher	\$5,000	\$30,000	\$1,000	\$29,000	\$90,000	\$65,000	\$30,000	\$35,000		

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 EXHIBIT 219.006

























































MADEIRA: MONTH OF MORTGAGE HOLLYWOOD  
(continued by State)

Line #	Line Name	Type	Status	Contract	How	Year	Mort	Cash Price	Yield	Date of	Difference of		Difference of	Folio	Mortgage	Sec'd	Prepaid	Sum of	Balance	Contract	Mortgage	Mortgage	
											1. A. Cash Price	2. A. Cash Price											1. A. Cash Price
1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
28	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...



AMEREN - HOLDING HOLDINGS  
 owned by Ameren

Doc No	Asset Name	Acq Date	Acq Price	Yield	Asset Class	Market	Book Value	Cost Basis	Current Value	Gain/Loss	Capital Gain	Dividend	Interest	Other	Total	Net	Yield	Asset Class	Market	Book Value	Cost Basis	Current Value	Gain/Loss	Capital Gain	Dividend	Interest	Other	Total	Net	Yield	Asset Class	Market	Book Value	Cost Basis	Current Value	Gain/Loss	Capital Gain	Dividend	Interest	Other	Total	Net	Yield	Asset Class	Market	Book Value	Cost Basis	Current Value	Gain/Loss	Capital Gain	Dividend	Interest	Other	Total	Net	Yield
11	AMEREN	01/01/00	100.00	5.00%	Equity	NYSE	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	5.00%	Equity	NYSE	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	5.00%	Equity	NYSE	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	5.00%	Equity	NYSE	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	5.00%			
12	AMEREN	01/01/00	100.00	5.00%	Equity	NYSE	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	5.00%	Equity	NYSE	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	5.00%	Equity	NYSE	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	5.00%	Equity	NYSE	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	5.00%			





UNAPPORTIONED - MONTHS BY MONTH HOLD DIVIDENDS  
ISSUES BY DATE 95

Table with multiple columns including Name, Date, Cash Price, Dividend, and various financial metrics. Includes a summary row at the bottom with totals for various categories.

Table with multiple columns including Name, Date, Cash Price, Dividend, and various financial metrics. Includes a summary row at the bottom with totals for various categories.







HARRAZO - RONDA 6 NORTH HOLLISTWOOD  
 Sorted by Bid #

Bid #	Bidder Name	Bid Type	Owner	Receipts Category	Item #	Year	Item	Cash Price (1) A-E Cash Price (Bid)	Bid #	Date of Purchase (2) Bidder	Bid Price (3) Bidder	Difference of Cash Price and Bid # (1)		Difference of Cash Price and Bid # (2)		Program	Transportation	Scribble	Preparation	State of Bid	Packaging Sheet	Equipment Item Bid	Contracted Bidder	Contracted Bidder
												MSAP (1)	MSAP (2)	MSAP (1)	MSAP (2)									
1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
25	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	









HAZARDOUS WASTE W/ NORTH HAVEN/CODD  
Continued on next page

HAZARDOUS WASTE W/ NORTH HAVEN/CODD										DESCRIPTION				PURCHASE INFO		PURCHASE PRICE		TOTAL								
Item #	Lot #	Material	Quantity	Unit	Year	Make	Model	Cash Price	Date of Purchase	Net Price	Net Price	Net Price	Net Price	Net Price	Net Price	Net Price	Net Price	Net Price	Net Price							
32309	2007	BOB-C	NETV	7067	01/01/07	GAZ/1000B		0.459 77	5	2,081.56	08/25/2009	13,959.00	1,109.77													
32310	2007	BOB-C	NETV	1000	01/01/07	GAZ/1000B		2,076.41	5	1,420.00	09/02/2009	8,499.00	800.00													
32311	2007	BOB-C	NETV	2007	01/01/07	TRAVEL		829.78	5	479.00	02/09/2009	1,199.00	800.00													
32312	2008	BOB-C	NETV	2008	01/01/08	TRAVEL		4,438.83	5	3,584.00	07/01/2009	8,888.00	800.00													
32313	2008	BOB-C	NETV	0099	01/01/08	NOVISA STRYCH	CS8400	0.154 37	5	4,379.00	02/02/2009	13,789.00	3,844.00													
408								120,155.54	5	120,155.54		2,496,827.74	218,817.29	348,819.40	4,479.58	121,648.00	131,234.65	315,673.50	476,099.16	282,847.60	636,151.34					
									1	1,188,710.88	5	11,268,998.23	5	1,258,357.79	5	800,738.74	5	827,976.00	5	24,242,346.36	5	2,714,214.29	5	2,986,097.57	5	3,309,214.84

408  
 Includes NCT per 42162  
 NCC 1 BOB-C column ADJ

N/C - No Charge shown, includes purchase  
 N/A - Not Applicable

7011207 highlighted - lot value changed to multi V purchase  
 BLUE highlighted - QOST changed from N/C to SF

1284 00  
 Non-Column - 465  
 Change - BOB C  
 Total Maximums

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
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**PROOF OF SERVICE**

STATE OF CALIFORNIA }  
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES }

I am a resident of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 16933 Parthenia St., Suite 202, Northridge, California 91343.


On June 17, 2016, I served the foregoing document described as:

**MOTION ON STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PLAN AND [PROPOSED] ORDER**  
(Facsimile Signatures)

Said document was served on the interested party or parties in this action by e-mail pursuant to stipulation of the parties at the e-mail addresses listed below.

Executed on June 17, 2016 at Northridge, California.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.



Steven A. Simons, Esq.

**MAILING LIST**

**Case : Medrazo vs. Honda of North Hollywood.**  
**Court : LASC**  
**Case Number: BC354744**

**Counsel for Defendant Honda:**

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**BC354744**

Motion and Stipulation for Approval of Class Distribution