

**S268437****IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

In re D.N., a Person Coming Under the  
Juvenile Court Law

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF  
CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.N.,

Minor and Petitioner.

No. S\_\_\_\_\_

(Court of Appeal  
No. F080624

(Fresno County  
Juvenile Case No.  
19CEJ600384-1)

**PETITION FOR REVIEW**

Appeal From the Judgment of the Superior Court  
of the State of California for the County of Fresno  
Honorable Gary D. Hoff, Judge

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Court of Appeal under the  
Central California Appellate  
Program Assisted Case  
System

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   |    |
|---|----|
| TABLE OF CONTENTS.....  | 2  |
| TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....  | 3  |
| ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .....   | 5  |
| NECESSITY FOR REVIEW.....   | 5  |
| STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.....  | 6  |
| ARGUMENT .....  | 8  |
| The Probation Condition Permitting the Probation Officer to<br>Punish Petitioner for a Violation of Probation Without a<br>Judicial Finding That Petitioner Actually Violated Probation<br>Is an Unlawful Delegation of Judicial Authority and Violates<br>Petitioner’s Right to Due Process of Law. .... | 8  |
| CONCLUSION.....   | 14 |
| CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT .....   | 15 |
| ATTACHMENT A .....  | 16 |
| PROOF OF SERVICE.....   | 17 |

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### **California Cases**

|  |        |
|--|--------|
| <i>In re Danielle W.</i> (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227 .....    | 4      |
| <i>In re Gabriel T.</i> (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 952.....        | 10, 11 |
| <i>In re Glen J.</i> (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 981.....           | 11     |
| <i>In re Pedro Q.</i> (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368 .....       | 8      |
| <i>In re Shawna M.</i> (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1686 .....      | 12     |
| <i>In re Victor L.</i> (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902 .....      | 9      |
| <i>People v. Gomez</i> (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1028.....      | 9, 13  |
| <i>People v. Quarterman</i> (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1280..... | 14     |
| <i>People v. Rodriguez</i> (199) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441.....     | 13     |
| <i>People v. Vickers</i> (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451.....            | 9, 13  |

### **Federal Cases**

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <i>United States v. Stephens</i> (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3d 876..... | 8 |
|--|---|

### **California Statutes**

#### Penal Code

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| § 288.5..... | 6 |
|--------------|---|

#### Welfare and Institutions Code

|            |            |
|------------|------------|
| § 602..... | 6          |
| § 777..... | 11         |
| § 778..... | 10, 11, 13 |

### **California Rules of Court**

|                 |                |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Rule 5.570..... | 10, 11, 12, 13 |
| Rule 8.500..... | 4              |

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

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| In re D.N., a Person Coming Under the<br>Juvenile Court Law  | No. S_____   |
| PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF<br>CALIFORNIA,<br>Plaintiff and Respondent,<br>v.<br>D.N.,<br>Minor and Petitioner. | (Court of Appeal<br>No. F080624<br><br>(Fresno County<br>Juvenile Case No.<br>19CEJ600384-1) |

**PETITION FOR REVIEW**

TO THE HONORABLE TANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE, CHIEF  
JUSTICE, AND TO THE HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES  
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA:

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.500,  
subdivision (a), minor-petitioner D.N. petitions this court for  
review following the unpublished decision of the Court of Appeal,  
Fifth Appellate District, filed on March 23, 2021. A copy of the  
Court of Appeal's decision is attached as Exhibit A.

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## **ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW**

1. May a juvenile court, at the time of disposition, authorize the probation department to impose a non-custodial sanction “to work off” future alleged probation violations in the absence of a judicial finding that the minor has, in fact, violated probation?
2. Does a juvenile court improperly delegate its authority to the probation department when it permits the probation officer to impose a non-custodial sanction “to work off” future alleged probation violations in the absence of a judicial finding that the minor has violated probation?

## **NECESSITY FOR REVIEW**

Juvenile courts possess broad authority to impose conditions upon minors who are adjudged wards of the court. That authority must nevertheless be exercised within the confines of constitutional and statutory boundaries. Review is appropriate to settle an important question regarding the contours of a minor’s due process rights in relation to alleged violations of probation where the probation department seeks to impose non-custodial sanctions without judicial involvement.

Factually, this issue arises often. When a minor is placed on probation, it does not stretch the imagination to imagine that a probation officer may, at some point in the future, believe that the minor has violated a condition of probation. This case raises the question of whether judicial involvement is required when a violation of probation is alleged, or whether the court may authorize, *in advance*, the probation officer both to determine the

existence of the violation and to impose punishment. Petitioner argues that the latter procedure, which was used here, is an improper delegation of judicial authority which violates his rights to procedural and substantive due process.

Of further concern is the fact that the condition at issue was suggested to the juvenile court by the probation department and appears to be a “standard” term and condition of probation. The juvenile court’s order and the Court of Appeal’s sanction of that order thus raises the specter of, at the very least, an entire county of minors who are being stripped of their due process rights so long as a probation officer unilaterally deems the purported violation of probation to be a “minor” one.

## **STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS**

### *Procedural History*

On August 20, 2019, the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office filed a Welfare and Institutions Code<sup>1</sup> section 602 petition charging 14-year-old D. N. with a single felony violation of Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a). (CT 5-7.)

After a contested jurisdictional hearing held from November 15-19, 2019, the court sustained the charge. (CT 120; 3RT 406.)

At a dispositional hearing held on December 4, 2019, the court declared appellant a ward of the court, ordered him to

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<sup>1</sup> All further unspecified statutory references are to the California Welfare and Institutions Code.

reside in the custody of his father, and imposed various terms and conditions of probation. (CT 122-124.)

On appeal, petitioner challenged the juvenile court's imposition of a condition of probation which authorized the probation department to offer minor a community service or electronic monitoring-home detention sanction to "work off any alleged probation violations." (4RT 517.) The court of appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion issued on March 23, 2021. (Exh. A.)

### *Relevant Facts<sup>2</sup>*

The testimony of the alleged victim, petitioner's 7-year-old cousin, established that petitioner touched her "private" with his hand or finger, either over or under her clothing, approximately "five to ten" times. (3RT 237-239, 241-243, 245-247, 252-253, 303-304.) During at least one of those times, petitioner licked the victim's "private" and had her touch his "private." (CT 91-93, 94, 96.) Petitioner was between 12 and 14 years old at the time of the incidents, which were alleged to have occurred from May 5, 2017 through July 16, 2019. (CT 5, 7.)

### *Disposition*

After declaring petitioner a ward of the court and placing him on probation, the juvenile court authorized "the Probation Department offer [sic] the minor community service, up to 50

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<sup>2</sup> As petitioner seeks review only of the juvenile court's ability to authorize the probation department to impose a non-custodial sanction for a future alleged violation of probation, a detailed recitation of the facts underlying the offense is not necessary.

hours of community service, up to a cumulative total of 10 days, to work off any alleged probation violations. That can also include the GPS system as a sanction, up to 30 days, but he'd already be on that program.”<sup>3</sup> (4RT 517.) The court continued, “I would anticipate if there's any significant violation of any term and condition of the grant of probation here, that he would be brought back to court for additional recommendations, which most likely would include substantial [sic] amount of time in custody.” (4RT 517.)

## ARGUMENT

### **The Probation Condition Permitting the Probation Officer to Punish Petitioner for a Violation of Probation Without a Judicial Finding That Petitioner Actually Violated Probation Is an Unlawful Delegation of Judicial Authority and Violates Petitioner's Right to Due Process of Law.**

In the instant case, the juvenile court authorized the probation department to impose a non-custodial sanction for a future, as-yet-uncommitted violation of probation. This sanction could be imposed in the absence of a judicial finding that petitioner had actually violated any condition of his probation.

Under both state and federal separation of powers doctrines, courts may not delegate the exercise of their discretion to probation officers. (*In re Pedro Q.* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1372; *United States v. Stephens* (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3d 876, 880-881 [limitation on probation officer's

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<sup>3</sup> The court also ordered the minor to remain on the GPS monitoring system for “at least” three months. (4RT 517.)



power to decide the nature or extent of punishment imposed on probationer derives from Article III's grant to courts of power over "cases and controversies"].) A court, however, may delegate its authority to a nonjudicial entity – such as a probation officer – if that delegation is (1) incidental or subsidiary to a function or power otherwise properly exercised by the court and (2) the court retains ultimate control over its authority through judicial review. (*In re Danielle W.* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1235.) As relevant here, these principles require that a juvenile court impose specific conditions of probation but permit the court to leave it to the probation department to supervise the time, place, and manner of compliance with the conditions. (*In re Victor L.* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 919.)

Petitioner argued on appeal that he possessed a right to due process, including notice of the alleged violation, the assistance of counsel, and an opportunity to be heard, before he may be found to have violated the terms and conditions of his probation. (AOB 17-20, citing *People v. Vickers* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 457-462; *People v. Gomez* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1033-1034.) Petitioner's position was that the challenged probation condition eliminated those protections and improperly placed the probation officer in the concurrent roles of prosecutor and judge. (AOB 20.)

The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the discretion offered to the probation officer was "limited" because the officer "could only offer [petitioner] the option of

community service if an alleged violation occurred” and because the total cumulative sanction was capped by the juvenile court. (Opn. at p. 7.) “The juvenile court set the basic condition, but it left the specific details to the probation officer and [petitioner] to resolve.” (Opn. at p. 8.) The Court of Appeal further found that petitioner was not at the mercy of his probation officer because he could seek judicial review pursuant to section 778. (Opn. at p. 8.)

The Court of Appeal’s opinion makes no mention of the fact that this was not a probation obligation which the juvenile court had imposed unconditionally, leaving only the ministerial details to the probation officer. Instead, this condition required that a “triggering event” – i.e., a violation of probation – occur before the probation department could wield the power invested in it by the court. The determination of whether a probationer has actually violated probation is vested in the court only. (§ 778, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570, subds. (f), (i) [court determines whether hearing is necessary before ruling on request to modify condition of probation; need for modification must be proven to court by preponderance of evidence].) The court may not empower the probation officer to make that decision in its place.

The determination that the triggering event has taken place may not be left to the probation department. (See, e.g., *In re Gabriel T.* (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 952, 960-961 (*Gabriel T.*) [error to impose probation condition permitting probation officer to impose one-time, 30-day custodial sanction for

violation of probation in absence of judicial finding that minor violated probation].) Although *Gabriel T.* was predicated upon section 777, similar notice and due process provisions are found within section 778, which controls modifications of conditions of probation which do not involve the removal of a minor from the custody of his or her parents or guardians.

A probation officer who wishes to impose a non-custodial sanction for a purported violation of probation has the power to petition the juvenile court for a modification of probation conditions under section 778. (*In re Glen J.* (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 981, 984, 986.) However, any modification must be done via a noticed hearing before the court and not by probation fiat. Under section 778, the probation officer must verify the petition and concisely describe the change of circumstance or new evidence underlying the requested change. (§ 778, subd. (a).) Then, “[i]f it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, ... the court shall order that a hearing be held and shall give prior notice ...” (§ 778, subd. (b) [emphasis added].) It is the court which must determine that the sought-for modification is appropriate. Under no circumstances does the statute authorize the probation department to impose a change in probation conditions in the absence of judicial oversight and without a finding that the change is in the best interests of the minor.

This conclusion is bolstered by California Rules of Court, rule 5.570 which further details the procedure to be followed before a probation may be modified pursuant to section 778. In

addition to setting forth detailed content requirements for any petition, the rule also provides specific guidelines for a court in evaluating the propriety of such a petition:

- (f) If all parties stipulate to the requested modification, the court may order modification without a hearing. If there is no such stipulation and the petition has not been denied ex parte ... the court *must* either:
  - (1) order that a hearing on the petition be held within 30 calendar days after the petition is filed; or
  - (2) order a hearing for the parties to argue whether an evidentiary hearing on the petition should be granted or denied. If the court then grants an evidentiary hearing on the petition, that hearing must be held within 30 calendar days after the petition is filed.

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570, subd. (f) [emphasis added].)

Nothing in this rule allows the court to authorize the probation officer to dispense with the hearing and move immediately to punishment.

The critical component of lawful delegation under both the state and federal constitutions is that the court determines whether a defendant must abide by a condition, while the ministerial details of where and when the condition will be satisfied may properly be left to the probation officer. Had the juvenile court actually ordered petitioner to complete 50 hours of community service or GPS monitoring for 30 days, it could reasonably be left to the probation officer to determine the details of his compliance. (*In re Shawna M.* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1686, 1690 [visitation with minor “arranged through, and

approved by” county human services agency unlawful delegation of judicial power because order gave “respondent no guidance as to when, how often and under what circumstances visitation is to occur”].) However, unlike conditions such as random drug testing or warrantless searches, which have no triggering event, the condition here requires a predicate finding of a violation of probation, the determination of which implicates appellant’s due process rights. (See *Vickers, supra*, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 457-462; *Gomez, supra*, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1033-1034.)

It is for this reason that the Court of Appeal’s reliance upon petitioner’s ability bring his own petition under section 778 if he disputes that he violated probation is particularly troubling. If petitioner possesses due process rights which attach prior to a determination that he violated his probation, those rights cannot be ignored because there is a *post-hoc* vehicle by which he can challenge the probation officer’s imposition of a judicial sanction. More fundamentally, a party “requesting the modification under section 778(a) has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the ward’s welfare requires the modification.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570, subd. (i)(1).) Petitioner would therefore have the burden under section 778 to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not violate probation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570, subd. (i).) Of course, in our system of justice, an accused never has to prove himself innocent, even when facing a probation violation. (*People v. Rodriguez* (199)

51 Cal.3d 437, 441; *People v. Quarterman* (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285.)

### CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner requests that this court grant review.

Dated: April 24, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Sangeeta Sinha  
Sangeeta Sinha  
Attorney for Petitioner,  
D.N.

## CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

I certify that this brief contains 2,290 words (including all tables), based on the word-count feature of my word-processing program.

Dated: April 24, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Sangeeta Sinha  
Sangeeta Sinha  
Attorney for Petitioner,  
D.N.

**ATTACHMENT A**

**ATTACHMENT A**



**NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS**

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re D.N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile  
Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.N.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F080624

(Super. Ct. No. 19CEJ600384-1)

**OPINION**

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Gary D. Hoff, Judge.

Sangeeta Sinha, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Kari Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

**INTRODUCTION**

Appellant D.N., a minor, challenges some of the terms and conditions of probation which the juvenile court imposed against him. Although we reject a majority of his

claims, we agree that the court failed to articulate the required probable cause necessary to impose AIDS testing, and the record is insufficient to sustain that finding. We strike the AIDS testing condition but remand to provide the People with the opportunity to introduce evidence sufficient to support it. We otherwise affirm the disposition order.

### **BACKGROUND**

Appellant was 14 years old when this wardship petition was filed. It was alleged he had committed continuous sexual abuse in violation of Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a). The petition alleged that the victim was under 14 years of age, and appellant had unlawfully engaged in three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct.

The victim was seven years old and in the second grade when she testified in this matter. She and appellant are cousins. Appellant spent time with the victim and her older brother at the victim's residence in Fresno County.

#### *The Ongoing Sexual Abuse.*

The testimony from the victim established that, on at least three occasions, appellant touched her "private" with his hand or finger. These touchings occurred both over and under her underwear. During some of these encounters, appellant exposed his "private" to her. The victim believed these touchings may have started when she was in kindergarten, and they continued until she was in second grade. The victim testified that, in total, appellant touched her between "five and ten times."

During her testimony, the victim said appellant tried to lick her private on one occasion, but she could not remember if he actually succeeded. During a forensic interview, however, the victim had reported that appellant had licked her "private" once for about one second.

On one occasion, appellant took out his "private" from his pants. He asked the victim to touch it. During her testimony, she initially could not recall if she touched it but she later indicated that she had touched it. According to the victim, appellant also

asked her to lick his private, but she refused. They lay on a bed and appellant moved his “private” towards her and he touched her private with his. His private touched her on her skin. Her panties were pulled down a little.

The final incident involved appellant touching the victim’s “private” with his hand while at her house. He told her not to tell her parents what had happened. The victim, however, reported the final incident to her mother, and law enforcement was alerted.

*Appellant’s Testimony.*

Appellant testified on his own behalf. The juvenile court learned that, when speaking with police officers, appellant had denied ever touching the victim inappropriately. In court, appellant denied ever touching the victim’s vagina or underwear, putting his mouth on her vagina, asking her to touch his penis, or asking her to put her mouth on his penis.

*The Juvenile Court’s Findings.*

At the conclusion of the contested hearing, the juvenile court noted that the victim and appellant had provided testimony that contained inconsistencies. The court credited the victim’s testimony over appellant’s denials of wrongdoing. The court found the victim’s demeanor in court credible. Despite certain inconsistencies between her testimony and her forensic interview, the court also found credible her statements made during the forensic interview. The court determined the victim had no apparent or obvious reason to fabricate the allegations. The court found true that appellant had committed continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 years of age.

At the December 4, 2019, disposition, appellant was adjudged a ward of the court. His maximum period of confinement was set at 16 years. He was placed on probation with certain terms and conditions. He was directed to reside with a parent or guardian.

## DISCUSSION

Appellant's various claims deal with the imposition of some of his conditions of probation. We use an abuse of discretion standard to review the juvenile court's imposition of these conditions. (*In re David C.* (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 661.)

### I. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE WHEN IT AUTHORIZED THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT TO OFFER COMMUNITY SERVICE TO APPELLANT.

The first disputed probation condition occurred when the juvenile court authorized the probation department to offer appellant up to 50 hours of community service, with a cumulative total of 10 days, "to work off any alleged probation violations." The court commented that any sanction could also include GPS monitoring.<sup>1</sup> The court stated, "I would anticipate if there's any significant violation of any term and condition of the grant of probation here, that [appellant] would be brought back to court for additional recommendations, which most likely would include substantial amount of time in custody." The court issued a written disposition order which imposed 50 hours of community service to be administered at the direction of the probation department.

In August 2020, appellant's current counsel sent a letter alerting the court that its oral disposition had not imposed community service but, instead, had authorized it "in case of a future probation violation only and not as an immediate condition of probation." In September 2020, the juvenile court issued an amended written disposition order which omitted a community service requirement. Instead, the amended order states: "Probation is authorized to offer [appellant] up to 50 hours of community service, or up to a cumulative total of 10 days on the community service work program as an option to work

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<sup>1</sup> Appellant was on a GPS monitor during the contested hearing. At the conclusion of that hearing, the juvenile court ordered him to remain on GPS pending disposition. At the disposition hearing, the court ordered appellant to remain on the GPS program for at least three months.

off alleged probation violations.” It also ordered that appellant would remain on GPS for three months.

Appellant argues that the juvenile court violated his due process rights by improperly delegating its authority to the probation officer to decide if and when he is in violation of probation. He contends this violates the separation of powers doctrine, and this condition must be stricken. In contrast, respondent asserts that appellant has forfeited this claim in failing to raise it below. In the alternative, respondent maintains this claim fails on its merits because the juvenile court “essentially imposed the community service and GPS monitoring conditions on appellant . . . but left the probation department discretion over when (if ever) to utilize it.” Respondent argues that this was a permissible delegation of authority.

We disagree with respondent that we should apply the forfeiture doctrine in this situation. In any event, we conclude that the court did not improperly delegate its authority.

*A. We Decline to Find Forfeiture.*

It is undisputed that appellant’s counsel below did not object to the imposition of this probation condition. Generally, the failure to object to a probation condition at sentencing forfeits its later challenge. (*People v. Welch* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.) However, exceptions exist when the challenge raises a question of pure law that can be resolved without reference to the sentencing record. (*In re Sheena K.* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888–889.) We review such an issue de novo. (*People v. Pirali* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1345.)

The parties dispute whether appellant has forfeited this claim. We agree with appellant that this issue involves a pure question of law. We can resolve this claim without referring to any disputed facts. Accordingly, we decline to find forfeiture in this situation and we will address the merits.

*B. The juvenile court properly delegated its authority.*

Under the separation of powers doctrine, executive or administrative officers cannot exercise or interfere with judicial powers. (*In re Danielle W.* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1235.) However, a nonjudicial officer may be authorized to perform quasi-judicial powers to determine facts and exercise discretion. (*Id.* at p. 1236.) A court may delegate its authority to a nonjudicial officer so long as (1) it is incidental or subsidiary to a function or power otherwise properly exercised by the court and (2) the court retains ultimate control over it, such as through court review. (*Ibid.*)

Although a juvenile court may not delegate its judicial discretion to the probation department, probation can be authorized to determine how best to implement the details of a particular condition. (*In re Victor L.* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 919 (*Victor L.*); *In re Pedro Q.* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1372–1373.) As such, it is generally permissible for a juvenile court to delegate to a probation officer or social worker the time, place and manner of compliance for an imposed probation condition, such as visitation.<sup>2</sup> (See *In re Moriah T.* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374; *In re Danielle W.*, *supra*, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1237.) On the other hand, a juvenile court may not delegate to a probation officer the authority to decide if and when a minor is in violation of probation. (See *In re Gabriel T.* (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 952, 958 [finding error when at “any time” while the juvenile attended an aftercare program, the minor could be returned to a correctional academy “for a one time remediation of 30 days due to a violation of probation or program rules.”].) Instead, a judicial finding is required, after proper statutory notice, to determine if a minor can be removed from his or her home. (*Id.* at pp. 960–961.)

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<sup>2</sup> However, when a visitation order delegates to the probation office or county welfare department the absolute discretion to determine whether any visitation occurs, the order violates the separation of powers doctrine. (*In re Moriah T.*, *supra*, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.)

In this matter, we disagree with appellant that the juvenile court improperly delegated its authority. Two cases cited by respondent are instructive.

In *Victor L.*, *supra*, 182 Cal.App.4th 902, the appellate court held that an impermissibly vague probation condition requiring a minor to stay away from areas of “gang-related activity” could be saved by giving the probation officer the power to determine whether this condition should be defined geographically or by activity. (*Id.* at pp. 917–918.) This was not an unlawful delegation of power because the probation officer’s discretion was limited. (*Id.* at pp. 918–919.)

In *People v. Penoli* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298 (*Penoli*), the trial court placed the defendant on probation after she pled guilty to possessing methamphetamines. The trial court authorized the probation department to select a drug rehabilitation program of its choice, and it ordered the defendant to remain there until she successfully completed that program (with no credit for time served while in the program). (*Penoli*, *supra*, at p. 301.) On appeal, the *Penoli* court declined to hold that this delegation of authority was erroneous. (*Id.* at p. 308.) As conceded by the defense, any attempt to specify a particular program at or prior to sentencing would pose serious practical difficulties, and the trial court was poorly equipped to micromanage the selection of a program. (*Ibid.*) In addition, this delegation did not place the defendant “completely at the mercy of the probation department.” (*Ibid.*) The defendant was permitted to bring any concerns it had to the court’s attention. The defendant could also seek judicial intervention by moving to modify the probation order if the probation officer sought to exercise the delegated authority. (*Ibid.*)

Similar to *Victor L.*, the discretion granted to the probation officer was limited. (See *Victor L.*, *supra*, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 918-919.) Probation could only offer appellant the option of community service if an alleged violation occurred. Moreover, the total hours of community service were capped at 50.

Similar to the situation in *Penoli*, it is not reasonable for the juvenile court to micromanage the daily supervision of appellant, and appellant is not at the mercy of the probation department because he can seek judicial intervention if necessary. (See *Penoli*, *supra*, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.) Appellant’s parents “or other person having an interest” in him may petition the court “to change, modify, or set aside” this condition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 778, subd. (a)(1).)

We disagree with appellant that this delegation permitted the probation officer to decide if and when a violation of probation had occurred. The probation officer was not given absolute discretion. (See *In re Jennifer G.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 758 [a visitation order delegating “complete and total discretion” to a probation office or county welfare department would violate the separation of powers doctrine and be invalid].) Instead, the court permitted the probation officer to offer appellant the option of community service for an alleged violation. The juvenile court set the basic condition, but it left the specific details to the probation officer and appellant to resolve. We conclude that this represents a permissible delegation of authority. (See *Victor L.*, *supra*, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.)

We reject appellant’s arguments that the court violated the separation of powers doctrine. Instead, the court delegated incidental authority regarding possible community service, and the court retained ultimate control over this issue. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion, and this claim fails.

## II. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF OTHER CONDITIONS OF PROBATION.

The parties dispute whether additional imposed probation conditions fail the test articulated in *People v. Lent* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (*Lent*), superseded by statute as stated in *People v. Moran* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403, fn. 6. Under *Lent*, a probation condition “will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3)



requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’ ” (*Lent, supra*, at p. 486.) Under the *Lent* test, “all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (*People v. Olguin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) The *Lent* test governs both juvenile and adult probation cases. (*In re Ricardo P.* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (*Ricardo P.*).)

Appellant challenges four probation conditions involving (1) curfew; (2) chemical testing for substances; (3) warrantless searches; and (4) substance abuse assessment, counseling or treatment. According to appellant, these conditions fail *Lent* because they are unrelated to his crime, they forbid otherwise lawful conduct, and they are not reasonably related to deterring future criminality.

We reject appellant’s arguments. An abuse of discretion is not present, and each of these conditions satisfies *Lent*.<sup>3</sup>

*A. The Curfew.*

The juvenile court prohibited appellant from being outside his home between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. if unaccompanied by his parent or an adult designated by his parent. The written disposition order directs appellant to obey curfew from 8:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. as ordered by the probation officer.

Appellant contends this curfew was not based on his background and needs, and it improperly infringes on his constitutional right to free movement. He asserts this condition does not address any behavioral problems or the need for greater parental

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<sup>3</sup> It is undisputed that appellant’s defense counsel failed to object to the imposition of these four conditions of probation. The parties dispute whether appellant received ineffective assistance. We need not resolve that disagreement. Instead, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in imposing these conditions of probation. As such, even if forfeiture did not occur, these claims fail on their merits. Thus, we need not analyze any alleged ineffective assistance. An attorney is not deemed incompetent when he or she fails to lodge meritless objections. (*People v. Lucero* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 732.) A defense attorney is not required to make futile motions or to engage in “ ‘idle acts to appear competent.’ [Citation.]” (*People v. Scheer* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1024.)

supervision. He notes that, stemming from the probation report, he had exhibited good behavior at home, he helps around the house, he has not acted out of control, and he demonstrates appropriate respect for his father. He argues there is no showing he was difficult to discipline or that he required an elevated amount of supervision.

We find appellant's arguments unpersuasive. By statute, a juvenile court must impose a curfew from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. when a minor is adjudged a ward of the court and he or she is not removed from the physical custody of his or her parents. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 729.2, subd. (c).) A juvenile court, however, may impose a longer curfew than this statute, which serves as "a floor" and "not a ceiling" for juvenile probation conditions. (*In re Walter P.* (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 99.) In general, a juvenile court is empowered to enhance the reformation and rehabilitation of a ward. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).)

The probation report noted that appellant's father had imposed a curfew for appellant to be home "by dark[.]" The report also stated that appellant had an extensive history of intervention at school for disciplinary reasons related to disrespectful behavior. Appellant's grades in high school had been poor. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court stated it had read the probation report.

In light of appellant's situation, the imposed curfew appears appropriate. The additional two hours of curfew will reasonably enhance appellant's reformation and rehabilitation, and it reinforces the father's informal curfew. The curfew is also reasonably related to future criminality. The court found true that appellant had engaged in ongoing sexual abuse of a minor much younger than himself. The curfew will ensure that appellant is home in the early evenings and he will be under the supervision of an adult. Consequently, *Lent* is satisfied, and the court did not abuse its discretion.

*B. The Chemical Testing.*

The court ordered appellant to “[s]ubmit to chemical testing to detect the use of narcotics, alcohol, and other controlled substances.” Appellant argues this condition bears no relationship to his crime, it relates to lawful criminal conduct, and it is not reasonably related to deterring future criminal conduct. He notes that neither his crime nor his social history reveal a concern about alcohol or substance abuse.

Respondent concedes that nothing in this record indicates that appellant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time he undertook his criminal behavior. Respondent, however, relies primarily on *In re Kacy S.* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704 (*Kacy S.*).

In *Kacy S.*, the juvenile court ordered random urine testing even though alcohol and drugs were not implicated in the minors’ offenses or social histories. The appellate court affirmed. The urine testing was “designed to detect the presence of substances whose use by minors *is unlawful*. [Citations.]” (*Kacy S.*, *supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 710.) As such, the testing related to conduct which was criminal and it also reasonably related to future criminality. (*Ibid.*) *Kacy S.* held that such a probation condition, even when alcohol or drugs were not involved in the minor’s offense, satisfied *Lent*. (*Kacy S.*, *supra*, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 710.)

Appellant criticizes the *Kacy S.* opinion, contending it did not properly analyze for abuse of discretion and, instead, it simply examined the statutory language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 729.3.<sup>4</sup> Appellant also complains the *Kacy S.* court only focused on the limited intrusion of *urine* testing, and it did not consider the added burdens of blood, breath and saliva testing. Finally, appellant asserts that *Ricardo P.* limits any precedential or persuasive value of *Kacy S.*

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<sup>4</sup> A urine test to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs may be imposed as a condition of juvenile probation if the minor is not removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 729.3.)

In *Ricardo P.*, the juvenile court ordered the minor to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices (and those accounts that could be accessed through those devices). (*Ricardo P.*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1115.) There was no indication the minor had used an electronic device during the commission of his burglaries, but this condition was imposed to monitor his compliance with other conditions prohibiting him from using or possessing illegal drugs. (*Ibid.*) On appeal, the California Supreme Court assumed that the first and second *Lent* requirements were satisfied (i.e., that an electronic device had no relationship to the juvenile’s burglaries and this did not involve something that was itself criminal). (*Ricardo P.*, *supra*, at p. 1119.) The focus turned to *Lent*’s third prong--whether the electronic search condition required or forbade conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. (*Ricardo P.*, *supra*, at p. 1119.) Nothing indicated that the juvenile had used, or would use, electronic devices in connection with drugs or any illegal activity. (*Id.* at p. 1116.) Thus, there was an insufficient basis “to justify the substantial burdens imposed by this electronics search condition. The probation condition is not reasonably related to future criminality and is therefore invalid under *Lent*.” (*Ibid.*) The high court explained that any probation condition must be reasonably related to future criminality. This “contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition.” (*Id.* at p. 1122.)

The *Ricardo P.* court also stated it was not appropriate to “categorically permit” a probation condition just because it was “reasonably related to enhancing the effective supervision of a probationer. ‘Not every probation condition bearing a remote, attenuated, tangential, or diaphanous connection to future criminal conduct can be considered reasonable’ under *Lent*. [Citation.]” (*Ricardo P.*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1127.) Such an approach “would effectively eliminate the reasonableness requirement in *Lent*’s third prong, for almost any condition can be described as ‘enhancing the effective supervision of a probationer.’ ” (*Ibid.*)

Appellant notes that the *Ricardo P.* court “endorsed” a finding that using an electronic device is not itself criminal. Using that as a foundation, appellant argues that testing for substance abuse should be considered conduct that is not itself unlawful, meeting the second prong of *Lent*.

We reject appellant’s argument. *Ricardo P.* cannot be read as endorsing an assertion that drug testing as a condition of probation relates to conduct that is not itself unlawful. *Ricardo P.* made no such pronouncement and it is not reasonable to infer such a holding from that opinion. Cases are not authority for propositions not considered or decided. (*Loeffler v. Target Corp.* (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1134.)

Appellant also contends that, under the holding in *Kacy S.*, any chemical testing regardless of the minor’s circumstances would satisfy *Lent*. He maintains that such an outcome violates his constitutional rights, and he notes that the juvenile court made no findings that would justify this condition.

We disagree that the juvenile court abused its discretion or violated appellant’s constitutional rights in imposing this condition. It is undisputed that juveniles enjoy a right of privacy protected by the California Constitution. (*In re Carmen M.* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 478, 490.) However, the scope and application of that right differs significantly from the rights enjoyed by adults. (*Id.* at p. 492.) When analyzing a legally recognized privacy interest, a court must weigh the justification for the conduct in question against the privacy intrusion. (*Ibid.*)

A juvenile court should consider the minor’s entire social history and the circumstances of the crime. Each juvenile probation condition must fit the juvenile’s circumstances. (*In re P.O.* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 293–294.) “The permissible scope of discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults.” (*Victor L.*, *supra*, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 910.) This is because juveniles need more guidance and supervision than adults, and because a juvenile’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed. (*Ibid.*) Thus, “ ‘a condition of probation

that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court.’ ” (*In re Sheena K.*, *supra*, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.)

In the present matter, appellant was required to obey all laws while on probation. As a minor, he could not lawfully possess or use alcoholic beverages. (*In re Jose R.* (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 279.) Moreover, there are numerous statutes which prohibit both adults and minors from possessing or using narcotics, and appellant was obliged to obey those laws as well. (*Ibid.*)

Although appellant does not have a prior juvenile record, he has displayed ongoing behavioral issues at school. In addition, the probation report noted that both of appellant’s parents had prior criminal records for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a).) Under the circumstances, we cannot state that the juvenile court’s order requiring him to submit to chemical testing to detect the use of narcotics, alcohol, and other controlled substances was unreasonable. There is evidence that appellant may be exposed to alcohol through his parents. Moreover, this order appears justified, at least in part, based on the court’s “general responsibility for the health and well-being of dependent children within its jurisdiction.” (*In re Carmen M.*, *supra*, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 494.)

Finally, our Supreme Court in *Ricardo P.* stated that a “nexus” is not required between a probation condition and the underlying offense. Instead, any required nexus “would essentially fold *Lent*’s third prong into its first prong. We have said that ‘conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime’ [citation] so long as they are ‘reasonably directed at curbing [the defendant’s] future criminality’ [citation]. For example, courts may properly base probation conditions upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about future criminality unrelated to a prior offense. [Citation.]” (*Ricardo P.*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122.) The *Ricardo P.* court clarified that “a degree of proportionality” is required

“between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition.” (*Ibid.*)

We disagree that this probation condition impermissibly infringes on appellant’s constitutional rights. The burden placed on appellant is not disproportionate to its justification. This condition is reasonably related to future criminality, which satisfies *Lent*. This record does not demonstrate a manifest abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we reject this claim.

*C. The Warrantless Search and Seizure.*

The court ordered appellant to submit his person and property to search and seizure by a peace or probation officer with or without a warrant. Appellant argues that this condition bears no relationship to his crime, his background or his needs. He contends it infringes on his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. He notes that he did not use any device, object or tool when he committed the continuous sexual abuse. He asserts that he has not exhibited behavior such as substance abuse or theft to justify this condition.

We reject appellant’s contention that this condition improperly violates his constitutional rights. The juvenile court found true that appellant had engaged in continuous acts of sexual abuse of his much younger cousin. The probation officer alerted the court that appellant had exhibited “negative behavior” outside the home, and the officer was concerned that appellant lacked the ability to accept responsibility for his actions.

Prior to *Ricardo P.*, our high court held that a condition of probation that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charge is reasonably related to future criminality, and, thus, *Lent* is satisfied. (*People v. Olguin, supra*, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 380–381.) “Proper supervision includes the ability to make unscheduled visits and to conduct unannounced searches of the probationer’s residence. Probation officer safety during

these visits and searches is essential to the effective supervision of the probationer and thus assists in preventing future criminality.”<sup>5</sup> (*Id.* at p. 381.)

The *Ricardo P.* court noted that an electronic search has a potentially far greater reach than a traditional property or residence search. Importantly, the high court stated that the *Ricardo P.* opinion should not be read to impair a juvenile court’s ability to impose traditional search conditions in future cases when warranted. (*Ricardo P.*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at 1127.)

In this situation, a warrantless search and seizure condition is reasonably related to future criminality, and it directly aids in the supervision of appellant as he completes his rehabilitation. This situation is not like *Ricardo P.*, and the burdens placed on appellant are not disproportionate to the justifications. *Lent* is satisfied and we find no abuse of discretion.

*D. Attending Substance Abuse Assessment, Counseling or Treatment.*

The juvenile court ordered appellant to attend “substance abuse assessment, counseling, or treatment as ordered by the Probation Officer.” Appellant argues that this condition bears no relationship to his offense, it does not relate to conduct that is criminal, and it is not reasonably related to deterring any future criminality. He contends that this condition does not satisfy *Lent* and it must be stricken.

Respondent concedes that nothing in this record indicates that appellant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time he undertook his criminal behavior. According to respondent, however, using drugs and alcohol “lessens self-control and impairs reasoning,” which are issues appellant struggled with during his engagement of criminal behavior. Respondent also notes a connection exists between alcohol

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<sup>5</sup> The *Ricardo P.* court subsequently declined to read *People v. Olguin* “to categorically permit any probation conditions reasonably related to enhancing the effective supervision of a probationer.” (*Ricardo P.*, *supra*, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1127.) Nevertheless, the *Ricardo P.* court did not overrule its prior language in *People v. Olguin*.



consumption and drug use. Respondent contends that the juvenile court acted within its discretion, and this condition gave the probation officer “flexibility” to provide additional resources to appellant “based on the results of those chemical tests.” Respondent maintains that this probation condition was reasonable.

The probation report suggests that appellant may have access to alcohol through his parents. In addition, this condition enables the probation officer to supervise appellant more effectively. (See *People v. Olguin*, *supra*, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 380–381.) Any burden placed on him by this condition is minimal compared to the interests it serves. In light of appellant’s circumstances, we cannot state that this condition is unreasonable. This record does not demonstrate a manifest abuse of discretion, and we reject this claim.

III. THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED TO GIVE THE PROSECUTION THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO IMPOSE AIDS TESTING.

Appellant claims insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s order that he submit to AIDS testing pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.1.

At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered appellant to “submit to AIDS testing as required by law, pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.1.” The court’s written disposition order states that appellant is to submit to testing.<sup>6</sup> In imposing this testing condition, it is undisputed that the court failed to state reasons for imposing it. It is also undisputed that appellant’s counsel failed to object below when this condition was imposed.

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<sup>6</sup> The court’s original written disposition order stated that appellant was to submit to testing and “register with [a] local law enforcement agency” pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.1. However, in August 2020, appellant’s current counsel sent a letter to the juvenile court alerting the court that its oral disposition had not required appellant to register with a law enforcement agency. In September 2020, the juvenile court issued an amended written disposition order which omitted any requirement for appellant to register with a law enforcement agency.

“Involuntary AIDS or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing is strictly limited by statute. [Citations.]” (*People v. Guardado* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 757, 763.) Penal Code section 1202.1, subdivision (a), requires a court to order every person convicted of certain enumerated sexual offenses to submit to “a blood or oral mucosal transudate saliva test for evidence of antibodies to the probable causative agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) within 180 days of the date of conviction.” Conviction of a sexual offense listed in subdivision (e) triggers mandatory testing. (Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subd. (e)(1)–(5).) Other enumerated sexual offenses trigger the testing “if the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim[.]” (*Id.* at subd. (e)(6).) Continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of Penal Code section 288.5 falls into this latter category. (Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subd. (e)(6)(A)(iv).)

In the absence of an objection in the lower court, a defendant forfeits the right to appeal the failure of the court to make the statutorily-required factual findings supporting an HIV test order pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.1, subdivision (e)(6). (*People v. Stowell* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1117.) However, a defendant may challenge the imposition of the testing order on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of probable cause, despite the failure to object. (*People v. Butler* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1123.) An appellate court reviews the evidence de novo to determine whether the record reveals probable cause sufficient to support the testing order. (*Id.* at p. 1127.) If probable cause is lacking based on the appellate record, the appropriate remedy is to remand the matter for further proceedings to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to present additional evidence that may establish the necessary probable cause. (*Id.* at p. 1129.)

“Probable cause is an objective legal standard—in this case, whether the facts known would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and

strong belief that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim.” (*People v. Butler, supra*, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1127.) If a trial court orders AIDS testing without articulating its required reasons on the record, an appellate court will presume an implied finding of probable cause, but “the appellate court can sustain the order only if it finds evidentiary support, which it can do simply from examining the record.” (*Ibid.*)

Appellant argues he never ejaculated, and neither blood nor other bodily fluids capable of transmitting HIV transferred from him to the victim. Without filing a request for judicial notice, appellant provides a hyperlink to a website for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in support of his argument that saliva is incapable of transferring HIV.

In contrast, respondent notes our Legislature has recognized that oral copulation can result in a transfer of bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV. (See Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subd. (e)(5).) Respondent argues that appellant orally copulated the victim, so this probation condition should be affirmed. In the alternative, respondent notes that, if this court finds insufficient evidence of probable cause, the proper remedy is to remand this matter for further proceedings.

Because it is outside the appellate record, we will not consider the information contained via the hyperlink in footnote 10 of appellant’s opening brief at page 42 regarding the transmission of HIV. (See *Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 975, fn. 5 [appellate courts will not typically take judicial notice of matters outside the appellate record].) Nevertheless, we agree with appellant that this record does not contain substantial evidence sufficient to make an implied finding of probable cause.

The victim testified during the jurisdictional hearing that appellant tried to orally copulate her, but she could not remember if he actually did. However, during her

forensic interview, the victim reported that appellant had on one occasion licked her “private” but the licking only lasted one second.

Although our Legislature recognizes that oral copulation can trigger the necessity for an AIDS test (see Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subd. (e)(5)), we cannot declare that the facts in this case “would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong belief that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV” was transferred from appellant to the victim. (*People v. Butler, supra*, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1127.) Based on the current record, substantial evidence does not exist to make an implied finding of probable cause. We will strike this probation condition, but remand this matter to give the prosecution the opportunity to present additional evidence on this issue. (*Id.* at p. 1129.)

#### IV. REMAND IS NOT NEEDED TO CLARIFY THE COURT’S DISPOSITION.

The parties agree, as do we, that the juvenile court made inconsistent findings when rendering its disposition order. The court initially stated that physical custody should be taken from appellant’s parents and that “continuation in the home with a parent” would be contrary to appellant’s welfare. However, the court later orally ordered that appellant would reside in the home of a parent or guardian under various conditions of probation. The court’s written amended disposition order likewise directs appellant to reside with a parent or guardian.

The parties ask us to strike the court’s erroneous oral finding that “physical” custody be taken from a parent. In the alternative, they seek a remand so the court can clarify its comments. We disagree that we should strike the court’s finding or that further clarification is needed.

Generally, a judgment is “the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 577.) “ ‘More specifically, the “judgment” in a juvenile court proceeding is the order made after the trial court has found facts

establishing juvenile court jurisdiction and has conducted a hearing into the proper disposition to be made.’ ” (*Ricki J. v. Superior Court* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 783, 789.) Hence, the disposition order is akin to a judgment.

Rendition of judgment is an oral pronouncement. (*People v. Mesa* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.) Generally, when there is a discrepancy between the minute order and the oral pronouncement of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. (*People v. Contreras* (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 880; accord *People v. Farell* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2.) Because entering judgment in the minutes is a clerical function, a discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced and as entered in the minutes is presumably a clerical error. (*People v. Mesa, supra*, at p. 471; Pen. Code, § 1207.) An appellate court may correct clerical errors appearing in abstracts of judgment. (*People v. Mitchell* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)

In this matter, probation had recommended physical custody be taken from appellant’s parents. The court, however, disagreed and determined it was in appellant’s best interest that he receive therapy and avoid time in custody. It is clear that the court was reading from the probation report when it misspoke regarding the removal of physical custody.

Although the court initially misspoke, it is also clear that the court’s oral pronouncement directed appellant to remain in the physical custody of a parent. The court’s written order is consistent with that oral pronouncement, and it directs appellant to reside with a parent. Thus, there is no material disagreement between the court’s oral pronouncement of the disposition, and the written disposition order. Consequently, we reject the assertions that correction is required or that remand is needed to clarify this issue. Instead, we will affirm the court’s disposition order which directed appellant to reside in the home of a parent or guardian as a condition of probation.

## DISPOSITION

The probation condition requiring appellant to submit to testing pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.1 is stricken. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court. No later than 30 days after this court's remittitur is filed in the lower court, the People may elect in writing to present additional evidence on the issue of whether the juvenile court should order AIDS blood testing under Penal Code section 1202.1. If the People make such an election, the juvenile court shall conduct further proceedings on that issue. In all other respects, the disposition order appealed from is affirmed.



FRANSON, J.

WE CONCUR:



LEVY, Acting P.J.



MEEHAN, J.

**PROOF OF SERVICE**  
**(Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(2))**

I, Sangeeta Sinha, certify:

I am an active member of the State Bar of California and am not a party to this cause. My business address is 2358 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94114.

On April 24, 2021, I personally caused the attached to be served on the following by submitting the brief for service through Truefiling:

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On April 24, 2021, I personally caused the attached to be served on the following by U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid:

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Attn: Hon. Gary D. Hoff, Judge

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D.N.  
Minor-Petitioner

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true  
and correct. Executed on April 24, 2021, at San Francisco,  
California.

/s/ *Sangeeta Sinha*  
Sangeeta Sinha  
SBN 194321  
Declarant



**STATE OF CALIFORNIA**  
Supreme Court of California

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**STATE OF CALIFORNIA**  
Supreme Court of California

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Case Number: **TEMP-2D95739V**

Lower Court Case Number:

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