No. S122611

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

## THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, )

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

MAURICE G. STESKAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Orange County Sup. Court No. 99ZF0023)

ARGUMENT FEB. 2, 2021

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ON AUTOMATIC APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF DEATH Superior Court of California, County of Orange Hon. Frank F. Fasel, Judge

#### THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

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#### **LEGISLATION**

Ohio Advance Legislative Service, 2019 Ohio HB 136
(enacted Jan. 9, 2021)

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Death Penalty Information Center, New Hampshire Becomes 21st State to Abolish Death Penalty (May 30, 2019), online at <u>https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/new-hampshire-becomes-</u> <u>21st-state-to-abolish-death-penalty</u> (last visited Jan. 19, 2021).......5

#### ARGUMENT

Now that the State of Ohio has barred the execution of the seriously mentally ill, there is, more than ever, a clear, developed national consensus that persons with severe mental illness should not be subject to the death penalty.

The Eighth Amendment is not frozen in time. In determining whether a particular practice – such as the execution of the intellectually disabled, or of persons who were juveniles at the time of their offenses – violates the the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has consistently been guided by the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of human society. In considering what punishment is excessive, the Supreme Court applies not "the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the 'Bloody Assizes' or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail." *Atkins v. Virginia* (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 311. The Court assesses whether there is a national consensus that a sentence is excessive, looking to legislation, judicial decisions, prosecution and sentencing trends, polling data, consensus among professional organizations, and the views of the international community. See *Atkins, supra*, 536 U.S. at p. 316.

As shown in appellant Maurice Steskal's opening brief (2014), in his first supplemental brief (2015), in his reply brief (2016), and in his brief in answer to the *amicus curiae* brief of Mental Health America and the National Alliance on Mental Illness (2016), there is a developing national consensus that capital punishment, as applied to persons whose capital crimes were the product of serious mental illness, is unconstitutionally excessive. This consensus is demonstrated not just by legal developments, but by, *inter alia*, the settled agreement of legal and mental health professional organizations in the United States that it is wrong to execute individuals who were suffering from mental illness at the time of their crimes. Cf. *Atkins, supra*, 536 U.S. at p. 316 fn.21 (citing brief of American Psychological Association and American Psychiatric Association, among others, as evidence of a "professional consensus" among those with "germane expertise . . . opposing the imposition of the death penalty upon a [intellectually disabled] offender").

Since the most recent brief was filed in this case in 2016, further important legislative developments bearing on the question presented in this case have transpired.

Two more states have legislatively abolished capital punishment not just for the mentally ill, but entirely. New Hampshire prospectively abolished capital punishment on May 30, 2019.<sup>1</sup> Colorado ended the death penalty on March 23, 2020.<sup>2</sup>

Just recently, in 2021, the national consensus against execution of the severely mentally ill has again been powerfully strengthened.

<sup>1</sup> Death Penalty Information Center, New Hampshire Becomes 21st State to Abolish Death Penalty (May 30, 2019), online at <u>https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/new-hampshire-becomes-</u> <u>21st-state-to-abolish-death-penalty</u> (last visited Jan. 19, 2021).

<sup>2</sup> Death Penalty Information Center, Colorado Becomes 22nd State to Abolish Death Penalty (March 24, 2020), online at <u>https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/colorado-becomes-22nd-state-</u> <u>to-abolish-death-penalty</u> (last visited Jan. 19, 2021).

The State of Ohio, by legislation signed into law by the Governor of Ohio earlier this month, on January 9, 2021, prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on persons suffering from one or more serious mental illnesses at the time of the charged offense, when that serious mental illness:

significantly impaired the person's capacity to exercise rational judgment in relation to the person's conduct with respect to either of the following:

(i) Conforming the person's conduct to the requirements of law;(ii) Appreciating the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of the person's conduct.

Ohio Advance Legislative Service, 2019 Ohio HB 136 (enacted Jan. 9, 2021). A true and correct copy of this legislation is attached to this brief as Exhibit A. A true and correct copy of the Bill Analysis of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission presented to the Ohio Senate is attached to this brief as Exhibit B.

Ohio is the seventh-most populous State in the Union. It has a death row population of 141 persons, one of the most populous death rows in the Nation.<sup>3</sup> Ohio's removal of the class of seriously mentally ill offenders from the category of those eligible to be executed is a development of considerable national significance under the Eighth Amendment, and marks a milestone in our evolving standards of decency.

If the defendant in this case, Maurice Steskal, had committed his offense in Forestville, Ohio rather than Lake Forest, California,

<sup>3</sup> See Death Penalty Information Center, State and Federal Info, Ohio, online at <u>https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-</u> info/state-by-state/ohio (last visited Jan. 20, 2021).

he would no longer be eligible to be executed.

This is because the Ohio legislation implementing contemporary standards of decency regarding execution of the mentally ill applies not just to future cases, but also to persons on that State's death row at the time of the legislation's enactment.

Ohio now "requires that a person previously sentenced to death who proves that the person had a serious mental illness at the time of the offense be resentenced to life imprisonment without parole, and provides a mechanism for resentencing." Exhibit B. Current death-row prisoners have one year in which to petition the court to overturn their death sentences because of severe mental illness.

Maurice Steskal clearly would meet the requirements for relief under Ohio law, were he in that State. The Ohio statute applies to persons diagnosed:

with one or more of the following conditions: (i) Schizophrenia; (ii) Schizoaffective disorder; (iii) Bipolar disorder; (iv) Delusional disorder.

Exhibit A.

Further, as noted above, the condition must have significantly impaired the person's capacity to exercise rational judgment in either conforming his conduct to the requirements of law, or appreciating the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of that conduct.

Maurice Steskal had a near-lifelong history of severe mental illness at the time of the offense in this case. As shown in previous briefing, Mr. Steskal came from a family in which all the male members had diagnosed mental illness, and despite average intelligence was so debilitated by longstanding mental illness that he was unable to function normally for virtually his entire life, starting in kindergarten. His behavioral patterns, while not criminal, were bizarre. He fled from others, living for two-and-a-half years in a small, windowless concrete bunker without plumbing or electricity in a remote area of Oregon, alone. Concealing himself with camouflage, staining his face with berries, Maurice Steskal evaded imaginary pursuers, digging tunnels to escape them. He believed people in the woods were watching him, and government airplanes were surveilling him, trying to hunt him down. (11 RT 2090, 12 RT 2159-2167, 30 RT 5721-5727, 34 RT 6513-6519.)

Maurice Steskal was given an extensive battery of neuropsychological tests, and his results were highly indicative of a schizophrenic spectrum disorder.

Dr. Roderick Pettis, a psychiatrist board-certified in both clinical and forensic psychiatry who had reviewed extensive records and interviewed Mr. Steskal in depth, diagnosed Maurice Steskal as suffering from an Axis I psychosis – a delusional disorder of the persecutory type. Dr. Pettis testified that Mr. Steskal was in a psychotic state on the night of the crime. (11 RT 2139-2140.) He suffered from a "break with reality." (11 RT 2052, 2055.) Dr. Pettis testified that on the night of the killing, Maurice Steskal was "grossly decompensated" (30 RT 5758), meaning "his psychosis has reached an extreme level. . . . He can't control his behavior." (30 RT 5759.)

Maurice Steskal's severe mental illness substantially impaired

his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, to exercise rational judgment in relation to his conduct, and to volitionally control his conduct and conform it to the requirements of law.

This evidence was <u>uncontroverted</u>. The prosecution presented no evidence, at the guilt phase or at the first or second penalty phase trials, to show that Maurice Steskal was not mentally ill, or that his serious mental illness was not the direct cause of his offense.

Since the conclusion of earlier briefing in this case, the national consensus has continued to evolve. New Hampshire and Colorado have ended capital punishment. Ohio has abolished the practice of sentencing to death seriously mentally ill offenders such as Maurice Steskal.

The standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment – and under Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitution, a document which has force and meaning independent of its federal counterpart – are not frozen. But if they are to retain their vitality, they must not take forever to evolve.

The Court should hold that the execution of persons such as Maurice Steskal is prohibited by both the Eighth Amendment, and by Article I Section 17 of the California Constitution.

DATED: January 20, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

/s/\_\_\_\_\_

GILBERT GAYNOR Attorney for Appellant Maurice G. Steskal

## **CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT**

I certify that the forgoing Appellant's Third Supplemental Brief contains 1,421 words, exclusive of tables, according to the word-count feature of Open Office.

DATE: January 20, 2021

/s/\_\_\_\_\_

GILBERT GAYNOR Attorney for Appellant Maurice G. Steskal

# EXHIBIT A

# **AN ACT**

To amend sections 2929.02, 2929.022, 2929.024, 2929.03, 2929.04, 2929.06, 2929.14, 2941.148, 2953.21, 2953.23, 2971.03, 2971.07, and 5120.61 and to enact section 2929.025 of the Revised Code to prohibit imposing the death penalty for aggravated murder when the offender had a serious mental illness at the time of the offense.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio:

SECTION 1. That sections 2929.02, 2929.022, 2929.024, 2929.03, 2929.04, 2929.06, 2929.14, 2941.148, 2953.21, 2953.23, 2971.03, 2971.07, and 5120.61 be amended and section 2929.025 of the Revised Code be enacted to read as follows:

Sec. 2929.02. (A) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated murder in violation of section 2903.01 of the Revised Code shall suffer death or be imprisoned for life, as determined pursuant to sections 2929.022, 2929.03, and 2929.04 of the Revised Code, except that no person who raises the matter of age pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code and who is not found to have been eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense <u>and no person</u> who raises the matter of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the offense pursuant to section 2929.025 of the Revised Code and is found under that section to be ineligible for a sentence of death due to serious mental illness shall suffer death. In addition, the offender may be fined an amount fixed by the court, but not more than twenty-five thousand dollars.

(B)(1) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) or (3) of this section, whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder in violation of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code shall be imprisoned for an indefinite term of fifteen years to life.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(3) of this section, if a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder in violation of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code, the victim of the offense was less than thirteen years of age, and the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, the court shall impose an indefinite prison term of thirty years to life pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(3) If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder in violation of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that were included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the murder, the court shall impose upon the offender a term of life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(4) In addition, the offender may be fined an amount fixed by the court, but not more than fifteen thousand dollars.

(C) The court shall not impose a fine or fines for aggravated murder or murder which, in the aggregate and to the extent not suspended by the court, exceeds the amount which the offender is or will be able to pay by the method and within the time allowed without undue hardship to the offender or to the dependents of the offender, or will prevent the offender from making reparation for the victim's wrongful death.

(D)(1) In addition to any other sanctions imposed for a violation of section 2903.01 or 2903.02 of the Revised Code, if the offender used a motor vehicle as the means to commit the violation, the court shall impose upon the offender a class two suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege as specified in division (A)(2) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code.

(2) As used in division (D) of this section, "motor vehicle" has the same meaning as in section 4501.01 of the Revised Code.

Sec. 2929.022. (A) If an indictment or count in an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated murder contains a specification of the aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction listed in division (A)(5) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the defendant may elect to have the panel of three judges, if the defendant waives trial by jury, or the trial judge, if the defendant is tried by jury, determine the existence of that aggravating circumstance at the sentencing hearing held pursuant to divisions (C) and (D) of section 2929.03 of the Revised Code.

(1) If the defendant does not elect to have the existence of the aggravating circumstance determined at the sentencing hearing, the defendant shall be tried on the charge of aggravated murder, on the specification of the aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction listed in division (A)(5) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, and on any other specifications of an aggravating circumstance listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code in a single trial as in any other criminal case in which a person is charged with aggravated murder and specifications.

(2) If the defendant does elect to have the existence of the aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction listed in division (A)(5) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code determined at the sentencing hearing, then, following a verdict of guilty of the charge of aggravated murder, the panel of three judges or the trial judge shall:

(a) Hold a sentencing hearing pursuant to division (B) of this section, unless required to do otherwise under division (A)(2)(b) of this section;

(b) If the offender raises the matter of age at trial pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code and is not found at trial to have been eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense or raises the matter of the offender's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the offense pursuant to section 2929.025 of the Revised Code and is found under that section to be ineligible for a sentence of death due to serious mental illness, conduct a hearing to determine if the specification of the aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction listed in division (A)(5) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. After conducting the hearing, the panel or judge shall proceed as follows:

(i) If that aggravating circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable doubt or if the defendant at trial was convicted of any other specification of an aggravating circumstance, the panel or judge shall impose sentence according to division (E) of section 2929.03 of the Revised Code.

(ii) If that aggravating circumstance is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant at trial was not convicted of any other specification of an aggravating circumstance, except as otherwise provided in this division, the panel or judge shall impose sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment on the offender. If that aggravating circumstance is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant at trial was not convicted of any other specification of an aggravating circumstance, the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, and the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, the panel or judge shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(B) At the sentencing hearing, the panel of judges, if the defendant was tried by a panel of three judges, or the trial judge, if the defendant was tried by jury, shall, when required pursuant to division (A)(2) of this section, first determine if the specification of the aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction listed in division (A)(5) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the panel of judges or the trial judge determines that the specification of the aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction listed in division (A)(5) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code is proven beyond a reasonable doubt or if they do not determine that the specification is proven beyond a reasonable doubt but the defendant at trial was convicted of a specification of any other aggravating circumstance listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the panel of judges or the trial judge and trial jury shall impose sentence on the offender pursuant to division (D) of section 2929.03 and section 2929.04 of the Revised Code. If the panel of judges or the trial judge does not determine that the specification of the aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction listed in division (A)(5) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code is proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant at trial was not convicted of any other specification of an aggravating circumstance listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the panel of judges or the trial judge shall terminate the sentencing hearing and impose sentence on the offender as follows:

(1) Subject to division (B)(2) of this section, the panel or judge shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment on the offender.

(2) If the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age and the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, the panel or judge shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

Sec. 2929.024. If (A) In a case described in division (B) of this section, if the court determines that the defendant is indigent and that investigation services, experts, or other services are reasonably necessary for the proper representation of a defendant charged with aggravated murder at trial or at the sentencing hearing, the court shall authorize the defendant's counsel to obtain the necessary services for the defendant, and shall order that payment of the fees and expenses for the necessary services be made in the same manner that payment for appointed counsel is made pursuant

to Chapter 120. of the Revised Code. If the court determines that the necessary services had to be obtained prior to court authorization for payment of the fees and expenses for the necessary services, the court may, after the services have been obtained, authorize the defendant's counsel to obtain the necessary services and order that payment of the fees and expenses for the necessary services be made as provided in this section.

(B) Division (A) of this section applies in a case in which either of the following apply:

(1) The court determines that the defendant is indigent.

(2) The defendant is described in division (C) of section 2929.025 of the Revised Code and raises the matter of the defendant's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the aggravated murder as described in that division.

Sec. 2929.025. (A) As used in this section:

(1) A person has a "serious mental illness" if both of the following apply with respect to the person, subject to division (A)(2) of this section:

(a) The person has been diagnosed as described in division (B) of this section with one or more of the following conditions:

(i) Schizophrenia;

(ii) Schizoaffective disorder;

(iii) Bipolar disorder;

(iv) Delusional disorder.

(b) At the time of the alleged aggravated murder with which the person is charged, the condition or conditions described in division (A)(1)(a) of this section with which the person has been diagnosed, while not meeting the standard to be found not guilty by reason of insanity as defined in section 2901.01 of the Revised Code or the standard to be found incompetent to stand trial as described in division (G) of section 2945.37 of the Revised Code, nevertheless significantly impaired the person's capacity to exercise rational judgment in relation to the person's conduct with respect to either of the following:

(i) Conforming the person's conduct to the requirements of law;

(ii) Appreciating the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of the person's conduct.

(2) A disorder manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct or attributable primarily to the acute effects of any use of alcohol or any other drug of abuse does not, standing alone, constitute a "serious mental illness" for purposes of division (A)(1) of this section.

(3) "Examiner" means a person who makes an evaluation ordered under division (F)(1) of this section.

(4) "Prosecutor" means a prosecuting attorney who has authority to prosecute a charge of aggravated murder that is before the court.

(B) The diagnosis of a person with a condition or conditions described in division (A)(1)(a) of this section may be made at any time prior to, on, or after the day of the alleged aggravated murder with which the person is charged or the day on which the person pursuant to division (C) of this section raises the matter of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of that aggravated murder. Diagnosis of the condition or conditions after the date of the alleged aggravated murder with which the person is charged does not preclude the person from presenting evidence that the person had a serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of that.

#### offense.

(C) A person charged with aggravated murder and one or more specifications of an aggravating circumstance listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code may, before trial, raise the matter of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. If a person raises the matter of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, the court shall order an evaluation of the person in accordance with division (F) of this section and shall hold a pretrial hearing on the matter. The person who raises the matter may present evidence, subject to division (D)(2) of this section, that the person had a serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and the person has the burden of raising that matter and of going forward with the evidence relating to the diagnosis described in division (A)(1)(a) of this section and the impairment described in division (A)(1)(b) of this section.

(D)(1) If a person described in division (C) of this section raises the matter of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the aggravated murder and submits evidence that the person has been diagnosed with one or more of the conditions set forth in division (A)(1)(a) of this section and that the condition or conditions diagnosed significantly impaired the person's capacity at the time of the alleged offense in a manner described in division (A)(1)(b) of this section, the prosecution shall have an opportunity to present evidence to contest the diagnosis. The defendant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person has been diagnosed with one or more of the conditions set forth in division (A)(1)(a) of this section and that the conditions set forth in division (A)(1)(a) of this section and that an approximate the evidence to contest the diagnosis. The defendant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person has been diagnosed with one or more of the conditions set forth in division (A)(1)(a) of this section and that the condition or conditions diagnosed significantly impaired the person's capacity at the time of the alleged offense in a manner described in division (A)(1)(b) of this section.

(2) If a person described in division (C) of this section raises the matter of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the aggravated murder and, prior to, on, or after the effective date of this section, the person has or has had an evaluation performed other than pursuant to a court order issued under division (F) of this section, the person shall provide the results of the evaluation to the prosecution at least thirty days prior to the pretrial hearing. If the person does not provide the results of the evaluation to the prosecution at least thirty days prior to the pretrial hearing, the results of the evaluation are inadmissible at the hearing.

(E)(1) Unless the court at the pretrial hearing finds that the defendant has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person has been diagnosed with one or more of the conditions set forth in division (A)(1)(a) of this section and that the condition or conditions diagnosed significantly impaired the person's capacity at the time of the alleged offense in a manner described in division (A)(1)(b) of this section, the court shall issue a finding that the person is not ineligible for a sentence of death due to serious mental illness.

(2) If the court at the pretrial hearing finds that the defendant has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person has been diagnosed with one or more of the conditions set forth in division (A)(1)(a) of this section and that the condition or conditions diagnosed significantly impaired the person's capacity at the time of the alleged offense in a manner described in division (A) (1)(b) of this section, the court shall issue a finding that the person is ineligible for a sentence of death due to serious mental illness.

(F)(1) If a person described in division (C) of this section raises the matter of the person's

serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the aggravated murder as described in that division, the court shall order an evaluation of the person. Section 2929.024 of the Revised Code applies with respect to an evaluation ordered under this division. If the person refuses to submit to an evaluation ordered under this division, the court shall issue a finding that the person is not ineligible for a sentence of death due to serious mental illness.

(2) No statement that a person makes in an evaluation ordered under division (F)(1) of this section or in a pretrial hearing under divisions (C) to (E) of this section relating to the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the aggravated murder with which the person is charged shall be used against the person on the issue of guilt in any criminal action or proceeding, but, in a criminal action or proceeding, the prosecutor or defense counsel may call as a witness any examiner who evaluated the person or prepared a report pursuant to a referral under this section. Neither the appointment nor the testimony of an examiner in an evaluation ordered under division (F)(1) of this section precludes the prosecutor or defense counsel from calling other witnesses or presenting other evidence on the issue of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the aggravated murder or on competency or insanity issues.

(G) A person's pleading of not guilty by reason of insanity or incompetence to stand trial, or a finding after such a plea that the person is not insane or that the person is competent to stand trial, does not preclude the person from raising the matter of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the offense pursuant to division (C) of this section and, if a person so raises that matter, does not limit or affect any of the procedures described in this section or the authority of a court to make any finding described in this section.

Sec. 2929.03. (A) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder does not contain one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, then, following a verdict of guilty of the charge of aggravated murder, the trial court shall impose sentence on the offender as follows:

(1) Except as provided in division (A)(2) of this section, the trial court shall impose one of the following sentences on the offender:

(a) Life imprisonment without parole;

(b) Subject to division (A)(1)(e) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment;

(c) Subject to division (A)(1)(e) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment;

(d) Subject to division (A)(1)(e) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment;

(e) If the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (A)(1)(a) of this section, the trial court shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment that shall be served pursuant to that section.

(2) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification

and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, the trial court shall impose upon the offender a sentence of life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(B) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the verdict shall separately state whether the accused is found guilty or not guilty of the principal charge and, if guilty of the principal charge, whether the offender was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense, if the matter of age was raised by the offender pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code, and whether the offender is guilty or not guilty of each specification. The jury shall be instructed on its duties in this regard. The instruction to the jury shall include an instruction that a specification shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support a guilty verdict on the specification, but the instruction shall not mention the penalty that may be the consequence of a guilty or not guilty verdict on any charge or specification.

(C)(1) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, then, following a verdict of guilty of the charge but not guilty of each of the specifications, and regardless of whether the offender raised the matter of age pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code or the matter of serious mental illness at the time of the commission of the offense pursuant to section 2929.025 of the Revised Code, the trial court shall impose sentence on the offender as follows:

(a) Except as provided in division (C)(1)(b) of this section, the trial court shall impose one of the following sentences on the offender:

(i) Life imprisonment without parole;

(ii) Subject to division (C)(1)(a)(v) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment;

(iii) Subject to division (C)(1)(a)(v) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment;

(iv) Subject to division (C)(1)(a)(v) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment;

(v) If the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (C)(1)(a) (i) of this section, the trial court shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(b) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, the trial court shall impose upon the offender a sentence of life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code. (2)(a) If the indictment or count in the indictment contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code and if the offender is found guilty of both the charge and one or more of the specifications, the penalty to be imposed on the offender shall be one of the following:

(i) Except as provided in division (C)(2)(a)(ii) or (iii), and subject to divisions (D)(1) and (E) of this section, the penalty to be imposed on the offender shall be death, life imprisonment without parole, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment.

(ii) Except as provided in division (C)(2)(a)(iii) of this section, if the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (C)(2)(a)(i) of this section, the penalty to be imposed on the offender shall be an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment that shall be imposed pursuant to division (B) (3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and served pursuant to that section.

(iii) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, the penalty to be imposed on the offender shall be death or life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(b) A penalty imposed pursuant to division (C)(2)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be determined pursuant to divisions (D) and (E) of this section and shall be determined by one of the following:

(i) By the panel of three judges that tried the offender upon the offender's waiver of the right to trial by jury;

(ii) By the trial jury and the trial judge, if the offender was tried by jury.

(D)(1) Death may not be imposed as a penalty for aggravated murder if the offender raised the matter of age at trial pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code and was not found at trial to have been eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense <u>or raised the matter of the offender's serious mental illness at the time of the commission of the offense pursuant to section 2929.025 of the Revised Code and was found under that section to be ineligible for a sentence of death due to serious mental illness. When death may be imposed as a penalty for aggravated murder, the court shall proceed under this division. When death may be imposed as a penalty, the court, upon the request of the defendant, shall require a pre-sentence investigation to be made, and shall require reports of the investigation and of any mental examination submitted to the court, pursuant to section 2947.06 of the Revised Code. No statement made or information provided by a defendant in a mental examination or proceeding conducted pursuant to this division shall be disclosed to any person, except as provided in this division, or be used in evidence against the defendant on the issue of guilt in any retrial. A pre-sentence investigation or mental examination shall not be made except upon request of the defendant. Copies of any reports prepared under this division</u>

shall be furnished to the court, to the trial jury if the offender was tried by a jury, to the prosecutor, and to the offender or the offender's counsel for use under this division. The court, and the trial jury if the offender was tried by a jury, shall consider any report prepared pursuant to this division and furnished to it and any evidence raised at trial that is relevant to the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing or to any factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death, shall hear testimony and other evidence that is relevant to the nature and circumstances of the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, and any other factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death, and shall hear the statement, if any, of the offender, and the arguments, if any, of counsel for the defense and prosecution, that are relevant to the presentation of evidence of the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section Section 2929.04 of the sentence of death. If the offender of evidence of the mitigating factors in mitigation of the sentence of death. If the offender chooses to make a statement, the offender is subject to cross-examination only if the offender chooses to make the statement under oath or affirmation.

The defendant shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence of any factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death. The prosecution shall have the burden of proving, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the defendant was found guilty of committing are sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death.

(2) Upon consideration of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the testimony, other evidence, statement of the offender, arguments of counsel, and, if applicable, the reports submitted pursuant to division (D)(1) of this section, the trial jury, if the offender was tried by a jury, shall determine whether the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case. If the trial jury unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jury shall recommend to the court that the sentence of death be imposed on the offender. Absent such a finding, the jury shall recommend that the offender be sentenced to one of the following:

(a) Except as provided in division (D)(2)(b) or (c) of this section, to life imprisonment without parole, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment;

(b) Except as provided in division (D)(2)(c) of this section, if the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the jury does not recommend a sentence of life imprisonment without parole pursuant to division (D)(2)(a) of this section, to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment to be imposed pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and served pursuant to that section.

(c) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, to life imprisonment without parole.

If the trial jury recommends that the offender be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment, or an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment to be imposed pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose the sentence recommended by the jury upon the offender. If the sentence is an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment imposed as described in division (D)(2)(b) of this section or a sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed under division (D)(2)(c) of this section, the sentence shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code. If the trial jury recommends that the sentence of death be imposed upon the offender, the court shall proceed to impose sentence pursuant to division (D)(3) of this section.

(3) Upon consideration of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the testimony, other evidence, statement of the offender, arguments of counsel, and, if applicable, the reports submitted to the court pursuant to division (D)(1) of this section, if, after receiving pursuant to division (D)(2) of this section the trial jury's recommendation that the sentence of death be imposed, the court finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the panel of three judges unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors, it shall impose sentence of death on the offender. Absent such a finding by the court or panel, the court or the panel shall impose one of the following sentences on the offender:

(a) Except as provided in division (D)(3)(b) of this section, one of the following:

(i) Life imprisonment without parole;

(ii) Subject to division (D)(3)(a)(iv) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment;

(iii) Subject to division (D)(3)(a)(iv) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment;

(iv) If the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (D)(3)(a) (i) of this section, the court or panel shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(b) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(E)(1) If the offender raised the matter of age at trial pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code, was convicted of aggravated murder and one or more specifications of an aggravating circumstance listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, and was not found at trial

to have been eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense, the court or the panel of three judges shall not impose a sentence of death on the offender. Instead, the court or panel shall impose one of the following sentences on the offender:

(1) (a) Except as provided in division (E)(2) (1)(b) of this section, one of the following:

(a) (i) Life imprisonment without parole;

(b) (ii) Subject to division (E)(2)(d) (1)(a)(iv) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment;

(c) (iii) Subject to division (E)(2)(d) (1)(a)(iv) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment;

(d) (iv) If the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (E)(2)(1)(a)(i) of this section, the court or panel shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(2) (b) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(2) If the offender raised the matter of the offender's serious mental illness at the time of the commission of the offense pursuant to section 2929.025 of the Revised Code, was found under that section to be ineligible for a sentence of death due to serious mental illness, and was convicted of aggravated murder and one or more specifications of an aggravating circumstance listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the court or panel of three judges shall not impose a sentence of death on the offender. Instead, the court or panel shall sentence the offender to life imprisonment without parole.

(F) The court or the panel of three judges, when it imposes sentence of death, shall state in a separate opinion its specific findings as to the existence of any of the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the existence of any other mitigating factors, the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, and the reasons why the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors. The court or panel, when it imposes life imprisonment or an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment under division (D) of this section, shall state in a separate opinion its specific findings of which of the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code it found to exist, what other mitigating factors it found to exist, what aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors. For cases in which a sentence of death is imposed for an offense committed before January 1, 1995, the court or panel shall file the opinion required to be prepared by this division with the clerk of the appropriate court of appeals and with the clerk of the supreme court within fifteen days after the court or panel imposes sentence. For cases in which a

sentence of death is imposed for an offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, the court or panel shall file the opinion required to be prepared by this division with the clerk of the supreme court within fifteen days after the court or panel imposes sentence. The judgment in a case in which a sentencing hearing is held pursuant to this section is not final until the opinion is filed.

(G)(1) Whenever the court or a panel of three judges imposes a sentence of death for an offense committed before January 1, 1995, the clerk of the court in which the judgment is rendered shall make and retain a copy of the entire record in the case, and shall deliver the original of the entire record in the case to the appellate court.

(2) Whenever the court or a panel of three judges imposes a sentence of death for an offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, the clerk of the court in which the judgment is rendered shall make and retain a copy of the entire record in the case, and shall deliver the original of the entire record in the case to the supreme court.

Sec. 2929.04. (A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) The offense was the assassination of the president of the United States or a person in line of succession to the presidency, the governor or lieutenant governor of this state, the president-elect or vice president-elect of the United States, the governor-elect or lieutenant governor-elect of this state, or a candidate for any of the offices described in this division. For purposes of this division, a person is a candidate if the person has been nominated for election according to law, if the person has filed a petition or petitions according to law to have the person's name placed on the ballot in a primary or general election, or if the person campaigns as a write-in candidate in a primary or general election.

(2) The offense was committed for hire.

(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.

(4) The offense was committed while the offender was under detention or while the offender was at large after having broken detention. As used in division (A)(4) of this section, "detention" has the same meaning as in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code, except that detention does not include hospitalization, institutionalization, or confinement in a mental health facility or intellectual disabilities facility unless at the time of the commission of the offense either of the following circumstances apply:

(a) The offender was in the facility as a result of being charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code.

(b) The offender was under detention as a result of being convicted of or pleading guilty to a violation of a section of the Revised Code.

(5) Prior to the offense at bar, the offender was convicted of an offense an essential element of which was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.

(6) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer, as defined in section 2911.01 of the Revised Code, whom the offender had reasonable cause to know or knew to be a law enforcement

(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and design.

(8) The victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense who was purposely killed to prevent the victim's testimony in any criminal proceeding and the aggravated murder was not committed during the commission, attempted commission, or flight immediately after the commission or attempted commission of the offense to which the victim was a witness, or the victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense and was purposely killed in retaliation for the victim's testimony in any criminal proceeding.

(9) The offender, in the commission of the offense, purposefully caused the death of another who was under thirteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the offense or, if not the principal offender, committed the offense with prior calculation and design.

(10) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit terrorism.

(B) If one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of this section is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the offender did not raise the matter of age pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code or if the offender, after raising the that matter of age, was found at trial to have been eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense, and if the offender did not raise the matter of the offender's serious mental illness at the time of the commission of the offender after raising that matter was found by the court to not be ineligible for a sentence of death, the court, trial jury, or panel of three judges shall consider, and weigh against the aggravating circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and background of the offender, and all of the following factors:

(1) Whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;

(2) Whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation;

(3) Whether, at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of the offender's conduct or to conform the offender's conduct to the requirements of the law;

(4) The youth of the offender;

(5) The offender's lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions and delinquency adjudications;

(6) If the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal offender, the degree of the offender's participation in the offense and the degree of the offender's participation in the acts that

#### led to the death of the victim;

(7) Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should be sentenced to death.

(C) The defendant shall be given great latitude in the presentation of evidence of the factors listed in division (B) of this section and of any other factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death.

The existence of any of the mitigating factors listed in division (B) of this section does not preclude the imposition of a sentence of death on the offender but shall be weighed pursuant to divisions (D)(2) and (3) of section 2929.03 of the Revised Code by the trial court, trial jury, or the panel of three judges against the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing.

Sec. 2929.06. (A)(1) If a sentence of death imposed upon an offender is set aside, nullified, or vacated because the, or voided for any of the following reasons, the trial court that sentenced the offender shall conduct a hearing to resentence the offender in accordance with division (A)(2) of this section:

(a) The court of appeals, in a case in which a sentence of death was imposed for an offense committed before January 1, 1995, or the supreme court, in <u>cases a case</u> in which the supreme court reviews the sentence upon appeal, could not affirm the sentence of death under the standards imposed by section 2929.05 of the Revised Code, is set aside, nullified, or vacated for the.

(b) The sole reason that the statutory procedure for imposing the sentence of death that is set forth in sections 2929.03 and 2929.04 of the Revised Code is unconstitutional<sub> $\frac{1}{2}$ </sub>.

(c) The sentence of death is set aside, nullified, or vacated pursuant to division (C) of section 2929.05 of the Revised Code, or is set aside, nullified, or vacated because a.

(d) A court has determined that the offender is a person with an intellectual disability under standards set forth in decisions of the supreme court of this state or the United States supreme court, the trial court that sentenced the offender shall conduct a hearing to resentence the offender.

(e) The sentence of death is voided by a court pursuant to division (H) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code.

(2) At the <u>a</u> resentencing hearing <u>conducted under division (A)(1) of this section</u>, the court shall impose upon the offender a sentence of life imprisonment or an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment that is determined as specified in this division. If the sentence of death was voided by a court pursuant to division (H) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code, the offender has waived any right to be sentenced to any sentence other than life imprisonment without parole as described in division (A)(3)(b) of that section and the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. If the immediately preceding sentence does not apply and if division (D) of section 2929.03 of the Revised Code, at the time the offender committed the aggravated murder for which the sentence of life imprisonment without parole or a sentence of an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment to be imposed pursuant to division (A) or (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and served pursuant to that section, the court shall impose the sentence so required. In all other cases, the sentences of life imprisonment that are available at the hearing,

and from which the court shall impose sentence, shall be the same sentences of life imprisonment that were available under division (D) of section 2929.03 or under section 2909.24 of the Revised Code at the time the offender committed the offense for which the sentence of death was imposed. Nothing in this division regarding the resentencing of an offender shall affect the operation of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(B) Whenever any court of this state or any federal court sets aside, nullifies, or vacates a sentence of death imposed upon an offender because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of the trial and if division (A) of this section does not apply, the trial court that sentenced the offender shall conduct a new hearing to resentence the offender. If the offender was tried by a jury, the trial court shall impanel a new jury for the hearing. If the offender was tried by a panel of three judges, that panel or, if necessary, a new panel of three judges shall conduct the hearing. At the hearing, the court or panel shall follow the procedure set forth in division (D) of section 2929.03 of the Revised Code in determining whether to impose upon the offender a sentence of death, a sentence of life imprisonment, or an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment. If, pursuant to that procedure, the court or panel determines that it will impose a sentence other than a sentence of death, the court or panel shall impose upon the offender one of the sentences of life imprisonment that could have been imposed at the time the offender committed the offense for which the sentence of death was imposed, determined as specified in this division, or an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment that is determined as specified in this division. If division (D) of section 2929.03 of the Revised Code, at the time the offender committed the aggravated murder for which the sentence of death was imposed, required the imposition when a sentence of death was not imposed of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole or a sentence of an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment to be imposed pursuant to division (A) or (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and served pursuant to that section, the court or panel shall impose the sentence so required. In all other cases, the sentences of life imprisonment that are available at the hearing, and from which the court or panel shall impose sentence, shall be the same sentences of life imprisonment that were available under division (D) of section 2929.03 or under section 2909.24 of the Revised Code at the time the offender committed the offense for which the sentence of death was imposed.

(C) If a sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed upon an offender pursuant to section 2929.021 or 2929.03 of the Revised Code is set aside, nullified, or vacated for the sole reason that the statutory procedure for imposing the sentence of life imprisonment without parole that is set forth in sections 2929.03 and 2929.04 of the Revised Code is unconstitutional, the trial court that sentenced the offender shall conduct a hearing to resentence the offender to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment or to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment.

(D) Nothing in this section limits or restricts the rights of the state to appeal any order setting aside, nullifying, or vacating a conviction or sentence of death, when an appeal of that nature otherwise would be available.

(E) This section, as amended by H.B. 184 of the 125th general assembly, shall apply to all offenders who have been sentenced to death for an aggravated murder that was committed on or after

October 19, 1981, or for terrorism that was committed on or after May 15, 2002. This section, as amended by H.B. 184 of the 125th general assembly, shall apply equally to all such offenders sentenced to death prior to, on, or after March 23, 2005, including offenders who, on March 23, 2005, are challenging their sentence of death and offenders whose sentence of death has been set aside, nullified, or vacated by any court of this state or any federal court but who, as of March 23, 2005, have not yet been resentenced.

Sec. 2929.14. (A) Except as provided in division (B)(1), (B)(2), (B)(3), (B)(4), (B)(5), (B)(6), (B)(7), (B)(8), (B)(9), (B)(10), (B)(11), (E), (G), (H), (J), or (K) of this section or in division (D)(6) of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code and except in relation to an offense for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment is to be imposed, if the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender pursuant to this chapter, the court shall impose a prison term that shall be one of the following:

(1)(a) For a felony of the first degree committed on or after the effective date of this amendment, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum term selected by the court of three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code, except that if the section that criminalizes the conduct constituting the felony specifies a different minimum term or penalty for the offense, the specific language of that section shall control in determining the minimum term or otherwise sentencing the offender but the minimum term or sentence imposed under that specific language shall be considered for purposes of the Revised Code as if it had been imposed under this division.

(b) For a felony of the first degree committed prior to the effective date of this amendment, the prison term shall be a definite prison term of three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years.

(2)(a) For a felony of the second degree committed on or after the effective date of this amendment, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code, except that if the section that criminalizes the conduct constituting the felony specifies a different minimum term or penalty for the offense, the specific language of that section shall control in determining the minimum term or otherwise sentencing the offender but the minimum term or sentence imposed under that specific language shall be considered for purposes of the Revised Code as if it had been imposed under this division.

(b) For a felony of the second degree committed prior to the effective date of this amendment, the prison term shall be a definite term of two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years.

(3)(a) For a felony of the third degree that is a violation of section 2903.06, 2903.08, 2907.03, 2907.04, 2907.05, 2907.321, 2907.322, 2907.323, or 3795.04 of the Revised Code or that is a violation of section 2911.02 or 2911.12 of the Revised Code if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty in two or more separate proceedings to two or more violations of section 2911.01, 2911.02, 2911.11, or 2911.12 of the Revised Code, the prison term shall be a definite term of twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, thirty-six, forty-two, forty-eight, fifty-four, or

sixty months.

(b) For a felony of the third degree that is not an offense for which division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies, the prison term shall be a definite term of nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months.

(4) For a felony of the fourth degree, the prison term shall be a definite term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen months.

(5) For a felony of the fifth degree, the prison term shall be a definite term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve months.

(B)(1)(a) Except as provided in division (B)(1)(e) of this section, if an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.141, 2941.144, or 2941.145 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose on the offender one of the following prison terms:

(i) A prison term of six years if the specification is of the type described in division (A) of section 2941.144 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having a firearm that is an automatic firearm or that was equipped with a firearm muffler or suppressor on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the offense;

(ii) A prison term of three years if the specification is of the type described in division (A) of section 2941.145 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the offense and displaying the firearm, brandishing the firearm, indicating that the offender possessed the firearm, or using it to facilitate the offense;

(iii) A prison term of one year if the specification is of the type described in division (A) of section 2941.141 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the offense;

(iv) A prison term of nine years if the specification is of the type described in division (D) of section 2941.144 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having a firearm that is an automatic firearm or that was equipped with a firearm muffler or suppressor on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the offense and specifies that the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.141, 2941.144, 2941.145, 2941.146, or 2941.1412 of the Revised Code;

(v) A prison term of fifty-four months if the specification is of the type described in division (D) of section 2941.145 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the offense and displaying the firearm, brandishing the firearm, indicating that the offender possessed the firearm, or using the firearm to facilitate the offense and that the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.141, 2941.144, 2941.145, 2941.146, or 2941.1412 of the Revised Code;

(vi) A prison term of eighteen months if the specification is of the type described in division (D) of section 2941.141 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the offense and that the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.141, 2941.144, 2941.145, 2941.146, or 2941.1412 of the Revised Code.

(b) If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(a) of this section, the prison term shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2967.19, section 2929.20, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. Except as provided in division (B)(1)(g) of this section, a court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act or transaction.

(c)(i) Except as provided in division (B)(1)(e) of this section, if an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of section 2923.161 of the Revised Code or to a felony that includes, as an essential element, purposely or knowingly causing or attempting to cause the death of or physical harm to another, also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in division (A) of section 2941.146 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with committing the offense by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle other than a manufactured home, the court, after imposing a prison term on the offender for the violation of section 2923.161 of the Revised Code or for the other felony offense under division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section, shall impose an additional prison term of five years upon the offender that shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code.

(ii) Except as provided in division (B)(1)(e) of this section, if an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of section 2923.161 of the Revised Code or to a felony that includes, as an essential element, purposely or knowingly causing or attempting to cause the death of or physical harm to another, also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in division (C) of section 2941.146 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with committing the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.141, 2941.144, 2941.145, 2941.146, or 2941.1412 of the Revised Code, the court, after imposing a prison term on the offender for the violation of section 2923.161 of the Revised Code or for the other felony offense under division (A), (B)(2), or (3) of this section, shall impose an additional prison term of ninety months upon the offender that shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, 2967.19, 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code.

(iii) A court shall not impose more than one additional prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(c) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act or transaction. If a court imposes an additional prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(c) of this section relative to an offense, the court also shall impose a prison term under division (B)(1)(a) of this section relative to the same offense, provided the criteria specified in that division for imposing an additional prison term are satisfied relative to the offender and the offense.

(d) If an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense of violence that is a felony also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1411 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with wearing or carrying body armor while committing the felony offense of violence, the court shall impose on the offender an additional prison term of two years. The prison term so imposed, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19 of the Revised Code, shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court

shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(d) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act or transaction. If a court imposes an additional prison term under division (B)(1)(a) or (c) of this section, the court is not precluded from imposing an additional prison term under division (B)(1)(d) of this section.

(e) The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section or any of the additional prison terms described in division (B)(1)(c) of this section upon an offender for a violation of section 2923.12 or 2923.123 of the Revised Code. The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) or (b) of this section upon an offender for a violation of section 2923.122 that involves a deadly weapon that is a firearm other than a dangerous ordnance, section 2923.16, or section 2923.121 of the Revised Code. The court shall not impose any of the prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section or any of the additional prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section or any of the additional prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section or any of the additional prison terms described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section of section 2923.13 of the Revised Code unless all of the following apply:

(i) The offender previously has been convicted of aggravated murder, murder, or any felony of the first or second degree.

(ii) Less than five years have passed since the offender was released from prison or postrelease control, whichever is later, for the prior offense.

(f)(i) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony that includes, as an essential element, causing or attempting to cause the death of or physical harm to another and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in division (A) of section 2941.1412 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with committing the offense by discharging a firearm at a peace officer as defined in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code or a corrections officer, as defined in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code or a corrections officer, as defined in section 2941.1412 of the Revised Code, the court, after imposing a prison term on the offender for the felony offense under division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section, shall impose an additional prison term of seven years upon the offender that shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code.

(ii) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony that includes, as an essential element, causing or attempting to cause the death of or physical harm to another and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in division (B) of section 2941.1412 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with committing the offense by discharging a firearm at a peace officer, as defined in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code, or a corrections officer, as defined in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code, or a corrections officer, as defined in section 2941.1412 of the Revised Code, and that the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.141, 2941.144, 2941.145, 2941.146, or 2941.1412 of the Revised Code, the court, after imposing a prison term on the offender for the felony offense under division (A), (B)(2), or (3) of this section, shall impose an additional prison term of one hundred twenty-six months upon the offender that shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, 2967.19, 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or 5120. of the Revised Code.

(iii) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies that include, as an essential element, causing or attempting to cause the death or physical harm to another and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described under division (B)(1)(f) of this

section in connection with two or more of the felonies of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty, the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(f) of this section for each of two of the specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term specified under that division for any or all of the remaining specifications. If a court imposes an additional prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(f) of this section relative to an offense, the court shall not impose a prison term under division (B)(1)(a) or (c) of this section relative to the same offense.

(g) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies, if one or more of those felonies are aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if the offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described under division (B)(1)(a) of this section in connection with two or more of the felonies, the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two most serious specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term specified under that division for any or all of the remaining specifications.

(2)(a) If division (B)(2)(b) of this section does not apply, the court may impose on an offender, in addition to the longest prison term authorized or required for the offense or, for offenses for which division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of this section applies, in addition to the longest minimum prison term authorized or required for the offense, an additional definite prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years if all of the following criteria are met:

(i) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.149 of the Revised Code that the offender is a repeat violent offender.

(ii) The offense of which the offender currently is convicted or to which the offender currently pleads guilty is aggravated murder and the court does not impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, murder, terrorism and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, any felony of the first degree that is an offense of violence and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole of life imprisonment without parole as entence of life imprisonment without parole, or any felony of the second degree that is an offense of violence and the trier of fact finds that the offense involved an attempt to cause or a threat to cause serious physical harm to a person or resulted in serious physical harm to a person.

(iii) The court imposes the longest prison term for the offense or the longest minimum prison term for the offense, whichever is applicable, that is not life imprisonment without parole.

(iv) The court finds that the prison terms imposed pursuant to division (B)(2)(a)(iii) of this section and, if applicable, division (B)(1) or (3) of this section are inadequate to punish the offender and protect the public from future crime, because the applicable factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating a greater likelihood of recidivism outweigh the applicable factors under that section indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism.

(v) The court finds that the prison terms imposed pursuant to division (B)(2)(a)(iii) of this section and, if applicable, division (B)(1) or (3) of this section are demeaning to the seriousness of the offense, because one or more of the factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code indicating

(b) The court shall impose on an offender the longest prison term authorized or required for the offense or, for offenses for which division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of this section applies, the longest minimum prison term authorized or required for the offense, and shall impose on the offender an additional definite prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years if all of the following criteria are met:

(i) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.149 of the Revised Code that the offender is a repeat violent offender.

(ii) The offender within the preceding twenty years has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more offenses described in division (CC)(1) of section 2929.01 of the Revised Code, including all offenses described in that division of which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty in the current prosecution and all offenses described in that division of which the offender previously has been convicted or to which the offender previously pleaded guilty, whether prosecuted together or separately.

(iii) The offense or offenses of which the offender currently is convicted or to which the offender currently pleads guilty is aggravated murder and the court does not impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, murder, terrorism and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, any felony of the first degree that is an offense of violence and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, any felony of the first degree that is an offense of violence and the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, or any felony of the second degree that is an offense of violence and the trier of fact finds that the offense involved an attempt to cause or a threat to cause serious physical harm to a person or resulted in serious physical harm to a person.

(c) For purposes of division (B)(2)(b) of this section, two or more offenses committed at the same time or as part of the same act or event shall be considered one offense, and that one offense shall be the offense with the greatest penalty.

(d) A sentence imposed under division (B)(2)(a) or (b) of this section shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, or section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. The offender shall serve an additional prison term imposed under division (B)(2)(a) or (b) of this section consecutively to and prior to the prison term imposed for the underlying offense.

(e) When imposing a sentence pursuant to division (B)(2)(a) or (b) of this section, the court shall state its findings explaining the imposed sentence.

(3) Except when an offender commits a violation of section 2903.01 or 2907.02 of the Revised Code and the penalty imposed for the violation is life imprisonment or commits a violation of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code, if the offender commits a violation of section 2925.03 or 2925.11 of the Revised Code and that section classifies the offender as a major drug offender, if the offender commits a violation of section 2925.05 of the Revised Code and division (E)(1) of that section classifies the offender as a major drug offender, if the offender commits a felony violation of section 2925.02, 2925.04, 2925.05, 2925.36, 3719.07, 3719.08, 3719.16, 3719.161, 4729.37, or 4729.61, division (C) or (D) of section 3719.172, division (E) of section 4729.51, or division (J) of

section 4729.54 of the Revised Code that includes the sale, offer to sell, or possession of a schedule I or II controlled substance, with the exception of marihuana, and the court imposing sentence upon the offender finds that the offender is guilty of a specification of the type described in division (A) of section 2941.1410 of the Revised Code charging that the offender is a major drug offender, if the court imposing sentence upon an offender for a felony finds that the offender is guilty of corrupt activity with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt activity being a felony of the first degree, or if the offender is guilty of an attempted violation of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code and, had the offender completed the violation of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code that was attempted, the offender would have been subject to a sentence of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without parole for the violation of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose upon the offender for the felony violation a mandatory prison term determined as described in this division that, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19 of the Revised Code, cannot be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or 5120. of the Revised Code. The mandatory prison term shall be the maximum definite prison term prescribed in division (A)(1)(b) of this section for a felony of the first degree, except that for offenses for which division (A)(1)(a) of this section applies, the mandatory prison term shall be the longest minimum prison term prescribed in that division for the offense.

(4) If the offender is being sentenced for a third or fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, the sentencing court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory prison term in accordance with that division. In addition to the mandatory prison term, if the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense, the court, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of this section, may sentence the offender to a definite prison term of not less than six months and not more than thirty months, and if the offender is being sentenced for a third degree felony OVI offense, the sentencing court may sentence the offender to an additional prison term of any duration specified in division (A)(3) of this section. In either case, the additional prison term imposed shall be reduced by the sixty or one hundred twenty days imposed upon the offender as the mandatory prison term. The total of the additional prison term imposed under division (B)(4) of this section plus the sixty or one hundred twenty days imposed as the mandatory prison term shall equal a definite term in the range of six months to thirty months for a fourth degree felony OVI offense and shall equal one of the authorized prison terms specified in division (A)(3) of this section for a third degree felony OVI offense. If the court imposes an additional prison term under division (B)(4) of this section, the offender shall serve the additional prison term after the offender has served the mandatory prison term required for the offense. In addition to the mandatory prison term or mandatory and additional prison term imposed as described in division (B)(4) of this section, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction under section 2929.16 or 2929.17 of the Revised Code, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

If the offender is being sentenced for a fourth degree felony OVI offense under division (G) (1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code and the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, the court may impose a prison term as described in division (A)(1) of that section.

(5) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2903.06 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the

type described in section 2941.1414 of the Revised Code that charges that the victim of the offense is a peace officer, as defined in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code, or an investigator of the bureau of criminal identification and investigation, as defined in section 2903.11 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose on the offender a prison term of five years. If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(5) of this section, the prison term, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19 of the Revised Code, shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(5) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act.

(6) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2903.06 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1415 of the Revised Code that charges that the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more violations of division (A) or (B) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or an equivalent offense, as defined in section 2941.1415 of the Revised Code, or three or more violations of any combination of those divisions and offenses, the court shall impose on the offender a prison term of three years. If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(6) of this section, the prison term, subject to divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19 of the Revised Code, shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(6) of this section for the composed to the reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(6) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act.

(7)(a) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony violation of section 2905.01, 2905.02, 2907.21, 2907.22, or 2923.32, division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2907.323 involving a minor, or division (B)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of section 2919.22 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1422 of the Revised Code that charges that the offender knowingly committed the offense in furtherance of human trafficking, the court shall impose on the offender a mandatory prison term that is one of the following:

(i) If the offense is a felony of the first degree, a definite prison term of not less than five years and not greater than eleven years, except that if the offense is a felony of the first degree committed on or after the effective date of this amendment, the court shall impose as the minimum prison term a mandatory term of not less than five years and not greater than eleven years;

(ii) If the offense is a felony of the second or third degree, a definite prison term of not less than three years and not greater than the maximum prison term allowed for the offense by division (A)(2)(b) or (3) of this section, except that if the offense is a felony of the second degree committed on or after the effective date of this amendment, the court shall impose as the minimum prison term a mandatory term of not less than three years and not greater than eight years;

(iii) If the offense is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, a definite prison term that is the maximum prison term allowed for the offense by division (A) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.

(b) Subject to divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19 of the Revised Code, the prison term imposed under division (B)(7)(a) of this section shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. of the Revised Code. A

court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(7)(a) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act, scheme, or plan.

(8) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony violation of section 2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1423 of the Revised Code that charges that the victim of the violation was a woman whom the offender knew was pregnant at the time of the violation, notwithstanding the range prescribed in division (A) of this section as the definite prison term or minimum prison term for felonies of the same degree as the violation, the court shall impose on the offender a mandatory prison term that is either a definite prison term of six months or one of the prison terms prescribed in division (A) of this section for felonies of the same degree as the violation, except that if the violation is a felony of the first or second degree committed on or after the effective date of this amendment, the court shall impose as the minimum prison term under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of this section a mandatory term that is one of the terms prescribed in that division, whichever is applicable, for the offense.

(9)(a) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2903.11 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1425 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose on the offender a mandatory prison term of six years if either of the following applies:

(i) The violation is a violation of division (A)(1) of section 2903.11 of the Revised Code and the specification charges that the offender used an accelerant in committing the violation and the serious physical harm to another or to another's unborn caused by the violation resulted in a permanent, serious disfigurement or permanent, substantial incapacity;

(ii) The violation is a violation of division (A)(2) of section 2903.11 of the Revised Code and the specification charges that the offender used an accelerant in committing the violation, that the violation caused physical harm to another or to another's unborn, and that the physical harm resulted in a permanent, serious disfigurement or permanent, substantial incapacity.

(b) If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(9)(a) of this section, the prison term shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(9) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act.

(c) The provisions of divisions (B)(9) and (C)(6) of this section and of division (D)(2) of section 2903.11, division (F)(20) of section 2929.13, and section 2941.1425 of the Revised Code shall be known as "Judy's Law."

(10) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A) of section 2903.11 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1426 of the Revised Code that charges that the victim of the offense suffered permanent disabling harm as a result of the offense and that the victim was under ten years of age at the time of the offense, regardless of whether the offender knew the age of the victim, the court shall impose upon the offender an additional definite prison term of six years. A prison term imposed on an offender under division (B)(10) of this section shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised

(11) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony violation of section 2925.03 or 2925.05 of the Revised Code or a felony violation of section 2925.11 of the Revised Code for which division (C)(11) of that section applies in determining the sentence for the violation, if the drug involved in the violation is a fentanyl-related compound or a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance containing a fentanyl-related compound, and if the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in division (B) of section 2941.1410 of the Revised Code that charges that the offender is a major drug offender, in addition to any other penalty imposed for the violation, the court shall impose on the offender a mandatory prison term of three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years. If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division (B)(11) of this section 2929.20, 2967.19, or 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or 5120. of the Revised Code. A court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender under division (B)(11) of this section (B)(11) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act.

(C)(1)(a) Subject to division (C)(1)(b) of this section, if a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(1)(a) of this section for having a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing a felony, if a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(1)(c) of this section for committing a felony specified in that division by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, or if both types of mandatory prison terms are imposed, the offender shall serve any mandatory prison term imposed under either division consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under either division or under division (B)(1)(d) of this section, consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony pursuant to division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section or any other section of the Revised Code, and consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(b) If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(1)(d) of this section for wearing or carrying body armor while committing an offense of violence that is a felony, the offender shall serve the mandatory term so imposed consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under that division or under division (B)(1)(a) or (c) of this section, consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony under division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section or any other section of the Revised Code, and consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(c) If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(1)(f) of this section, the offender shall serve the mandatory prison term so imposed consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony under division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this section or any other section of the Revised Code, and consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(d) If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(7) or (8) of this section, the offender shall serve the mandatory prison term so imposed consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under that division or under any other provision of law and
(e) If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(11) of this section, the offender shall serve the mandatory prison term consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under that division, consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony, and consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(2) If an offender who is an inmate in a jail, prison, or other residential detention facility violates section 2917.02, 2917.03, or 2921.35 of the Revised Code or division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code, if an offender who is under detention at a detention facility commits a felony violation of section 2923.131 of the Revised Code, or if an offender who is an inmate in a jail, prison, or other residential detention facility or is under detention at a detention facility commits another felony while the offender is an escapee in violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code, any prison term imposed upon the offender for one of those violations shall be served by the offender consecutively to the prison term or term of imprisonment the offender was serving when the offender committed that offense and to any other prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(3) If a prison term is imposed for a violation of division (B) of section 2911.01 of the Revised Code, a violation of division (A) of section 2913.02 of the Revised Code in which the stolen property is a firearm or dangerous ordnance, or a felony violation of division (B) of section 2921.331 of the Revised Code, the offender shall serve that prison term consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender.

(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

(5) If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(5) or (6) of this section, the offender shall serve the mandatory prison term consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2903.06 of the Revised Code pursuant to division (A) of this section or section 2929.142 of the Revised Code. If a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(5) of this section, and if a mandatory prison term also is imposed upon the offender pursuant to division (B)(6) of this section

in relation to the same violation, the offender shall serve the mandatory prison term imposed pursuant to division (B)(5) of this section consecutively to and prior to the mandatory prison term imposed pursuant to division (B)(6) of this section and consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2903.06 of the Revised Code pursuant to division (A) of this section or section 2929.142 of the Revised Code.

(6) If a mandatory prison term is imposed on an offender pursuant to division (B)(9) of this section, the offender shall serve the mandatory prison term consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of section 2903.11 of the Revised Code and consecutively to and prior to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed on the offender.

(7) If a mandatory prison term is imposed on an offender pursuant to division (B)(10) of this section, the offender shall serve that mandatory prison term consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felonious assault. Except as otherwise provided in division (C) of this section, any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the offender may be served concurrently with, or consecutively to, the prison term imposed pursuant to division (B)(10) of this section.

(8) Any prison term imposed for a violation of section 2903.04 of the Revised Code that is based on a violation of section 2925.03 or 2925.11 of the Revised Code or on a violation of section 2925.05 of the Revised Code that is not funding of marihuana trafficking shall run consecutively to any prison term imposed for the violation of section 2925.03 or 2925.11 of the Revised Code or for the violation of section 2925.05 of the Revised Code that is not funding of marihuana trafficking.

(9) When consecutive prison terms are imposed pursuant to division (C)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), or (8) or division (H)(1) or (2) of this section, subject to division (C)(10) of this section, the term to be served is the aggregate of all of the terms so imposed.

(10) When a court sentences an offender to a non-life felony indefinite prison term, any definite prison term or mandatory definite prison term previously or subsequently imposed on the offender in addition to that indefinite sentence that is required to be served consecutively to that indefinite sentence shall be served prior to the indefinite sentence.

(11) If a court is sentencing an offender for a felony of the first or second degree, if division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of this section applies with respect to the sentencing for the offense, and if the court is required under the Revised Code section that sets forth the offense or any other Revised Code provision to impose a mandatory prison term for the offense, the court shall impose the required mandatory prison term as the minimum term imposed under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of this section, whichever is applicable.

(D)(1) If a court imposes a prison term, other than a term of life imprisonment, for a felony of the first degree, for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree that is an offense of violence and that is not a felony sex offense, it shall include in the sentence a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control after the offender's release from imprisonment, in accordance with section 2967.28 of the Revised Code. If a court imposes a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division on or after July 11, 2006, the failure of a court to include a post-release control requirement in the sentence pursuant to this division does not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory period of post-release

control that is required for the offender under division (B) of section 2967.28 of the Revised Code. Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division and failed to include in the sentence pursuant to this division a statement regarding post-release control.

(2) If a court imposes a prison term for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject to division (D)(1) of this section, it shall include in the sentence a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control after the offender's release from imprisonment, in accordance with that division, if the parole board determines that a period of post-release control is necessary. Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division and failed to include in the sentence pursuant to this division a statement regarding post-release control.

(E) The court shall impose sentence upon the offender in accordance with section 2971.03 of the Revised Code, and Chapter 2971. of the Revised Code applies regarding the prison term or term of life imprisonment without parole imposed upon the offender and the service of that term of imprisonment if any of the following apply:

(1) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violent sex offense or a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense, and, in relation to that offense, the offender is adjudicated a sexually violent predator.

(2) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code committed on or after January 2, 2007, and either the court does not impose a sentence of life without parole when authorized pursuant to division (B) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, or division (B) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code provides that the court shall not sentence the offender pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(3) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to attempted rape committed on or after January 2, 2007, and a specification of the type described in section 2941.1418, 2941.1419, or 2941.1420 of the Revised Code.

(4) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of section 2905.01 of the Revised Code committed on or after January 1, 2008, and that section requires the court to sentence the offender pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(5) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated murder committed on or after January 1, 2008, and division (A)(2)(b)(ii) of section 2929.022, division (A)(1)(e), (C)(1)(a)(v), (C) (2)(a)(ii), (D)(2)(b), (D)(3)(a)(iv), or (E)(1)(d)(E)(1)(a)(iv) of section 2929.03, or division (A) or (B) of section 2929.06 of the Revised Code requires the court to sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(6) A person is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder committed on or after January 1, 2008, and division (B)(2) of section 2929.02 of the Revised Code requires the court to sentence the offender pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(F) If a person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony is sentenced to a prison term of imprisonment under this section, sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code, section 2929.142 of the Revised Code, section 2971.03 of the Revised Code, or any other provision of law, section 5120.163 of the Revised Code applies regarding the person while the person is confined in a state correctional institution.

(G) If an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony that is an offense of violence also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.142 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having committed the felony while participating in a criminal gang, the court shall impose upon the offender an additional prison term of one, two, or three years.

(H)(1) If an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated murder, murder, or a felony of the first, second, or third degree that is an offense of violence also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.143 of the Revised Code that charges the offender with having committed the offense in a school safety zone or towards a person in a school safety zone, the court shall impose upon the offender an additional prison term of two years. The offender shall serve the additional two years consecutively to and prior to the prison term imposed for the underlying offense.

(2)(a) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony violation of section 2907.22, 2907.24, 2907.241, or 2907.25 of the Revised Code and to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1421 of the Revised Code and if the court imposes a prison term on the offender for the felony violation, the court may impose upon the offender an additional prison term as follows:

(i) Subject to division (H)(2)(a)(ii) of this section, an additional prison term of one, two, three, four, five, or six months;

(ii) If the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more felony or misdemeanor violations of section 2907.22, 2907.23, 2907.24, 2907.241, or 2907.25 of the Revised Code and also was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1421 of the Revised Code regarding one or more of those violations, an additional prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve months.

(b) In lieu of imposing an additional prison term under division (H)(2)(a) of this section, the court may directly impose on the offender a sanction that requires the offender to wear a real-time processing, continual tracking electronic monitoring device during the period of time specified by the court. The period of time specified by the court shall equal the duration of an additional prison term that the court could have imposed upon the offender under division (H)(2)(a) of this section. A sanction imposed under this division shall commence on the date specified by the court, provided that the sanction shall not commence until after the offender has served the prison term imposed for the felony violation of section 2907.22, 2907.24, 2907.241, or 2907.25 of the Revised Code and any residential sanction imposed for the violation under section 2929.16 of the Revised Code. A sanction imposed under this division shall be considered to be a community control sanction for purposes of section 2929.15 of the Revised Code, and all provisions of the Revised Code that pertain to community control sanctions shall apply to a sanction imposed under this division, except to the extent that they would by their nature be clearly inapplicable. The offender shall pay all costs associated with a sanction imposed under this division, including the cost of the use of the monitoring device.

(I) At the time of sentencing, the court may recommend the offender for placement in a program of shock incarceration under section 5120.031 of the Revised Code or for placement in an intensive program prison under section 5120.032 of the Revised Code, disapprove placement of the offender in a program of shock incarceration or an intensive program prison of that nature, or make

no recommendation on placement of the offender. In no case shall the department of rehabilitation and correction place the offender in a program or prison of that nature unless the department determines as specified in section 5120.031 or 5120.032 of the Revised Code, whichever is applicable, that the offender is eligible for the placement.

If the court disapproves placement of the offender in a program or prison of that nature, the department of rehabilitation and correction shall not place the offender in any program of shock incarceration or intensive program prison.

If the court recommends placement of the offender in a program of shock incarceration or in an intensive program prison, and if the offender is subsequently placed in the recommended program or prison, the department shall notify the court of the placement and shall include with the notice a brief description of the placement.

If the court recommends placement of the offender in a program of shock incarceration or in an intensive program prison and the department does not subsequently place the offender in the recommended program or prison, the department shall send a notice to the court indicating why the offender was not placed in the recommended program or prison.

If the court does not make a recommendation under this division with respect to an offender and if the department determines as specified in section 5120.031 or 5120.032 of the Revised Code, whichever is applicable, that the offender is eligible for placement in a program or prison of that nature, the department shall screen the offender and determine if there is an available program of shock incarceration or an intensive program prison for which the offender is suited. If there is an available program of shock incarceration or an intensive program prison for which the offender is suited, the department shall notify the court of the proposed placement of the offender as specified in section 5120.031 or 5120.032 of the Revised Code and shall include with the notice a brief description of the placement. The court shall have ten days from receipt of the notice to disapprove the placement.

(J) If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of division (A)(1) of section 2903.06 of the Revised Code and division (B)(2)(c) of that section applies, the person shall be sentenced pursuant to section 2929.142 of the Revised Code.

(K)(1) The court shall impose an additional mandatory prison term of two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years on an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violent felony offense if the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1424 of the Revised Code that charges that the offender is a violent career criminal and had a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the presently charged violent felony offense and displayed or brandished the firearm, indicated that the offender possessed a firearm, or used the firearm to facilitate the offense. The offender shall serve the prison term imposed under this division consecutively to and prior to the prison term imposed for the underlying offense. The prison term shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2929.20 or 2967.19 or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or 5120. of the Revised Code. A court may not impose more than one sentence under division (B)(2)(a) of this section and this division for acts committed as part of the same act or transaction.

(2) As used in division (K)(1) of this section, "violent career criminal" and "violent felony offense" have the same meanings as in section 2923.132 of the Revised Code.

Sec. 2941.148. (A)(1) The application of Chapter 2971. of the Revised Code to an offender is precluded unless one of the following applies:

(a) The offender is charged with a violent sex offense, and the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the violent sex offense also includes a specification that the offender is a sexually violent predator, or the offender is charged with a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense, and the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense also includes both a specification of the type described in section 2941.147 of the Revised Code and a specification that the offender is a sexually violent predator.

(b) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code committed on or after January 2, 2007, and division (B) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code does not prohibit the court from sentencing the offender pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(c) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to attempted rape committed on or after January 2, 2007, and to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1418, 2941.1419, or 2941.1420 of the Revised Code.

(d) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of section 2905.01 of the Revised Code and to a specification of the type described in section 2941.147 of the Revised Code, and section 2905.01 of the Revised Code requires a court to sentence the offender pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(e) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated murder and to a specification of the type described in section 2941.147 of the Revised Code, and division (A)(2)(b)(ii) of section 2929.022, division (A)(1)(e), (C)(1)(a)(v), (C)(2)(a)(ii), (D)(2)(b), (D)(3)(a)(iv), or (E)(1)(d)(a)(iv) of section 2929.03, or division (A) or (B) of section 2929.06 of the Revised Code requires a court to sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(f) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder and to a specification of the type described in section 2941.147 of the Revised Code, and division (B)(2) of section 2929.02 of the Revised Code requires a court to sentence the offender pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(2) A specification required under division (A)(1)(a) of this section that an offender is a sexually violent predator shall be stated at the end of the body of the indictment, count, or information and shall be stated in substantially the following form:

"Specification (or, specification to the first count). The grand jury (or insert the person's or prosecuting attorney's name when appropriate) further find and specify that the offender is a sexually violent predator."

(B) In determining for purposes of this section whether a person is a sexually violent predator, all of the factors set forth in divisions (H)(1) to (6) of section 2971.01 of the Revised Code that apply regarding the person may be considered as evidence tending to indicate that it is likely that the person will engage in the future in one or more sexually violent offenses.

(C) As used in this section, "designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense," "violent sex offense," and "sexually violent predator" have the same meanings as in section 2971.01 of the Revised Code.

Sec. 2953.21. (A)(1)(a) <u>A person in any of the following categories may file a petition in the</u> court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief:

(i) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or adjudicated a delinquent child and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of the person's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States<del>, any</del>;

(ii) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced to death and who claims that there was a denial or infringement of the person's rights under either of those Constitutions that creates a reasonable probability of an altered verdict<del>, and any</del>;

(iii) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense that is a felony and who is an offender for whom DNA testing that was performed under sections 2953.71 to 2953.81 of the Revised Code or under former section 2953.82 of the Revised Code and analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of all available admissible evidence related to the person's case as described in division (D) of section 2953.74 of the Revised Code provided results that establish, by clear and convincing evidence, actual innocence of that felony offense or, if the person was sentenced to death, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, actual innocence of the aggravating circumstance or circumstances the person was found guilty of committing and that is or are the basis of that sentence of death, may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other-appropriate relief<sub>2</sub>

(iv) Any person who has been convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death for the offense and who claims that the person had a serious mental illness at the time of the commission of the offense and that as a result the court should render void the sentence of death, with the filing of the petition constituting the waiver described in division (A)(3)(b) of this section.

The (b) A petitioner under division (A)(1)(a) of this section may file a supporting affidavit and other documentary evidence in support of the claim for relief.

(b)(c) As used in division (A)(1)(a) of this section, "actual:

(i) "Actual innocence" means that, had the results of the DNA testing conducted under sections 2953.71 to 2953.81 of the Revised Code or under former section 2953.82 of the Revised Code been presented at trial, and had those results been analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of all available admissible evidence related to the person's case as described in division (D) of section 2953.74 of the Revised Code, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted, or, if the person was sentenced to death, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the aggravating circumstance or circumstances the petitioner was found guilty of committing and that is or are the basis of that sentence of death.

(ii) "Serious mental illness" has the same meaning as in section 2929.025 of the Revised Code.

(c)(d) As used in divisions (A)(1)(a) and (b)(c) of this section, "former section 2953.82 of the Revised Code" means section 2953.82 of the Revised Code as it existed prior to July 6, 2010.

(d)(e) At any time in conjunction with the filing of a petition for postconviction relief under division (A) of this section by a person who has been sentenced to death, or with the litigation of a

petition so filed, the court, for good cause shown, may authorize the petitioner in seeking the postconviction relief and the prosecuting attorney of the county served by the court in defending the proceeding, to take depositions and to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum in accordance with divisions (A)(1)(d)(e), (A)(1)(e)(f), and (C) of this section, and to any other form of discovery as in a civil action that the court in its discretion permits. The court may limit the extent of discovery under this division. In addition to discovery that is relevant to the claim and was available under Criminal Rule 16 through conclusion of the original criminal trial, the court, for good cause shown, may authorize the petitioner or prosecuting attorney to take depositions and issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum in either of the following circumstances:

(i) For any witness who testified at trial or who was disclosed by the state prior to trial, except as otherwise provided in this division, the petitioner or prosecuting attorney shows clear and convincing evidence that the witness is material and that a deposition of the witness or the issuing of a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum is of assistance in order to substantiate or refute the petitioner's claim that there is a reasonable probability of an altered verdict. This division does not apply if the witness was unavailable for trial or would not voluntarily be interviewed by the defendant or prosecuting attorney.

(ii) For any witness with respect to whom division (A)(1)(d)(e)(i) of this section does not apply, the petitioner or prosecuting attorney shows good cause that the witness is material and that a deposition of the witness or the issuing of a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum is of assistance in order to substantiate or refute the petitioner's claim that there is a reasonable probability of an altered verdict.

(e)(f) If a person who has been sentenced to death and who files a petition for postconviction relief under division (A) of this section requests postconviction discovery as described in division (A)(1)(d)(e) of this section or if the prosecuting attorney of the county served by the court requests postconviction discovery as described in that division, within ten days after the docketing of the request, or within any other time that the court sets for good cause shown, the prosecuting attorney shall respond by answer or motion to the petitioner's request or the petitioner shall respond by answer or motion to the petitioner's request.

(f)(g) If a person who has been sentenced to death and who files a petition for postconviction relief under division (A) of this section requests postconviction discovery as described in division (A)(1)(d)(e) of this section or if the prosecuting attorney of the county served by the court requests postconviction discovery as described in that division, upon motion by the petitioner, the prosecuting attorney, or the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from oppression or undue burden or expense, including but not limited to the orders described in divisions (A)(1)(g)(h)(i) to (viii) of this section. The court also may make any such order if, in its discretion, it determines that the discovery sought would be irrelevant to the claims made in the petition; and if the court makes any such order on that basis, it shall explain in the order the reasons why the discovery would be irrelevant.

(g)(h) If a petitioner, prosecuting attorney, or person from whom discovery is sought makes a motion for an order under division (A)(1)(f)(g) of this section and the order is denied in whole or in part, the court, on terms and conditions as are just, may order that any party or person provide or

permit discovery as described in division (A)(1)(d)(e) of this section. The provisions of Civil Rule 37(A)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion, except that in no case shall a court require a petitioner who is indigent to pay expenses under those provisions.

Before any person moves for an order under division (A)(1)(f)(g) of this section, that person shall make a reasonable effort to resolve the matter through discussion with the petitioner or prosecuting attorney seeking discovery. A motion for an order under division (A)(1)(f)(g) of this section shall be accompanied by a statement reciting the effort made to resolve the matter in accordance with this paragraph.

The orders that may be made under division (A)(1)(f)(g) of this section include, but are not limited to, any of the following:

(i) That the discovery not be had;

(ii) That the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;

(iii) That the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;

(iv) That certain matters not be inquired into or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters;

(v) That discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court;

(vi) That a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;

(vii) That a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;

(viii) That the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.

(h)(i) Any postconviction discovery authorized under division (A)(1)(d)(e) of this section shall be completed not later than eighteen months after the start of the discovery proceedings unless, for good cause shown, the court extends that period for completing the discovery.

(i)(j) Nothing in division (A)(1)(d)(e) of this section authorizes, or shall be construed as authorizing, the relitigation, or discovery in support of relitigation, of any matter barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

(i)(k) Division (A)(1) of this section does not apply to any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced to death and who has unsuccessfully raised the same claims in a petition for postconviction relief.

(2)(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication or, if the direct appeal involves a sentence of death, the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the supreme court. If no appeal is taken, except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, the petition shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the expiration of the time for filing the appeal.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(iv) of this section shall be filed not later than three hundred sixty-five days after the effective date of this amendment.

(3)(a) In a petition filed under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section, a person who has been sentenced to death may ask the court to render void or voidable the judgment with respect to the conviction of aggravated murder or the specification of an aggravating circumstance or the sentence of death.

(b) A person sentenced to death who files a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(iv) of this section may ask the court to render void the sentence of death and to order the resentencing of the person under division (A) of section 2929.06 of the Revised Code. If a person sentenced to death files such a petition and asks the court to render void the sentence of death and to order the resentencing of the person under division (A) of section 2929.06 of the Revised Code, the act of filing the petition constitutes a waiver of any right to be sentenced under the law that existed at the time the offense was committed and constitutes consent to be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under division (A) of section 2929.06 of the Revised Code.

(4) A petitioner shall state in the original or amended petition filed under division (A) of this section all grounds for relief claimed by the petitioner. Except as provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, any ground for relief that is not so stated in the petition is waived.

(5) If the petitioner in a petition filed under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony, the petition may include a claim that the petitioner was denied the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Ohio Constitution or the United States Constitution because the sentence imposed upon the petitioner for the felony was part of a consistent pattern of disparity in sentencing by the judge who imposed the sentence, with regard to the petitioner's race, gender, ethnic background, or religion. If the supreme court adopts a rule requiring a court of common pleas to maintain information with regard to an offender's race, gender, ethnic background, or religion, the supporting evidence for the petition shall include, but shall not be limited to, a copy of that type of information relative to the petitioner's sentence and copies of that type of information relative to sentences that the same judge imposed upon other persons.

(6) Notwithstanding any law or court rule to the contrary, there is no limit on the number of pages in, or on the length of, a petition filed under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section by a person who has been sentenced to death. If any court rule specifies a limit on the number of pages in, or on the length of, a petition filed under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section or on a prosecuting attorney's response to such a petition by answer or motion and a person who has been sentenced to death files a petition that exceeds the limit specified for the petition, the prosecuting attorney may respond by an answer or motion that exceeds the limit specified for the response.

(B) The clerk of the court in which the petition for postconviction relief and, if applicable, a request for postconviction discovery described in division (A)(1)(d)(e) of this section is filed shall docket the petition and the request and bring them promptly to the attention of the court. The clerk of the court in which the petition for postconviction relief and, if applicable, a request for postconviction discovery described in division (A)(1)(d)(e) of this section is filed immediately shall forward a copy of the petition and a copy of the request if filed by the petitioner to the prosecuting attorney, the clerk of the court immediately shall forward a copy of the courts of the court immediately shall forward a copy of the request to the prosecuting attorney, the clerk of the court immediately shall forward a copy of the request to the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel.

(C) If a person who has been sentenced to death and who files a petition for postconviction relief under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section requests a deposition or the prosecuting attorney in the case requests a deposition, and if the court grants the request under division (A)(1)(d)(e) of this section, the court shall notify the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel and the prosecuting attorney. The deposition shall be conducted pursuant to divisions (B), (D), and (E) of Criminal Rule 15. Notwithstanding division (C) of Criminal Rule 15, the petitioner is not entitled to attend the deposition. The prosecuting attorney shall be permitted to attend and participate in any deposition.

(D) The court shall consider a petition that is timely filed <u>under within the period specified in</u> division (A)(2) of this section even if a direct appeal of the judgment is pending. Before granting a hearing on a petition filed under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section, the court shall determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief. In making such a determination, the court shall consider, in addition to the petition, the supporting affidavits, and the documentary evidence, all the files and records pertaining to the proceedings against the petitioner, including, but not limited to, the indictment, the court's journal entries, the journalized records of the clerk of the court, and the court reporter's transcript. The court reporter's transcript, if ordered and certified by the court, shall be taxed as court costs. If the court dismisses the petition, it shall make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to such dismissal. If the petition was filed by a person who has been sentenced to death, the findings of fact and conclusions of law shall state specifically the reasons for the dismissal of the petition and of each claim it contains.

(E) Within ten days after the docketing of the petition, or within any further time that the court may fix for good cause shown, the prosecuting attorney shall respond by answer or motion. Division (A)(6) of this section applies with respect to the prosecuting attorney's response. Within twenty days from the date the issues are raised, either party may move for summary judgment. The right to summary judgment shall appear on the face of the record.

(F) Unless the petition and the files and records of the case show the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court shall proceed to a prompt hearing on the issues even if a direct appeal of the case is pending. If the court notifies the parties that it has found grounds for granting relief, either party may request an appellate court in which a direct appeal of the judgment is pending to remand the pending case to the court.

With respect to a petition filed under division (A)(1)(a)(iv) of this section, the procedures and rules regarding introduction of evidence and burden of proof at the pretrial hearing that are set forth in divisions (C), (D), and (F) of section 2929.025 of the Revised Code apply in considering the petition. With respect to such a petition, the grounds for granting relief are that the person has been diagnosed with one or more of the conditions set forth in division (A)(1)(a) of section 2929.025 of the Revised Code and that, at the time of the aggravated murder that was the basis of the sentence of death, the condition or conditions significantly impaired the person's capacity in a manner described in division (A)(1)(b) of that section.

(G) A petitioner who files a petition under division  $(A)(\underline{1})(\underline{a})(\underline{i})$ , (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section may amend the petition as follows:

(1) If the petition was filed by a person who has been sentenced to death, at any time that is not later than one hundred eighty days after the petition is filed, the petitioner may amend the petition

with or without leave or prejudice to the proceedings.

(2) If division (G)(1) of this section does not apply, at any time before the answer or motion is filed, the petitioner may amend the petition with or without leave or prejudice to the proceedings.

(3) The petitioner may amend the petition with leave of court at any time after the expiration of the applicable period specified in division (G)(1) or (2) of this section.

(H) If the court does not find grounds for granting relief, it shall make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall enter judgment denying relief on the petition. If the petition was filed by a person who has been sentenced to death, the findings of fact and conclusions of law shall state specifically the reasons for the denial of relief on the petition and of each claim it contains. If no direct appeal of the case is pending and the court finds grounds for relief or if a pending direct appeal of the case has been remanded to the court pursuant to a request made pursuant to division (F) of this section and the court finds grounds for granting relief, it shall make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall enter a judgment that vacates and sets aside the judgment in question, and, in the case of a petitioner who is a prisoner in custody, except as otherwise described in this division, shall discharge or resentence the petitioner or grant a new trial as the court determines appropriate. If the court finds grounds for relief in the case of a petitioner who filed a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(iv) of this section, the court shall render void the sentence of death and order the resentencing of the offender under division (A) of section 2929.06 of the Revised Code. If the petitioner has been sentenced to death, the findings of fact and conclusions of law shall state specifically the reasons for the finding of grounds for granting the relief, with respect to each claim contained in the petition. The court also may make supplementary orders to the relief granted, concerning such matters as rearraignment, retrial, custody, and bail. If the trial court's order granting the petition is reversed on appeal and if the direct appeal of the case has been remanded from an appellate court pursuant to a request under division (F) of this section, the appellate court reversing the order granting the petition shall notify the appellate court in which the direct appeal of the case was pending at the time of the remand of the reversal and remand of the trial court's order. Upon the reversal and remand of the trial court's order granting the petition, regardless of whether notice is sent or received, the direct appeal of the case that was remanded is reinstated.

(I) Upon the filing of a petition pursuant to division  $(A)(\underline{1})(\underline{a})(\underline{i})$ , (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section by a person sentenced to death, only the supreme court may stay execution of the sentence of death.

(J)(1) If a person sentenced to death intends to file a petition under this section, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the person upon a finding that the person is indigent and that the person either accepts the appointment of counsel or is unable to make a competent decision whether to accept or reject the appointment of counsel. The court may decline to appoint counsel for the person only upon a finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the person rejects the appointment of counsel and understands the legal consequences of that decision or upon a finding that the person is not indigent.

(2) The court shall not appoint as counsel under division (J)(1) of this section an attorney who represented the petitioner at trial in the case to which the petition relates unless the person and the attorney expressly request the appointment. The court shall appoint as counsel under division (J)(1) of this section only an attorney who is certified under Rule 20 of the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio to represent indigent defendants charged with or convicted of an offense for which the death penalty can be or has been imposed. The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during proceedings under this section does not constitute grounds for relief in a proceeding under this section, in an appeal of any action under this section, or in an application to reopen a direct appeal.

(3) Division (J) of this section does not preclude attorneys who represent the state of Ohio from invoking the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 154 with respect to capital cases that were pending in federal habeas corpus proceedings prior to July 1, 1996, insofar as the petitioners in those cases were represented in proceedings under this section by one or more counsel appointed by the court under this section or section 120.06, 120.16, 120.26, or 120.33 of the Revised Code and those appointed counsel meet the requirements of division (J)(2) of this section.

(K) Subject to the appeal of a sentence for a felony that is authorized by section 2953.08 of the Revised Code, the remedy set forth in this section is the exclusive remedy by which a person may bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case or to the validity of an adjudication of a child as a delinquent child for the commission of an act that would be a criminal offense if committed by an adult or the validity of a related order of disposition.

Sec. 2953.23. (A) Whether a hearing is or is not held on a petition filed pursuant to section 2953.21 of the Revised Code, a court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in division (A) of that section or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless division (A)(1) or (2) of this section applies:

(1) Both of the following apply:

(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner's situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.

(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence.

(2) The petitioner was convicted of a felony, the petitioner is an offender for whom DNA testing was performed under sections 2953.71 to 2953.81 of the Revised Code or under former section 2953.82 of the Revised Code and analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of all available admissible evidence related to the inmate's case as described in division (D) of section 2953.74 of the Revised Code, and the results of the DNA testing establish, by clear and convincing evidence, actual innocence of that felony offense or, if the person was sentenced to death, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, actual innocence of the aggravating circumstance or circumstances the person was found guilty of committing and that is or are the basis of that sentence of death.

As used in this division, "actual innocence" has the same meaning as in division (A)(1)(b)(c) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code, and "former section 2953.82 of the Revised Code" has the same meaning as in division (A)(1)(c)(d) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code.

(B) An order awarding or denying relief sought in a petition filed pursuant to section 2953.21 of the Revised Code is a final judgment and may be appealed pursuant to Chapter 2953. of the Revised Code.

If a petition filed pursuant to section 2953.21 of the Revised Code by a person who has been sentenced to death is denied and the person appeals the judgment, notwithstanding any law or court rule to the contrary, there is no limit on the number of pages in, or on the length of, a notice of appeal or briefs related to an appeal filed by the person. If any court rule specifies a limit on the number of pages in, or on the length of, a notice of appeal or briefs described in this division or on a prosecuting attorney's response or briefs with respect to such an appeal and a person who has been sentenced to death files a notice of appeal or briefs that exceed the limit specified for the petition, the prosecuting attorney may file a response or briefs that exceed the limit specified for the answer or briefs.

Sec. 2971.03. (A) Notwithstanding divisions (A) and (D) of section 2929.14, section 2929.02, 2929.03, 2929.06, 2929.13, or another section of the Revised Code, other than divisions (B) and (C) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, that authorizes or requires a specified prison term or a mandatory prison term for a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony or that specifies the manner and place of service of a prison term or term of imprisonment, the court shall impose a sentence upon a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violent sex offense and who also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexually violent predator specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, and upon a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to both a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that were included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, as follows:

(1) If the offense for which the sentence is being imposed is aggravated murder and if the court does not impose upon the offender a sentence of death, it shall impose upon the offender a term of life imprisonment without parole. If the court sentences the offender to death and the sentence of death is vacated, overturned, or otherwise set aside, the court shall impose upon the offender a term of life imprisonment without parole.

(2) If the offense for which the sentence is being imposed is murder; or if the offense is rape committed in violation of division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code when the offender purposely compelled the victim to submit by force or threat of force, when the victim was less than ten years of age, when the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to either rape committed in violation of that division or a violation of an existing or former law of this state, another state, or the United States that is substantially similar to division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, or when the offender during or immediately after the commission of the rape caused serious physical harm to the victim; or if the offense is an offense other than aggravated murder or murder for which a term of life imprisonment may be imposed, it shall impose upon the offender a term of life imprisonment without parole.

(3)(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (A)(3)(b), (c), (d), or (e) or (A)(4) of this section, if the offense for which the sentence is being imposed is an offense other than aggravated murder, murder, or rape and other than an offense for which a term of life imprisonment may be imposed, it shall impose an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term fixed by the court as

described in this division, but not less than two years, and a maximum term of life imprisonment. Except as otherwise specified in this division, the minimum term shall be fixed by the court from among the range of terms available as a definite term for the offense. If the offense is a felony of the first or second degree committed on or after the effective date of this amendment March 22, 2019, the minimum term shall be fixed by the court from among the range of terms available as a minimum term for the offense under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of that section.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in division (A)(4) of this section, if the offense for which the sentence is being imposed is kidnapping that is a felony of the first degree, it shall impose an indefinite prison term as follows:

(i) If the kidnapping is committed on or after January 1, 2008, and the victim of the offense is less than thirteen years of age, except as otherwise provided in this division, it shall impose an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term of fifteen years and a maximum term of life imprisonment. If the kidnapping is committed on or after January 1, 2008, the victim of the offense is less than thirteen years of age, and the offender released the victim in a safe place unharmed, it shall impose an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term of ten years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(ii) If the kidnapping is committed prior to January 1, 2008, or division (A)(3)(b)(i) of this section does not apply, it shall impose an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term fixed by the court that is not less than ten years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in division (A)(4) of this section, if the offense for which the sentence is being imposed is kidnapping that is a felony of the second degree, it shall impose an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term fixed by the court that is not less than eight years, and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in division (A)(4) of this section, if the offense for which the sentence is being imposed is rape for which a term of life imprisonment is not imposed under division (A)(2) of this section or division (B) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, it shall impose an indefinite prison term as follows:

(i) If the rape is committed on or after January 2, 2007, in violation of division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, it shall impose an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term of twenty-five years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(ii) If the rape is committed prior to January 2, 2007, or the rape is committed on or after January 2, 2007, other than in violation of division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, it shall impose an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term fixed by the court that is not less than ten years, and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(e) Except as otherwise provided in division (A)(4) of this section, if the offense for which sentence is being imposed is attempted rape, it shall impose an indefinite prison term as follows:

(i) Except as otherwise provided in division (A)(3)(e)(ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section, it shall impose an indefinite prison term pursuant to division (A)(3)(a) of this section.

(ii) If the attempted rape for which sentence is being imposed was committed on or after January 2, 2007, and if the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1418 of the Revised Code, it shall impose an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term of five years and a maximum term of twenty-five years.

(iii) If the attempted rape for which sentence is being imposed was committed on or after January 2, 2007, and if the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1419 of the Revised Code, it shall impose an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term of ten years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

(iv) If the attempted rape for which sentence is being imposed was committed on or after January 2, 2007, and if the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1420 of the Revised Code, it shall impose an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term of fifteen years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

(4) For any offense for which the sentence is being imposed, if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violent sex offense and also to a sexually violent predator specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, or previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense and also to both a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that were included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, it shall impose upon the offender a term of life imprisonment without parole.

(B)(1) Notwithstanding section 2929.13, division (A) or (D) of section 2929.14, or another section of the Revised Code other than division (B) of section 2907.02 or divisions (B) and (C) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code that authorizes or requires a specified prison term or a mandatory prison term for a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony or that specifies the manner and place of service of a prison term or term of imprisonment, if a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code committed on or after January 2, 2007, if division (A) of this section does not apply regarding the person, and if the court does not impose a sentence of life without parole when authorized pursuant to division (B) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose upon the person an indefinite prison term consisting of one of the following:

(a) Except as otherwise required in division (B)(1)(b) or (c) of this section, a minimum term of ten years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(b) If the victim was less than ten years of age, a minimum term of fifteen years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

(c) If the offender purposely compels the victim to submit by force or threat of force, or if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to violating division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code or to violating an existing or former law of this state, another state, or the United States that is substantially similar to division (A)(1)(b) of that section, or if the offender during or immediately after the commission of the offense caused serious physical harm to the victim, a minimum term of twenty-five years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

(2) Notwithstanding section 2929.13, division (A) or (D) of section 2929.14, or another section of the Revised Code other than divisions (B) and (C) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code that authorizes or requires a specified prison term or a mandatory prison term for a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony or that specifies the manner and place of service of a prison term or term of imprisonment and except as otherwise provided in division (B) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, if a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to attempted rape committed on or after January 2, 2007, and if division (A) of this section does not apply regarding the person, the court

shall impose upon the person an indefinite prison term consisting of one of the following:

(a) If the person also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1418 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose upon the person an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term of five years and a maximum term of twenty-five years.

(b) If the person also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1419 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose upon the person an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term of ten years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(c) If the person also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1420 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose upon the person an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term of fifteen years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(3) Notwithstanding section 2929.13, division (A) or (D) of section 2929.14, or another section of the Revised Code other than divisions (B) and (C) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code that authorizes or requires a specified prison term or a mandatory prison term for a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony or that specifies the manner and place of service of a prison term or term of imprisonment, if a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense described in division (B)(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section committed on or after January 1, 2008, if the person also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, and if division (A) of this section does not apply regarding the person, the court shall impose upon the person an indefinite prison term consisting of one of the following:

(a) An indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum of ten years and a maximum term of life imprisonment if the offense for which the sentence is being imposed is kidnapping, the victim of the offense is less than thirteen years of age, and the offender released the victim in a safe place unharmed;

(b) An indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum of fifteen years and a maximum term of life imprisonment if the offense for which the sentence is being imposed is kidnapping when the victim of the offense is less than thirteen years of age and division (B)(3)(a) of this section does not apply;

(c) An indefinite term consisting of a minimum of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment if the offense for which the sentence is being imposed is aggravated murder, when the victim of the offense is less than thirteen years of age, a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole is not imposed for the offense, and division (A)(2)(b)(ii) of section 2929.022, division (A)(1)(e), (C)(1)(a)(v), (C)(2)(a)(ii), (D)(2)(b), (D)(3)(a)(iv), or (E)(1)(d)(iv) of section 2929.03, or division (A) or (B) of section 2929.06 of the Revised Code requires that the sentence for the offense be imposed pursuant to this division;

(d) An indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment if the offense for which the sentence is being imposed is murder when the victim of the offense is less than thirteen years of age.

(C)(1) If the offender is sentenced to a prison term pursuant to division (A)(3), (B)(1)(a), (b), or (c), (B)(2)(a), (b), or (c), or (B)(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section, the parole board shall have control over the offender's service of the term during the entire term unless the parole board terminates its control in accordance with section 2971.04 of the Revised Code.

(2) Except as provided in division (C)(3) of this section, an offender sentenced to a prison term or term of life imprisonment without parole pursuant to division (A) of this section shall serve the entire prison term or term of life imprisonment in a state correctional institution. The offender is not eligible for judicial release under section 2929.20 of the Revised Code.

(3) For a prison term imposed pursuant to division (A)(3), (B)(1)(a), (b), or (c), (B)(2)(a), (b), or (c), or (B)(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section, the court, in accordance with section 2971.05 of the Revised Code, may terminate the prison term or modify the requirement that the offender serve the entire term in a state correctional institution if all of the following apply:

(a) The offender has served at least the minimum term imposed as part of that prison term.

(b) The parole board, pursuant to section 2971.04 of the Revised Code, has terminated its control over the offender's service of that prison term.

(c) The court has held a hearing and found, by clear and convincing evidence, one of the following:

(i) In the case of termination of the prison term, that the offender is unlikely to commit a sexually violent offense in the future;

(ii) In the case of modification of the requirement, that the offender does not represent a substantial risk of physical harm to others.

(4) An offender who has been sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole pursuant to division (A)(1), (2), or (4) of this section shall not be released from the term of life imprisonment or be permitted to serve a portion of it in a place other than a state correctional institution.

(D) If a court sentences an offender to a prison term or term of life imprisonment without parole pursuant to division (A) of this section and the court also imposes on the offender one or more additional prison terms pursuant to division (B) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, all of the additional prison terms shall be served consecutively with, and prior to, the prison term or term of life imprisonment without parole imposed upon the offender pursuant to division (A) of this section.

(E) If the offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more offenses for which a prison term or term of life imprisonment without parole is required to be imposed pursuant to division (A) of this section, divisions (A) to (D) of this section shall be applied for each offense. All minimum terms imposed upon the offender pursuant to division (A)(3) or (B) of this section for those offenses shall be aggregated and served consecutively, as if they were a single minimum term imposed under that division.

(F)(1) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violent sex offense and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexually violent predator specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, or is convicted of or pleads guilty to a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to both a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that were included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, the conviction of or plea of guilty to the offense and the sexually violent predator specification automatically classifies the offender as a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender for purposes of Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code.

(2) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to committing on or after January 2, 2007, a

violation of division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code and either the offender is sentenced under section 2971.03 of the Revised Code or a sentence of life without parole is imposed under division (B) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, the conviction of or plea of guilty to the offense automatically classifies the offender as a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender for purposes of Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code.

(3) If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to committing on or after January 2, 2007, attempted rape and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1418, 2941.1419, or 2941.1420 of the Revised Code, the conviction of or plea of guilty to the offense and the specification automatically classify the offender as a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender for purposes of Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code.

(4) If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to one of the offenses described in division (B) (3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section and a sexual motivation specification related to the offense and the victim of the offense is less than thirteen years of age, the conviction of or plea of guilty to the offense automatically classifies the offender as a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender for purposes of Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code.

Sec. 2971.07. (A) This chapter does not apply to any offender unless the offender is one of the following:

(1) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violent sex offense and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexually violent predator specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense.

(2) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to both a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that were included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense.

(3) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code committed on or after January 2, 2007, and the court does not sentence the offender to a term of life without parole pursuant to division (B) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code or division (B) of that section prohibits the court from sentencing the offender pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(4) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to attempted rape committed on or after January 2, 2007, and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1418, 2941.1419, or 2941.1420 of the Revised Code.

(5) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of section 2905.01 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, and that section requires a court to sentence the offender pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(6) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated murder and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, and division (A)(2)(b)(ii) of section 2929.022, division (A)(1)(e), (C)(1)(a)(v), (C)(2)(a)(ii), (D)(2)(b), (D)(3)(a)(iv), or (E)(1)(d)(a)(iv)) of section 2929.03, or division (A) or (B) of section 2929.06 of the Revised Code requires a court to sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(7) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, and division (B)(2) of section 2929.02 of the Revised Code requires a court to sentence the offender pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(B) This chapter does not limit or affect a court in imposing upon an offender described in divisions (A)(1) to (9) of this section any financial sanction under section 2929.18 or any other section of the Revised Code, or, except as specifically provided in this chapter, any other sanction that is authorized or required for the offense or violation by any other provision of law.

(C) If an offender is sentenced to a prison term under division (A)(3), (B)(1)(a), (b), or (c), (B)(2)(a), (b), or (c), or (B)(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and if, pursuant to section 2971.05 of the Revised Code, the court modifies the requirement that the offender serve the entire prison term in a state correctional institution or places the offender on conditional release that involves the placement of the offender under the supervision of the adult parole authority, authorized field officers of the authority who are engaged within the scope of their supervisory duties or responsibilities may search, with or without a warrant, the person of the offender, the place of residence of the offender, and a motor vehicle, another item of tangible or intangible personal property, or any other real property in which the offender has the express or implied permission of a person with a right, title, or interest to use, occupy, or possess if the field officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the offender is not abiding by the law or otherwise is not complying with the terms and conditions of the offender's modification or release. The authority shall provide each offender with a written notice that informs the offender that authorized field officers of the authority who are engaged within the scope of their supervisory duties or responsibilities may conduct those types of searches during the period of the modification or release if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the offender is not abiding by the law or otherwise is not complying with the terms and conditions of the offender's modification or release.

Sec. 5120.61. (A)(1) Not later than ninety days after January 1, 1997, the department of rehabilitation and correction shall adopt standards that it will use under this section to assess the following criminal offenders and may periodically revise the standards:

(a) A criminal offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violent sex offense or designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense and is adjudicated a sexually violent predator in relation to that offense;

(b) A criminal offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) (b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code committed on or after January 2, 2007, and either who is sentenced under section 2971.03 of the Revised Code or upon whom a sentence of life without parole is imposed under division (B) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code;

(c) A criminal offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to attempted rape committed on or after January 2, 2007, and a specification of the type described in section 2941.1418, 2941.1419, or 2941.1420 of the Revised Code;

(d) A criminal offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of section 2905.01 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, and

who is sentenced pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code;

(e) A criminal offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated murder and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, and who pursuant to division (A)(2)(b) (ii) of section 2929.022, division (A)(1)(e), (C)(1)(a)(v), (C)(2)(a)(ii), (D)(2)(b), (D)(3)(a)(iv), or (E) (1)(d) (E)(1)(a)(iv) of section 2929.03, or division (A) or (B) of section 2929.06 of the Revised Code is sentenced pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code;

(f) A criminal offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging that offense, and who pursuant to division (B)(2) of section 2929.02 of the Revised Code is sentenced pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(2) When the department is requested by the parole board or the court to provide a risk assessment report of the offender under section 2971.04 or 2971.05 of the Revised Code, it shall assess the offender and complete the assessment as soon as possible after the offender has commenced serving the prison term or term of life imprisonment without parole imposed under division (A), (B)(1)(a), (b), or (c), (B)(2)(a), (b), or (c), or (B)(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code. Thereafter, the department shall update a risk assessment report pertaining to an offender as follows:

(a) Periodically, in the discretion of the department, provided that each report shall be updated no later than two years after its initial preparation or most recent update;

(b) Upon the request of the parole board for use in determining pursuant to section 2971.04 of the Revised Code whether it should terminate its control over an offender's service of a prison term imposed upon the offender under division (A)(3), (B)(1)(a), (b), or (c), (B)(2)(a), (b), or (c), or (B)(3) (a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code;

(c) Upon the request of the court.

(3) After the department of rehabilitation and correction assesses an offender pursuant to division (A)(2) of this section, it shall prepare a report that contains its risk assessment for the offender or, if a risk assessment report previously has been prepared, it shall update the risk assessment report.

(4) The department of rehabilitation and correction shall provide each risk assessment report that it prepares or updates pursuant to this section regarding an offender to all of the following:

(a) The parole board for its use in determining pursuant to section 2971.04 of the Revised Code whether it should terminate its control over an offender's service of a prison term imposed upon the offender under division (A)(3), (B)(1)(a), (b), or (c), (B)(2)(a), (b), or (c), or (B)(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code, if the parole board has not terminated its control over the offender;

(b) The court for use in determining, pursuant to section 2971.05 of the Revised Code, whether to modify the requirement that the offender serve the entire prison term imposed upon the offender under division (A)(3), (B)(1)(a), (b), or (c), (B)(2)(a), (b), or (c), or (B)(3)(a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code in a state correctional institution, whether to revise any modification previously made, or whether to terminate the prison term;

(c) The prosecuting attorney who prosecuted the case, or the successor in office to that

prosecuting attorney;

(d) The offender.

(B) When the department of rehabilitation and correction provides a risk assessment report regarding an offender to the parole board or court pursuant to division (A)(4)(a) or (b) of this section, the department, prior to the parole board's or court's hearing, also shall provide to the offender or to the offender's attorney of record a copy of the report and a copy of any other relevant documents the department possesses regarding the offender that the department does not consider to be confidential.

(C) As used in this section:

(1) "Adjudicated a sexually violent predator" has the same meaning as in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code, and a person is "adjudicated a sexually violent predator" in the same manner and the same circumstances as are described in that section.

(2) "Designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense" and "violent sex offense" have the same meanings as in section 2971.01 of the Revised Code.

SECTION 2. That existing sections 2929.02, 2929.022, 2929.024, 2929.03, 2929.04, 2929.06, 2929.14, 2941.148, 2953.21, 2953.23, 2971.03, 2971.07, and 5120.61 of the Revised Code are hereby repealed.

SECTION 3. Notwithstanding section 1.50 of the Revised Code, if any provision of a section as amended or enacted by this act is determined to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid in a final judgment by a court of last resort, the remainder of the enactments and amendments made in Section 1 of this act are void.

SECTION 4. Section 2929.14 of the Revised Code is presented in this act as a composite of the section as amended by H.B. 63, S.B. 1, S.B. 20, and S.B. 201, all of the 132nd General Assembly. The General Assembly, applying the principle stated in division (B) of section 1.52 of the Revised Code that amendments are to be harmonized if reasonably capable of simultaneous operation, finds that the composite is the resulting version of the section in effect prior to the effective date of the section as presented in this act.

133rd G.A.

Speaker \_\_\_\_\_\_ of the House of Representatives.

48

President \_\_\_\_\_\_ of the Senate.

Passed \_\_\_\_\_, 20\_\_\_\_

Approved \_\_\_\_\_, 20\_\_\_\_

Governor.

Am. Sub. H. B. No. 136

133rd G.A.

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The section numbering of law of a general and permanent nature is complete and in conformity with the Revised Code.

Director, Legislative Service Commission.

Filed in the office of the Secretary of State at Columbus, Ohio, on the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, A. D. 20\_\_\_.

Secretary of State.

File No. \_\_\_\_\_ Effective Date \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT B



# Ohio Legislative Service Commission

Office of Research and Drafting Legislative Budget Office

Bill Analysis

Click here for H.B. 136's Fiscal Note

Version: As Reported by S. Judiciary

Primary Sponsor: Rep. Hillyer

H.B. 136<sup>\*</sup> 133<sup>rd</sup> General Assembly

Dennis M. Papp, Attorney

# SUMMARY

- Specifies that a person convicted of aggravated murder who shows that the person had a serious mental illness at the time of the offense may not be sentenced to death for the offense and instead requires that the person be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.
- Requires that a person previously sentenced to death who proves that the person had a serious mental illness at the time of the offense be resentenced to life imprisonment without parole, and provides a mechanism for resentencing.
- Defines a "serious mental illness" for purposes of the bill's provisions.

# **DETAILED ANALYSIS**

# Introduction

Current Ohio law allows the death penalty only for the offense of aggravated murder when the offender also is convicted of one or more specifications of an "aggravating circumstance" (e.g., committed for hire, repeat offense, felony murder, law enforcement officer victim, under age 13 victim, etc.), or for the offense of terrorism when the most serious offense comprising terrorism is aggravated murder. The court must determine after applying a specified balancing test that the death penalty is appropriate. A defendant must have been at least 18 at the time the crime was committed to be sentenced to death.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>\*</sup> This analysis was prepared before the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee appeared in the Senate Journal. Note that the legislative history may be incomplete.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> R.C. 2903.01 and 2909.24, not in the bill; R.C. 2929.02 to 2929.06.

# Sentencing a person with serious mental illness

The bill provides that a person convicted of aggravated murder who shows that the person had a "serious mental illness" at the time of committing the offense cannot be sentenced to death.

# Definition of "serious mental illness"

As used in the bill, a person has a "serious mental illness" if both of the following apply to the person:<sup>2</sup>

- The person has been diagnosed with one or more of the following conditions: schizophrenia; schizoaffective disorder; bipolar disorder; or delusional disorder (hereafter, collectively referred to as "SMI condition");
- 2. At the time of the alleged aggravated murder, the SMI condition or conditions with which the person has been diagnosed, while not meeting the standard to be found either "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI) or "incompetent to stand trial" (IST),3 nevertheless significantly impaired the person's capacity to exercise rational judgment with respect to either of the following (hereafter, collectively referred to as "SMI impairment"):
  - a. Conforming the person's conduct to the requirements of law; or
  - b. Appreciating the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of the person's conduct.

A disorder manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct or attributable primarily to the acute effects of any use of alcohol or any other drug of abuse does not, standing alone, constitute a serious mental illness.<sup>4</sup>

# When diagnosis may be made

The diagnosis of a person with one or more SMI conditions may be made at any time prior to, on, or after the day of the alleged aggravated murder with which the person is charged or the day on which the person raises the matter of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of that aggravated murder. Diagnosis of the condition or conditions after the date of the alleged aggravated murder does not preclude the person from presenting evidence that the person had a serious mental illness at the time of that offense.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> R.C. 2929.025(A)(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> R.C. 2901.01 and 2945.37(G), respectively, not in the bill.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> R.C. 2929.025(A)(2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> R.C. 2929.025(B).

# Raising matter of serious mental illness and initial proceedings

Under the bill, a person charged with aggravated murder and one or more specifications of an aggravating circumstance may, before trial, raise the matter of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the offense (hereafter, such a person is referred to as a "capital defendant who alleges serious mental illness"). If a person raises that matter, the court must order an evaluation of the person (see "**Evaluation**," below) and hold a pretrial hearing on the matter. The person who raises the matter may present evidence that the person had a serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. The person has the burden of raising that matter and of going forward with the evidence relating to the diagnosis of the SMI condition and the SMI impairment.<sup>6</sup>

# Prosecution's contesting of diagnosis or rebuttal presumption

Under the bill, if a capital defendant who alleges serious mental illness submits evidence that the person has been diagnosed with one or more SMI conditions and that the diagnosed condition or conditions was an SMI impairment that existed at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, the prosecution may present evidence to contest the diagnosis. The defendant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person has been diagnosed with one or more SMI conditions and that the condition or conditions constituted an SMI impairment at the time of the alleged offense.<sup>7</sup>

# **Outcome of pretrial hearing**

# No finding in favor of defendant

Unless the court at the pretrial hearing finds that the defendant has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person has been diagnosed with one or more SMI conditions and that the condition or conditions constituted an SMI impairment at the time of the alleged offense, the court must issue a finding that the person is not ineligible for a sentence of death due to serious mental illness.<sup>8</sup>

# Finding in favor of defendant

If the court at the pretrial hearing finds that the defendant has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person has been diagnosed with one or more SMI conditions and that the condition or conditions constituted an SMI impairment at the time of the alleged offense, the court must issue a finding that the defendant is ineligible for a death sentence due to serious mental illness.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> R.C. 2929.025(C).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> R.C. 2929.025(D).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> R.C. 2929.025(E)(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> R.C. 2929.025(E)(2).

# Effect of finding that the person is ineligible for death sentence

If a court issues a finding that a capital defendant who has alleged serious mental illness is ineligible for a sentence of death due to serious mental illness, the person cannot be sentenced to death.<sup>10</sup> Instead, the court or panel of three judges imposing sentence in the case must sentence the person to life imprisonment without parole.<sup>11</sup>

The bill corrects several erroneous cross-references in the existing provisions regarding the sentencing of an offender who was convicted of aggravated murder and one or more specifications of an aggravating circumstance, raised the matter of age at trial, and was not found to have been age 18 or older.<sup>12</sup>

### Evaluation

Under the bill, if a capital defendant alleges serious mental illness, the court must order an evaluation of the person.<sup>13</sup> With respect to an evaluation, if the court determines that investigation services, experts, or other services are reasonably necessary for the proper representation of the capital defendant at trial or at the sentencing hearing, the court must authorize the defendant's counsel to obtain the necessary services for the defendant, and must order that payment of the fees and expenses for the necessary services be made in the same manner that payment for appointed counsel is made under current law. If the court determines that the necessary services had to be obtained prior to court authorization for payment of the fees and expenses for the necessary services, the court may, after the services have been obtained, authorize the defendant's counsel to obtain the necessary services and order that payment of the fees and expenses for the necessary services be made. The bill retains the current application of these provisions in a case in which the court determines that investigation services, experts, or other services are reasonably necessary for the proper representation of an indigent defendant charged with aggravated murder at trial or at the sentencing hearing.<sup>14</sup>

# Use of statements made in evaluation, hearing, or proceeding

The bill specifies that no statement that a person makes in an evaluation ordered as described above or in a pretrial hearing under its provisions relating to the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the aggravated murder may be used against the person on the issue of guilt in any criminal action or proceeding. But, in a criminal action or proceeding, the prosecutor or defense counsel may call as a witness any examiner who evaluated the person or prepared a report pursuant to a referral under the bill. Neither the appointment nor the testimony of an examiner in such an evaluation precludes the prosecutor

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> R.C. 2929.02(A), 2929.022(A)(2)(b), 2929.03(C) and (D), and 2929.04(B).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> R.C. 2929.03(E)(2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> R.C. 2929.03(E)(1); also R.C. 2929.14(E)(5), 2941.148, 2971.03, 2971.07, and 5120.61(A)(1)(e).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> R.C. 2929.025(F)(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> R.C. 2929.024 and 2929.025(F)(1).

or defense counsel from calling other witnesses or presenting other evidence on the issue of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the aggravated murder or on competency or insanity issues.<sup>15</sup> As used in this provision, "examiner" means a person who makes an evaluation ordered by the court under the bill and "prosecutor" means a prosecuting attorney who has authority to prosecute a charge of aggravated murder that is before the court.<sup>16</sup>

# Effect of other pleas

The bill specifies that a person's pleading of NGRI or IST, or a finding after such a plea that the person is not insane or that the person is competent to stand trial, does not preclude the person from raising the matter of the person's serious mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the offense pursuant to the bill's provisions. If a person so raises that matter, such a plea or finding does not limit or affect any of the procedures described above or the authority of a court to make any finding described in them.<sup>17</sup>

# Resentencing of person previously sentenced to death

The bill also provides a mechanism for resentencing a person who has been sentenced to death for aggravated murder, and who had a serious mental illness at the time the offense was committed, to a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.

# Postconviction relief proceeding to void sentence of death

The bill expands the existing Postconviction Relief Law<sup>18</sup> so that it also will apply to a person who has been convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death, and who claims that the person had a serious mental illness at the time of the commission of the offense and that as a result the court should void the sentence of death, with the filing of the petition constituting a waiver of any right to be sentenced to any sentence other than life imprisonment without parole if the sentence of death is voided in the requested postconviction proceeding. Such a person may file a petition under that law in the court that imposed the sentence, stating that ground for relief and asking the court to render the sentence void and to order the resentencing of the offender – the act of filing the petition constitutes a waiver of any right to be sentenced under the law that existed at the time the offense was committed and constitutes consent to be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, as described below in "Resentencing after voiding of sentence of death." The petition must be filed not later than 365 days after the bill's effective date, subject to limited exceptions involving unavoidable prevention of discovery of relevant facts or a specified Constitutional claim. As with other postconviction relief claims: there is no limit on the number of pages in or the length of the petition; if a court rule purports to impose such a limit and the petitioner exceeds the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> R.C. 2929.025(F)(2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> R.C. 2929.025(A).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> R.C. 2929.025(G).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> R.C. 2953.21 to 2953.23; R.C. 2953.22 is not in the bill.

limit, the prosecuting attorney also may exceed the limit in the prosecuting attorney's response; the petitioner or prosecuting attorney may request depositions and postconviction discovery; and the clerk of the court in which the petition is filed must docket it and any request for postconviction discovery, bring it (or them) to the attention of the court, and forward a copy to the prosecuting attorney of the county or the petitioner or petitioner's counsel, as applicable. The prosecuting attorney must respond to the petition and the court, after considering specified information, must determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief. Unless the petition and the files and records of the case show the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court must proceed to a prompt hearing on the issues.<sup>19</sup>

The procedures and rules regarding introduction of evidence and burden of proof at the pretrial hearing that are described above apply in considering the petition for postconviction relief. The petitioner may amend the petition under the same authority as applies to other postconviction relief claims by a person sentenced to death. With respect to such a petition, the grounds for granting relief are that the person has been diagnosed with one or more SMI conditions and that, at the time of the aggravated murder that was the basis of the sentence of death, the condition or conditions constituted an SMI impairment.

If the court does not find grounds for granting relief, it must make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment denying relief on the petition. If the court finds grounds for relief, it must render void the sentence of death and order the resentencing of the offender, as described below.

If a person sentenced to death intends to file a postconviction relief petition, the court must appoint counsel to represent the person if it finds that the person is indigent and that the person either accepts the appointment or is unable to make a competent decision whether to accept or reject the appointment. The court may decline to appoint counsel for the person only upon a finding that the person rejects the appointment and understands the legal consequences of that decision or upon a finding that the person is not indigent.<sup>20</sup>

# Resentencing after voiding of sentence of death

The bill enacts a provision for the resentencing of an offender whose sentence of death is voided by a court in a postconviction relief proceeding under the bill's provisions after a finding that the offender had a serious mental illness at the time of the commission of the offense. Under the bill, if a sentence of death that has been imposed upon an offender is voided by a court in a postconviction relief proceeding under those circumstances, the offender has waived any right to be sentenced to any sentence other than life imprisonment without parole (see "**Postconviction relief proceeding to void sentence of death**," above) and the trial court that sentenced the offender must conduct a hearing to resentence the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> R.C. 2953.21(A) to (E) and 2953.23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> R.C. 2953.21(F) to (J).

offender. At the resentencing hearing, the court must impose upon the offender a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.<sup>21</sup>

# Nonseverability clause

Generally, if a court holds that a provision of the Revised Code is invalid, its invalidity does not affect any other Revised Code provisions that can still be given effect. However, the bill declares that if any part of the bill is determined to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid in a final judgment by a court of last resort, the remainder of its provisions would be void.<sup>22</sup>

# HISTORY

Action	Date
Introduced	03-19-19
Reported, H. Criminal Justice	05-30-19
Passed House (76-18)	06-05-19
Reported, S. Judiciary	

H0136-RS-133/ec

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> R.C. 2929.06.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Section 3; R.C. 1.50, not in the bill.

### **PROOF OF SERVICE**

I, Gilbert Gaynor, am an attorney, over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action. My business address is Gilbert Gaynor, Attorney, 8383 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 510, Beverly Hills, CA 90211.

On Jan. 19, 2021, I served the document entitled **THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF** by placing true and correct copies thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Mail, addressed as set forth below:

Maurice Gerald Steskal, V-23820 CSP-San Quentin Housing Unit, Cell # 5-EY-23 San Quentin, CA 94974

Clerk of the Court

**Orange County Superior Court** 

700 Civic Center Drive West

Santa Ana, CA 92701

and on the following, via TrueFiling:

Deputy Attorney General Christine Friedman Christine.Friedman@doj.ca.gov

California Appellate Project <u>filing@capsf.org</u> Attn: Morey Garelick, Esq.

Attorney General's Office sdag.docketing@doj.ca.gov

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Michelle Gillette mgillette@crowell.com

Nicole M. Ambrosetti and Tiffanie McDowell (288946) <u>nambrosetti@crowell.com</u>

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 19, 2021.

/s/

GILBERT GAYNOR

### STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Supreme Court of California

# **PROOF OF SERVICE**

# STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Supreme Court of California

# Case Name: PEOPLE v. STESKAL (MAURICE GERALD)

#### Case Number: **S122611**

Lower Court Case Number:

- 1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.
- 2. My email address used to e-serve: gilbertgaynor@post.harvard.edu
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District Attorney	appellate@da.ocgov.com		1/20/2021
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

#### 1/20/2021

Date

#### /s/Gilbert Gaynor

Signature

Gaynor, Gilbert (107109)

Last Name, First Name (PNum)

#### Law Office of Gilbert Gaynor

Law Firm